

# 絲綢之路

4-5 June 2021

## THE SILK ROAD

*Collection of Papers from the Sixth International  
Conference on Chinese Studies "The Silk Road",  
Organized by Confucius Institute in Sofia*

# 絲綢之路



Confucius Institute in Sofia, 2021

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
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
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LANGUAGE, EDUCATION  
AND LITERATURE



ЕЗИК, ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ  
И ЛИТЕРАТУРА

# Historical Contents in Bulgarian Language Teaching in China

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## Abstract

This paper takes the case of Course “Concise history of Bulgaria” in the curriculum of Bulgarian Major at BFSU, discussing how historical contents function and perform effectively in Bulgarian language teaching under the trend of interdisciplinary talents cultivation. The historical dimension in language teaching increases the background knowledge reserve of language learners to the target country, broadening the extension of Bulgarian teaching, deepening the connotation of course development, and laying the foundation for training cross-cultural-oriented talents and historical researchers as well. This could be seen as the first step of interdisciplinary talents cultivation.

**Keywords:** Bulgarian language teaching, history course, curriculum, interdiscipline

Since 1990s, foreign language course construction in China has undergone in-depth reform. What kind of talents should be cultivated for foreign language majors has become the central topic of reform. Traditional foreign language education pays attention to the practice of listening, speaking, reading and writing skills, but ignores that foreign language learners should not only understand and speak, but also understand and master the culture behind the language. The students of foreign language are not limited to be translator and interpreter, they also can play a creative role in various cross-cultural fields. This requires that the dimension of foreign languages education needs to be continuously expanded, from language skill training to general education, and then to developing cross-cultural competence.

## Background of the Bulgarian Major

Bulgarian major in Beijing Foreign Studies University (BFSU) was founded in 1961. In the past 60 years, a total of 244 students have graduated, who work actively in different fields as diplomacy, economy and trade, journalism, culture, higher education and research. Language level is their advantage, meanwhile, a deep understanding of Bulgarian history, culture and national conditions is also an essential component of their knowledge structure. Understanding the target country is the prerequisite of communication.

The previous curriculums of the Bulgarian Major (2007, 2012) show that through language training courses, the students acquire systematic language skills and are well trained in listening, speaking, reading, writing and translation. Through the courses for general purposes (CGP) and for specialized purpose (CSP) which were put into the recent curriculums (2016, 2020), the aim of teaching Bulgarian is to cultivate in the students a more comprehensive understanding of the society and culture of Bulgaria and Europe as a whole.

Generally speaking, the purpose of Bulgarian teaching is explicit – to improve the reading ability of foreign languages and increase the vocabulary with knowledge of the national conditions of the target country. From the perspective of the concept of foreign language education, the curriculum of this period is characterized by:

- 1) Focus on developing language skills: through the development of the five major skills – listening, speaking, reading, writing and translating – consolidating and improving language knowledge and language skills such as grammar, vocabulary, text reading, and expanding the relevant knowledge of the target country. This represents the backbone and core part of the language major, laying foundation for other relevant courses in higher grades.
- 2) Language learning associated grammatical knowledge and the general content of the target country.

In the Curriculum 2012 and curriculum 2016, credits of the CGP and for CSP occupy one third of the total credits of higher grades. The first type of course covers country profile, history of Bulgaria, history of Bulgarian literature, films and Bulgarian society, Chinese culture (in Bulgarian). The courses with historical contents account for more than half of CGP. This implicates the direction of the cultivation – to draw an as-complete-as-possible picture of the target country, to build up a system of the knowledge about Bulgaria, to master the way of dealing with academic and practical problems. (LIN: 2020)

### **Course in history and history in courses**

In the 2020 edition of Bulgarian undergraduate training program, the required courses total 90 credits, including language skills courses such as listening, speaking, reading, writing and translation, 14 credits of CGP and 6 credits of CSP; Elective courses take 10 credits. History courses are distributed in CGP (3 courses, 6 credits) and CSP (3 courses, 6 credits).

#### **Distribution of courses in Curriculum of Bulgarian Major, BFSU 2020**

<b>Compulsory Courses</b>								<b>Elective Courses</b>	
listening	speaking	reading	writing	T&I	grammar	CGP	CSP		
12	8	38+4	6	4	4	14	6	10	

Historical themes in the curriculum of the Bulgarian Major fall into the following categories:

1. History of the country. The concise history of Bulgaria presents the history of human development on Bulgarian territory from the beginning of human activities to the end of the WWII.
2. History of literature. Bulgarian Major belongs to the discipline of philology. Therefore, History of Bulgarian literature has always been a core course out of compulsory ones in the curriculum. After studying Bulgarian history, students should study the history of Bulgarian literature, reading through the important Bulgarian writers and works.
3. History of the relationship between the home country of language learners and the target country. The history of exchanges between the two countries in the fields of diplomacy, economy and trade, culture, education and literature guides students to conduct basic academic research, getting ready for thesis writing.

### **Proportion of History courses in the Curriculum 2020**



The setting of the above-mentioned courses in history themes comprehensively reflects the cultivating goal of Bulgarian Major, that is, to foster cross-cultural communication talents who are proficient in language, understand the national conditions, and have high level of language ability, general knowledge and specialization.

### **Course “Concise history of Bulgaria”: target and its realization**

This course is offered to undergraduate students in the second year. After studying national conditions and extensive reading in last semester, they have basic reading ability to understand textbooks in Bulgarian, but they are still limited to grammar, syntax and text. The general requirements for understanding the meaning of the text are still insufficient, and they are not familiar with the method of learning history in a foreign language.

The course “Concise history of Bulgaria” adopts Chinese and Bulgarian textbooks. The Chinese textbook is *History of Bulgaria* written by Ma Xipu, expert in Balkan history in China. This book is the first Chinese work on the general history of Bulgaria, which combines teaching function and academic value. This book embodies the perspectives of a Chinese scholar. Another text book is *Bulgarian History and Civilization* published by Sofia Education Press in 2011. This textbook tells the history of Bulgaria under the background of European civilization from the perspective of Bulgarian history and European history, which is applicable to the history teaching of high schools in Bulgaria. Reading difficulty is slightly higher than that of sophomores in Bulgarian Major, but with the help of the book by Ma and other references, students can complete the reading task. On the one hand, the two textbooks complement each other in terms of content depth, reading difficulty, language learning and cognitive ability improvement; on the other hand, they can provide students with different historical narrative angles and methods. By reading these materials in different language, students have the opportunity to expand the space for academic training and to cultivate their critical thinking.

The teaching objectives of this course are mainly reflected in the following three aspects:

1. Knowledge: to master important historical concepts and expressions, major events, activities and figures in different historical periods of Bulgaria in both Bulgarian and Chinese.
2. Ability: to improve the reading ability of documents in Bulgarian; to cultivate the ability to analyze historical problems objectively by reading historical materials in Bulgarian, Chinese and English; to establish dialectical historical view and great historical vision.
3. Quality: to cultivate students to understanding the history objectively, grasping historical materials, taking a new look at history and using historical materialism to study and treat history.

The teaching process of the course mainly includes the following contents:

1. Clarifying historical concepts and terminology

The teacher clarifies the Bulgarian historical concepts and terms, especially the expression of important historical events and figures, showing the historical context through key words for the purpose of improving the reading level of students.

2. Presenting historical themes and problems

Through multilingual texts, diversified and multi-media historical materials, teacher can clarify historical periods and events, historical themes and historical figures, and construct a “real” historical scene, so that learners can approach the historical truth in classroom and independent reading.

3. Shaping historical thinking

In the reading and understanding of historical materials, teacher guides students to reveal the thoughts behind historical events, helping students to take a new look at

historical events from their own knowledge composition, value judgment and way of thinking.

#### 4. Exploring question and task for further research

On the basis of grasping historical knowledge and cultivating individual way of thinking, teachers help students to explore topics for further historical research, encouraging students to obtain historical materials through multiple channels, to analyze different historical views upheld by different historians, and to present research results.

A history class lasts 100 minutes, which is usually arranged as follows:

##### 1. Warming up – review

Usually, this session takes 10 minutes. Teacher asks students to review the essential points from the previous lesson according to the key words suggested in the blackboard or PPT, and to repeat or summarize an important historical knowledge point in Bulgarian. After reappearing all the key words, the students will do Q&A. Questions are all left in the previous lesson, which usually require students to discriminate, analyze, compare or explain some historical problems. The purpose of this session is to cultivate in students a rigorous learning attitude, and to encourage students to express and analyze based on what they read and learn.

2. Leading in (10 minutes): Teacher presents with various presentation forms such as historical texts, pictures or videos, movie clips, etc. the theme of the current lesson, paving the way to the historical background, and guiding students to the historical stages that will be taught.

3. Exploring history (40 minutes): Teacher presents diversified historical materials, telling relevant historical knowledge, showing the vertical and horizontal connection between the theme of the current lesson and that of the previous one, leading students to discuss and clarify the main line and soul of the lesson, and dealing with the difficult content of the lesson (mainly some difficult points for understanding in texts) as well.

4. Chewing history (30 minutes): Teacher encourages students to analyze the perspective and characteristics of historical narrative through a close reading or a comparative reading of bilingual texts; or to compare the similarities and differences between texts in Bulgarian and Chinese regarding to the same historical event; or to discuss in group or simulate a historical event, such as negotiations, according to different historical periods.

5. Summary and task (10 minutes): Teacher summarizes the key points of the lesson, assigning questions for further thinking or further reading.

The value of historical contents is to cultivate not only the knowledges of the students regarding history, but to establish a learning pattern that is gradually acquired by students in the learning process.

## First step of interdisciplinary talents cultivation

Since the 21<sup>st</sup> century, particularly in the recent ten years, due to the rapid development of information technology, AI translation has been involved in many aspects of modern life. This has aroused great concern in foreign language circles. If foreign language teaching only emphasizes language ability, will AI translation possibly replace manual work? If foreign language education is not limited to training language skills, but communication skills and call of cultural diversity, obviously, foreign language education will be necessary, and irreplaceable as well (Jiang Hongxin 2019: 10). Under this background, cultivation of interdisciplinary talents<sup>1</sup> has occupied a hot topic in higher education. The so-called “compound foreign language talents” must master foreign language, this is the concentrated expression of personal professional level, also it is an important measure of whether graduates can get employment opportunities. After that, the students should have comprehensive ability – communication ability, teamwork ability, ideological and moral quality, sense of responsibility, dedication and mental health are all important indicators that employers consider (Liu Xi 2010).

In the process of promoting the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative, employees from various fields need to cooperate and compete with their counterparts from many countries with unprecedented openness. Mastering only one foreign language will inevitably weaken the breadth and depth of communication (Zheng Yongying 2020: 8). Therefore, cultivating compound type talents has become a new development trend of foreign language education. Compound can be divided into two forms: major compound and two-foreign-languages compound. Major compound is based on “foreign language + professional knowledge/professional direction”, that is, foreign language courses to be the core, engaged in other minor courses, the purpose of which is to cultivate specialized talents who understand foreign languages. Another form is that foreign language is to be used as a medium or tool for information exchange. The graduates are employed as interpreters and translators with certain professional background (Jiang Hongxin 2019: 11).

The study and research of foreign history requires high level of knowledge of students’ foreign language, because if they can only read native language documents, it will restrict the height that learners can achieve in their future study and research. However, many studies on the history of non-English-speaking countries in China are limited merely to mother tongue or English. In this context, in 2011, “Foreign Languages and Foreign History” Major was established in Chinese universities. This new interdisciplinary major aims at cultivating international cultural exchange talents with high quality, wide knowledge, solid foundation and strong adaptability, and delivering high-quality compound talents for related disciplines.

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<sup>1</sup> Also named “compound type talents” in Chinese.

In February 2020, in the *Catalogue of Undergraduate Majors in Colleges and Universities (2020)* issued by the Ministry of Education of China “Foreign Languages and Foreign History” Major belongs to Discipline History, and the professional code is 060106T<sup>2</sup>.

History majors for undergraduates generally have a 4-year academic system. The Universities that set up “Foreign Languages and Foreign History” Major can implement flexible academic system according to actual conditions, but the shortest time should not be less than 3 years, which allows students to adjust their academic progress and keep their status. The total credit is about 150 credits, in which every 16 hours are converted into 1 credit. The total credits for each major shall be implemented according to the regulations of the institution, but the proportion of credits for major courses shall not be less than 60%. Students who have completed credits and meet all the requirements of the curriculum can be awarded a bachelor degree in history, among which “Foreign Languages and Foreign History” Majors can be awarded bachelor degree in history or bachelor degree in literature.

At the knowledge level, students are required to master the basic knowledge of humanities and social sciences, as well as the basic knowledge of related natural sciences. They should also be familiar with and master the core knowledge, basic theories and research methodology of history, understanding the updated academic results of historians at home and abroad. Furthermore, they should be able to observe and understand historical events by using the theories and methodology of humanities and social sciences, having certain philosophical thinking ability and literary attainment.

At the ability level, students are required to master basic skills such as data classification, retrieval and screening, and to have the ability to raise and analyze questions. They need to have strong ability to translate texts in traditional Chinese, being able to refer to relevant foreign language materials, and to use foreign languages for academic communication and exchange. More than that, students should have capability of international communication to spread history, culture and knowledge in written, spoken and multimedia ways (Higher Education Steering Committee of the Ministry of Education of PRC 2018: 102–106).

At present, the “Foreign Languages and Foreign History” Major has been established in Peking University (PU) by integrating the teaching resources of School of Archaeology and Culture, School of Foreign Languages and Yuanpei College. The goal is to cultivate foreign archaeological talents with high quality, broad knowledge, solid foundation and strong adaptability, and also, to deliver high-quality graduate talents for related disciplines. This major requires students to master the basic theories of historical science and archaeology, having solid archaeological professional knowledge and field archaeological work skills, be proficient in using foreign languages to communicate, and have good com-

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<sup>2</sup> Cited in *Notice of the Ministry of Education on Publishing the Record and Approval Results of Undergraduate Majors in Colleges and Universities in 2019* – Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China [Reference Date: July 15, 2021]

prehensive abilities of listening, speaking, reading, writing and translating. Meanwhile, the students are required to have a deep understanding of the history and archaeological research of the target country and region, having strong independent research capability (Zheng 2020: 9).

CGP in history in foreign language majors could be regarded as the initial stage of the cultivation of interdisciplinary talents in “Foreign language + Foreign history”. The difference is that, because it is only at the level of general education, CGP in history only adds necessary historical and cultural contents to the curriculum of foreign language major. Students need to further study in the CSPs, or to pursue a master degree in foreign history. However, from another perspective, it also retains the broad scope of employment for the students in foreign language majors, that is, they don’t have to take part in employment with degree in history. When they are willing to pursue Continued Education in history, they have basic academic background in this field.

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# The Influence of News Headlines Patterns on the Grammatical Behaviour of the Arguments in the V-O Verbs

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## Abstract

In recent years, a linguistic phenomenon has increasingly appeared in the headlines of Chinese news media, that is, intransitive verbs carrying objects. Semantically speaking, these words in the object position represent various argument roles of the core verbs. This paper makes a preliminary analysis of these roles and explores the reasons for their formation from the perspective of diachronic and synchronic language evolution. Furthermore, an explanation of this phenomenon is suggested from three perspectives: disyllabification process and lexicalization, Chinese endogenous syntactic genes, language economic principles and sentence pattern valency theory. As a conclusion, this analysis demonstrates that language change is inevitable and should be welcomed.

**Keywords:** News headlines, V-O verbs, Arguments, Sentence patterns, valency theory, Language economic principles

## 0 引言

汉语新闻媒体的标题中有一种现象,近年来愈演愈烈。即双音节动宾结构动词直接加宾语现象,如新闻标题“张小斐登封面解锁新发型”中动词“解锁”直接带宾语的情形。这类句子中的动词普遍为不及物动词,有些甚至不是严格意义上的词,只是一个短语。其所带宾语的语义类型则广泛包含受事、与事、对象、地点等。此类现象并非新近有之,早在几十年前就有学者撰文讨论过,但是对于其成因一般没有给出过多的解释。近年来,随着网络的发展,各种新媒体形式蔚然成风,我们发现这类语言现象呈现积极活跃的增长趋势,因此本文的写作目的是基于前人的研究,藉由对语料的分析,在兼顾语言发展历时和共时层面的基础上,从句法、语义和语用功能的不同角度对这类现象的成因做一个探究。

## 1 论元角色的句法表现

(袁毓林 2004:1)对汉语的配价理论和论元理论有一个简洁的概括:“汉语的动词配价奉行的是动词中心论。核心思想有两点:(1)动词决定有多少种和什么样的从属成分跟它共现。

(2)动词具有n元关系,等待着一定数目和类型的论元来填充。”本文所讨论的正是新闻标题中动词所带论元的句法表现。

首先,我们从新闻标题中看到的这种语言现象都有一个共性,那就是句中的核心动词多数都是不及物动词,在句法表现上都不能在其后带直接的宾语。汉语动词和宾语的关系问题早有学者讨论,(邢福义 1991: 76-78)讨论了汉语里不及物动词后面非常规宾语的代入现象。比如“吃馆子”“听耳机”。邢文认为不及物动词的常规宾语的语义角色通常是受事(如“吃饭”)、目标(如“挖地道”)和对象(如“挖土”)。而非常规宾语常见的有表示工具的(如“吃大碗”)和表示处所(如“吃馆子”)等。文章随后指出一个把这些非常规宾语和常规宾语区别开来的方法,“一个VO结构,如果一出现表示V的对象或目标的词语(记为O1),就可以把原来V后边的宾语寄出宾语位置,让他出现在次动词“用、在、到、跟”等后边,居于次宾位,那么,原来的宾语便是代体宾语(记为O2)”。这里所说的“代体宾语”就是非常规宾语,也就是本文所讨论的这些居于新闻标题里核心动词之后的这些宾语。需要指出的是,邢文所说的动词都是单音节不及物动词,本文所说的动词都是双音节不及物动词,性质不同,但是从带宾语与否、宾语的语义类别以及论元角色的句法分布方面来看,则是相通的。

关于动词的论元系统,(袁毓林 2003: 24-35)提出了17种论元角色(Thematic role),分别描述了其相应的语法表现(Grammatical behavior)并谈论了它们的范畴特征(categorial feature)。其中包含“工具”“对象”“场所”“源点”“终点”等。它指出,这17种不同的论元角色基本都以名词为实现形式。基于这个分类标准,我们把新闻标题中核心动词之后的宾语论元角色分成六类:对象、场所、与事、受事、结果、源点。当然,动词论元与动词之间的语义特征有较大的模糊性,因此在分类上面有一些不同的操作标准。

下面我们就对收集到的若干语料进行讨论。

### 1.1 对象作宾语

- (1) 孙继海有望续约曼城
- (2) 腾讯云携手波士顿咨询 助力企业的数字化转型

上述例子中动词之后的宾语通常不作“把”等介词的宾语,也不作“被”字的主语,不作基础句的主语。他们与动词的语义关系是“动作-动作的施加对象”。其常规的句法表现应该是由介词“与”“和”引出,并至于动词之前。

### 1.2 场所作宾语

- (3) 香港联合出版集团将携320多种新书亮相香港书展
- (4) 凝聚新力量,筑梦新时代
- (5) 布局医药零售板块,润都股份开设健康大药房
- (6) “70后”朱忠明,履新副部级新岗位
- (7) “中国红”转播车现身东京街头
- (8) 打卡城市书房 乐享精彩暑假

这类宾语在新闻标题中出现频率很高。句法上通常可以改为放在核心动词之前的由介词引出的地点状语,或放在动词之后的介宾短语作补语。如“在香港书展亮相”“在新时代筑梦”“布局于医药零售板块”“到副部级新岗位履新”“在东京街头现身”“在城市书房打卡”。语义关系层面,上述例子中的这些论元角色都是动词所指动作发生的场所。

### 1.3 与事作宾语

- (9) CNN造谣中国核电站后,日本宣称:要中国向国际社会解释
- (10) 教育部辟谣取消教师寒暑假
- (11) 人民日报点赞西宁!

(12) 美预置装备能续命“台独”吗?

(13) 中国体育代表团名单公布, 这些名将无缘东京奥运

(14) 《教育家》杂志连线辽宁省教育厅

上述五个例子中宾语成分的句法表现是: 不作基础句的宾语; 不作“把”等介词的宾语; 不作“被”字的主语, 作“为、对、给、向、替”等介词的宾语; 作动词宾语时可以左向出位而成为话题, 留下的空位须用续指代词“他”等填充。

从句法上看, 能不能由不同的介词引出是区分常规宾语或非常规宾语的显要标志, 即这些新闻标题中的宾语成分应该是介词的宾语, 而非加粗字的宾语。加了介词之后如“CNN对中国核电站造谣”“教育部为取消教师寒暑假(这件事)辟谣”“人民日报为西宁点赞”“美预置装备能为‘台独’续命吗?”“这些名将与东京奥运无缘”。按照上述所说, 我们还可以让其左向出位, 变为“东京奥运, 这些名将无缘它(了)”等。

“造谣”“辟谣”本身从句法表现上来说一般是不带宾语的。词语“造谣”偶然的带宾语的情况也是对所“造谣”的具体情况引述, 而非某个“造谣”对象。如: “他造谣‘世界末日’就要到来。”

(人民日报海外版 2001 年 01 月 05 日) “至于杨立孝造谣咱长短, 咱行得端, 立得正, 不怕半夜鬼敲门……”(《青松与小红花》)。对本身若要引出其行为的对象, 一般用介词“对”“为”“说”, 例如“...旁人又会造谣说, 李是天下第一大姓...”(王小波 《黑铁时代》)。至于“他造谣‘世界末日’就要到来”这个例子中的宾语“‘世界末日’就要到来”, (袁毓林 2003: 34-35) 称这种论元与动词的语义关系为“命题”。这是“造谣”这类词语论元的常规句法形式, 不是本文所谈论的新闻标题中的句法表现形式。

#### 1.4 受事作宾语

(15) 李小璐果然大胆, 疑似喊话贾乃亮: 今天也很想你!

(16) 奥运冠军罗雪娟张国政领跑成都全民健身跑

(17) 24位奥运冠军领衔中国奥运代表团

受事成分做宾语情况的语法特征是通常可以改成“被”字句。如“贾乃亮被李小璐喊话”“成都全民健身跑(这项活动)被(由)奥运冠军罗雪娟张国政领跑”“中国奥运代表团被(由)24位奥运冠军领衔”。不作“为、给、对、向、替”等介词的宾语。

#### 1.5 结果作宾语

(18) 央行降准放水一万亿, 如何影响楼市?

在这个例子中, 宾语作为动词的一个论元, 它与动词的语义关系的“动作-动作的结果”。从句法限制上看, “一万亿”可以作“把”等介词的宾语或“被”的主语, 不作“为、对、给、向、替”等介词的宾语。如“央行把一万亿(就这么)放水了”“一万亿(就这么)被央行放水了”。

#### 1.6 源点作宾语

(19) 贝索斯正式卸任亚马逊CEO

这个例子中的宾语与动词“卸任”的语义关系是“动作-动作的出发点”。一般来说, 这类论元的在句法中最典型的实现形式是作介词“从”的宾语, 整个介宾结构在基础句中放在动词之前作状语。或者作介词“于”的宾语, 整个介宾结构放在动词之后做补语。但是在新闻标题中的时候则全然不同了。“亚马逊CEO”直接作为动词“卸任”的宾语, 无需介词引导。

当然, 新闻标题里出现的不及物动词之后的宾语似乎还有其他类型, 我们这里不做穷尽性的统计和全面的罗列, 而是在下面试着谈一谈造成这种现象的原因。

## 2 原因探究

### 2.1 双音化和词汇化

(彭戴娜 2006: 12) 把新闻标题中这种动宾结构双音节动词带宾语现象归因于“醒目、简洁、新鲜、认知方便”。除此之外, 并没有进行深入的探讨。本文力图通过句法、语义和功能的三维视角, 综合历时和共时的演变来尝试对此做出一些解释。

我们再来看一组例子:

八一队率先进军女篮联赛决赛

起底海地总统遇刺案背后神秘公司

AI赋能产业变革 业界聚焦人工智能融合创新应用新趋势

科技力量助力美好生活

酒驾被查“甩锅”荔枝 听闻验血低头认罪

我们把前文提到的所有的双音节动词列在这里: “续约、携手、亮相、筑梦、布局、履新、现身、打卡、造谣、辟谣、点赞、续命、无缘、连线、喊话、领跑、领衔、放水、卸任、进军、起底、赋能、助力、甩锅”。其中, 未收录于《现代汉语词典》(第7版) 的词语有“筑梦、续命、赋能、甩锅”, 当然, 其余已收录的词语, 其体现在例句中的用法也都跟本文所说的标题中的用法全然不同。那么, 为什么这些例子中的动词都无一例外是动宾结构? 我们分三方面来分析:

一、为什么是动词? 不论是从句法、语义还是语用的层面来看, 动词始终都是一个句子的核心, 它表达一个叙述对象的状态、动作、变化等。从系统功能语法的视角来看, 新闻标题的首要任务是传递新信息。传递新信息的一个重要媒介也是动词。因此, 在新闻标题这种特殊的文体形式中, 动词的变化最为剧烈, 也体现得最为明显。

二、为什么是双音节动词? 回答这一点, 我们需要立足整个汉语史, 着眼于汉语的韵律特点, 尤其是韵律结构对句法的反作用。在漫长的上古汉语-中古汉语-现代汉语发展历程里, 汉语演变出了一套对双音节句子单位的优先选择机制。汉语词语的优势音步是双音节, 如果一个词语——最小的能单独运用的音义组合体单位——不是双音节, 那么语言的自我革新过程就会慢慢倾向于将其双音节化。这样的语言外壳客观上倾向于要求每一个句法成分都至少由一个双音节词充当。而双音节动宾结构——作为全句中最重要信息传递的部分——却要同时充当谓语动词和宾语这两个成分, 这使得全句的音节数目和句法成分的组配变得不协调。因此一个动宾结构在特定的句法语义和语用频率环境的催生下, 极易凝固成一个双音节动词。但这个过程不是绝对的, 因为现代汉语里依然有大量的单音节词。双音节化是汉语史中词汇发展的最显著特点。如“石-石头”“目-眼睛”“窗-窗户”等。即便某个单位没有双音节化, 这种韵律层面的选择机制也会反作用于句法认知层面, 如短语“黄焖鸡米饭”, 从语义上来说, 其韵律应当是“黄焖鸡-米饭”, 但由于汉语对这类短语的优势韵律选择模式是“2-3”, 因此生活中人们常常将其读成“黄焖-鸡米饭”。

三、为什么是动宾结构? (董秀芳 2009: 399) 对词汇化做了一个界定“词汇化指的是非词汇性的 (non-lexical) 成分变为词汇性的 (lexical) 成分, 或者词汇性较低的成分变为词汇性较高的成分”“句法演变造成某类结构形式不再是合法的句法形式, 其中的一部分通过词汇化进入了词库。”如本节中的几个词语“筑梦、续命、赋能、甩锅”, 严格意义上说, 他们现在并不是典型的词, 这点从《现代汉语词典》的收录情况也能看出来。但是它们又实在太“像”词了, 体现在具备了动词的各种典型句法特性: 能作谓语、能带宾语、能加“了”等。从动态的视角来看, 这些词语都尚未完成其词汇化的过程, 处于一个由动宾式短语到动宾式词语的动态变化过程中。而

且正因为其高强度的出现在报纸和网络新闻标题中的语用频率，它们的词汇化进程还会大大加快——起码比历史上同类双音节词的词汇化速度要快，这也是社会生活反作用于语言的必然结果。

比如现代汉语的VO式双音节词“注意”，在完成词汇化过程之前，在古代汉语中是两个词，其用例如“时天子方注意郊社宗庙之祀”（明·宋濂《〈太古正音〉序》），然而在现代汉语中，“注意”可以直接带表示对象的宾语，无需介词引入。新闻标题中的情况亦是如此，只不过他们尚未完成词汇化而已。如例子“筑梦新时代”，在“筑梦”词汇化成为一个双音节动词之前，这个句子中的动词是“筑”，而不是“筑梦”。

我们上文谈论了动宾式双音节出现在新闻标题中原因。那么，既然它们词汇化或正在词汇化成为一个具有凝固意义的动词，那么这个动词为什么可以在这里直接带各类非常规的宾语？

## 2.2 汉语内生的句法基因

其实，在古汉语中，这种动词加各种非常规宾语的现象早已有之，我们来看看跟上述例子类似的情况在古代汉语中的分布。

动作+对象：

念足下悬情武昌，诸子宜多远宦。（晋·王羲之《杂帖二》）

动作+受事：

齐威王之时喜隐，好为淫乐长夜之饮，沉湎不治，委政卿大夫。（《史记·滑稽列传》）

动作+场所：

张天锡为凉州刺史，称制西隅。（《世说新语·言语》）

动作+范围：

仲舒遭汉承秦灭学之后，六经离析，下帷发愤，潜心大业。（《汉书·董仲舒传赞》）

动作+与事：

琛不能承事刘湛，故寻见斥外。（《南史·顾琛传》）

于是结恨释氏，宿命都除。（《世说新语·尤悔》）

上述例子中的加粗字都是本文所涉及的非常规宾语，值得注意的是，他们前面的动词也都是双音节的动宾结构动词。语料显示，这种双音节动宾结构动词带宾语的现象自汉魏以来，直到明清，从未中断。如《水浒传》第七回中的例子“不曾有亲儿，无人帮助。因此过房这高阿叔高三郎儿子在房内为子。”

因此，语言环境本来就是交织的复杂的，语言的历时演变和横向变化是同时并作的。我们可以称之为汉语的“内生基因”。尤其是现代汉语中还有大量的成语，这些成语在句法形式上是词语，但是在内部语义结构上多数又是一个句子，如“如履薄冰”“独占鳌头”。因此，诸如此类的语言现象汉语母语者接受起来不会觉得奇怪，更不会有认知和理解上的障碍。

所谓的“及物”与“不及物”这两个概念也是基于词汇化过程的阐释。在这个词语词汇化为一个完整的双音节动宾式动词之前，它本身是两个词语，一个是V，一个是O。在它们词汇化过程正在发生或者已经完成但是还不成熟的时候，人们对它“及物”属性的界定就必然会遇到很多模棱两可的问题。因此才会出现对“小璐果然大胆，疑似喊话贾乃亮”中“喊话”能否直接加受事宾语的疑问。“喊话”现在是一个词，但是词的凝固性又不太典型，它还处在词汇化的过程中。正如我们上面所说的，我们对“词汇化”的界定标准从来不是一个词语是否能一刀切地被算作词或是不被算作词，而是由它身上所带有的“词汇性”的多寡来决定的，这是一个模糊的连续统。

### 2.3 语言的经济原则和句式配价理论

那么为什么古汉语中常见的句法表现在新闻标题中时常出现呢?这还要归因于新闻标题这种文体形式本身,也就是我们上文说的“特殊的句法、语义和语用环境”。即便在古汉语中,造成这种现象的原因也是语言的经济机制,事实上我们可以看到,并不是所有古汉语中的用例皆是如此的。如《尚书·泰誓》中的“自绝于天,结怨于民”就是常规的带介词用法。而省略介词的用例多数出现在骈文或诗歌中,这是汉语韵律反作用句法和词法的一个鲜明特点。

关于“语言的经济原则”,法国语言学家马丁内、我国语言学家吕叔湘、吕冀平等入皆有详细的论述。这个概念最初应用于音位领域,后来扩展到词汇和句法领域。指的是在言语交际中,在保证准确和有效性的前提下,用最经济的手段来达到交际目的。新闻标题讲究时效性,力求在极短时间内吸引别人的注意。而与此同时,标题的字数又是有限的,因此,为了用最经济的手段达到最有效的目的(传递足够多的信息),这种特殊文体对汉语原有的句法形式进行动态的压制。一个动宾结构短语包含一个动词和一个宾语两个部分,此时,后面若再加上另外一个宾语,这个标题中的有效信息就增加了。这个功能上的需求反作用在句法和词法上的表现就是我们上文说的“双音化”和“词汇化”,结果便是这个动宾结构的短语变成了动宾结构词。新闻标题加速了它们演变的进程。

与语言的经济原则类似,“句式配价”理论也许能为我们提供更多思路。

(沈家煊 2000:293)给“句式配价”下了个定义:“抽象的句式配备的、与谓语动词同现的名词性成分的数目和类属(指施事、受事、与事、工具等)。”它将这种配价称为“句式的论元”。例如“他扔我一个球”,在这个句子中,动词“扔”有三个论元,“我”“他”“球”。然而动词“扔”本身却只有两个论元,即“他”“球”。这种理论认为,是某类特殊句式允准了句中动词可以带一些非常规宾语(与事、地点、工具、对象等)。那么新闻标题的典型句式是什么呢?从信息传递的角度出发,我们认为其典型句式是“主语+谓语+宾语”句式,也就是“S-V-O”。从本文所举的例子也可以看出来。这类句式是有一个“句式义”的,这个句式义表达一种“处置”或“使动”意义。一般来说,动词词义须是句式义的一个实例,才能进入这个句式。如动词“喊话”表示一方承受来自另一方的动作“喊话”。动词“续约”表示一方作为参与动词“续约”进程的主体,接受这个行为的“处置”。那么我们如何判定某个动词是否包含“处置”或“使动”的含义?这一点我们认同(沈家煊 2000:294-296)提出的动词词义的“理想认知模型(Idealized Cognitive Model)”理论。这种理论把“动词的参与角色”与“动词的论元”区分开来。句式的论元是比价抽象的如一般的施事、受事、与事等。而动词的参与角色则要具体得多。例如“偷”“抢”的参与角色是:

“抢”[**抢劫者** **被抢者** 抢劫物]

“偷”[**偷窃者** 失窃者 **失窃物**]

加粗的部分是这个动词的理想认知模型(ICM)中凸显的部分。凸显的部分是语义上主要的部分。因此我们可以说“他偷我一分钱”,但是不大会说“他抢走我一分钱”。因为在动词“抢”的ICM中,“抢劫物”不是凸显成分。从言语交际的常识来理解则归因为,人们认为一分钱不是什么重大的损失。动词词义的“理想认知模型”理论投射到本文讨论的新闻标题现象则体现为,新闻标题这种特殊句式在选择动词进入的时候,在动词语义上面也有细分的规则要求,这些动词除了常规的词义的区别之外,其不同的“理想认知模型”也决定了它能否进入这个标题中,这方面我们这里不作深入讨论。

### 3 结语

综上所述,动宾结构词语带宾语的现象并不是在今天的新闻标题中才开始出现的,它在汉语发展的每个阶段都存在,只是存在的文体形式各有侧重罢了,在古汉语中多存在与骈文和诗句中。而在汉代汉语中,除存在于大量的习语、成语中外,由于新闻标题这种特定语体环境的句法和语义要求,这种现象在这块“沃土”中表现得尤其活跃,除承袭下来的习语和成语外,新闻标题这种语体形式可以说是当代汉语词汇化和双音化进程的一个“加速剂”。这类语言现象是语言本身演变的要求,既符合语言的经济原则,又不失表义的准确性生动性。而且随着互联网的发展,自媒体形式的繁荣,这类现象在不远的将来还会只增不减。自媒体的繁荣在新闻文字的表达上必然会带来一些问题,为保持语言的纯洁性和严整性,对少数现象确有规范的必要。而对大量的基于约定俗成而固定下来的这类语言现象,不必过分担心。

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# Causal Constructions in Modern Chinese

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## Abstract

The study deals with causal constructions in modern Chinese with special attention to their morphosyntactic, semantic and pragmatic features. There are three strategies for expressing the reason at the clausal level: simple juxtaposition of clauses, use of conjunctions, and frame constructions. Apart from specialized conjunctions which only introduce a reason, polysemantic conjunctions combine causal meaning with purpose, instrument, condition, etc. The frame constructions that have been attested are of different degree of grammaticalization. The most commonly used strategy at the adnominal level is the prepositional group with causal meaning. The lack of morphology results in difficulties in drawing a borderline between two functional classes – conjunctions and prepositions.

**Keywords:** Chinese, Mandarin Chinese, causal construction, causal relations, causal conjunction, causal preposition

## Introduction

The paper provides an analysis of causal constructions (CC) in modern Chinese. The results were obtained in a large linguistic study conducted within a project on description of causal constructions in the world's languages (for the studied typological parameters see (Zaika 2019)) in accordance with the traditions of language studies formed within the Leningrad/St. Petersburg's typological school (Russia).

### 1. Causal constructions: definition of the term

Causal constructions in this study imply constructions denoting a variety of causal relations between two situations: one causing event induces the emergence of another situation. Causal constructions represent an important class of primarily polypredicative constructions, which is relatively underexplored – especially compared to temporal, conditional and purposive constructions.

There may be various ways of encoding relationship between a causal situation and a consecutive situation. Polypredicative causal constructions as in example (1) are used

most frequently; however, in modern Chinese (MC), a causal situation may also be introduced as a nominal CC – i.e., be realized syntactically as a noun group. An example of a monopredicative nominal construction is shown in (2)

- (1) *The Government imposed restrictions, because the coronavirus pandemic was gaining momentum in the country.*  
 (2) *The Government imposed restrictions because of the coronavirus pandemic in the country.*

## 2. Main strategies of reason encoding in Chinese

Strategies of reason encoding in MC include polypredicative (clausal) and monopredicative (nominal) constructions.

a. Polypredicative causal constructions are realized:

- by simple juxtaposition of clauses with a context-restricted meaning (3), wherein a CC linearly precedes a clause denoting the consequence (ConC):

(3) 她病了, 今天不能来上课了。

*Tā      bìng-le,              jīntiān   bù      néng   lái   shàngkè   le*  
 3F.Sg   get\_sick-PRFV   today   NEG   MOD   come   study   COS  
 ‘She got sick, can’t come to studies today.’

- as a prepositive CC introduced by a conjunction with a causal meaning, which is most frequently represented by specialized causal conjunctions 因为 *yīnwèi* and 由于 *yóuyú* (4). A ConC is placed in the postposition and may be marked by conjunctions with a consecutive meaning (所以 *suǒyǐ* ‘therefore’, 因此 *yīncǐ* ‘therefore, because of (this)’):

(4) 因为她孩子病了, 一早就抱着孩子去医院了。

*Yīnwèi   tā      hái      bìng-le              yīzǎo      jiù*  
**CONJ**   1F.Sg   child   get\_sick-PRFV   very\_early   **CONJ**  
*bào-zhe   hái      qù      yīyuàn              le*  
 take-DUR   child   go   hospital   COS  
 ‘**Since** her child got sick, (she) took him to hospital very early.’

Despite the numerosity of causal markers in the system, the basic means of encoding are represented by the conjunctions 因为 *yīnwèi* and 由于 *yóuyú*, which specialize in expression of the meaning of cause per se.

Other markers featured in clausal CCs show polysemy (a combination of the meaning of cause with purpose (the so-called 为-series), inference (既然 *jìrán*) and condition. According to the corpus data, the conjunction of cause and purpose 为了 *wèile* and the conjunction of inference 既 *jì* should be singled out as the most frequent ones among polysemic causal markers.

- as a frame construction, when a causal conjunction in a CC is complemented with a word meaning ‘cause, reason, motive.’ Such combination may be considered as a specialized multicomponent conjunction; possible variants of the second component include 原因 *yuányīn*, 之故 *zhīgù*, 缘故 *yuángù*, etc.:

(5) 因社会上有语言之故

*yīn*      *shèhuì-shàng*      *yǒu*      *yǔyán*      *zhīgù*  
**CONJ**    society-LOC    have    language    **CONJ\_cause**

‘...**due to the fact that** the society has language.’

The grammaticalization degree of second components varies. Thus, it is greater with 之故 *zhīgù* than with 原因 *yuányīn*, which more often frames rather nominal groups than clauses – this poses a question whether it is a conjunction or something else, cf. (6), (7) and (8):

(6) 由于深圳注册受阻的原因...

*Yóuyú*    *Shēnzhèn*    *zhùcè*      *shòuzǔ*    *de*      *yuányīn*  
**CONJ**    Shenzhen    registration    block    REL      **CONJ\_cause**

‘Due to the fact that registration in Shenzhen was blocked.’

(7) 由于其学术定位的原因...

*Yóuyú*              *qí*      *xuéshù*      *dìngwèi*    *de*      *yuányīn*  
<sup>?</sup>**CONJ/ PREP**    3Sg    academic    position    REL    <sup>?</sup>**PREP\_cause**

‘Because of his academic position.’

(8) 由于经济的原因...

*Yóuyú*    *jīngjì*      *de*      *yuányīn*  
**PREP**    economics    REL      reason

‘For economic reasons.’

#### b. Monopredicative CCs

Strategies of expressing causal situations through the use of noun group have certain specifics in MC. In contrast to polypredicative CCs, nominal CCs always feature a formal maker, by which the semantic and syntactic relationship between a noun (or a nominal group) denoting a causal situation and a syntactic structure, by which a consecutive situation is expressed, is marked. A nominal causal construction is as follows:

- the cause is introduced as a prepositional group, for example, 由于 *yóuyú* (9) or 为了 *wèile* (10):

(9) 妻子由于琐事要和王钢离婚。

*Qīzi*    *yóuyú* *suǒshì* *yào*    *hé*    *Wáng* *Gāng* *líhūn*  
 Wife    **PREP**    trifle    MOD    **CONJ**    Wang    Gang    divorce

‘The wife wants to divorce Wang Gang over a trifle.’

(10) 王钢为了这事感到十分苦恼。

Wáng Gāng wèile zhè shì  
Wang Gang **PREP** DEM incident  
gǎndào shífēn kǔnǎo  
feel very upset  
'Wang Gang is very upset because of what happened.'

- the cause is introduced as an applicative group, which is expressed by the marker 于 *yú* placed right after the predicate:

(11) 她确实死于癌症。

Tā quèshí sǐ-yú áizhèng  
3F.Sg really die-**APPL** cancer  
'She died **of** cancer.'

The head of a nominal CC may represent a situation based on metonymic shift, when a causal situation is syntactically compressed to a nominal group denoting one of the participants (12):

(12) 他的婚姻因为“小三”而面临危机。

Tā de hūnyīn yīnwèi xiǎosān er miànlín wéijī  
3Sg POSS marriage **PREP** concubine CONJ become crisis  
'Due to (the presence of) the concubine, his marriage was threatened.'

Strategies of expressing causing event through the use of nominal CCs are not universal in the world's languages. For a number of stimulus situations – for example, those expressed in Russian through the use of noun group – it proved impossible in MC. Thus, for the situations <X screams in (=because of) pain> or <X shivers with (=because of) cold>, our informants deemed acceptable only transformation of such sentences into polypredicative structures with changing the order of clauses in re each other to a 'more natural,' in their view, one – for example, <X feels pain => (therefore/ so) he screams>, <X is cold => (therefore/ so) he shivers> – examples (13), (14):

(13) 男人痛得大喊大叫。

Nánrén tòng dé dàhǎndàjiào  
Man in\_pain PTCL scream\_loudly  
'The man is loudly screaming in pain.'

(14) 女人冷得直发抖。

Nǚrén lěng dé zhí fādǒu  
Woman cold PTCL really shiver  
'The woman was shivering with cold.'

Such clauses are not monopredicative: a causing event in them cannot be 'compressed' to nominalization with syntactic properties of a noun and is expressed by an individual predication, in the postposition to which a secondary predication denoting a consecutive

situation is added as a complement (补语 *bǔyǔ*). Such syntactic representation does not comply with the parameters, by which the nominal CC was defined within this study, since this type of construction is typically characterized by incompliance between the form (a nominal group) and the meaning (a situation), which is not observed in (13) and (14).

The semantic role of the Cause/ Reason has a certain similarity to that of the Agent. Within this study, however, constructions, in which a nominal cause occupies a syntactic position typical of an agentive participant – as in (15) – expressing a causative construction quite frequent for MC, were not considered as nominal CCs. Passive construction with 被 *bèi* and noun group with a causal meaning that occupies a position typical of Agent (16) were not included in the analysis either:

- (15) 丈夫的话让妻子感到生气。  
*Zhàngfū de huà rang qīzi gǎndào shēngqì*  
 Husband REL words CAUS wife feel angry  
 ‘The husband’s words infuriated the wife.’
- (16) 树被风吹倒了。  
*Shù bèi fēng chuīdào le*  
 Tree PASS wind turn\_over PTCL  
 ‘The tree fell in the wind.’

### 3. Issues to discuss

First, there is a synonymy between polypredicative and nominal CCs. Compression of a proposition to a noun group takes place when certain information on a causal situation becomes more actualized for communicators – see discussion in (Abraham 1991) and examples below:

- (17) 因为天气不好,飞机不能按时起飞。  
*Yīnwéi tiānqì bù hǎo, fēijī bù néng*  
**CONJ** weather NEG good airplane NEG MOD  
*ànrshí qǐfēi*  
 in\_time take\_off  
 ‘**Because of** bad weather, the airplane could not take off in time.’
- (18) 由于天气的原因,航班临时取消。  
*Yóuyú tiānqì de yuányīn, hángbān*  
**PREP** weather REL reason flight  
*línshí qǔxiāo*  
 temporarily cancel  
 ‘**Because of** the weather, the flight was cancelled temporarily.’

(19) 因为[天气]的关系,飞机不能按时起飞。

*Yīnwèi tiānqì de guānxì, fēijī bù néng*  
**PREP** weather REL relation airplane NEG MOD  
*ànsǐ qǐfēi*  
in\_time take\_off  
'The airplane could not take off in time because of the bad weather.'

In (18) and (19), the person is aware that the weather is unfavorable for flights, whereas in (17) this information will be new for him/her.

Second, there is the so-called 'linking words' problem.

The predicate in MC lacks the concept of the finite / infinite distinction, which raises difficulties at differentiation of clausal and nominal CCs. The optional nature of grammatical markers, along with indistinguishability of compound words and (phrases or even sentences) that are typical of MC due to its lack of inflectional morphology, in certain contexts do not allow to disambiguate, whether one is dealing with a conjunction or a preposition:

(20) 下雨。

*Xià yǔ*  
go rain  
'It's raining.'

(21) 因为下雨, 火药被雨水淋湿了。

*Yīnwèi xià yǔ, huǒyào bèi*  
**CONJ** go rain powder PASS  
*yǔshuǐ línshī-le*  
rainwater get\_wet-PFV  
'Because it was raining, the powder got wet of the rainwater.'

(22) 运动会由于下雨延期。

*Yùndònghuì yóuyú xià yǔ yánqí*  
Contest **CONJ/ PREP** go rain postpone  
'The contest is postponed because of the rain.'

Because of the poor applicability of the current POS-theory (Parts of speech theory) to MC, ambiguity between conjunctions and prepositions is up to the absolute impossibility of their distinction and, as a consequence, stating 'linking words' (关系词 *guānxì cí*) as a single category, we have to resort to a purely formal criterion for differentiating of causal conjunctions and prepositions. Thus, the relative marker 的 *de* (24) or a prepositional classifier as modifier in a nominal group (23) allows us to consider a given causal marker as a preposition more or less unambiguously:

(23) 兄弟俩为了一套房子大打出手。

*Xiōngdì liǎ wèile yī tào fángzi dàdǎchūshǒu*  
Brothers both PREP one CLF house put\_up\_fight  
'Two brothers put up a real fight for the house.'

- (24) 兄弟俩为了房子的所有权大打出手。  
*Xiōngdì liǎ wèile fángzi de suǒyǒuquán dàdǎchūshǒu*  
 Brothers both PREP house REL title put\_up\_fight  
 ‘Two brothers put up a real fight for the title to the house.’

The two examples (23) and (24) illustrate how a causal situation in MC is syntactically compressed to a nominal group denoting one of the participants based on metonymic shift. Nominal causal constructions, wherein a causing event is expressed by a nominal group introduced by the causal preposition 因 *yīn* are quite frequent in MC, as it was shown in (12):

- (12) 他的婚姻因为“小三”而面临危机。  
*Tā de hūnyīn yīnwèi “xiǎosān” ér miànlín wéijī*  
 3Sg REL marriage PREP concubine CONJ become crisis  
 ‘Due to (the presence of) the concubine, his marriage was threatened.’

Besides, apparently, a verb-noun group, which is introduced by a causal marker, if a verb has no tense-aspect suffix, should also be considered a kind of nominal group. At such approach, a causal marker will be assigned to a class of prepositions:

- (26) 兄弟俩为了抢苹果大打出手。  
*Xiōngdì liǎ wèile qiǎng píngguǒ dàdǎchūshǒu*  
 Brothers both CONJ take\_away apple put\_up\_fight  
 ‘Two brothers put up a real fight because of a dispute over an apple.’
- (27) 王钢因为抢老婆婆的玉米粑, 被老婆婆的儿子用斧头当场砍死。  
*WángGāng yīnwèi qiǎng lǎopópo de yùmǐbā, bèi*  
 Wang\_Gang CONJ rob old\_woman REL corn\_oil\_cake PASS  
*lǎopópo de érzi yòng fùtóu dāngchǎng kǎnsǐ*  
 old\_woman REL son INST axe on\_the\_spot hack\_death  
 ‘Because of robbery of the corn oil cake from the old woman, Wang Gang was axed to death by her son on the spot.’

A similar formal criterion should also apply to adjectival phrases, wherein the absence of an adverb at an adjective (which, as a general rule, serves a condition for grammatical acceptability of a predicate in MC) – as in (28) – is an indication of a non-predicative nature of the group and must be considered as a nominal CC:

- (28) 男方以工作忙为借口, 住在单位, 偶尔回家。  
*Nánfāng yǐ gōngzuò máng wèijièkǒu,*  
 Man PREP work busy PREP.on\_the\_pretext  
*zhù-zài dānwèi, ǒu’ěr huí jiā*  
 live-APPL firm rarely return home  
 ‘On the pretext of being busy, men live where they work and return home rarely.’

Third, as I already mentioned above, a number of stimulus situations from our linguistic questionnaire on causal constructions, in MC may be expressed only by sentences with the so-called ‘complement’ (补语 *bǔyǔ*). This element may be considered a sentence modifier. It represents an individual dependent clause subordinate to a predicate, but not filling its semantic valency. Such constructions, referred by us to polypredicative, are used in MC to convey situations represented in examples (29)–(31), when a condition induced by an attribute of the subject is stated in the sentence. A polypredicative structure with changing the order of CCs and ConCs to a ‘more natural’ one, proved to be the only acceptable in MC. The argumentation of all informants in this case centered around the fact that precisely such order corresponds to the chronology and logic of events: for example, the man feels pain => (therefore/so) he screams, the woman is cold => (therefore/so) she shivers).

(13) 男人痛得大喊大叫。

*Nánrén tòng dé dàhǎndàjiào*  
 Man in\_pain PTCL scream\_loudly  
 ‘The man is loudly screaming in pain.’

(14) 女人冷得直发抖。

*Nǚrén lěng dé zhí fādǒu*  
 Woman cold PTCL really shiver  
 ‘The woman was shivering with cold.’

(29) 女人被烟呛得咳嗽。

*Nǚrén bèi yān qiāng dé késòu*  
 Woman PASS smoke tickling PTCL cough  
 ‘The woman began to cough because of smoke.’

In such sentences, the order of elements and the structural particle 得 *dé* between clauses serves a formal mean of encoding causing event and the following consecutive situation. And these types of constructions were excluded from our study.

#### 4. Linear position of a causal clause

The relative position of CCs and ConCs in MC is fixed and reflects the logic of events development: first the cause, then the consequence. The reverse order, i.e., the transition ‘from consequence to cause’ is considered to be a marked order – therefore, the copula 是 *shì* or another intensifying word is often added to such CCs; thereat, a prepositional clause may contain one of consecutive markers (之所以 *zhī suǒyǐ* or 其所以 *qí suǒyǐ*):

(32) 因为人多、车多, 污染太重。

*Yīnwéi rén duō, chē duō, wūrǎn tài zhòng*  
 CONJ people many car many contamination too heavy  
 ‘Since there are many people, many cars, the contamination is very heavy.’

(33) 我们主张从词出发进行初级汉语教学, 是因为人的头脑中本就有词。

Wǒmen zhǔzhāng cóng cí chūfā jìnxíng chūjí Hànyǔ  
 1PL stand\_for PREP word set\_out conduct initial Chinese  
 jiàoxué, shì yīnwéi rén de tóunǎo-zhōng běn jiù  
 teaching COP CONJ man REL head-LOC originally already  
 yǒu cí  
 have word

'We promulgate initially teaching Chinese starting from words because words are already present in people's heads.'

Apart from the order of clauses, the conjunctions 正因为 *zhèng yīnwèi*, (就)是因为 (*shì yīnwèi*), 是由于 *shì yóuyú*, 就在于 *jiù zàiyú* serve as means of marking: at such inferentive usage, a complex sentence is realized as 'the speaker may make a statement P because Q':

(34) 人能说话, 因社会上有语言之故。

Rén néng shuōhuà, yīn shèhuì-shàng yǒu  
 man MOD speak CONJ society-LOC have  
 yǔyán zhīgù  
 language CONJ\_cause

'People may speak **due to the fact that** the society has language.'

(35) 小王还爱李丽, 因为他回来了。

XiǎoWáng hái ài Lǐ Lì, yīnwèi tā huí-lái le.  
 Xiao\_Wang still love Li\_Li CONJ 3M.Sg return-DIR COS

'Xiao Wang still loves Li Li **because** he returned.'

## 5. Semantics of causal markers

Main causal markers are neutral in relation to reality/ unreality of the cause; all examples above denote a real cause, whereas a fictitious cause can be introduced by words or prepositional groups as follows: 以.....为借口 *yǐ...wèi jièkǒu*, 借故 *jiègù*, 假托 *jiǎtuō* (lit.) 'on the pretext of', 以.....为理由 *yǐ.....wèi lǐyóu* 'based on, using as an argument':

(36) 在完成了任务后, 以妻子生病为借口, 小王离开单位了。

zài wánchéng-le rènwù hòu, yǐ qīzi  
 PREP complete-PRFV assignment LOC INSTR wife  
 shēngbìng wèijièkǒu, XiǎoWáng líkāi dānwèi le  
 get\_sick as\_a\_pretext Xiao\_Wang leave company PTCL

'Having fulfilled the assignment, **on the pretext that** (his) wife got sick, Xiao Wang left the company.'

In terms of verbal expression, polypredicative constructions with single-component and compound conjunctions tend towards standard verbal expression free of any visible restrictions, as well as may also include a verbal group free of any tense-aspect markers.

In contrast to mononuclear causal markers tending towards usage with verbal groups and clauses, the cause within frame construction such as 因为.....的原因 *yīnwèi...de yuányīn* may be expressed not only by a verbal, but also by a nominal group.

## 6. Structural features of nominal causal constructions

The set of markers introducing a causal situation as a noun group includes the prepositions 因为 *yīnwèi*, 因 *yīn*, 由于 *yóuyú*, 由 *yóu*, 为 *wèi*, 为了 *wèile*, 为着 *wèizhe*, 以 *yǐ*, 鉴于 *jiànyú* and other ones, among which the first three are specialized markers (4), (9), as well as numerous polysemantic markers combining the meaning of cause and purpose (10), cause and instrument (37) and other semantics are identified:

- (10) 王钢为了这事感到十分苦恼。  
*Wáng Gāng wèile zhè shì gǎndào shífēn kǔnǎo*  
 Wang Gang **PREP** DEM incident feel very upset  
 'Wang Gang is very upset **because of** what happened.'
- (37) 学校以王钢骄傲。  
*Xuéxiào yǐ Wáng Gāng jiāo'ào*  
 School **PREP** Wang Gang proud  
 'The school is proud of Wang Gang.'
- (38) 王钢为祖国骄傲。  
*Wáng Gāng wèi zǔguó jiāo'ào*  
 Wang Gang **PREP** homeland proud  
 'Wang Gang is proud of (his) homeland.'

The above causal prepositions are single-component markers.

Besides, there are multicomponent markers, into which a proposition introducing a noun group and a nominal element closing the group are included, as a result a frame construction is formed (39):

- (39) 因为年龄的缘故王钢不得不下岗。  
*Yīnwèi niánlíng de yuángù Wáng Gāng*  
 PREP age REL cause Wang Gang  
*bùdébù xià gang*  
 forced resign position  
 'Due to (his) age, Wang Gang had to resign (his) position.'

Such multicomponent causal markers include the frame constructions 由于.....的原因 *yóuyú...de yuányīn* 'because of; due to', 为.....之故 *yīnwèi wèi...zhī gù*, 因(为).....之故 *yīn (wèi)...zhī gù* 'due to', 因为.....缘故 *yīnwèi...yuángù* 'in virtue of', 为.....起见 *wèi...qǐjiàn* 'in view of', 以.....为借口 *yǐ...wèi jièkǒu* 'on the pretext of', 因为.....的关系 *yīnwèi...de guānxì* 'on account of', in which a postpositive element represent a noun (originally, primarily

with the semantics of cause or motive) with a various degree of desemantization (“semantic bleaching”).

Generally, a dependence-based encoding strategy, when a causal marker introduces a noun group (40), is typical of MC:

- (40) 由于他们的发明公司获得了奖赏。  
*Yóuyú tāmen de fāmíng gōngsī*  
 PREP 3PL REL invention company  
*huòdé-le jiǎngshǎng*  
 receive-PFV award  
 ‘Owing to his invention, the company received an award.’

In certain cases, double marking, when a predicate expressing a consecutive situation is also marked in a certain way, may be used. In this case 而 *er* is placed before the predicate (41):

- (41) 西湖以其美景而驰名于世界。  
*Xīhú yǐ qí měijǐng er chīmíng-yú shìjiè*  
 Xihu PREP 3Sg beautiful\_landscape CONJ famous-APPL world  
 ‘The Xihu Lake is world-famed for its beautiful landscapes.’

At such double marking, there are restrictions in usage of certain non-specialized causal markers. For example, out of the 为-series only causal marker 为 *wèi* is encountered, whereas for 为了 *wèile* such usage is excluded:

- (42) 为学术而学术。  
*Wéi xuéshù er xuéshù*  
 PREP science CONJ science  
 ‘Science for (the sake of) science.’

Besides, the preposition 为了 *wèile*, in the semantics of which the meaning of purpose dominates over that of cause, shows incompatibility with stative predicates denoting uncontrollable emotions:

- (43a) 妈妈为王钢感到高兴。  
*Māmā wèi Wáng Gāng gǎndào gāoxìng*  
 Mother PREP Wang Gang feel glad  
 ‘Mother was glad for Wang Gang.’
- (43b) \*妈妈为了王钢感到高兴。  
*Māmā wèile Wáng Gāng gǎndào gāoxìng*  
 Mother PREP Wang Gang feel glad  
 ‘Mother was glad for Wang Gang.’

## 7. Positional features of nominal causal constructions

In terms of a linear position, nominal CCs more frequently take the preposition to the consecutive clause, which corresponds to the typical order of predication construction in MC – i.e., they may appear in the absolute beginning of a sentence (44) or after the subject group (45). For a nominal group with the semantics of cause in MC, a postposition will be an emphatic context (46):

- (44) 由于下雨明天运动会停赛一天。

<i>Yóuyú</i>	<i>xià</i>	<i>yǔ</i>	<i>míngtiān</i>	<i>yùndònghuì</i>
<b>PREP</b>	go	rain	tomorrow	competition
<i>tíng</i>	<i>sài</i>	<i>yī</i>	<i>tiān</i>	
stop	match	one	day	

‘Because of the rain, competitions were suspended for one day.’

- (45) 明天运动会由于下雨停赛一天。

<i>Míngtiān</i>	<i>yùndònghuì</i>	<b>yóuyú</b>	<i>xià</i>	<i>yǔ</i>
Tomorrow	competition	<b>PREP</b>	go	rain
<i>tíng</i>	<i>sài</i>	<i>yī</i>	<i>tiān</i>	
stop	match	one	day	

‘**Because of** the rain, competitions were suspended for one day.’

- (46) 明天运动会停赛一天, 由于下雨。

<i>Míngtiān</i>	<i>yùndònghuì</i>	<i>tíng</i>	<i>sài</i>	<i>yī</i>	<i>tiān</i>
tomorrow	competition	stop	match	one	day
<b>yóuyú</b>	<i>xià</i>	<i>yǔ</i>			
<b>PREP</b>	go	rain			

‘Competitions were suspended for one day (and that’s all) **because of** the rain.’

A nominal causal construction introduced by an applicative marker is placed in an immediate postposition to the predicate. Thus, a specialized applicational marker 于 *yú*, which signals inclusion of a compulsory participant with a causal role into the number of objects, is used in (47):

- (47) 男人死于饥饿。

<i>Nánrén</i>	<i>sǐ-yú</i>	<i>jī'è</i>
Man	die- <b>APPL</b>	hunger

‘The man died **of** hunger.’

Analysis of the language material revealed the following grammatical features of predicate in sentences containing nominal CCs.

In the middle of a sentence before a qualitative predicate expressed by an adjective, no special grammatical marker is required, whereas placement into the absolute beginning of a sentence entails compulsory adverbial modifier for an adjective, combination with

which may be notionally considered an equivalent of a ‘finite form’ of the predicate in MC. Cf. (48a–c):

- (48a) 妈妈为王钢的事难堪。  
Māmā wèi Wáng Gāng de shì nánkān  
Mother **PREP** Wang Gang REL incident intolerable  
‘Mother suffers **because of** what happened to Wang Gang.’
- (48b) \*为王钢的事, 妈妈难堪。  
wèi Wáng Gāng de shì māmā nánkān  
**PREP** Wang Gang REL incident mother intolerable  
‘Mother suffers **because of** what happened to Wang Gang’
- (48c) 为王钢的事, 妈妈很难堪。  
Wèi Wáng Gāng de shì māmā hěn nánkān  
**PREP** Wang Gang REL incident mother very intolerable  
‘Mother suffers **because of** what happened to Wang Gang.’

## Conclusions

The present study of causal constructions in MC has dealt with the large variety of markers of cause. The most significant issues discovered within this typologically-oriented study include a competition of clausal causal constructions with markers of cause between each other and a competition between polypredicative causal constructions and monopredicative ones were identified.

There are intrinsic difficulties in differentiation of nominal and clausal causal constructions, which are overcome in this study upon a formal criterion.

Along with monosemantic causal markers expressing causation as is, there is a significant number of non-specialized means of cause expression, which, along with the causal one, have another meaning restricting their distribution.

The observed variability at stimuli translation indicates that these causal constructions have been grammaticalized as means of causation encoding in a relatively recent past, and this process is still underway.

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# Chinese Cultural Terms in Morrison and Medhurst's Chinese–English Dictionaries

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## Abstract

The present paper discusses the role of bilingual dictionaries to introducing new concepts and new images into the host culture. The analysis focusses on Robert Morrison's *A Dictionary of the Chinese Language in Three Parts* (1815–1823) and Walter Henry Medhurst's *Chinese and English Dictionary Containing All the Words in the Chinese Imperial Dictionary Arranged According to the Radicals* (1842–1843), and the way Chinese cultural concepts were translated and explained to their Western users. Compiled as instruments to assist Christian missionaries in their work, the dictionaries reflect not only the encyclopedic knowledge of their compilers and the degree to which they had been exposed to the Chinese culture, but also the increasing Western presence in China, and a deepening understanding by the Western intellectuals of the traditional Chinese culture.

**Keywords:** Morrison, Medhurst, Chinese-English dictionary, cultural concepts

The nineteenth century is a very special moment in Chinese history, a period of profound social and political transformations, of confrontation and turmoil, when the Chinese and the Western powers rose against each other; it is also the time of cultural dialogue and learning.

Compiled before the first Opium War, the Chinese–English dictionaries by Robert Morrison and Walter Henry Medhurst, two Protestant missionaries, were the first bilingual dictionaries, with the largest number of entries and detailed explanations, accessible to anyone interested in the Chinese culture, in China or abroad. Intended initially as tools to be used by their fellow missionaries either for translating Christian texts, or in their daily preaching and communication with the locals, the dictionaries became more than that, inspiring the generations to come. (Yang 2014)

## 1. The Missionaries

Born in 1782, in England, Robert Morrison felt the missionary call very early in his life, and in 1804 he asked to be sent to Africa by the London Missionary Society. To his surprise, the Society sent him to China instead, leaving home at the beginning of 1807,

and arriving in Canton nine months later, via the United States. Prior to going to China, Morrison had already started learning the language with the help of the few manuscripts at the British Library and of Yong Sam-tak, a Chinese leaving in London. (Starr 1998) Years later, the two would meet again, in Canton, becoming very good friends and working together. (Yang 2014)

In Canton, Morrison continued to learn Chinese, but he had to do it secretly, since teaching the language to foreigners was an offence punishable by death in China. Luckily, his very good language skills secured him a position with the East Indian Company, which gave him a certain degree of financial independence to pursue his goals. Except for a few years between 1822 and 1825, Morrison spend his entire adult life in China, in Canton and Macao, where he passed away in 1934.

In China, Morrison learned very quickly that it was not at all easy to carry out his missionary work, due to various constraints imposed by the Imperial Court, the East Asia Company and Macao. As a result, he reinterpreted his divine mission in the sense that God's plan for him was not necessarily to evangelize, but to pave way for the missionaries to come by creating instruments to help them learn the language and understand the people. (Starr 1998) Thus, a few years after his arrival, Morrison started by publishing *Horæ Sinicæ: Translations from the Popular Literature of the Chinese* (1812), an anthology of Chinese literature, followed by *A Grammar of the Chinese Language* (1815), *Dialogues and Detached Sentences in the Chinese Language* (1816), *A View of China for Philological Purposes* (1817), etc. His dictionaries were compiled and published between 1815 and 1823, and in 1823, he published together with William Milne, the translation of the Bible into Chinese. (Daily 2013)

Walter Henry Medhurst was born in 1796, in London. Just as Robert Morrison, Medhurst dreamt of becoming a missionary, and enrolled as a printer with the London Missionary Society station in Malacca. He left London in September 1816, and arrived at his post in 1817, via India. Medhurst started learning Chinese only after arriving in Asia, becoming fluent in the Min Nan dialect spoken by many in the Malay peninsula. He was ordained in 1819 by William Milne, and stationed in Penang and Batavia. After the first Opium War, in 1942, he moved to Shanghai where he founded the London Missionary Society Press, (*Mohai shuguan*), remaining there until 1856. He died in London in 1857.

Although he is remembered mainly for his contribution to the Delegate's Version of the Bible, Medhurst was also a very prolific writer and translator, publishing *An English and Japanese, and Japanese and English Vocabulary Compiled from Native Works* (1830), *A Dictionary of the Hok-kèen Dialect of the Chinese Language* (1831), *China: its state and prospects, with especial reference to the spread of the gospel: containing allusions to the antiquity, extent, population, civilization, literature, and religion of the Chinese*, (1838), *Chinese dialogues, questions, and familiar sentences: literally rendered into English, with a view to promote commercial intercourse, and to assist beginners in the language*, (1844), etc. His Chinese–English dictionary was published in 1842–3, followed in 1847–8 by the English–Chinese edition.

## 2. The Dictionaries

Morrison's project was a very ambitious one. Between 1815 and 1823, he published in Macao, six volumes called *A Dictionary of the Chinese Language in Three*. The first part, a *Zidian* contains three volumes published in 1815, 1822 and 1823, that include characters arranged according to "the keys", the 214 radicals from Kangxi's Dictionary (Yong and Jing 2008); the second part called *Wuche yunfu*<sup>1</sup> consists of two volumes published in 1819 and 1820, with characters arranged alphabetically; the third part, the English–Chinese dictionary in one volume, was published in 1822.

Yang (2014) mentions that the number of entries in the first part of the dictionary is almost identical to that in Kangxi's Dictionary; the second part contains less entries, the author himself writing in the *Introduction* that his aim was for *Wuche yunfu* "to be more concise" compared to the *Zidian*. (RM, part II, vol. 1, p. vi) Also, the definitions and explanations in the first part are richer and longer compared to the second part, therefore we will limit our analysis in this paper to the *Zidian*, and not the *Wuche yunfu*.

Medhurst's *Chinese and English Dictionary Containing All the Words in the Chinese Imperial Dictionary Arranged According to the Radicals* consists of two volumes published in 1842 and 1843, in Batavia, with characters arranged according to the radicals in Kangxi's Dictionary. Yang calls Medhurst's dictionary "just an abbreviated and edited copy of Morrison's, a plagiarism rather than an original compilation". (Yang 2014: 318)

Both Morrison's and Medhurst's dictionaries contain approximately the same number of characters, over 45 000, based on Kangxi's, and use the *guanghua* pronunciation in Nanjing; Medhurst also marks the tones, which are not always marked in Morrison's. Both have extensive prefaces, over 40 pages, with detailed information about pronunciation, tones, characters and radicals.

Medhurst's *Introduction* is rather technical, dedicated mainly to sounds, tones and characters. He mentions that his goal was to create an English–Chinese dictionary, but in order to "provide the copious and accurate list of English words rendered into Chinese, it was necessary first to determine the meaning of all Chinese characters in English". (WHM, vol. 1, p. iii) In order to make his dictionary accessible and reduce its size, he limited the explanations and examples and eliminated the "obsolete, contracted and synonymous words", keeping only the "modern and correct characters". The completion of his bilingual dictionaries meant that "England and China be brought nearer together, and the promotion of Civilization and Christianity be the result." (WHM, vol. 1, p. v)

Morrison's *Introduction* goes beyond the description of the Chinese language and script, and is much more informative about the Chinese culture. It introduces the reader to the legend of Can Jie, the six categories by Xu Shen, talks about book printing and pa-

<sup>1</sup> After a rhyme dictionary published in the Qing dynasty by Pan Yingbin, based on the final chapters of *Yuanyin tongyun* by Chen Jinmo, from the Ming dynasty.

per making, the benefits of writing with characters instead of having an alphabet for a language with so many dialects. He also states that:

“Of the following Dictionary, Kang-he’s Tsze-tëen forms the ground work; the arrangement and number of Characters in the First Part, are according to it. The Definitions and Examples, are derived chiefly from it; from Personal knowledge of the use of the Character; from the Manuscript Dictionaries of Romish Church; from Native Scholars; and from Miscellaneous Works perused on purpose.” (RNM, part I, vol. 1, p. ix)

Yang (2014) and Masini (2019) identify the “Manuscript Dictionaries of Romish Church” as Basilio Brollo’s *Dictionarium Sinico-Latinum (Hanzi xi yi)* from the 17<sup>th</sup> century and its version published in 1813 in Paris by the Chrétien-Louis-Joseph de Guignes, *Dictionnaire chinois-français et latin*. At the end of his preface, Morrison takes a critical approach to de Guignes’s dictionary, pointing out some inaccuracies, ending with the legend of Yu, or the Deluge. By mistranslating the explanation used in the Chinese dictionaries, 石阻河流为洪, de Guignes explains 洪水 as “pierrers qui arrêtent le cours d’un fleuve”, Morrison pointing out that the correct translation was “stones or rocks hindering the flowing of a river make *hong*”, and that 洪水 was “the Universal Deluge”. (RM, part I, vol. 1, p. xvi)

### 3. The Entries

Because of space limitations, we will limit our analysis to three entries, 人 (RM, part I, vol. 1, pp. 59–62 / WHM, vol. 1, pp. 6–7), 儒 (RM, part I, vol.1, pp. 166–167 / WHM, vol. 1, p. 30) and 佛 (RM, part I, vol. 1, pp. 92–93 / WHM, vol. 1, p. 10).

#### 3.1. 人 *ren*

Both authors transcribe it as *jín*, without a tone mark in Morrisons, with a circumflex “î”, *jîn*, in Medhurst’s.

Morrison’s explanations are abundant, spreading on almost four pages. He starts by explaining the ancient scripts, “The Seal form is said to represent the two arms of a man”, then gives the English equivalent “A human being; commonly understood as man” and the two main compounds “男人 A man. 女 | A woman”.<sup>2</sup> Following are a series of definitions the Book of Documents and Kangxi’s Dictionary, then the legend of the creation of man from *Lidai shenxian tongjian* and of Pangu, their first ruler:

<sup>2</sup> The romanization of the characters in all definitions has been left out because of space limits.

“爲萬物之靈 Man is the intelligent part of the universe. He is, 天地之性最貴者也 The most excellent production of the heavens and earth. (Shwǒ wàn.) They further say, 人者天地之德陰陽之交鬼神之會五行之秀氣也 Man, is from the energies of the heavens and earth; from the connexion of the principles Yin and Yang ; from the union of figure and spirit; and from the pure influence of the five elements.” (Le king) 人仁也仁生物也 Man, i.e. benevolence; benevolence to animated nature. [...] 自陰陽互交五行錯綜時在天地中央濕熱相蒸處產出一人 From the time that the Yin and the Yang combined, and the five elements intermingled, in the centre of the universe, where moisture and heat operated on each other, a man was produced. (Shin sēn t’hung këen.) [...] 盤古 Pwan koo, an extraordinary person, whose origin is not known, came from the vast deserts. He was four times taller than other human beings; had horns on his head, and his teeth stood out of his mouth. He taught navigation more perfectly; and made passages through the mountains. All submitted to him, and he became the first king of men.” (RM, part I, v. 1, pp. 59–60)

We can see Morrison’s desire to find comparable elements between the Christian tradition and the Chinese one. In both traditions, man is a superior intelligent creature, born out of the purest, and at the same time, the most basic elements in our world. Morrison’s choice also shows his familiarity with the Chinese culture; he does not seem satisfied with the explanations in the Chinese source, adding a Daoist legend, helping the reader find something to relate to.

The compounds are arranged somehow hierarchically: sages and immortals, virtuous and petty, good and bad, family and others, man and women, occupations, barbarians, etc., respecting the Chinese way of looking at the world, up/down, inside/outside, center/periphery.

The entry finishes with a lecture about the belief in God. Morrison admits that he cannot find any concrete proof “to the existence of spiritual Beings, the Soul of man, and the Deity” in the Chinese books, however

“there is a probability on the affirmative side of these opinions, and the most enlightened philosophy has not yet demonstrated any thing to the contrary; the Chinese generally, as well as the rest of mankind, think it more rational to believe, than to reject, what may finally prove to be seriously true. [...] Confucius, and writers of his school, are rather sceptics than atheists; they rather hesitate, than deny the existence of a Deity, and a Future State.” (RM, part I, vol. 1, pp. 61–62)

By comparison, Medhurst’s entry is extremely short and concise, consisting of the English equivalents and a few relevant compounds one might encounter in the daily dealings with the Chinese: man, woman, husband, wife, host, guest, etc. There are no detailed explanations and no examples.

“A man, a human being. 男人, a male, 女人, a female. 他人, another man. 婦人 a woman. 內人, my wife. 夫人, a lady. 凡人, all men. 人人, every body. 聖人, a sage. 仙人, the genii. 大人, your Excellency! 小人, a worthless fellow. 家人, domestics. 主人, a host. 人客, a guest. 寡人, I, as used by sovereigns. 人情, kindness. 中人, a mediator.” (WHM, vol. 1, pp. 6–7)

### 3.2. 儒 *ru*

The character *ru*, Confucian scholar, transcribed as *joo* or *yu* by Morrison and as *joô* by Medhurst is also treated differently in the two dictionaries.

True to his intentions of compiling “a portable and comprehensible” dictionary, Medhurst’s keeps the explanations very short, and limits the number of compounds:

“A learned man, a scholar; the literati. 大儒, a great scholar. 宿儒, a bright scholar. 儒區, a thorough scholar. 通儒, a well versed scholar. 名儒, a famous scholar. 腐儒, a rotten scholar. 寒儒, a poor scholar. 侏儒, a dwarf.” (WHM, vol. 1, p. 30)

Morrison again goes much further than just explaining the concept according to the Chinese sources and giving a few examples, by adding his own comments based on his direct observations of the Chinese society in those days:

“Denomination of persons which, in China, devote themselves to study. Originally their intention was, to improve themselves in moral and science; *the object at present is, to acquire a place in the government*<sup>3</sup>. The Literati. 學者之稱 The denomination of the learned.” (RM, part I, vol. 1, p. 166)

The concept is a good excuse for Morrison to further teach his readers of the importance of learning, the imperial exams, Confucius, Mencius and Zhu Xi:

“通天地人曰 | He who understands heaven, earth, and man, is called Joo. (Sha-muh.) 明先王之道 | 者事也 To understand the doctrines of the ancient kings, is the business of the scholar. | 者為席上之珍 A scholar is the pearl that adorns the table. | 者不祈多積多文以為富 The scholar does not seek for great wealth; he esteems much learning to be riches. [...] 唐太宗好穩開科取士 About A.D. 600, “Tae-tsung, of the Dynasty Tang, being a lover of learning, commenced the examination of the literati, to take from them the officers of government.” (Yew-heo.) 自堯舜以下若不生箇孔子後人去何處討分曉 From the time of Yao and Shun, descending downwards, if Confucius had not been born, whither should succeeding ages have gone to seek for a clear understanding of philosophy. (Choo-foo-tsze.) Next to Confucius, as a link in the chain, was 孟子 Mang-tsze, or Mencius. [...] 諸 | 說理便直是說夢 All the literati, who philosophized (in their histories and other works) did nothing more than utter dreams. (Choo-foo-tsze.) This writer lived under the Dynasty 宋 Sung, about A.D. 1150. His Commentaries on the 五經 and 四書, are much valued. The

<sup>3</sup> Our emphasis.

Emperor Kang-he published, in 26 volumes his works, consisting of detached criticisms and remarks." (RM, part I, vol. 1, p. 167)

### 3.3. 佛 *fo*

In both dictionaries, this character is transcribed as *fūh*, with a tone mark, and explained first as a verb "see indistinctly; to examine". To this, Morrison adds the adjectival meaning of "unreasonable, a bright appearance, great", the fact that it can form place names or can be used as surname; the religious meaning comes last:

"To see indistinctly; to examine; to turn aside. Unreasonable. A bright appearance; great. Forms part of the names of places. A surname. The Founder of a religious Sect, by Europeans, commonly called Fo, or Foe, now worshipped as a god. In this last application of the word, it is said to denote "Awakening and enlightening mankind." (RM, part I, vol. 1, p. 92)

Although the word Buddha existed in the English language from 1681<sup>4</sup>, nowhere in his dictionary does Morrison mention either Buddha's name or Buddhism, calling them instead "Fūh" or "the religion of Fūh":

"教 or 門 The religion of Fūh. 法 Laws of Fūh, sometimes means the religion or doctrines of Fūh generally; at other times, certain enigmatical saying delivered by Fūh; also the powers or means of operating possessed by Fūh. 法無邊 The powers of Fūh are unlimited." (RM, part I, vol. 1, p. 92)

Just as in the case of *ru*, *fo* gives Morrison the opportunity to add comments on the Chinese tradition of flattering, and then lecture about the entrance of Buddhism in China, translating faithfully the information in Kangxi's Dictionary:

"A boy in a temple, was playfully asked by the Emperor, Yung-ching, which god he should worship? The boy replied, 現在 不拜過去 | "The god Fūh now present, does not worship him whose reign is passed." This saying, is remembered and considered, as a ready piece of flattery, by which the Emperor was complimented as being himself equal to a god. [...] The author of Ching-tsze-T'hung states, that religion of Fūh, entered China during the seventh year of the reign of the Emperor 明 Ming, of Dynasty 漢 Han, about A.D. 50. The Compilers of Kang-he's Dictionary deny this, and say, that some of the 沙門 Sha mun, or priests of Fūh, came to China during the Dynasty 晉 Tsin. 始皇 Che hwang the first Emperor of that Dynasty, who reigned about 250 years B.C. imprisoned those priests on account of their being foreigners; but, it is said, a golden man broke open the prison doors at night. In the time of 武帝 Woo te, (B.C. 150 years) an image of Fūh was ob-

<sup>4</sup> According to the Merriam-Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/Buddha>, accessed July 25, 2021.

tained, and the 像 Images of Fūh, of the present day, are according to that model. They allow, however, that it was during the reign of the emperor 明 Ming, that the religion of Fūh entered China more effectually; and that the occasion of it was, a dream of the Emperor's, in which he saw a golden man flying about the palace." (RM, part I, vol. 1, p. 93)

As expected, Medhurst's explanation is short, and different from Morrison, he calls Buddha by his name<sup>5</sup>:

"To see indistinctly, to examine, The name of Buddha. 仿佛, seen indistinctly. 阿彌陀佛, Amida Buddha. 佛教, the religion of Buddha. 佛法, the laws of Buddha. 現在佛, the present Buddha." (WHM, vol. 1, p. 10)

#### 4. Conclusions

At a first glance, the two dictionaries are very different, which is absolutely normal, considering the different purpose each author had in mind.

Walking on the steps of the Catholic missionaries before him, Morrison continues their work not only by disseminating the Christian faith in China, but also by introducing and educating the European public about the Chinese culture. To him, the first part of his dictionary was much more than a linguistic tool, it was a cultural guide meant to teach not only the language, but also the culture and mentality of the Chinese people. Many times, the entries seem just excuses; he goes far beyond the meaning of the word, and gives an abundance of quotations from the classical books, examples, comments and proverbs in the spoken language, his own insights into the contemporary Chinese society, or lectures on various topics. However, no matter if he uses classical or spoken Chinese, his examples and explanations are clear, elegant and accessible, the language is not very complicated and reflects the Chinese way of thinking and conceptualizing the world. This is the very language one should find the Christian texts in Chinese, elegant but accessible to everyone.

His examples also help the reader find common ground between the Christian and the Chinese tradition. Morrison does not force the comparable, he accepts that the Chinese way of thinking is different from that of the Europeans, (RM, part II, vol. 1, p. viii), but there could still be some similarities: the *ru* – intelligent, understanding, someone who does not care about material gains – resembles, in a way, with a missionary; the legend of Yun and the Universal Deluge, etc. This adds a moral dimension to his work, making the reader respect and desire to find more about the Chinese culture.

Morrison combines lexicography with preaching; the final part of explanation for *ren*, for example where he accepts that he could not find any concrete proof of the existence of God in the Chinese culture looks like a sermon.

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<sup>5</sup> In *Wuche yunfu*, Morrison alternates the names of Fuh with those of Buddā or Budha. However, Fuh remains predominant. (vol. 1, pp. 175–176)

By comparison, Medhurst's dictionary is much more concise and it lacks the encyclopaedical nature Morrison's dictionary has. It has been criticized as being just an abbreviation of Morrison's (Yang 2014), and it is not our purpose to further investigate it. However, even if it is nothing but an abbreviation, Medhurst still needed to decide what to keep and what to leave out, and this kind of choice was most probably influenced by the socio-cultural context. By the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, Europe knew a bit more about China than it had known three or four decades before; also, the attitude of admiration towards the Chinese empire had changed, it had become much more pragmatic and that can explain the wish for a concise language tool, to help deal with China, rather than understand it.

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# Chinese Learner Corpora and Creation of Slovak Learner Corpus of Chinese

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## Abstract

The emergence of the Chinese learner corpora to great extent facilitates the research embedded in the field of teaching Chinese as a second language. There are numerous existing Chinese learner corpora mainly created at Chinese institutions up to two decades ago composed of texts written by learners mainly from Asian countries. The small-scale Chinese learner corpus focused on a particular group of learners enables the research of the interlanguage development based on the acquisition process of Slovak learners and the error analysis is helpful for the determination of the learner's main problems. The creation of the first Chinese learner corpus of Slovak students enriches the research devoted to the methodology of Chinese taking into consideration the needs of Slovak students due to the limited availability of the teaching materials in the language combination Chinese – Slovak.

**Keywords:** Chinese, learner corpus, Slovak students, error analysis

## 1. Introduction

The learner corpora represent a useful tool for researchers, teachers, and students because of the large amount of processed language material and facilitate the study of the processes related to the development of the learner's interlanguage at various proficiency levels. When focusing on the learner's main difficulties in the process of Chinese language acquisition, the teachers are able to adjust the teaching methods with the objective to increase the efficiency of the instruction practice (Aston 1995: 261). The learner corpus enhances the development of the learner's intercultural awareness and the student's communication skills are perceived as more fluent, because it reflects the natural language utterances of the native speakers (Cocchetta & Samiolo 2015: 240). In comparison with the traditional research of second language acquisition (SLA) and the study of the learner's interlanguage, learner corpora contain language data in context, therefore the researchers gain a complex understanding of the learner's interlanguage and achieve more refined research results (Díaz-Negrillo & Fernández-Domínguez 2006: 85).

## 2. Learner Corpus Research

The important fields related to learner corpus research are corpus linguistics, linguistic theory, SLA, and foreign language teaching. The SLA theories enhance the understanding of the learner's language production and are necessary for its interpretation. Because of that, the theoretical knowledge of SLA plays an important role for the learner corpus researchers as well. The methodology of foreign language teaching is also important for the successive implementation of the research results in the instruction (Granger 2009: 16). In comparison to the traditional methods employed in the learner's interlanguage analysis, the advanced processing methods of corpus linguistics, the use of real language data, and new analysis approaches represent an important innovation of interlanguage research (Deng 2007: 16).

The learner's interlanguage is a unique system differing from the target language by the presence of linguistic features transferred from the learner's mother tongue (Ellis 1997: 33). The learner's language production is influenced by factors such as form (written or spoken), exercise type (examination or non-examination tasks), language environment (classroom or non-classroom) and others, because the characteristics of language production under different conditions vary (Zhou 2015: 99). The transfer from the learner's native language is reflected on every level of the second language production including phonology, syntax, semantics, or pragmatics. Not only errors are signs of the learner's mother tongue interference, but also avoidance and over-use of certain structures together with the facilitation are considered as a sign of the interference. However, some linguists do not consider the learner's mother tongue as the main source of the errors (Ellis 1994: 29). The occurring errors are significant indicators of the extent of the learners' knowledge and reflect the possible interference of their mother tongue. The motivation for analysing the learner's errors is to increase the efficiency of the teaching methods and improve the learner's language proficiency (Corder 1967). The error analysis helps teachers to evaluate the learner's language competence, but it also facilitates the learning process, because the students become aware of their errors and they are able to convey self-correction. However, the identification and description of the errors are rather ambiguous and in certain cases, it is demanding to reconstruct the learner's original meaning (Ellis 1997: 15).

## 3. Learner Corpora and Language Acquisition

The learner corpus enables dynamic monitoring of the student's language production based on the findings of the synchronic or diachronic study of the language material. The researchers either concentrate on the learner's individual development of language proficiency or a particular group of learners. The latter leads to the establishment of a more scientific and objective teaching methodology based on the findings

from the learner corpus (Zhen & Wang 2010: 141), because the one-sided use of native speaker corpora without the supplementary knowledge gained from the learner corpus might lead to the selection of unsuitable teaching materials and methods (Granger 2002: 19). The learner corpus facilitates a relatively fast evaluation and categorization of the common errors occurring in the texts written by students as well as enables a systematic examination of the selected language from the point of second language teaching methodology (Hnátková et al. 2012: 61) and contributes to the description of interlanguages across various proficiency levels (Callies 2015: 21).

#### 4. Chinese Learner Corpora

The increasing number of studies based on the learner corpora reflects extending research interests of the processes linked to the development of the learners' interlanguage with a focus on Chinese. Despite the flourishing tendencies of research embedded in the field of corpus linguistics and the rising popularity of teaching Chinese as a second language (TCSL), there is a rather limited number of institutions within the European region focused on the development of the Chinese corpora (Petrovčič et al. 2020: 66), therefore the development of the Chinese learner corpora created at the European institutions represents an important milestone for the future linguistic research and methodology of TCSL meeting the needs of different groups of learners.

The creation of the Chinese learner corpora is driven by the development of theoretical research embedded in the field of TCSL. The complex development of the TCSL methodology requires a representative and balanced learner corpus equipped with error annotation. Another implication is linked to the needs of teaching practice, because the study of the language material in learner corpus reveals the processes related to Chinese language acquisition. The teachers analyse and summarize the factors affecting the learning efficiency to optimize the teaching strategies following the learners' needs (Zheng 2013: 132). Although a balanced and representative learner corpus is the ideal prerequisite for the study of the interlanguage, the degree of compiled language material's authenticity is rather limited due to the constrained conditions of the learner's language production. The common source of the language material used for the creation of learner corpora are exams or writing compositions that are both considered partially controlled productions (Granger 2002: 7). The learner's language production is limited by the task variation and the compiled language material processed in the Chinese learner corpora is not an exception. Based on the existing Chinese learner corpora introduced in the following section, the exam papers from HSK (*Hanyu shuiping kaoshi*) or TOCFL (*Test of Chinese as a Foreign Language*) represent the main source of the compiled language material.

The majority of the learner corpora contain metadata providing information about the learners and the text (e.g., proficiency level, length of study, nationality, gender,

text length, text category, etc.). The number of metadata varies based on the preference of the researcher creating the corpus. Although metadata represent valuable information, language proficiency does not always correspond to the learner's real command of the studied language. It is partially caused by the ununified standards assessing the student's language proficiency at different institutions (Wang & Zhang 2016: 108). Regarding the learner's nationality, the researchers either decide to concentrate on students with a particular nationality or with various nationalities to ensure the general validity of the research findings. The multiangle analysis extends the research scope and has a positive impact on overall teaching arrangements, textbook creation, or test design (Zheng 2013: 133). Taking into consideration the distribution ratio of various nationalities, it is not possible to ensure an ideal balance due to the prevailing number of students originated from the Asian region, therefore the amount of language material written by European or American students is naturally lower (Zhang & Cui 2015: 129). Learner corpus containing the language material written by the learners with various nationalities reflects the characteristic features of the Chinese language acquisition that they have in common. As a result, it is possible to concentrate on the learner's needs when selecting the content of the Chinese textbooks. Another important aspect linked to the creation of the learner corpus is the longitudinal compilation of the language material that ensures the language material covers the gradual development of the learner's interlanguage (Zheng 2013: 135–136).

	<b>International Corpus of Learner Chinese</b>	<b>Jinan Chinese Learner Corpus</b>	<b>HSK Dynamic Composition Corpus</b>	<b>Guangwai-Lancaster Chinese Learner Corpus</b>	<b>TOCFL Learner Corpus</b>
scale	45 mil. words	6 mil. characters	4,24 mil. characters	approx. 600k words	1,5 mil. characters
created	1995	2006	2006	2016	texts compiled between 2006 and 2012
proficiency levels	beginner, intermediate, advanced	beginner, intermediate, advanced	A, B, C	beginner, intermediate, advanced	A2, B1, B2, C1
nationalities	120	59	28	107	46
error annotation	yes	n/a	yes	yes	partially annotated

**Figure 1.** Overview of existing Chinese learner corpora

Based on the overview of the existing Chinese learner corpora (figure 1) created within the last two decades, four out of the five examples are still available on their corresponding websites and we did not succeed only with the access to Jinan Chi-

nese Learner corpus. The diversified query options are the result of the individual preferences of the creators and the compiled language material is written by students at various language levels. The number of learner's nationalities also widely varies. The corpora are equipped with extensive metadata about the learners and the written material (Cf. Cui & Zhang 2011; Wang et al. 2012; Zhang 2014; Chen & Xu 2019; Chang 2013).

## 5. Small-scale Chinese Learner Corpus

Considering the Slovak students of Chinese and the methodology of TCSL, the lack of comprehensive teaching methodology design aimed at the needs of the Slovak students caused that the teachers tend to employ their intuition and experience from the instruction practice. The further research embedded in the field of learner corpus linguistics and TCSL represents an important basis for the creation of teaching materials reflecting the difficulties of Slovak students in the process of acquiring Chinese. Due to a relatively low number of Slovak students enrolled in the program at the university, the creation of a large-scale Chinese learner corpus composed of texts written solely by Slovak students represents a rather demanding task, therefore the creation of a small-scale corpus is more suitable based on the actual research environment and the future usage of the learner corpus.

Teachers employ the small-scale learner corpus for the retrieval of the language material written by their students to understand the learner's overall language learning situation, word collocation mastery, error typology, and other factors instead of making judgments only based on intuition and previous teaching experience (Zhou 2007: 118). The small-scale learner corpus reflects the actual language proficiency of the learners and maps the interlanguage development of a particular group (Ragan 1996: 211). Concordance represents a suitable tool for drawing comparisons of problematic linguistic forms to improve the process of language acquisition (Granger 2002: 22–23). Apart from the comparison of the texts and errors with the correct formulations, the learners have an opportunity to compare the language production with their classmates. The active use of the learner corpus composed of texts written by classmates increases the learner's language awareness. It is also useful for the consequent error analysis and error correction as an inseparable part of the classroom activity (McEnery & Xiao 2011: 373).

The creation of a small-scale corpus is beneficial for improving the methodology of TCSL reflecting the needs of a particular group of learners. Considering the limited amount of teaching materials using Slovak and Chinese as instruction languages, it is necessary to convey more research embedded in the field of corpus linguistics with the primary focus on the Slovak students of Chinese and the development of their interlanguage. Because of the fact that the existing Chinese learner corpora either do

not contain the texts written by Slovak students or the number of texts is very low, it is not possible to convey a complex analysis of the error patterns and determine the main difficulties of the Slovak students, therefore the creation of a specialized small-scale corpus containing the language production of the Slovak learners represents a suitable solution for the future development of the research in this field.

## 6. Conclusion

The development of corpus linguistics paved the way for the creation of numerous Chinese learner corpora. The increasing number of available learner corpora extends the range of linguistic research aimed at the development of the learner's interlanguage and reflects the evolving language proficiency of the learners. The existing large-scale Chinese learner corpora composed of texts written by students of different nationalities facilitate the complex error analysis and interlanguage research, but the large-scale Chinese corpora do not contain a sufficient number of texts written by Slovak students, therefore the existing corpora are not suitable for the research concerning this particular group of learners. The creation of a small-scale Chinese learner corpus represents an important milestone in the development of the comprehensive teaching methodology corresponding to the needs of Slovak students as well as the linguistic research, because we gain a better understanding of the gradual development of the learner's interlanguage and error's variation throughout the evolving language proficiency. As a result, we determine the main difficulties of the Slovak learners and teachers have an opportunity to work with relevant information about the current language proficiency of their students instead of relying on their intuition based on the previous teaching practice. A relatively low number of Sinology students in Slovakia hinders the creation of a large-scale learner corpus, therefore we consider a small-scale learner corpus as a suitable basis for the research of the learner's interlanguage studying Chinese.

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# The Influence of Buddhist Temples on Tang Dynasty Poetry

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## Abstract

The temples of the Tang Dynasty were closely connected with the literati in the Tang Dynasty in terms of economy, politics, social culture, etc. Therefore, the poets of the Tang Dynasty visited the temples and interacted with the monks in the temples. It has become a social custom. This will inevitably make the monasteries and monks penetrate into the daily life of the poets, and then have an impact on the poets' poetry creation. As an important place in the life of poets in the Tang Dynasty and the specific context of their creation, the temple had a subtle influence on the creation subject in the Tang Dynasty.

**Keywords:** temple, Tang poetry, creation subject, influence

唐代寺院与诗人的生活息息相关，自然也影响到了他们的诗歌创作，为数众多的寺院题材诗歌的存在即为证明。以寺院这一特殊场所为中心，包含山水环境、人文景观、诗僧等在内的佛寺文化整体为诗人的创作提供了种种机缘。佛教寺院独特的山水景观与人造景观，为诗人提供了创作之思与素材；诗人独游与群游寺院时，作为一种表现与交流的需要以及在寺院的寺壁题诗，刺激了诗人创作的兴趣；而以官僚文人或寺僧为首，在寺院组织的诗会联唱活动，也对诗人的创作以及联唱体式诗歌的发展产生了巨大的影响。另外，“寺壁”这一独特的载体形式所引发的题壁诗创作，又使得寺院成为了诗人发表新章、获取文名、流布作品的重要场所。

### 1. 寺院对诗人兴思的激发

寺院在其发展过程中，由于佛教徒往往注意将寺址选择于山水形胜之地，从而形成了宗教环境与自然环境的结合，谚语所谓“天下名山僧占多”，即是这种情况的反映。

自然风景对于中国古典诗歌的创作有着非常重要的意义。特别是六朝以后，伴随着中国文人对于自然山水的审美价值的发现，不仅诗歌创作中自然风景的描写分量越来越大，而且自然山水也逐渐成为诗人创作感物起兴、引发诗思的源泉。刘勰曾云：

春秋代序，阴阳惨舒，物色之动，心亦摇焉。……是以诗人感物，联类不穷。流连万象之际，沉吟视听之区。写气图貌，既随物以宛转；属采附声，亦与心而徘徊。……若乃山林皋壤，实文思之奥府。<sup>1</sup>

唐代诗人继承了六朝以来借山水景物抒情写怀的传统，特别注重景物在诗歌创作中的作用。一方面山水景物是作家寄托情怀的载体，另一方面它也往往是作家灵感产生的触媒。由于唐代诗人特别重视兴感赋诗，兴又常常由物引发，因此，当唐代诗人在寺院游赏时，由于其中

<sup>1</sup> 周振甫：《文心雕龙注释》，人民文学出版社，1981，第493-494页。

多有与山水景物相联系的景观,它自然也就成为诗人感兴赋诗的最佳场所了。

寺院的自然景观对诗人创作的意义,可以从两方面来考察。首先是寺院周围的自然景观对诗人创作的影响。就唐代现存的题咏寺院之作来看,多数诗歌所写的都是自然景观十分出色的寺院,当诗人游览这类寺院时,他们所关注的也常是寺院周围的景物,并由此引发他们登临观赏的感受,王维的《过香积寺》就是这样的诗作。诗云:

不知香积寺,数里入云峰。古木无人径,深山何处钟。泉声咽危石,日色冷青松。薄暮空潭曲,安禅制毒龙。<sup>2</sup>

这首诗并未从香积寺本身着笔,开头一句“不知香积寺,数里入云峰”,即点明了诗人是远在寺院之外,以下“古木无人径,深山何处钟。泉声咽危石,日色冷青松”两联,写其因闻钟声而知寺,并写所见寺院周围清幽之景,最后一句“薄暮空潭曲,安禅制毒龙”,转写因寺院的环境之幽,臆想寺内僧人克制妄想的禅定生活。从全诗可以看出,诗歌的重心在于写香积寺周围景色之幽美,所以近人俞陛云即评此诗云:“此咏寺外幽景,皆不本寺落笔,游山寺者,可知所着想矣。”<sup>3</sup>白居易的《游悟真寺》长达百韵,以移步换形的笔法,从出游写至山顶寺院,将沿途所见,备写无余。《唐宋诗醇》评曰:“洋洋洒洒,一气读下,几于千岩竞秀、万壑争流,目不给赏矣。”<sup>4</sup>

如果说寺院周围之景引发诗人的游兴诗情并提供了写诗的素材,那么处于山水环境中的寺院,则又常常成为诗人观景的最佳视点。佛教徒在创寺之初,未必有将寺院作为观景之处的考虑,但由于寺院多处高山,加之寺院与周围环境浑然一体,因此当寺院建成后,也就成为便于观赏的处所。地处杭州西子湖畔的灵隐寺便是这样的一个例子。初唐诗人宋之问的《灵隐寺》诗,即写由登寺所见之胜景,云:“楼观沧海日,门对浙江潮。桂子月中落,天香云外飘。”由于诗中这几句写景极为出色,因而还由此诗引出了一则诗坛佳话<sup>5</sup>。

“贾生耽此寺,胜事入诗多”<sup>6</sup>，“一时风景添诗思”<sup>7</sup>，唐代寺院景观的形胜，确实为诗人的创作提供了诗材与诗趣，也触动了诗人的灵感，激发了他们的创作热情。“官清书府足闲时，晓起攀花折柳枝。九陌城中寻不尽，千峰寺里看相宜。高人酒味多和药，自古风光只属诗。见说往来多静者，未知前日更逢谁。”<sup>8</sup>“千峰寺里看相宜”与“自古风光只属诗”两句诗，或许正可说明寺院这一特殊场所与诗人诗歌的创作关系。

## 2. 寺院对诗人诗艺的提高

佛教寺院所具有的公共游赏场所的性质使之成为所有信仰与不信仰佛教的人可共同自由出入之所。于是，喜欢漫游的诗人常结伴而游寺院；同时，寺院对文人开放为投宿、宴饮之所，

<sup>2</sup> 《全唐诗》卷一二六，第1274页。

<sup>3</sup> 俞陛云：《诗境浅说》，北京：北京出版社，2003，第9页。

<sup>4</sup> 据四库本。

<sup>5</sup> (唐)孟郊《本事诗·征异第五》云：“宋考功以事累贬黜，后放还，至江南。游灵隐寺，夜月极明，长廊吟行，且为诗曰：“鹫岭郁岩峩，龙宫隐寂寥。”第二联搜奇思，终不如意。有老僧点长明灯，坐大禅床，问曰：“少年夜夕久不寐，而吟讽甚苦，何邪？”之问答曰：“弟子业诗，适偶欲题此寺，而兴思不属。”僧曰：“试吟上联。”即吟与听之，再三吟讽，因曰：“何不云‘楼观沧海日，门听浙江潮’？”之问愕然，讶其道丽。又续终篇曰：“桂子月中落，天香云外飘。扪萝登塔远，剡木取泉遥。霜薄花更发，冰轻叶未凋。待入天台路，看余度石桥。”僧所赠句，乃为一篇之警策。迟明更访之，则不复见矣。寺僧有知者，曰：“此骆宾王也。”……”见丁福保《历代诗话续编》上册，第17-18页，中华书局1983年版。

<sup>6</sup> (唐)李洞：《题慈恩友人房》，《全唐诗》卷五〇一，第5735页。

<sup>7</sup> (唐)刘禹锡：《广宣上人寄在蜀与韦令公唱和诗卷，因以令公手札答诗示之》，《全唐诗》卷三五九，第4066页。

<sup>8</sup> (唐)姚合：《和秘书崔少监春日游青龙寺僧院》，《全唐诗》卷五〇一，第5735页。

多人会宿、彻夜诗酒之集会也常于其中举办。在诗歌创作极为兴盛并且是最为惯用的交际手段的唐代，他们在这一场合也常常是游集必有诗。这既是交流思想、联络感情的需要，也是展示才华、呈露智慧、切磋诗艺的最好机会。

郑谷《喜秀上人相访》结句与僧人相约“他夜松堂宿，论诗更入微”<sup>9</sup>，这反映了诗人与诗僧之间谈论诗道的交友方式。其实，这一活动并不仅限于士僧之间。唐代以寺院为中心所进行的种种文人雅集、士僧酬唱，都对唐代诗歌技艺的发展、提高和创新起到了重要作用。寺院对诗人创作的这一特殊意义毋宁表述为：“夜夜僧堂聚，论诗方入微”。

唐代诗人的“聚会”活动很多，如王昌龄有《诸官游招隐寺》、刘长卿《集梁耿开元寺所居》等。为何这类活动多于寺院之中举办，抑或寺院何以能引起诗人才艺相较的欲望？对此，权德舆记友人在天长寺酬唱时说：

《易》之《同人》曰：‘文明以健，中正而应。’故道同于内，而气相求；情发于中，而声成文。以观以群，以比以兴。清河崔处仁、河东卫从周，于是有清秋仁祠往复十七韵之作。初二贤皆以秀造分校秘府宏文之书，贞元初，同为渭南尉，联曹结绶，相视莫逆。处仁自府庭旋归，税驾于斯，国门胜概，康庄在下，驰车徒而走声利者，此为咽喉。外烦埃壒，中孕闲旷，昼悬清光，夕湛虚明。上方之锤磬，深夜之月露，眺听寂寞，情灵感发。投者报者，无非琼瑶，如金丝应和，孔翠翔集，尽在是矣。厥后同为左右补阙，从周以本官入为翰林学士，处仁累以尚书郎知制造。既而处仁西垣即真，从周复以外郎掌诰，泊处仁迁小宗伯，而从周即真，俄掌贡举，实为之代。元和三年秋，处仁为吏部侍郎，从周为兵部侍郎，重九休浣，联镳道旧，永怀曩篇，二纪于兹。虑屋壁之隙坏，诗文之磨灭，不若刻勒片石之为坚且久也。惟二贤大雅闲达，人伦龟玉，更为王阳，迭为田苏。便蕃清近，烜赫章大，其于为霖为砺，四方之属耳目久矣。然则志气之所舒，英华之所摅，其滥觞于此乎？德舆与二君子同为谏官，同掌书命，相继典贡士，分曹居中台，其间交代迭处，不可具举。敢叨益者之数，实悦同心之言，追琢既具，序夫本示，亦二君子之志也。<sup>10</sup>

正是因为处身寺院这种特定的情境，诗人们情灵感发，才有了相互酬唱、切磋诗艺的愿望。

有时在这一场合诗人们还会与旧友不期而遇，温庭筠《和友人盘石寺逢旧友》诗即是写友人在寺院邂逅逢旧因而自己创作唱酬诗歌的，这当然也是同样提供了交流诗艺的机会。有时不熟悉的诗人在寺院相遇，也会切磋诗艺。《唐摭言》就有一条这样的记载，云：

湖南日试万言，王璘与李群玉校书相遇于岳麓寺。群玉揖之曰：“公何许人？”璘曰：“日试万言王璘。”群玉待之甚浅，曰：“请与公联句可乎？”璘曰：“惟子之命。”群玉因破题而授之，璘览之略不伫思，而继之曰：“芍药花开菩萨面，棕榈叶散野叉头。”群玉知之，讯之他事矣。<sup>11</sup>

这种寺院之内逞才显能的行为应是以寺院为诗艺竞技场这一社会风气的客观反映，此为寺院提高诗人诗艺之一端。其另一端，则是活动于寺院之中的寺僧所带来的新变。其具体途径，便是通过文人与寺僧在寺院内的雅集酬唱，包括结僧唱和以寺僧为中心的诗会等形式。

中唐以后，随着江南诗僧的崛起，其对诗人创作的正面影响就更为突出，如道标、皎然、灵一、广宣等，这一群活跃于江南的诗僧，与众多的诗人都有交往。

<sup>9</sup> 《全唐诗》卷六七五，第 7785 页。

<sup>10</sup> (唐) 权德舆：《崔吏部卫兵部同任渭南尉日宿天长寺上方唱和诗序》，《全唐文》卷四九〇，第 2216 页。

<sup>11</sup> (五代) 王定保：《唐摭言》，上海：古典文学出版社，1957，第 149-150 页。

大历时期，浙西湖州的诗会是中唐时期最有影响的诗会之一。元和年间，诗人孟郊重到湖州，追忆当年的诗会活动，曾满含深情地写道：“昔游诗会满，今游诗会空”<sup>12</sup>。

唐代寺院不仅能够激发诗人的创作兴致，诗人同游、会聚寺院时，这里又成了诗艺交流、比竞之所；而诗僧的介入更加强了寺院的这一功能。僧社、联唱等带有近代文艺沙龙性质的活动每每于寺院之中举行。这些围绕寺院展开的活动都对唐代诗人艺术技巧的磨练与提高具有积极意义。

### 3. 寺院对诗人作品的传播

题诗于壁这一独特的现象“前代无闻，唐始盛焉”<sup>13</sup>。题壁诗在唐代以前虽然已出现，但还没有形成风气；到唐代，题壁逐渐蔚为风尚。今存唐人题壁诗当在千首以上。<sup>14</sup>唐人题壁，遍及公署、私舍、驿站、旅馆、寺院、道观、塔坟等处，几乎无所不在。但在其中题诗最多的处所，当属寺院。<sup>15</sup>

唐代题壁诗发达的客观原因大致有两点：第一，唐代文人出行频繁。唐代文人受政治影响至深，身如转蓬，四处漂泊。“入仕前，他们必须为寻求进身之道路而四处活动；入仕后，他们因公因私，不断在南北驿道上奔波”。<sup>16</sup>对于“多于情而工于诗，善状咏风态物色”的唐代诗人而言，在烦闷冗长的旅途中吟诗作词不失为调剂生活和妆点心情的手段。一方面行旅之中不可能带有大量纸笔，另一方面，当良辰美景寓目、诗情画意溢心、愁情烦郁恼人之时，难以抑制的创作冲动喷薄而出，此时直接挥洒壁上，无疑更具有淋漓尽致的创作快感，正所谓“兴来索笔谩题诗”<sup>17</sup>是也。第二，唐代文人作品并无便利通畅的出版发行渠道。唐代纸张价格高昂，不易得，无法满足文士高涨的文学创作需求。雕版印刷范围狭窄，唐玄宗朝，朝廷诏令仍以抄写为主，至于文士的诗文，更是如此。<sup>18</sup>于是，诗人采取变通的方法，题壁，乃至树叶、树干、竹子、石壁、门窗等都被当作题写的材料和发表的途径。题壁诗的传播简便快捷。题诗的时间、地点、工具较少受到限制。诗人偶然心会，信笔而书，当诗人创作完成时，传播即告开始。对作者来说，题壁可以说是一种免费的、省时节工的“发表”机会。对于读者来说，读题壁诗也是一种免费的精神享受。题壁诗读者层次比一般的书籍发行还多样。所以从传播的角度来看，题壁可以说是一种更为大众化的传播方式。

在这一背景下，寺院得天独厚之利使其成为题壁诗创作的重镇。首先，唐代寺院具有停客职能，是唐代文人行旅中经常投宿的逆旅。其次，寺院的墙壁多经粉刷，楹梁门柱光滑便于书写。唐代的寺僧对诗人在寺内题诗不仅不加阻挠，反而粉刷墙壁、设置诗板，创造一切便利的条件时并主动请题，以之为荣。宋人诗话载：

张祜喜游山而多苦吟，凡历僧寺，往往题咏。如《题僧壁》云：“客地多逢酒，僧房却厌花。”《题万道人禅房》云：“残阳过远水，落叶满疏钟。”《题金山寺》云：“僧归夜船月，如龙拂晓云。树色中流见，钟声两岸闻。”《题孤山寺》云：“不雨山长润，无云水自阴。断桥荒藓涩，空院落花深。”如杭之灵隐寺、天竺，苏之灵岩、楞伽，常之惠山、善权，润之甘露、招隐，皆有佳作。

<sup>12</sup> (唐)孟郊：《送陆畅归湖州，因凭题故人皎然塔、陆羽坟》，《全唐诗》卷三七九，第4266页。

<sup>13</sup> (宋)韩琦：《定州刺史厅壁题名记》，据四库本《安阳集》。

<sup>14</sup> 刘洪生《唐代题壁诗》选录优秀题壁诗，共841首。北京：中国社会科学出版社，2004。

<sup>15</sup> 参罗宗涛：《唐人题壁诗初探》，载《唐代文学研究》第三辑，广西师范大学出版社，1992。

<sup>16</sup> 李德辉：《唐代交通与文学》，湖南人民出版社，2003，第28页。

<sup>17</sup> 徐冲渊：《清隐斋饮酒》，《全宋诗》卷二六一一，第48册，第30342页。

<sup>18</sup> 参张泽贤：《唐代工商业》，北京：中国社会科学出版社，1996。

李涉在岳阳常赠其诗曰：“岳阳西南湖上寺，水阁松房遍文字。新钉张生一首诗，自余吟着皆无味。”信知僧房佛寺赖其诗以标榜者多矣。<sup>19</sup>

这些便利的条件加上寺院情境对文人诗兴的激发，题寺壁诗特别多也就不足为怪了。除却这些客观因素，唐代寺院题壁诗的繁盛，其根本原因还在于寺院对于诗人作品的强大传播功能以及诗人对这一功能的强烈诉求。

唐代佛教昌盛，寺院内香客信众络绎不绝；同时，寺院还是当时的社会文化中心，兼具公共园林、艺术博物馆、戏场、旅馆等社会文化功能，这必然导致唐代寺院人员来往密度极大、人群流动性极强。到访寺院者上至王公贵戚、名公巨卿，下至贩夫走卒、山野草莽，包含社会各个阶层。寺院这一地位在当时社会堪称独一无二，诗人若想发布新章，引起影响，迅速成名，舍此别无更佳之所。唐代诗人对寺院传播作品的重要功能有着清晰体认，其寺院题壁也带有鲜明的表现自我、露才扬名的心理动机。

唐时，诗名或文名是士人追求自我精神满足的一种的有效形式，“一句能令万古传”，文士因一篇之善或一句之工而声誉四闻，扬名天下的现象屡见不鲜。题壁文学就以其独特的呈现方式被唐人实用化，其扬名显身的传播作用被凸显出来，作为自我价值实现的一种方式，逐渐沉淀为一种约定俗成的创作范式。而在这一点上，唐代寺院题壁诗的传播效果是极为突出的。

寺院题壁诗的传播效果还体现为引发后来人的和作、继作。壁上之诗文与寺院一起经历岁月的消逝，后来人目睹前时旧作，一种时空的沧桑感油然而生，自然就会引发他们的创作冲动。如杜甫有《岳麓山道林二寺行》诗云：“宋公放逐曾题壁，物色分留与老夫。”其后唐扶题诗《题道林岳麓寺》云：“两祠物色采拾尽，壁间杜甫真少恩。”

寺院题壁诗对诗人作品的传播不仅有着空间上的广度，还有着时间上的跨度。《全唐诗》中多有仅靠一、二首题壁诗得以留名至今者。如史俊《题巴州光夫福寺楠木》，陆海《题奉国寺》、《题龙门寺》，许玫《题雁塔》，崔庸《题惠严寺》，陈光《题桃源僧》等。寺院题壁诗的恒定性确实可以让很多诗人行之久远。

具有强烈扬名意识的唐代诗人充分认识到寺院题壁的传播意义，纷纷借助于题寺壁这一免费便利的条件将诗作置于读者眼中，通过流动大众或口耳相传、或抄写三散播的方式将诗作广布天下，赢得生前身后名。白居易自谓“逢山辄倚棹，遇寺多题诗”<sup>20</sup>，可视为唐代诗人的共同趋向。

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<sup>19</sup> (宋) 葛立方:《韵语阳秋》，上海:上海古籍出版社，1984年版，第56页。

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# From Shen Congwen in Xiangxi to Giovanni Verga in Sicily

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## Abstract

Shen Congwen is a representative writer of Chinese Realism literature, and Giovanni Verga is a representative of Italian Verismo. Both Chinese Realism in the 1920s and Italian Verismo were influenced by French Naturalism, and this influence strengthened the connection between these two literary schools. Although Shen Congwen and Giovanni Verga lived in different eras and different countries, both of them created many local novels (xiangtu xiaoshuo). Both writers focus on their remote hometowns and on underclass of people who live there, respectively showing the customs of the countryside in China in the 1930s and that in Italy at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Shen Congwen, with the background of Xiangxi, Hunan, uses lyric-like language in a series of works to depict the landscape of Xiangxi which is full of folk customs, showing the truth, goodness and beauty of the people living there. In the verist works set in Sicily of Giovanni Verga, he uses simple language to outline the poor Sicilian mountain village scenery. The author objectively shows how local people fight for survival, hiding behind the works, and letting the characters do the talking. The paper will take the novels of Shen Congwen and Giovanni Verga as a reference, discuss both the growth background and the creation background, and analyse the connections and differences between the two writers in their respective works.

**Keywords:** Shen Congwen, Giovanni Verga, Naturalism, 1920s Chinese realism, Italian verismo

## 1. 20世纪20年代的中国现实主义与意大利真实主义的对比

20世纪20年代的中国现实主义和19世纪末的意大利真实主义都受到了法国自然主义的影响。文学领域中的自然主义诞生于19世纪下半叶工业发达的法国，它是哲学思想实证主义在文学与艺术上的体现。自然主义文学在法国的代表人物是埃米尔·左拉（1840-1902），他在受到了两位同国哲学家奥古斯特·孔德（1798-1857）和泰纳（1828-1893）的影响后，将自然主义定义成实证主义与现实主义相结合的产物。左拉主张，自然主义以科学为主要理论基础，认为作家们应当像科学家做实验一样，将周遭的所见所闻按部就班地呈现在纸上，作家所创造出来的人物以及其在所处环境中的行为应当谨遵科学定律。

与十九世纪的浪漫主义作家不同，自然主义作家以科学、客观的方式描写并分析现实，他们并不会从自我角度出发去评判人物行为的好坏、善恶，也不会过多地表达自我感受，他们会隐藏在作品背后，让人物本身来讲述他们的生活、表达他们的情感、宣泄他们的痛苦。这种表达方式被称为“非个人化”表达。

信奉科学的左拉认为文学不应该是想象的产物，而应该是一种探寻人、探索环境以及探究人物在所处环境中的行为的工具。在他提出的“实验小说”这一理论中，“实验”一词指的是，作品即是如何科学地分析现实。左拉想通过自然科学的研究方式来探索人的精神世界。在受到泰纳影响的左拉看来，遗传和环境是构成人行为的两大基本元素。但与泰纳不同，左拉更加侧重于遗传对人的性格和行为的影响。因此，在左拉所创作的自然主义作品中，小说人物都被宿命论套牢，遗传下来的性格是无法通过环境来改变的。例如，在《卢贡-马卡尔家族》中（这是一套包含了20部实验小说的小说集），小说《娜娜》的主人翁娜娜（Nana）和《萌芽》的主人翁艾蒂安（Étienne）都是《小酒馆》中绮尔维丝·马卡尔（Gervaise Macquart）的孩子，前两者对待爱情的方式和他们的母亲如出一辙，环境的变迁并没有改变他们的行为方式，而是遗传基因注定了他们的悲剧。

《卢贡-马卡尔家族》小说集创作于1871年到1893年，这套小说集通过一个家庭中不同成员之间的联系与不同境遇展现出了法兰西第二帝国的自然与社会历史。左拉正是秉承科学客观的写作态度，通过“非个性化”的表达方式，用文字为我们铺陈开了一张张十九世纪末生活在巴黎的底层人民的相片。

到了20世纪初，在法国乃至欧洲曾经盛行一时的自然主义文学被新青年带到了中国。1915年，陈独秀在《青年杂志》上发表了一篇名为《欧洲文艺史谭》的文章。在文章中他首次提到了“自然主义”一词，他认为，文学的发展过程是从古典主义到浪漫主义，再到现实主义，最后到自然主义这样一步步进化的。虽然陈独秀是首位将自然主义文学引入中国的，但他并未把自然主义文学与中国文学放在一起进行比较。直到1922年，茅盾通过在《小说月报》上发表的一篇名为《自然主义与中国现代小说》的文章，才第一次将自然主义文学与当时的中国文学进行了系统且详细的对比。

茅盾在这篇文章中首先指出了当时中国盛行的旧派文学的弊病，认为创作其的作者“没有确定的人生观，又没有观察人生的一副深炯眼光和冷静头脑”<sup>1</sup>，因此创作出来的小说要么是一件仅供游戏消遣的商品，要么是一种“载道之器”<sup>2</sup>。

在茅盾看来，左拉所提倡的自然主义文学正是改变中国文学面貌的灵丹妙药。自然主义文学首先主张从客观的角度出发，作者要像照相一样，用文字如实地再现现实。这一点可以改善以“黑幕小说”为主的中国文学脱离现实，只有些不自然的“佯啼假笑”<sup>3</sup>或凭空捏造的“男女淫欲之事”<sup>4</sup>的弊病。自然主义文学的第二大特点是描写现实所用的科学方法。这一运用科学方法进行创作的理论，一方面迎合了新文化运动时期新青年对于“科学”与“民主”的诉求，另一方面也能解决中国文学“只知主观的向壁虚造”、“满纸虚伪做作”<sup>5</sup>的问题。茅盾认为，作家应该客观地观察身边的世界，深入了解所要创作的内容，最后再运用做实验时的严谨科学方法，用文字呈现现实；而不应该以记流水账的方式铺陈

<sup>1</sup> (Mao 1981: 89)

<sup>2</sup> (Mao 1981: 90)

<sup>3</sup> (Mao 1981: 84)

<sup>4</sup> (Mao 1981: 84)

<sup>5</sup> (Mao 1981: 90)

文字,堆砌出思想空洞、味同嚼蜡的内容。自然主义文学的客观描写和注重科学的精神迎合了文学研究会中新派文学家所提出的文学“为人生”的口号。文学研究会是茅盾、郑振铎、叶绍钧等文人学者一道,创办于1921年的文学组织。该组织以倡导现实主义文学为己任,提出“文学是表现人生的,诉通人与人间的情感,扩大人们同情的”<sup>6</sup>主张。左拉的自然主义文学首先将人从居高临下的位置拉到了与万物众生皆平等的位置。在自然主义文学家看来,人类不再是神圣般、主宰万物的存在,而是与其他物种平等且相似的。在左拉的作品中,有大量的人对于性欲的渴求,这一点即表现出了人类的动物性。其次,左拉的作品更加注重通过对人物行为的客观描写来塑造人物性格,尤其是塑造那些生活在巴黎底层的人物,而并非将大量笔墨倾注于小说情节的发展上。20世纪初推崇新文学的中国作家受到左拉作品的这两点影响后,摆脱了中国晚清小说情节光怪陆离、跌宕起伏的牵绊,将注意力集中在小说人物本身,认为文学作品不应该是吸引眼球、任人娱乐的游戏商品,而应该是能影响人们思想的精神补给。

在塑造人物方面,中国20世纪20年代的现实主义与自然主义是有差别的。中国现实主义作家认为人的行为方式和周遭环境有着紧密的联系。人物所处的环境能影响其行为方式,同时,人们也可以通过自身行动来尽可能地改变社会环境。而左拉的自然主义却认为人的行为方式是由遗传所决定的,通过遗传所形成的人物性格是很难改变的。因此,左拉笔下的人物都陷入了宿命论的泥沼,远离了环境对人的影响。自然主义的这一点遭到了与茅盾同时期的中国文人的诟病,同时茅盾自己也意识到了其危险性。宿命论并不符合茅盾所希望的“文学为人生”,它往往会带来悲观的情绪。因此,茅盾强调,“采用自然主义的描写方法并非即是采用物质的机械的命运论”<sup>7</sup>,而应该更多地学习自然主义的客观描写方法。

自然主义文学受到同期文人批判的另一个原因是“纯粹的客观描写法”<sup>8</sup>。批评者指出,绝对的客观描写会使人物丧失生命力,左拉等自然主义者只看到了人性的丑恶,却忽略了人性的真善美,这种极端的客观描写使小说人物的人生死板僵硬。面对自然主义批评者的观点,茅盾并没有全盘否定。他认为文学作品应该在客观冷静的观察和科学描写的基础上增加作者的主观思想,这样文学作品的内容才更加丰富且深厚。针对该问题茅盾再次指出,学习自然主义并不是全部生搬硬套,而是要选择能“补救我们的弱点”<sup>9</sup>的方面,从而来改善中国文学的现状。

自然主义在中国的生命并不长,只有1921到1922短短两年,后来在马克思主义的影响下,文学研究会的作家们纷纷投身到了对俄国现实主义的研究中。虽然自然主义在中国昙花一现,但却为20世纪20年代中国现实主义文学的发展打下了坚实的理论基础。

与中国文学家不同,意大利的真实主义作家更加看重法国自然主义文学所主张的“贴近现实、揭露贫苦、不公,以及人们为反抗社会而做出的斗争”<sup>10</sup>。法国自然主义在19世纪下半叶传到了意大利,那时的意大利正在为全国统一而奋斗。经过半个多世纪的复兴运动(1815-1870),意大利先于1861年建立了意大利王国,然后在1870年占领罗马,完成了统一。在整个复兴运动期间,文学家们以祖国统一为目标和己任,充当着引领人民思

<sup>6</sup> (Mao 1981: 90)

<sup>7</sup> (Mao 1981: 96-7)

<sup>8</sup> (Mao 1981: 96)

<sup>9</sup> (Mao 1981: 96)

<sup>10</sup> (Vigini 2016: 82)

想的导师角色，因此，诲人不倦的浪漫主义文学占据着首要地位。到了1870年后，祖国统一业已完成，曾经受到了浪漫主义文学熏陶的新一代文人开始逐渐接受新的社会现实，他们将眼光聚焦到底层人民身上，创作出了许多描绘困苦生活的作品，这类作品便被称为真实主义 (Verismo) 文学。真实主义于1874年开始萌芽，盛行于1875年至1895年的意大利，其代表人为路易吉·卡普阿纳 (Luigi Capuana 1839–1915) 和乔万尼·维尔加 (Giovanni Verga 1840–1922)。与左拉不同，两位意大利作家的真实主义小说的故事背景集中在贫穷落后，以农耕或打渔为业的西西里。这一点与鲁迅所开创的乡土文学相似，两者都是身处都市，胸怀故乡：维尔加在佛罗伦萨和米兰创作出了大量的描写西西里的真实主义作品；鲁迅在北京发表了许多关于故乡小镇的短篇小说。

20世纪20年代的中国现实主义作家与意大利真实主义作家的另一个相同之处在于，两者都表达了悲观的情绪。鲁迅 (1881–1936) 通过《狂人日记》、《药》、《祝福》等作品表现出了个人力量的薄弱，以及受封建思想荼毒的群众力量的强大，认为个人是很难通过自身力量来改变社会的；茅盾也通过《蚀》三部曲表现了青年人在大革命时期的迷茫与无能为力。维尔加通过《农耕生活》(Vita dei campi) 和《乡村小说》(Novelle rustiche) 两部小说集中的短篇小说以及长篇小说《马拉沃里亚家族》(I Malavoglia) 表达了现实不可改变的悲观情绪。受法国自然主义影响，意大利真实主义作家秉承了宿命论思想，认为人的命运是无法通过个人努力而改变的。他在作品中强调了家的重要性，认为家人就像是“同一只手上的指头”<sup>11</sup>，应该不离不弃，任何远走他乡，想去改变命运的人都会注定以悲剧收场。

虽然中国现实主义作家与意大利真实主义作家都在作品中表达了现实难以改变的悲观情绪，但其原因是不同的。中国现实主义作家在现代文学中扮演着思想领路人的角色，在受到了梁启超 (1873–1929) 提出的“小说有不可思议之力支配人道故”<sup>12</sup>思想的影响后，中国现实主义作家希望通过文学来改变人民麻木、愚昧的思想，让人们认清周遭的现实，通过个人的努力使生活得到改善。但当他们逐渐意识到个人力量在大众面前的渺小，个人努力在社会现实下的无力后，他们开始怀疑自己是否能够通过文学来改变现状，因此产生了无奈与悲观的情绪。与中国现实主义作家不同，意大利真实主义作家一改昔日浪漫主义作家进行思想指导的形象，他们像自然主义作家一样，成为了冷静的旁观者。他们隐藏在人物背后，让人物本身进行叙述，对其行为不置可否。他们所做的只是将真实的现实呈现出来供读者品读。正如卡普阿纳所说：“我不太相信艺术具有社会功能性这一思想价值”<sup>13</sup>，真实主义作家并不认为文学能改变人的思想，他们也并不希望人们改变自身所处的环境，因为改变环境会造成人们生活的悲剧，这种悲剧正是他们的悲观情绪的来源。

不论是20世纪20年代的中国现实主义，还是19世纪末的意大利真实主义，都受到了法国自然主义的影响，这种影响让两个相隔甚远的文学流派有了共通之处。两者皆通过自然主义改变了当时的文学面貌，拉开了与老派文学的距离。两者在运用自然主义时都不是按部就班，而是对症下药，即根据各自不同的文学环境进行了相应的选择，让自然主义成为了发展本国文学的新鲜血液，促进了各自新文学流派的诞生与发展。中国现实主义与意大利真实主义之间最大的共同之处在于，两者都为乡土文学做出了巨大的贡

<sup>11</sup> (Verga 2016: 300)

<sup>12</sup> (Liang 1902)

<sup>13</sup> (Luperini 2009: 11)

献。接下来，本文将聚焦于各自的代表作家——沈从文和维尔加——从其生活经历出发，将其作品的特点进行一一对比。

## 2. 沈从文与维尔加

沈从文(1902–1988)和维尔加之所以会倾注大量笔墨在乡土文学上，是因为两位作家都来自经济相对落后、社会环境相对封闭的乡村。沈从文来自中国南方的湖南湘西，维尔加来自位于意大利南部的西西里的卡塔尼亚。这两个地方当时都完好地保留了各自的民俗风情和传统文化。湘西依山傍水，沈从文从小就目睹着生活在这里的农民和船夫，他们或是在山间田地劳作，或摆船溯沅水而上，到处弥漫着一片田园风光。西西里则地广人稀，毗邻大海，维尔加的周遭也环绕着为生计奔忙的农民与打渔人。他也自幼见证了人们与生存搏斗的场景。虽然两位作家的家乡相对落后，但他们在幼年时却并未饱受艰辛生活之苦。沈从文来自于一个达官显贵之家，祖父曾是一名将军，父亲也是一名副将。维尔加与沈从文一样，也来自一个富裕之家，父亲是一位古老贵族的后裔，母亲则来自于卡塔尼亚的一个资产阶级家庭。虽然幼年时家境优渥，但两位作家都不约而同地遭受了家道中落的变故。1915年，沈从文的父亲沈宗嗣(1866–1930)为逃避追捕，远走他乡，隐姓埋名，为了生存债台高筑，直到一年后才敢与家人联系，变卖家产，以供还债。维尔加家则因为1854年的瘟疫举家搬到了更偏远的地方，家庭的经济情况每况愈下，逐渐过上了窘困的生活。童年的生活让两位作家对乡村环境十分熟悉，家庭的变故让他们各自离开了家乡，开始接触更广阔的世界。除了各自的原生家庭相似外，两者还都曾有过一段军旅生活。沈从文于1917年至1922年参军，维尔加则是在1860年开始在国防军中服役了5年。军旅生活后，两位作家分别踏上了前往大城市的征途，在那里他们接触到了与自己志同道合的文人学者，学习到了新的文学思想，开启了文学生涯的辉煌。

沈从文自1922年离开军队后，一直辗转于中国的各大城市，如北京、上海、青岛等地，正是在这些城市中，沈从文陆续完成了许多短篇小说集和中、长篇小说，如小说集《蜜柑》、《新与旧》、《边城》等。维尔加也在服完兵役后，于1869年首先前往了意大利语之都佛罗伦萨，然后于1872年搬到了米兰，他一直在此居住到1893年。在佛罗伦萨和米兰，维尔加接触到了奢华的上流生活，结识了志同道合的文人墨客，受到了当时盛行的自然主义的影响，同时也意识到了乡村文化环境的闭塞。1874年，维尔加通过一篇名为《内达》

(Nedda)的短篇小说开始了现实主义文学的创作。沈从文和维尔加都是在城市定居之后才开始创作乡土文学，这样的文学作品也被鲁迅称之为“侨居文学”<sup>14</sup>，即作者从城市视角出发，创作出了以乡村为主要背景的文学作品。侨居文学一方面体现了作者记忆中的故乡面貌，表现出了作者对于故乡的思念；另一方面也反映了作者与繁华都市的格格不入。正如沈从文曾说：“在都市住上二十年，我还是乡下人”<sup>15</sup>。维尔加也曾表达过同样的意思，他将自己定义成一位“乡村古老小世界中的诗人”<sup>16</sup>。

两位作家在缅怀故乡的同时，也进行了对城市的描写。沈从文通过《八骏图》、《绅士的太太》、《大小阮》等作品描写了城市人内心的虚假、病态，以及人性的丧失，表达

<sup>14</sup> (Yan 1989: 64)

<sup>15</sup> (Shen 1983: 11)

<sup>16</sup> (Russo 1995: 20)

了作者对城市生活的不满与蔑视，突显了作者在乡土作品中所强调的人性美；维尔加则通过《唐·杰苏阿尔德师傅》(Mastro don-Gesualdo) 和《厄洛斯》(Eros) 两部现实主义长篇小说展现了城市生活。在这两部作品中，维尔加像自然主义作家一样，冷眼旁观，不予置评，但却通过小说人物的行为与对话，为读者塑造了上流社会中落魄公爵、不择手段只为跻身上流社会，或玩弄感情只为体现自己的社会地位的城市人形象，同时也揭示了城市人心理的病态与行为的荒谬。沈从文和维尔加都是从偏远落后的地区搬迁到了繁华的大都市，并在大都市中进行了作家生涯中主要作品的创作。乡村与城市的不同生活经历让他们对于两地的生活都十分熟悉，同时幼年的生活让他们与成年后所生活的地方产生了疏离感。因此，两者皆通过作品，表达了对故乡、对自己的过去的思念，以及对自身记忆的整理，同时，也体现了对当下城市生活的思索。

沈从文和维尔加作品的另一个共同之处在于，都不具备思想引导和教化功能。与希望通过文学来改变人民思想的那些中国现实主义作家不同，沈从文是一位主张文学独立的现实主义作家。在30年代，当众多文人就“到底是文学革命还是革命文学”一题争论得不可开交时，沈从文提出文学不应该受到外界政治因素影响，而应该更加注重文学作品的内在品质。沈从文受到了五四时期周作人(1885-1967)所提出的“人的文学”的影响，他在自己的乡土文学作品中努力构建出了一座“人性的希腊小庙”。他希望通过作品能给读者带来“审美享受”<sup>17</sup>，因此，在他的作品中，遍布着抒情的田园牧歌，呈现出一幅幅古朴的田园风光，涌现了许多生性善良的湘西人。与沈从文一样，维尔加也不主张文学具有引导思想的作用。在维尔加看来，社会的发展同样遵循达尔文的进化论，社会现实的变迁是一种“自发的力量”<sup>18</sup>，是不受外力影响的。因此，文学作品也无法通过人的思想来改变现实。维尔加所做的是尽可能客观地将他所熟悉的现实展现出来，通过冷静的笔触描写出生活在西西里的乡村人民饱受窘迫之苦，挣扎在生存线上的场景。

与沈从文不同，维尔加在描写乡村时，尽可能地将自己隐藏在人物背后，他并不对人物的行为进行好与坏、善与恶的评价。他继承了自然主义中的“非个人化”的表达方式，像一个“隐藏叙述者”<sup>19</sup>一样，置身于小说场景中，任凭事态发展。维尔加笔下的西西里乡村是洒满汗水与泪水的，是凄凉困苦的，是令人唏嘘的。而沈从文则是对乡村人淳朴、善良的天性进行了歌颂。他在真实记录湘西世界的基础上，添加了主观的抒情与赞美。沈从文笔下的湘西是幸福健康的，是人与自然和谐共处的，是现实被美化后的产物。

另一个沈从文与维尔加的不同之处在于，作者对于改变处境的态度。在赞美乡下人温良淳朴的人性的同时，沈从文也揭露了存在于乡村的一些问题。受到落后传统文化熏陶的乡下人是闭塞、保守的，是不愿意接受新思想的。比如在《萧萧》中，村里人总会笑话“装扮奇奇怪怪，行为更不可思议”<sup>20</sup>的女学生，萧萧虽然内心对女学生曾有一丝向往，但最终还是摆脱不了传统文化的桎梏，成为了一个童养媳。沈从文在乡土文学作品中，一方面歌咏了乡下人的真善美，另一方面也希望他们能远离落后传统，寻找克服旧习的理性。相比于沈从文，维尔加则更加悲观。他认为，不论是底层人民还是上流社会人士都应该始终停留在自己本身所处的环境中，否则就会以悲剧收场。在他看来，人们应该像“

<sup>17</sup> (Lombardi 2001: 206)

<sup>18</sup> (Luperini 2009: 8)

<sup>19</sup> (Marchese 1990: 171)

<sup>20</sup> (Shen 2019: 412)

生蚝”<sup>21</sup>一样紧紧地贴在“崖壁”<sup>22</sup>上, 否则就会被大鱼吞噬。受自然主义宿命论的影响, 维尔加在作品中强调了家庭的重要性, 认为既然人们无法改变现实, 就应该向生活屈服, 向家庭屈服。自身所熟悉的环境与家庭永远是人们的避风港。

### 3. 小结

虽然沈从文并不像维尔加那样与自然主义文学有着直接的接触, 但其作品中不乏自然主义的气息。注重个人性格描写的“人的文学”以及不受政治、阶级评判的影响, 尽可能客观地记录现实, 不让文学成为载道工具, 这些都有着自然主义的烙印。沈从文继承了受自然主义影响的中国现实主义的衣钵, 开创了属于自己的现实主义纯文学。维尔加虽然在19世纪末直接接触到了法国自然主义, 但他并未全然效仿, 而是摘取了有益于本国文学发展的根茎, 嫁接到了自己的乡土之上。自然主义对于中国现实主义和意大利现实主义是催化剂, 同时它也将沈从文的湘西和维尔加的西西里联系在了一起。

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# Forgotten Book, Forgotten Life: Polish Officer-Sinologist Paweł Alexandrowicz and His *Land of the Dragon*

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## Abstract

In 1939 retired Polish Army colonel Paweł Alexandrowicz, former Russian Imperial Army intelligence officer and translator published a popular-scientific compendium about China, which he visited several times during his studies at the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok (1906–10). Alexandrowicz, a keen observer, offers many fascinating glimpses into Chinese life; and although he uses broad generalizations, and sometimes seemingly racism-tinted language, he is careful to give reasonable explanations for the observed characteristics of the Chinese people, based on social, historic and economic circumstances. Being himself a minority person (a Pole in the Russian army) and coming from ethnically-diverse region he is intuitively more sympathetic to the plight of the Chinese people in early 20<sup>th</sup> century and less inclined to assume “colonial” and “orientalistic” attitudes.

**Keywords:** China in 20<sup>th</sup> century; China – descriptions; Polish sinology; Polish-Chinese relations

## Introduction

The book titled *Kraj smoka: Charakter Chińczyka, jego zwyczaje i obyczaje* (*Land of the Dragon – the Character of a Chinaman, his habits and customs*<sup>1</sup>) was published by Paweł Alexandrowicz in 1939, on the eve of the Second World War – not the best possible moment to interest Polish reading public in Chinese culture. Easily enough, it did not receive any attention and became forgotten, just as its author. It is, however, worth reading – not so much for its factual content (some of which is quoted from other sources and not truly original), as for these moments when its author offers us his glimpses of the Chinese reality, which he knew personally. Some of these remarks are not really politically correct – some of them appear downright rude – and often go against the “generally approved” wisdom about China. There are many “fissures” in this book – between acute observations and sweeping generalizations, between remarks about the “character of a yellow race” and logical and consistent explanations of certain behavioural patterns.

<sup>1</sup> As there is no official English translation of the book title I provide my own, which I will use in the rest of the paper, so as not to clutter the text with non-English phrases.

I would posit that this “fissured portrait” is one of the “fissured world” – of China in its most transitional period, between tradition and modernity, between the dying empire and not-quite-stillborn Republic; and that in a sense, mirrors the life of the author, which was also full of fissures.

### The Author

Paweł Oktawian Alexandrowicz<sup>2</sup> was born in Karczowa Ruda, Mariampol county, Suwałki Governorate of the Russian Empire on 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 1874 as a son of Malwina de domo Adamowicz and Felix Alexandrowicz. According to his own unpublished autobiography, his family was Polish on both sides and belonged to the local lower-level intelligentsia-professional class, living in a predominantly Lithuanian community. Young Paweł did not finish his secondary school in Mariampol, being relegated for striking a teacher and known for his anti-Polish behaviour (Aleksandrowicz, n.d.).

On May 28<sup>th</sup> 1892 he was accepted as a volunteer to the 110 Kamski Infantry Regiment, which was stationed in Kowno (lit. Kaunas). One year later he was sent to Vilna Infantry Junker Academy (rus. Виленское пехотное юнкерское училище, later Vilna Military School, rus. Виленское военное училище), where he finished two-year-long course, graduating in 1895. In 1896 he was promoted to sub-lieutenant and then, in regular, four-year intervals: to lieutenant in 1900, stabs-kapitan in 1904 and captain in 1908. In 1904, after the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, he was sent to the east, and took part in Russian excursion into Korea, but did not participate in any real fighting. In 1906 he was assigned to 24<sup>th</sup> Eastern Siberian Rifle Regiment, and then was delegated to the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok as an officer-student. Four years later he graduated with the “first class diploma and gold medal and was awarded meritorious annotation”. He was then assigned to be a translator in the staff of the 6<sup>th</sup> Siberian Rifle Division and the staff of Primorsk Military Region. After the start of the First World War, he served with his division on the Russian Western Front (i.e. called “Eastern Front” in English-language sources) in central Poland. He was moved to the general staff of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army, to serve as a translator and intelligence officer. He did see some action, was gassed, decorated and promoted to lieutenant colonel (1916). In 1917, when military and political structure of the Russian Empire started to crumble after the February Revolution, Polish officers and soldiers of the Russian army created Associations of Polish Military Men, out of which the one of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Army was the most important. Aleksandrowicz served as the Chairman of the Association and its official representative from 1917 to 1918, and after the Polish 1<sup>st</sup> Corps was formed, he served as its deputy commander (civilian affairs) and then the Chief of the Intelligence Department (WBH-CAW).

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<sup>2</sup> He is written as „Aleksandrowicz” in his military documents and in modern library catalogues. I follow his own practice of spelling his name, as in the book discussed in this paper.

Before I move to his service in the Polish army I need to pause for a moment. Described above is an almost-common career of a professional soldier, with steady peacetime advancement, characteristic for solid, but perhaps not exceptional, officer. However, it is important to remember that Alexandrowicz was Polish and Roman Catholic, two features that did not facilitate a career in the Russian Imperial Army. He was also a self-confessed Polish patriot, which could not only slow but easily hinder his advancement; and seeing his engagement and responsibilities he undertook in the Polish military associations in 1917, there is no reason to doubt his patriotism.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, in 1906–1910, he was delegated to study oriental languages at the Eastern Institute – with an obvious implication of working as an intelligence officer, an implication fully substantiated by his later assignments. To be so delegated and employed he had to be perceived as loyal and apolitical.

The officer-student programme of the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok (now Russian Far-Eastern Federal University) was an interesting idea to provide specialist training for the officers in a civilian institution. By its charter, the Institute, since the time of its establishment, was to train officers assigned by the Amur Governorate in Chinese, Japanese, Mongolian and Manchurian languages, corresponding with the needs of the far-east reaching Russian empire (Buyakov, 1999). The number of the students-officers rose from 4 in 1899 to 20 in 1906, when Alexandrowicz was admitted. It was not only a chance to study and gain exceptional qualifications, but – for a young officer without family inheritance – also quite a lucrative appointment: the student-officers received subsidies not only to pay for tuition and necessary books, but also for trips to neighbouring countries to obtain first-hand language and cultural experiences (Serov, 1994). Alexandrowicz spent a few months in China and Japan in the years 1907, 1908, 1909 and 1914.

In December 1918 Alexandrowicz was first attached to the Ministry of Military Affairs of the Republic of Poland (which in itself has been re-created just a month earlier) and then delegated to the General Staff. On July 1<sup>st</sup> 1920 he was appointed as a military attaché to the Polish Embassy in Tokyo, the first ever to serve in such a position; he left Poland before in August and arrived in Tokyo in October 1920 (WBH-CAW). He was to assist in rescuing the remnants of Polish troops fighting in the Russian Civil War against the Bolsheviks in Siberia, primarily the 5<sup>th</sup> Polish Division. His mission was in fact doomed from the beginning, as the division was already in 1919 beaten by the Red forces and most of its soldiers taken prisoners.<sup>4</sup>

In 1922 the post of military attaché was abolished due to the lack of funds and Alexandrowicz returned to Poland, stopping in then Japanese-occupied Qingdao, where he taught English for a few months. In 1923 he left the army and became a reservist, to be

<sup>3</sup> It has to be remembered that the success of Polish independence movement and re-emergence of Poland as a sovereign nation-state was at the time by no means assured. Therefore, such activities did carry certain professional and personal risks.

<sup>4</sup> Polish mission in Tokyo had some success in extracting Polish nationals from the Russian Far East, notably a large group of Polish children, which reached Poland with Japanese assistance.

finally retired in 1932. The question is, why this professional military intelligence officer, who spoke several languages, including such rare ones like Chinese and Manchu, and had unique, first-hand experience in the Far East, was not employed by the Polish General Staff? Or did not find a university job? Or a post in diplomacy?

One of the answers could be that he became embroiled in conflicts with authorities. He applied, on the basis of his service experiences, for a rank of general, however, the military commission recognized only his promotion to lieutenant colonel, claiming he had not sufficient experience of field command. Alexandrowicz contested this decision in rather sharp tones, accusing the members of the commission of prejudice<sup>5</sup>. His claims had certain merits (his wartime rank of full colonel was, in the end, confirmed), but for this accusation, which was deemed unjust, he received an official reprimand from the military court of honour. Few years later, he was again reprimanded by such court, for “behaving (in good faith) in a manner appearing of disloyalty towards his superior” – it has to be noted that from charges of actual disloyalty he was fully acquitted (WBH-CAW). The charges had to do with his conflict with Józef Targowski, Polish charge d’affaires in Tokyo in 1921, who filed negative report about Alexandrowicz – it seems, in response to Alexandrowicz’s also negative report about himself. The matter of Alexandrowicz recall from his post was in fact quite complicated and badly handled by all parties involved, as R. Majzner showed in his paper (2020).

It has to be said, that his peculiar talents and specializations were not in great demand in the Second Polish Republic, which struggled between Soviet Russia and Germany, and which did not pursue a very active Far Eastern policy. The few academic institutions researching the Far East were staffed by academicians of the more traditional type.

Aleksandrowicz then settled in Bydgoszcz with his family. He wrote several works about China, only one of which was published – the discussed *Land of the Dragon*. During the Second World War, he tried unsuccessfully to re-enlist, then hid in Lithuania, where he taught English in a gymnasium. After Lithuania was overrun by Germans he returned to Poland, where he lived to his death in 1965.

## The Book

*Land of the Dragon – the Character of a Chinaman, his habits and customs* is a 198 pages long kind of encyclopaedic compendium for the general public. It is divided into 37 chapters, most of a few pages’ length; at the end we find a very short bibliography, but there is no introduction, author’s note or a review by a friendly voice. The reader, from the very first page, comes straight into the factual matter. The first three chapters (*Cities; Streets; Houses*) deal with “living space”, then come four, which we may call “way of living” (*Clothing;*

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<sup>5</sup> Members of the commission were originally from Austro-Hungarian army, while Alexandrowicz was a former Russian officer. In newly formed Polish Military forces there were often quite high tensions between these groups.

*Food; Means of Transportation; Piracy*). Family life comes next (*Chinese Family. Children and Parents; Marriage; Divorce; Slavery; Funerals*); then the more general social life and mores (*Character and customs; Face; Thriftiness; Diligence; Inherent Tactfulness*, etc.) which constitute the rest of the book. Sometimes seemingly contradictory chapters coincide (chapter 34, *Philanthropy*, is immediately followed by the *Lack of Compassion*); some seem to be disjointed (there are separate chapters *Chinese Family. Children and Parents* and placed half-book later *Children's Attitude towards Parents*), but usually the subjects are grouped together (e.g. *Inaccuracy, Gift for incorrect understanding, Gift for going in Roundabout Ways*) or at least follow one another in a quite logical way (e.g. *Indifference Towards Lack of Comforts, Physical Resiliency and Tolerance and Persistence*).

There are 16 pages of illustrations, with 5 full-page and 17 smaller black-and-white photographs (altogether 22 photos on 12.5 pages), three full-page renderings of Chinese prints and one drawing which shares a page with two photographs; the titles are short and do not provide any detailed information. There are 6 street views, both general and close-up, of each only one is clearly identified, *The Street in the European Quarter in Shanghai* (it is in fact Shanghai Bund). Most of the others are portraits showing "types": *Beggars* (3 photos), *Street Barber, A Type of Woman from South China, A Type of Manchurian Woman, Middle-class Family, A Criminal* etc. (9 photos, plus one reproduction of a picture of a female dress); to this class I would also include two photos of bound female feet. Three photos show means of communication (sampan, cartwheel and palanquin); another four "institutions": *A Money Exchange, Cheap Street Eatery, Better Class Street Restaurant and Rich Family Cemetery*. The illustrations correspond to the text of the book, which contains almost no information about arts, visual or performative, traditional or modern; and the descriptions of beliefs are completely subjugated to the main topics (e.g. marriage): there are no photographs of typical "tourist sites", or cultural monuments (the only photograph of the small Chinese temple shows the above-mentioned cemetery).

The reproductions of prints appear to confirm to this scheme: they represent deities and mythological creatures, but according to the more detailed, than in the case of the photographs, descriptions, two of them show deities concerned with matrimony (social, not a religious subject). In one graphic there is one deity caring for the betrothed and one working against them, and also "Shé – viper, playing no role". Although it is obvious that this remark explains the role of the viper with regard to the marital union, it is curious that Alexandrowicz was so particular about making such a remark. Was it because he wanted to cut off any possible association the readers could form with the biblical serpent? Or did he want to distance himself from describing any symbols in the sketches, and he chose the most obvious one, rather the smaller and less visible ones, like the tiny skulls forming the necklace of one of the "devils", of which three different kinds are shown in the third picture?

## Characteristics of the book

*Land of the Dragon* is an uneven book: some passages show an eye for detail, for acute observation of everyday life; some are just generalizing descriptions, without specifying which part of China is actually described; finally, there are large passages quoted from other works. Unfortunately, Alexandrowicz rarely notes where such translations start or end, and he rarely provides bibliographical annotations. The bibliography at the end of the book is sketchy but signals a variety of sources in four languages: Chinese (4 titles), English (6), Polish (2) and Russian (2). In the course of the book, additional titles or authors are mentioned, which are not listed in the bibliography. Most of the books are pre-WW I, possibly the titles he read during his studies, e.g. Hosie's (1890) and Dingle's (1911) travel accounts. Interestingly, the English titles are given in the original version, while the Russian ones are translated to Polish: *Zasady życia w Chinach* (orig. *Принципы жизни Китая*; Georgievskij, 1888) and *Chiny* (orig. *Kumaï*, Putjata, 1895). Of the four Chinese books, I was able to identify just one: the history of the Qing military *Shengwu Ji* (聖武記) by Wei Yuan. Unfortunately, Alexandrowicz uses his own transcription of the Chinese language, which is supposed to be intuitive for Polish readers, but is neither consistent nor conforms to any accepted standard. Such practices show an (understandable) lack of academic discipline in dealing with sources.

The style is usually rather dry and informative. Alexandrowicz does not hesitate to offer broad generalizations and strong statements. If he qualifies his utterances, it is usually by the way of a concrete example. He presents matters „as they are”, without qualifying them to be his own impressions; his are not „thick descriptions” to use Geertzian (1973) phrase. His frankness, lack of „political correctness” is in a way refreshing, but at the same time may appear rude. However, I would not describe Alexandrowicz as „colonial”, „supremacist” or „racist”. Some of his unqualified statements may appear so – but first, it would be necessary to make a very detailed analysis, which of these statements are actually his, and which are unmarked quotations from other authors<sup>6</sup>.

He does however differentiate the Chinese and foreign points of view and way of doing things, often contrasting them with one another. Also, he differentiates between tradition and ideals described in old texts and modern reality. This is the point I would like to stress, because to mistake the ideal norm for the accepted way of doing things, or in other words, the prescription for the reality, is to make a grave methodological error. Alexandrowicz was not a methodology-conscious anthropologist, but he was an intelligence officer. Any officer with a modicum of experience knows how dangerous is to confuse these two orders of description, to believe that what is on the map, is also true in the field. I believe this distinction is too often not made too clearly by the books about China, especially of the more popular kind (as the *Land of the Dragon*). Awed by the „ancient tra-

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<sup>6</sup> I am of course aware of the fact, that by quotation he, to some extent, „embraces” the contents of the quoted texts.

ditions”, „wisdom of great sages” eternally preserved from the times immemorial, many authors do present these ideas as if they were fully practised today – which is certainly not the case. Alexandrowicz does not make this mistake; in fact, he underlines many times how big is the difference between the claimed ideal and real practice.

I believe this is the main reason why his views are often in marked contrast to the „accepted wisdom” about China. „Everybody knows” that the Chinese are communal people, who put the common good before private one. Maybe in ancient times it was so, says Alexandrowicz, „but in modern times little is preserved from such spirit. [...] The Chinese does not care for public property and steals it, if left unguarded” (Alexandrowicz 1939: 146). He sometimes connects ancient traditions with the modern situation (as in the chapter on *Conservatism*) and sometimes falls into the “unchanging China” trap – but bigger names that he had done it, too: Leopold Ranke said that the Chinese are “a nation of eternal stagnation” and G. W. Hegel believed that China had no real history because for millennia nothing had been changing there (Franke 1967: 142). But more often than not he notes, when changes do happen, and when (and where) they do not; he warns before all too quick belief in “new, republican, westernized” China, because great masses of the Chinese people live outside of modernizing and westernizing influences, which was undoubtedly true in the 1930s.

Alexandrowicz is able to look at simple issues and sees their multi-faceted implications. He does not praise or bemoan the Chinese lack of trust in each other: he treats it as a fact and describes many effects of such distrust: the influence it has on everyday behaviour and courtesy; the features of banking and monetary system; the problems for travellers unable to find ways and guides; the development of commerce. He rarely moralizes; he observes and provides a logical commentary.

What is most important, even when he mentions the “temperament of an Asian” or “features of a yellow race” he treats it also in a more descriptive than explanatory way. In this respect, he is not racist, even if he uses a racism-tinted language. He gives historical, social and economic reasons for different Chinese characteristics and patterns of behaviour. He notices, that the Chinese are not compassionate – but in the population on the brink of starvation, compassion is an unaffordable luxury; that they are conservative – but it simply means that they keep to proven ways of survival, having no margin for experiments; that both their basic good-nature and great resilience are strategies of survival in harsh economic and natural circumstances.

### **The man and his book**

The method of analysing a book through a biography of its author is outmoded in studies of literature, however, I believe that in this particular case the person of the author offers important clues to the text. It is a non-fictional book, as befits a down-to-earth officer; it is written in rather dry, matter-of-fact style, akin to military report, but lightened

with some humour and gentle irony. He does not write about things that he does not know much about: art, religion, spiritual life etc. – these subject he touches upon, only when they are relevant to his main subjects of the social life of the Chinese people.

For all the “unpleasant” things he writes about Chinese people: their dirtiness, callousness, dishonesty, love of money etc., he treats them very much as fellow human beings, not as some mysterious, oriental “Others” (compare Said, 1973). I believe that he saw enough of dirt and poverty and his native Lithuanian county, one of the poorest in the European part of Russia, to be too quick to judge other people’s uncleanliness as a sign of their presumed degeneration, rather than an obvious effect of poverty and lack of access to clean water. He was in many ways a member of a minority: born a Pole in a predominantly Lithuanian region; probably slightly better off than Lithuanian peasants in his native town, but worse than many of his colleagues in the army; a Roman Catholic from the eastern outskirts of pre-partition Poland,<sup>7</sup> but from the western outskirts of the Russian Orthodox empire. He travelled across the largest land empire of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to study the most populous one – and ended knowing three of the most popular languages of the world (Chinese, Russian and English), but also one of the least popular (Lithuanian). He was a liminal person, in spatial and temporal meanings of the word. As such he was a perfect candidate for the role he was to play: an engaged observer of foreign peoples, a role could easily adapt, being to some extent a “foreigner” his entire life. This gift of interested, but slightly detached observation is keenly felt in the *Land of the Dragon*. The book, although not written for scientists, sometimes “orientalising” and now certainly dated, is still a good read for any anthropologist, reminding of all-important qualities in research: attention to detail and common sense.

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# Chinese Olympiads for Schoolchildren as an Important Element of the Linguocultural Space

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## Abstract

In recent years, interest in Chinese language is growing. In addition to schools in which the Chinese language has been taught for many years, specialized Chinese language classes have also been established in many schools. Senior students of such schools would like to use their knowledge to get the opportunity to study in various institutions and universities. It is for this purpose that Olympiads for schoolchildren have been created in various prestigious universities in the country, including St. Petersburg State University. Such Olympiads are not just a test for knowledge of grammar or realities. The luggage of knowledge necessary for a student to successfully complete the tasks of any Olympiad should be greater than that provided by the school curriculum.

**Keywords:** Chinese language, Olympiad, Chinese Olympiad, language competition, Saint-Petersburg State University, SPbSU

In recent years, friendly contacts between Russia and China in a wide variety of fields – economic, trade, cultural, etc. – are getting stronger, hence interest in Chinese language is also growing and its popularity is increasing. Since last year, Unified State Exam in Chinese has been held. Apart from schools already teaching Chinese for many years and even decades, an increasing number of schools are opening specialized forms of Chinese studies. Naturally, students of senior levels of such schools wish, first and foremost, to show themselves and to use their knowledge for gaining the opportunity to study in various educational institutions.

Precisely with this view, special Olympiads for schoolchildren were created at various prestigious higher educational institutions of the country, including the SPbSU (Saint Petersburg State University). Such Olympiads are not just grammar or realia tests, nor examinations. The store of knowledge required for a student to successfully pass assignments of any Olympiad must be greater than provided by the school curriculum.

The All-Russian Olympiad for Schoolchildren organized by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, which was held for the first time in 2015–2016, is considered to be the main Olympiad in the country. It consists of six units and represents the most

prestigious intellectual contest, as a result of which a maximum number of incentives and benefits may be gained – such as, for example, entering a higher educational institution in the major of the Olympiad without Unified State Exam, a monetary reward, a short-term traineeship in China, a trip voucher for an international educational session at “Artek” (international children center at the Black Sea), as well as various prizes from partners of the Olympiad.

Another prestigious Olympiad for schoolchildren is the Olympiad in Oriental Studies held by the Institute of Asian and African Studies at the Moscow State University, wherein students may choose one of the countries, on which they will answer questions. It consists of 5 units. Its successful passage allows gaining a short-term traineeship in China, a trip voucher to “Artek” and special prizes from partners.

Since 2012, the Moscow State Linguistic University has been holding the Eurasian Linguistic Olympiad in various languages including Chinese. It consists of 5 parts; however, the format of many assignments duplicates assignments of the All-Russian Olympiad for Schoolchildren. Besides, it focuses mostly on the linguistic aspect including too little questions on country and culture knowledge. Nevertheless, this Olympiad provides winners with benefits at entering higher educational institutions in the form of awarding the highest score for Unified State Exam in foreign language or in the form of extra points.

In 2018, the Moscow Center of Pedagogical Excellence together with the “Artek” Camp held the *Golden Dragon Contest*, the winners of which received as an award not only a trip voucher for an international educational session at “Artek”, but also an opportunity to take a short-term traineeship in China. The contest itself consists of 9 units, wherein students make assignments for language knowledge and intercultural country and culture knowledge, as well as must make assignments for translation in both directions.

Another Olympiad that should be mentioned has been held by the HSE University (Higher School of Economics) for the fifth year already is the *Vyssshaya Proba* (Highest Standard) *Olympiad* in Oriental Languages. It consists of three units and provides winners with benefits at entering higher educational institutions.

And, at last, the Chinese Olympiad for Schoolchildren, held by SPbSU. For several years already, SPbSU has been holding Olympiads on various subjects (they currently total to 18). The youngest of them, existing since 2017, is the Chinese Olympiad, which provides winners with serious benefits at entering higher educational institutions.

Thereby, a rapid growth of significance of the Olympiad should be noted. If the first year it was held it had no level and only gave one point at entering SPbGU, the second year it gained the second level and the third year – the first level.

In 2017–2018, 2018–2019 and in 2019–2020, over three hundred persons participated in the qualifying round of the Chinese Olympiad. Geographically, it encompassed the entire country: not only schoolchildren from Saint Petersburg, but also from 30 cities

of Russia and CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries took part in the Olympiad.

Since 2018–2019, assignments are prepared for various age groups: 7–9 forms and 10–11 forms. Assignments for the former ones were targeted at approximately HSK3, for the latter ones – at HSK4.

The SPbSU's Chinese Olympiad is held in two stages. The first stage is online, which is held in the period from October through January and in which any student who wishes may participate. It is represented by a test consisting of 13–15 assignments, for which 60 minutes are given and a maximum of 100 points may be gained. Out of the participants, winners and prize takers, who are invited to participate in the final in-person (offline) stage, are determined.

180 minutes (3 hours) are given for fulfillment of assignments of the final stage, which consists of three units: 'Characters,' 'Lexical and Grammatical Assignments' and 'Questions on the Country and Culture Knowledge.' This stage features both test and creative assignments.

During elaboration of the assignments, it was taken into account that participants of the Olympiad must show:

1. knowledge of the phonetic system of Chinese;
2. knowledge of Pinyin and Palladius transcription systems;
3. knowledge of history and evolution of the main Chinese characters;
4. knowledge of the principles of character formation, concepts of 'radical,' 'stroke' and 'grapheme';
5. knowledge of basic vocabulary within at least HSK3-4;
6. skills of translation subject to Russian literary norms;
7. knowledge of Russian and Chinese phraseology and ability to analyze functional features of idioms in a literary text, ability to find Russian equivalents to Chinese idioms and vice versa;
8. knowledge of Russian speech norms and skill of appropriate translation from Chinese into Russian and from Russian into Chinese;

One of the most important problems that almost all Chinese Olympiads face is the growing number of participants represented by native speakers (this applies especially to the All-Russian Olympiad). As V.V. Kruglov, head trainer of the Moscow team in preparation to the All-Russian Chinese Olympiad for Schoolchildren, noted, "this year (2018 – *author's note*), fifteen out of the first twenty-five participants, who gained the highest scores at the Regional Stage in one of the regions, were ethnic Chinese, which comprises already 60%" (Kruglov 2018). One of our most important tasks at preparation of assignments was elaboration of a strategy for equalizing and balancing chances of students learning Chinese as a foreign language and those of ethnic bilingual Chinese. This determined the internal logic and content of assignments.

As previously stated, the Olympiad is not a language-knowledge test (for this, the HSK exam exists) – it represents primarily creative assignments, which allow identifying among participants those students, who have a great command of both Chinese and Russian, as well as of phraseology of both countries and who are able to demonstrate creative approach and at times even acumen.

A couple of examples of such assignments. For example, the unit ‘Lexical and Grammatical Assignments’ includes assignments for knowledge of phraseology. Special attention is paid to translation of idioms into Russian – therefore, in a series of such assignments a student must show not only knowledge of idioms, but also ability to choose a proper translation/analogue in Russian. Thereby, translation must be correct, *inter alia*, in terms of stylistics.

We also added an assignment for selection of a proper – both grammatically and stylistically – sentence translation into Russian: that is, participants are provided with a sentence in Chinese and four variants of its translation into Russian subject to stylistic features.

We also added translation of a small text (100–120 characters) from Chinese into Russian to the assignments.

In 2017–2018, the unit ‘Questions on the Country and Culture Knowledge’ contained, apart from standard questions on Chinese history, literature, culture, etc. in Chinese, an assignment for identifying a Russian poem in Chinese translation. The name of the author and the title of a Russian poem translated into Chinese had to be specified; the poems were taken from the codifier of Unified State Exam in literature. In this assignment, three poems were given – from the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, from the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and from the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In 2018–2019, a mini-quiz was added: 4 questions on Chinese history, culture and literature in Russian.

Last year, a quiz devoted to various aspects of life in China, culture, cinema and history was added – but this quiz was in Russian.

One of specific features of the SPbSU’s Olympiad for schoolchildren is represented by online presentation lectures. They are conducted three times a year. First, in autumn, prior to the qualifying stage. In this lecture, we tell future participants of the structure, format and types of assignments, of the books, which may help them in preparation. The second lecture is conducted in winter, after completion of the qualifying stage and prior to the final stage. In this lecture, we tell of the assignments waiting for participants at the final onsite stage, as well as of certain purely technical aspects that should be taken into account. And at last, the third lecture is conducted in late spring after announcement of the results. As a rule, it is conducted by members of the jury: they analyze the most frequent mistakes. Records of all lectures are available online, so the schools have the opportunity to study them carefully before participating.

Thus, in elaboration of assignments for the Olympiad, we are guided by the main goal – to identify talented Russian students, to engage them into studying at one of the leading higher educational institutions in the country – SPbSU, to bring talents of future enrollees to light through the use of an intellectual contest.

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***Let the Rain and the Fire Listen to my Tale –  
an Econarratological Reading  
of The Last Quarter of the Moon, by Chi Zijian***

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**Abstract**

The relationship between man and nature has always been a major theme in Chinese literature. Creating the background for the events in a novel, symbolizing a character's emotions or being the main character, nature impresses the reader through its diversity and richness. *In my paper, I will analyze the role played by nature in one of Chi Zijian's novels, "The Last Quarter of the Moon", from an econarratological point of view. A confession of an old Evenki woman that does not want to abandon her traditional way of life, the novel can be considered both a metaphor about the beauty that can be saved through art and a powerful reminder that humans' actions can affect nature forever. Chi Zijian's novel is one of the artistic expressions of the green civilization China is trying to build.*

**Keywords:** ecocriticism, econarratology, Evenki, Ecological Migration

One of China's famous contemporary authors, Chi Zijian started writing in 1983, introducing her wonderful native land to readers who, at that time, were not quite familiar with the beautiful mountains and forests that stretched at the far Northeastern Chinese border. Birch trees, icy-cold rivers, green pastures, reindeer, bears and humans are all part of an amazing world, in which the seen and the unseen are equally important and communicate through signs and symbols as old as the world itself.

Published in 2005, 《额尔古纳河右岸》 (É'ěrgǔnà hé yòu àn), translated in 2013 in English, by Bruce Holmes, as *The Last Quarter of the Moon*, is one of the first novels written by Chi Zijian, a work that brought the author one of China's most important literary prizes, The Mao Dun Literature Award, in 2008<sup>1</sup>. Written in the form of an old Evenki woman's confession, the novel tells the story of the reindeer herders, and covers a time span of almost a century. The relationship between people and their surroundings is the major theme of the novel, raising readers' awareness about a world which slowly disappears.

In my paper, I will analyze the novel through an econarratological perspective, highlighting the connections between the ecological background of the novel and the literary strategies used by the author. I will demonstrate that the narrative strategies, and the characters used by the author

<sup>1</sup> <http://en.cnpubg.com/enauthors/2015/0814/24259.shtml>, May 18, 2021.

help the reader relate with the storyworld and understand the difficulties people face when they separate from nature.

As a branch of ecocriticism, econarratology developed as a critical discourse which pairs “ecocriticism’s interest in the relationship between literature and the physical environment with narratology’s focus on the literary structures and devices by which writers compose narratives.” (James 2015: xvi) Reading a text through this point of view means studying “the storyworlds that readers simulate and transport themselves to when reading narratives, the correlations between such textual, imaginative worlds and the physical, extratextual world, and the potential of the reading process to foster awareness and understanding for different environmental imaginations and experiences.” (James 2015: xvi)

Although a recent theory, econarratology has already started to define several key directions, In the *Introduction* to their book, *Environment and Narrative. New Directions in Econarratology*, published in 2020, the editors, Erin James and Eric Morel, present the main fields that econarratologists will explore in their works: representations of nonhuman in narratives, narrative ethics, postcolonial studies, oral narratives, visual narratives. A special orientation is represented by the closer connection with the cognitive sciences, “encouraging narrative scholars to think through the ways in which readers simulate narrative space”. (James, Morel eds. 2020: xvi). The cognitive sciences approach helps theorists “develop their understanding of how narratives can affect emotions, attitudes, and behaviors of readers by encouraging them to simulate the emotional states and experiences of characters and/or narrators”. (James, Morel 2020: xvi) From the cognitive sciences’ point of view, reading is considered a particular case of neuronal reuse (Weik Von Mossner 2020), neuroscientists demonstrating that our brains respond in a similar way both to actions which we perceive with our senses and to those we only read about. The classical concept of *mimesis*, theorized by Aristotle, could thus be extended so that to include the reading process along with writing. The readers’ relationship with the characters and with the environment becomes the main focus for the econarratological analysis. There are certain discourse strategies that become relevant for such an approach (Weik Von Mossner 2020): first person narration (the narrator as the primary experiencing agent generates a more powerful response than a third person narrator), vivid sensory imagery (to see, to smell, to hear, to touch the environment), constructing credible characters (mediators between the fictional world and the real one) and using metaphors and similes for their affective value, taking into consideration the relationship between the text, the reader and the extratextual world.

*The Last Quarter of the Moon* is novel in which the readers discover a slowly disappearing world, and the impact of the story upon the readers is created at different levels in the text, which are relevant for the econarratological analysis. The whole effect is amplified by the fact that the author’s life experience is closely related to the world she imagines in her novel. Writing about the people and the places on the right bank of the Argun river was not a random choice for Chi Zijian. She was born in Beiji village and she spent her childhood in the land covered in ice and snow for many months a year. Talking about creating the novel, she explains her connection with this wonderful place: “this land that turns muddy as the ice thaws in the spring, shaded by green

trees in the summer and covered by motley leaves in the autumn and endless snow-white in the winter, is very familiar to me.”<sup>2</sup> Not only the land, but also the characters have a counterpart in reality. The relocation of the Evenki in 2003 was an episode covered by the Chinese media, that made a deep impression on Chi Zijian: “But as crowds of people descended upon Genhe City, Inner Mongolia, to witness this grand moment in the civilizing process of mankind, my heart was filled with an inescapable sense of melancholy and gloom.”<sup>3</sup> Moreover, one of the key characters in the novel, Irina, a young painter with a tragic fate, was inspired by Liu Ba, an Evenki painter who “had walked forth from the mountain forest with her dazzling artistic talent, and yet eventually emotionally drained, she quit her job, returned to the forest and, deeply troubled, found her resting place in a river.”<sup>4</sup> All these sources of inspiration melt in an impressive story, in which people and their world go through radical changes.

The story is organized in four chapters, *Dawn*, *Mid-Day*, *Dusk*, *The Last Quarter of the Moon*, whose symbolical meaning refer to time passing implacably, both in the human world and in the celestial one. All through the novel, the reader can hear a lyrical, melancholic voice, who starts telling the story with the days of her early childhood (dawn), and ends it in her nineties (the last quarter of the moon). The confession belongs to an old Evenki woman, the wife of the last Evenki Chieftain. The first person narrator is also the main character in the novel, and the voice who comments upon people and the events they go through. Her relationship with nature is obvious from the first lines of the novel, as she describes herself as “a long-time confidante of the rain and the snow. (...) The rain and the snow have weathered me, and I too have weathered them.” (Chi 2014: 3) The rain and the snow are symbols of femininity, of fertility, and of a strong connection between sky and earth, the visible and the invisible parts of the world. Just like them, the anonymous narrator is the one who connects all the parts of her world, making sure that it enters eternity, just like nature’s elements. She begins her story in a moment of crisis, when her clan, as the last Evenki living in the forests, has to end the nomadic life and relocate to a village at the foot of the mountain. Moving would mean not only abandoning a way of living, but also slowly losing one’s ability to connect to nature: “I won’t sleep in a room where I can’t see the stars. All my life I’ve passed the night in their company. If I see a pitch-dark ceiling when I awake from my dreams, my eyes will go blind. (...) If I can’t hear those reindeer bells ringing like rippling water, I’ll certainly go deaf. My legs and feet are accustomed to the jagged mountain paths, and if I have to walk the narrow, flat walkways of the town, my legs will become flabby that they’ll no longer support my weight, and I’ll become a cripple.” (Chi 2014: 4) Using very simple, but powerful sensory images which become component elements of some antitheses (to see – to go blind, to hear – to go deaf, to walk – to become a cripple), the narrator is convinced that changing places would be similar to dying. The situation is the same if looked from the point of view of the animals: “My reindeer have committed no crime, and I don’t want to see them imprisoned either.” (Chi 2014: 4) The most important argument against relocating remains, however, the fact that the spirit must be given

<sup>2</sup> <https://bruce-humes.com/2014/04/22/authors-afterword-last-quarter-of-the-moon/>, May 18, 2021

<sup>3</sup> Ibidem

<sup>4</sup> Ibidem

back to those who have created it: “My body was bestowed by the Spirits, and I shall remain in the mountains to return it to the Spirits.” (Chi 2014: 4)

As the story unfolds, the readers meet other powerful, credible characters, among which two are very significant: the tribe’s last Shaman (a woman) and a young painter, Irina, the narrator’s granddaughter. Interestingly enough, nature’s degradation story is told by means of female characters, the novel also being interpreted as an ecofeminist prose (Du 2018). The last Shaman is a wonderful woman who saves her clan in exchange for her own life. At the end of the novel, a fire starts in the forest and the helicopters brought in by the township Party Secretary cannot extinguish it, so Nihau the Shaman performs a last Rain Dance. When she dances, her old age and the fragility of her body are replaced by an unimaginable force: “As Nihau danced, thick clouds roiled in the sky and the reindeer herd stood, heads down, on the bank of the Argun. The drum beats feverishly, but Nihau’s feet were not as nimble as before. She danced and danced, and then she coughed. (...) The mountain fire extinguished, Nihau departed.” (Chi 2014: 301) As the character that represents the-more-than-visible world, Nihau is a symbol of force, spirituality and goodness. Her sacrifice saves the world, demonstrating that the connection between man and nature has a strong, spiritual basis. After Nihau’s death, the clan donates her shaman cloths and her drum to a museum, as a way of preserving, symbolically, the clan’s cultural heritage. But, as the sacred becomes profane and the world loses its spiritual center, its integrity is menaced.

As opposed to the old and experienced Shaman, the painter, Irina, is very young and unable to find her inner peace. She belongs to two worlds, the traditional one, represented by her clan, and the modern one, represented by her life in Beijing, but she can’t seem to find her place in either of the them: “When Irina became restless in the mountains, she would put her paintings on her back and return to the city. But she’d be back again before long.” (Chi 2014: 298) Nihau rescues the world through her sacrifice, while Irina saves it by transforming it into art. She is the one who paints Nihau’s last dance, her last painting being one of the most vivid representations of a world that no longer exists: “Nihau is dancing and reindeer surround her in the middle of the tableau. The Shaman’s face is fuzzy, but the Spirit Robe and the Spirit Skirt are so vivid that if the wind were to blow ever so lightly, those twinkling metallic totems would kling and klang. At the bottom are the desolate Argun and our people standing on the bank with heads drooped, praying for rain.” (Chi 2014: 302) Torn apart between the two lifestyles she cannot reconcile, Irina throws herself in the river after finishing her last painting. Her tragic destiny is representative of the dim future awaiting the Evenki clan, the author expressing “deep concerns about the bewildered young people in plight, whose souls are ground to bits by the powerful wheels of modern civilization.” (Du 2018: 796)

The ecological message of the novel is conveyed through a story that follows the Evenki clan for almost a century. Time is an important component of the storyworld, and Chi Zijian creates it on two different coordinates: the profane and the sacred. Historically, the events unfold through the twentieth century, referring to the Sino-Japanese war, the Sino-Soviet border conflict and the Ecological migration. The difficulties that the Evenki have to face during those harsh times in history form the realistic background of the novel, connecting the clan’s history to China’s recent

past. On the other hand, the sacred time, that of the legends about the Argun, about the reindeer, and the ritual time of the Shaman are instances in which the real events are linked to the immortal world, in which humans and non-humans share the same spirit. The historical time is linear, but the sacred one is circular, and the Shaman can access it and reinforce the real world with vitality, as it is shown in the final episode of the novel.

Place is another important component of the storyworld, also set on two coordinates: the sacred one, represented by the river, the mountains and the forest, and the real one, which is Jiliu Township. The river is the main axis of the world inhabited by the Evenki, its description highlighting its importance to the clan: “We always treated it as our center, living alongside its many tributaries. If the Argun is the palm of a hand, then its tributaries are five open fingers. They extend in different directions, illuminating our lives like flashes of lightening.” (Chi 2014: 20). The comparison used by the author links the river both to the human world and to that above, expressing the idea that nature and people, earth and sky, water and air form an inseparable unity. Through an aesthetic form, Chi Zijian conveys one of Evenki’s most important beliefs, that in nature, Buga, the supreme god: “Buga gives life to all kinds of scraps on earth, including humans. Buga sees everything, warms everything with its inner warmth, makes us human.”<sup>5</sup> In the ecological thinking of the Evenki, humans are equals to all other elements that make up the world. To express that, in their tradition, “people are called *mugdeken ekhachi*, a tree stump that sees [literally a treestump with eyes] and *mugdeken sechi* a tree stump that hears [literally a treestump with ears].”<sup>6</sup> In this system of beliefs, reindeer and humans are closely connected, inasmuch as one reindeer fawn’s life can be sent to the spirits in exchange for a child’s life. At the beginning of the novel, the narrator recollects one of her first childhood memories, in which her sister, Lena, was saved by the Shaman, who performed a ritual which ended with the fawn dying and Lena remaining alive. The mother of the two girls treats the fawn as her own child, giving it a proper funeral: “Mother picked up the fawn that had ceased breathing and cast it on a south-eastern slope. The infants of our people who don’t survive are usually tied up inside a white cloth bag and thrown onto a hillside that faces the sun too. The grass there is the first to sprout in the spring, and wild flowers open the earliest.” (Chi 2014: 21) Life and death form a circle in the Evenki world, in which all elements are interconnected, and numerous episodes of the novel prove it.

Unlike the magical forests and the almighty Argun river, Jiliu township is a real place, described as settlement in which people and animals alike feel trapped and lost. In the first days after being relocated “no one could sleep. they slipped out of their houses and wandered like sleepwalking ghosts. (...) So did their hunting dogs. They were accustomed to guarding their shirangju in the mountain forests, and those houses laid out in rows seemed unfamiliar (...)” (Chi 2014:261) Living in the town means having no connection with the environment, losing one’s purpose of living and one’s culture. For the reindeer, the situation is even worse, as they start getting weaker and finally getting sick, because they stop eating moss from the forest.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.evenki.atlas.org/index.html?module=module.cosmos>, May 20, 2021

<sup>6</sup> *Ibidem*

From an econarratological point of view, *The Last Quarter of the Moon* is a novel in which the plot, the characters, the textual strategies underline the same message: the real world, in which people have to abandon their traditional way of life, forests are cut and deadly fires start because of human negligence, is under threat. A nomad minority is relocated, but that is not the proper solution for the ecological problem. Salvation comes, however, through symbolic actions undertaken by three female characters: the narrator, the painter (Irina), and the Shaman (Nihau). Through stories, art and ritual, people can re-evaluate their position in the Universe and their relationship with the Other (environment/ humans/non-humans). Words, colours and prayers can help people transcend the borders between the real and the imaginary, and keep memories alive.

Reading the story through the econarratological approach can give us a better insight on what strategies are effective in creating virtual environments that appeal to the readers, and what is the relationship between the extratextual world and the reader. Inspired by reality, *The Last Quarter of the Moon* has vivid characters, credible events told in a sincere voice, being a precious instrument for (re)discovering ways in which humans and nature can live in harmony.

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## Българският език от перспективата на китайските студенти

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## Bulgarian Language From Chinese Students' Perspective

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### Abstract

The paper presents the experience, impressions, and attitudes of Chinese students who have studied or are studying Bulgarian language and culture. The emphasis is set on their motivation for choosing this major, the difficulties they face, as well as their goals for future realization. Most of the information was gathered through surveys, interviews, and questionnaires conducted with Chinese students. Based on the results of the survey, Chinese students usually start learning Bulgarian by chance, but in the process of education, they develop a long-lasting and deep interest. Despite the difficulties that they face, their motivation is high enough to continue forward and to overcome the problems.

**Keywords:** Bulgarian language, Chinese students, motivation, experience, realization

Настоящата статия<sup>1</sup> разглежда темата за опита, впечатленията и нагласите на китайски студенти, които: 1. са изучавали или изучават български език и култура в китайски университети; 2. са били в България по студентски програми за обмен; 3. са посещавали страната по време на летни школи. Целта на изследването е да се анализира съвременното състояние на изучаването на български език и литература от китайски студенти, причините за нарастващия интерес към тази специалност, както и перспективите за нейното развитие.

Изучаването на български език и литература в Китай е сравнително ново направление (към момента има 60-годишна история), което се развива интензивно през последните години. В общо четири китайски висши училища се изучава български език:

<sup>1</sup> Статията е първата част от по-голямо изследване, което подготвям като част от постдокторантски проект по програма на Министерството на образованието и науката за млади учени (2021 година).

- „Пекински университет за чужди езици: Според настоящия план на всеки две години има един прием, за всеки от тях – 16 души; специалността е основана в 1961 г., а през 1999 г. е открита и магистърска програма<sup>2</sup>.
- Пекински университет за международни изследвания: на всеки две години има прием по 16 души; за първи път бакалаври се обучават през 2017 г.
- Тиендзински университет за чужди езици: от 2018 г. се приемат студенти веднъж на две години – по 10 души.
- Хъбейски университет за чужди езици: български език се изучава временно само като втори език в специалността за преподаване на чужди езици.“ (Gai-er 2019)

До момента единственият китайски университет, в който е открита катедра Българистика, е Пекинский университет за чужди езици (ПУЧЕ). През 2021 г. се навършват 60 години от основаването ѝ. От две години насам СУ „Св. Климент Охридски“ и ПУЧЕ провеждат съвместна магистърска програма „Межкултурна комуникация и превод с китайски и български език“, в която се обучават български и китайски студенти.

Преподавателският състав в катедра Българистика на ПУЧЕ включва трима преподаватели от Китай – проф. Лин Уъншуан, проф. Чън Ин и доц. Тиен Дзиендзюн, както и български лектор<sup>3</sup>. Катедрата е част от Факултета за европейски езици и култури. Първоначално се приема нов випуск веднъж на всеки четири години. В момента едновременно се обучават студенти в два курса, приети с разлика от две години. Тази промяна е въведена през учебната 2017/2018 г. Първоначалният прием в един курс е бил 16, но от 2014 г. квотата е увеличена до 24 души. Към настоящия момент има 244 завършили студенти. От 2019 г. освен специалност „Българска филология“ е основана и съвместна програма с Юридическия факултет на ПУЧЕ – „Българистика и право“ (Lin 2020: 99).

Проф. Гъ Джъян, директор от китайска страна на Институт „Конфуций“ в София от 2014 до 2018 г., посочва, че в ПУЧЕ е изградена собствена система за преподаване на български език за китайски студенти, която той нарича „българска интегрирана педагогика“. Тя включва методите: „Метод на четенето; Естествен подход; Аудио-визуален метод; Граматико-преводен метод; Аудиолингвален метод; Преводен метод“ (Zhiqiang 2013: 16).

<sup>2</sup> В цитирания източник не е отчетена промяната от 2014 г. – приемът вече е 24 души.


<sup>3</sup> В статията си „Животът като преподаване. Българистиката в Пекинский университет за чужди езици“ Люба Атанасова, която е преподавател от българска страна в катедрата, представя следния списък на лекторите, които са водили този тип курсове в ПУЧЕ от 1963 до 2013 г.: „проф. Стефания Гинина – от 1963 до 1966 г.; доц. Снежана Гогова – 1984 до 1986 г.; доц. Цветана Базова – 1988–1991 г.; проф. Бора Белванова – 1991–1992 г.; проф. Лилия Илиева – от 1994 до 1997 и от 2004 до 2006 г.; доц. Илия Недин – от 1998 до 2000 г.; доц. Светлана Стойчева – от 2000 до 2004 г. и от 2009 до 2011 г.; доц. Мила Кръстева – от 2006 до 2007 г.; доц. Димитър Камбуров – от 2007 до 2009 г. и д-р Мариана Малинова в периода от 2011 до 2013 г.“ (Атанасова 2018: 95)

По думите на проф. Лин Уъншуан, има значими изменения в методологията на преподаване и в учебните планове на катедрата от нейното създаване до настоящия момент<sup>4</sup>. В обучението са включени множество учебни дисциплини, които не само развиват чисто лингвистичните умения на обучаваните, но и предоставят обширна информация за страната.

Успешното развиване у студентите на културологичен интерес по отношение на България личи и в отговорите, които те дават на въпросите в анкетата, проведената в рамките на представеното тук проучване. Към настоящия момент броят на анкетирания е 33. Поради все още неголемия брой китайски студенти, които изучават или са изучавали български език, този сравнително малък брой респонденти може да бъде приет като представителна извадка. Голяма част от въпросите са с отворен отговор (общият им брой е 31), така че въпросникът е предвиден да изпълнява функции на границата между анкета и интервю.

Най-голям брой от анкетирания са студенти в Пекиния университет за чужди езици 北京外国语大学 – 11 души от специалност „Българска филология“, а също и от Пекиния педагогически университет 北京师范大学 – 12 души, като тези студенти са били в България през лятото на 2019 г. в рамките на лятна школа по български език и култура. След това са възпитаниците на Софийския университет (четирима) и на Тиендзинския университет за чужди езици 天津外国语大学: (трима). Има също така един обучаващ се в ИЧС, един студент от Източно-китайския педагогически университет 华东师范大学 и студент от Националната художествена академия (София).

39,39% от анкетирания изучават български език от по-малко от 1 година, 30,3% – между една и три години, 18,18% – от 3 до 5 години и 12,12% – над 5 години.




Тридесет от анкетирания са посещавали България по различни причини, а 54,55% са били у нас в рамките на едногодишно или по-дълго обучение.

<sup>4</sup> В началния етап „От 1961 г. до около 2000-та година курсовете са основно насочени към четене, слушане, говорене и превод. Методът на преподаване е главно граматико-преводен. В хода на преподаване голям брой упражнения са върху българско-китайски и китайско-български превод, обучение по лексика, упражнения с изречения, обяснение на граматиката, фокусиране на обучението върху основните езикови умения. Освен курсове по чужд език, се предлагат и курсове, като например: странознание, история на България и история на българската литература.“ (Lin 2020: 97)

За 39,39% от анкетираните слушането и разбирането на разговорната реч на носителите на езика е най-трудната част от изучаването на българския език. Вижда се, че четенето и писането в значително по-малка степен затрудняват китайските студенти и само 15,15% се справят трудно. Усвояването на българската граматика е най-сложната част от обучението за 18,18%, но в свободните отговори всъщност голяма част от посочените примери са свързани именно с нея.

Кой аспект при усвояването на българския език според Вас е най-труден?  
您认为学习保加利亚语的哪个方面最困难?



Сред примерите за конкретни трудности при изучаването на български език са посочени: промяната на думите 词的变化, родовете на съществителните, системата на глаголните времена 时态 (7 от отговорите), също и разликата между свършен и несвършен вид на глагола, структурата на изреченията 句子结构 (3), предлозите и членуването, произнасянето на определени звукове или различаването им при слушане (напр. различаване на Д и Т; К и Г; Б и П, както и артикулирането на Л и Р). Именно по отношение на изговарянето на дадени звуци се затрудняват голяма част от анкетираните, като те отбелязват разликата с китайския език 语音系统和汉语差别很大.

По отношение на трудностите при слушането няколко от студентите посочват, че българите понякога говорят неясно и също така твърде бързо. Те отбелязват също така и индивидуалните специфики на говора на различните носители на езика, които често създават непреодолима трудност. За себе си някои смятат, че все още нямат достатъчно голям набор от лексика, а други се затрудняват от това, че при изразяване на български език личи преводната структура на изреченията им.

Преподавателката по български език в ПУЧЕ д-р Люба Атанасова смята, че при китайските студенти първоначалното възприемане на нови езикови модели и структури винаги преминава със сравнително бавна скорост, необходими са множество обяснения и повторения. След като се премине този етап обаче, китайските студенти успяват да усвоят новия елемент и го прилагат изключително ефек-

тивно. Тя посочва, че „веднъж възприели и запазвали правилото, китайските студенти са всъщност по-бързи от европейските“ (Атанасова 2018: 98).

Като най-приятен аспект в обучението китайските студенти са посочили в отговорите си: разговори и общуване с български приятели и колеги (8 отговора); четирима са отбелязали четенето на книги и други материали, гледането на филми и постановки; двама – изучаване на разговорна лексика по време на лекции 在课上学习生活用语. Сред останалите отговори са включени: превод; участие в часовете, водени от български лектори; изучаване на произношението, учене на граматика и нови думи; българска история и актуалната ситуация; опознаване на страната и на специфичните обичаи посредством езика 通过语言的学习接触到新的国家、民族习俗特色. Някои от студентите посочват, че имат интерес към всичко, което е включено в програмата.

От дадените отговори се вижда, че желанието на студентите за прилагане на наученото в реална ситуация е водеща мотивация в процеса на обучение, като най-голям интерес имат към свободното общуване с български приятели. Към тези отговори може да се причисли и желанието за изучаване на разговорна лексика в рамките на лекциите. Някои от анкетираните имат и по-специфични интереси към историята и културата на страната, а други – чисто езикови: към граматиката, произношението или лексиката.

Един от главните проблеми, с които се сблъскват китайските студенти, е това, че възможностите им да практикуват наученото, общувайки с носители на езика, са твърде ограничени. В някаква степен това е валидно и за българските им колеги, които изучават китайски език. Повечето от анкетираните посочват, че случаите, когато практикуват български език са много малко, най-често в класната стая и основно с преподаватели и колеги.

Почти всички анкетирани отбелязват, че според тях има нужда от издаването на нови учебни материали и използването им в учебния процес. Някои считат, че има необходимост от учебници, които включват по-съвременно съдържание, например такива, които представят съвременния начин на живот в България 和现实生活紧密结合的. Много от студентите се интересуват от начина, по който българите разговарят в ежедневието си и в тази връзка част от идеите за нови материали са свързани с такъв тип съдържание. Сред отговорите е посочено също, че има нужда от учебни пособия, в които да бъде застъпено по-голямо количество упражнения (например учебна тетрадка, която може да служи изцяло за тази цел). Предложено е и включването на повече материали, свързани с културата на страната.

Също така, някои от студентите се надяват на публикуването на съвместно изготвени материали от китайска и българска страна 期待中保联合编写的教材. В тази връзка е и друг от дадените отговори – това, че би било хубаво да има повече учебници, които да бъдат адаптирани специално за китайските студенти.

Българските книги, които анкетираните знаят и харесват, са много, като вариат от класически произведения до най-нова литература. Иван Вазов е добре познат сред анкетираните – той е споменат от 11 от тях, като двама от тях са посочили конкретно „Под игото“, а един – разказа „Една българка“. В четири от отговорите е отбелязан Елин Пелин („Гераците“, „Ян Бибиян“, „Печената тиква“). Поезията на Христо Ботев, на Димчо Дебелянов и на Пейо Яворов са избрали съответно по трима души, а сред творбите, които познават, са „Хаджи Димитър“ и „Две хубави очи“. Алеко Константинов и книгата му „Бай Ганьо“ също са посочени от трима души. Сред посочените заглавия още са: „Тютюн“ – Димитър Димов, „Всички наши тела“ – Георги Господинов, „Нежната спирала“ – Йордан Радичков, „Къщата при последния фенер“ – Светослав Минков и много други.

Сред специфичните за България архитектурни и културни паметници, както и произведения на изкуството, които са впечатлили анкетираните, са: тракийските златни съкровища, храмът „Света София“, Мадарският конник, Боянската църква, Рилският манастир, паметникът на Бузлуджа, статуята на Света София, архитектурата и стенописите в българските църкви. Мартениците, разбира се, също са направили силно впечатление на някои от студентите.

На въпроса как са избрали да изучават български език по-голямата част от анкетираните отговарят, че е станало случайно. Най-често това е свързано с резултатите им на изпитите за завършване на гимназия 高考 и българският език се е оказал една от възможностите, които ще ги отведе в желанието от тях университет. Някои смятат, че изборът им всъщност е решение на съдбата 命运的安排. Част от анкетираните, които в момента живеят в България, посочват, че им се е наложило да изучават езика по необходимост. Сред отговорите обаче има и по-специфични, например: „заради българската природа“, „заради българските рози“, заради това, че България е европейска държава или защото граничи с Черно море.

Предварителната информация и впечатления за България, които китайските студенти са имали, в общия случай са сравнително малко. Сред отговорите най-често се среща: „Страната на розите“ 玫瑰王国 (7 отговора); това, че е малка европейска страна със сравнително спокоен начин на живот. Голяма част от анкетираните също така са знаели географското ѝ положение, каква е политическата система или са имали общи исторически познания за региона. Споменават се също и музикални изпълнители, за които са чували. Освен това някои пишат, че са слушали за България по новините, а трима души посочват българското кисело мляко (в някои от отговорите е отбелязана и марката „Момчиловци“, която се продава в Китай). Познат е също така и българският футбол. Някои от анкетираните казват, че не са имали никакви предварителни знания за страната. Започнали са да се интересуват чак когато са били приети в тази специалност.

Първоначалната мотивация на българските студенти за изучаване на китайски език в сравнение с тази на китайските им колеги относно нашия език се различава значително. Според проучване от 2013 г., в което участват 136 български студенти, проведено от Сун Юнхун 孙永红, три са причините, които биват посочени като водещи при избора за изучаване на китайски език като чужд от българи<sup>5</sup>: „Заради интерес към Китай“ 对汉语感兴趣 – 83,10%, „Заради интерес към китайската култура“ 对中国文化感兴趣 – 73,51%; „За да пътувам в Китай“ 为了在中国旅行 – 54,41% (Sun 2013: 28). Когато обаче китайски студенти започват да учат български, аналогична тенденция не може да бъде открита. Напротив, по-голямата част от анкетираните посочват, че не са имали никаква или само твърде оскъдна предварителна информация за България и решението им често е породено от случайно стечение на обстоятелствата.

Проф. Лилия Илиева пише в своя статия, че „никой от кандидатите не е избрал предварително българския език като своя специалност, а попада в нея в зависимост от бала си и от други обстоятелства“ (Илиева 2010: 9). Почти аналогично наблюдение има и в статията на Люба Атанасова, като изключение прави само една студентка, която предварително била запозната с поезията на Яворов в превод на английски език и това повлияло на избора ѝ (Атанасова 2018: 96). Така през 2010 г., когато е писана статията на проф. Илиева, през 2017 г., според Люба Атанасова, а също и през настоящата 2021 г. чрез резултатите от анкетите, проведени с китайски студенти, се потвърждава същият извод. Може да се обобщи, че това е трайна тенденция при първоначалния избор на специалност, но в същото време, промяната, която настъпва в отношението на студентите към езика и културата на страната в процеса на обучението им е може би най-интересният наблюдаван феномен.

Двадесет и шест от анкетираните заявяват, че имат желание да прилагат знанията си по български език в бъдещата си професия. Те посочват, че биха могли да ги използват: в общуването и ежедневието си; за преводи; четене на материали на български език; по отношение на разбирането на българската литература; за да преподават; в областите на икономиката и международното право. Част от тях са се ориентирали към журналистика (4), преподаване (3), дипломация и отношенията между България и Китай (3), преводаческата професия (2), бизнеса (2) и други.

Четиринадесет от анкетираните посочват, че вече им се е случвало да участват в проект, където да прилагат знанията си по български език или те да им помогнат в работата. Най-голямата част от примерите, които дават, са свързани с превод по време на определени мероприятия или на писмени текстове.

Може да се обобщи, че китайските студенти най-често започват да изучават български език случайно, но в процеса на обучение развиват траен и дълбок ин-

<sup>5</sup> Въпросът в анкетата на Сун Юнхун е зададен с възможност за посочване на повече от една причина.

терес към страната. Предварителните знания, които са имали за България, обикновено са фрагментарни. С напредване на обучението обаче те се запознават подробно с българската история, литература и актуална обстановка, задълбочават интереса си към специфични феномени или културно-исторически периоди.

Специалността Българска филология все още не е достатъчно позната сред кандидат-студентите в Китай. Според направените дотук наблюдения може да се каже, че популяризирането ѝ би могло да привлече една по-голяма част от тях да направят този избор. От отговорите в анкетите става ясно, че българската природа, културата и традициите на страната, както и нейните геополитически характеристики, биха могли да предизвикат интерес към изучаването на български език.

Сред проблемите, с които китайските студенти се сблъскват, са ограничените възможности за общуване с носители на езика и намирането на български приятели. Вероятно с активното навлизане на методите за виртуално обучение, свързани с настоящата световна ситуация, препятствието пред общуването поради огромната пространствена дистанция все по-лесно ще може да бъде преодолявана. Създаването на платформа или организирани онлайн срещи, чрез които да се установи възможност за регулярно общуване между български студенти китаисти и китайски българисти, например, би могло да бъде такъв вариант.

Друга насока за развитие, посочена от анкетиранияте, е публикуването на още учебни материали и пособия по български език, предназначени специално за китайски студенти. Може би най-голям интерес биха предизвикали текстове, включващи актуалната разговорна лексика и общоупотребяеми фразеологизми, както и трудове, посветени на бита и културата на страната. Идеята за съвместно съставяне на подобни материали между български и китайски специалисти отразява необходимостта от адаптиране на информацията към конкретния тип възприематели.

Разбира се, в процеса на обучение всеки студент се сблъсква с най-различни трудности при усвояването на един език, който е толкова далечен от родния му. Според отговорите на анкетиранияте обаче може да се обобщи, че независимо от трудностите, в даден етап от обучението мотивацията им е достатъчно висока, за да продължат да ги преодоляват. Тази промяна в отношението към изучаваната специалност – от първоначално изцяло случайния избор до решението за продължаване на професионалното развитие именно с български език – е сигурно доказателство за високото ниво на обучение във въпросните университети. Както и самите преподаватели в ПУЧЕ посочват, специалността Българска филология непрестанно се развива от създаването си и досега. Може да се предположи, че тези тенденции ще продължат да утвърждават културния обмен между двете страни и успешно ще задълбочават взаимното разбиране.

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# Changing Perception of Hu Shi Among Chinese Intellectuals

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## Abstract

Hu Shi was a prominent thinker, essayist, scholar, who helped build the New China only first to be marginalized and then rehabilitated by his former friends, colleagues and students. In this paper we look into the scholarly and literary works that shaped the collective memory of Hu Shi throughout the years since the May Fourth Movement and until modern days. These sources show us how perception of his character, ideas and academic heritage evolved with the rapidly changing circumstances of the 20<sup>th</sup> century China.

**Keywords:** Hu Shi, May Fourth Movement, criticism campaign

Hu Shi is undoubtedly one of the greatest Chinese thinkers of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. His legacy and influence on modern-day China have such importance that even his antagonistic political stance has not been able to overshadow his fame and prominence. During his lifetime he was both praised and harshly criticized by the public and his fellow scholars. In his time Hu Shi was not fully understood by his contemporaries, having received education in the West and trying to implement Western ideas in the turmoil of the warlord era in China. His gradualism in reforms had great criticism among his fellow intellectuals who were looking for more extreme and radical measures. Until this day there are discussions about whether he is worth the acclamation, or deserved the critiques.

Life and work of Hu Shi has been researched from many angles, from biographies of his critics, friends and contemporaries (Schulz Zinda 2009), from his own writings (Zhang Jingjing 2016) and letters (Wu Yuankang 2007). Western researchers tend to praise Hu Shi as a 'prophet' of liberalism and pragmatism, however with his ideas being too Western for China of his lifetime (Grieder 1962). He certainly was creating a link between China and the West with his outstanding education in the US on one hand, and profound knowledge and appreciation of Chinese history and culture on the other.

Born in Shanghai in 1891, Hu Shi, also known as Hu Shih, received fundamental education in China and in 1910 was sent to the Cornell University to study agriculture. He then changed his major to philosophy and literature and went on to study

from John Dewey in the Columbia University. Finishing his studies, he returned to China, had a major role in the May Fourth Movement and the following New Culture Movement. Later he became Chinese ambassador in the US during the World War II and had an instrumental role in Chinese foreign politics at the time. Returning to China in 1942 he later became the chancellor of Peking University (Beida). However, his disagreement with the Marxist theory led him to leave that position and later flee from Mainland China to Taiwan, where he became the President of Academia Sinica in Taipei. Until his death in 1962 he lived between Taiwan and the US.

After his departure from Mainland China, he was getting criticized for his 'betrayal' of New China and support of Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-Shek. As a renowned intellectual, he was an ideal victim for a critical campaign in the 50's. He was a major character in revolutionary actions prior to the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and fell out of favor soon after. Him being an example of such a 'reactionary' scholar fit in well with the narrative of building new ideological viewpoint (Liu Xiangyun 2011). Hu Shi was at that point seen as outdated intellectual, attempting to actualize Western methods in humanities. While first critical attacks on Hu Shi were more personal and concerned with his nonconforming political views (Schulz Zinda 2009: 155), they gradually shifted to his scientific methods in research.

Foremost, his years spent studying in the United States between 1910 and 1917 were interpreted almost as a conditioning to become an agent of American force meant to enslave the Chinese people. One of his early articles titled 'More researching problems, less talking about -isms', that dates back to time after the May Fourth Movement, was used as an illustration of Hu Shi's betrayal and obstructing said Movement. He was also quite vocal about his distrust of communist and Marxist ideas throughout the warlord era, which only became problematic decades later, when he was subjected to the large-scale critical campaign approved by chairman Mao himself. Appointing Hu Shi a scapegoat despite his major role in the nation-building was a move that was meant to establish the new relations between the government and the academia, intellectuals. It implied that no accomplishments and significance could grant an exemption to those scholars, who were ideologically disloyal.

During and immediately after the May Fourth Movement Hu Shi gained great popularity among his peers, young scholars and students considered him one of the most prominent thinkers of the time. His push for the vernacular literature, his role in the New Culture Movement, strong background in Chinese classics and elite Western education made him a notable figure in the uncertain and turbulent times of warlord China. Him bringing ideas of pragmatism, liberalism and good governance to the Chinese people was very well-timed. However, in following years he had many disagreements with his colleagues both in matters of research and ideology, which later became the precursor to his disfavor. Supporting Kuomintang instead of the CCP on

the verge of the foundation of the People's Republic of China and opposing rapid and radical reforms was the unseemly stance that brought on his fall from grace in the 50's.

Hu Shi criticism campaign was a massive act of defamation – with his former friends and colleagues denouncing him and anything that he created in his career. The materials of his criticism are numerous and relentless (Fu Nuo 2010, Xie Yong 2006), what first started as an attack on his anti-communist claims, later became a full-scale denigration and erasure from collective memory. Only in the years after the Cultural revolution, and a decade after his passing, was it possible to mention Hu Shi not in a fault-finding context. The 80's became a period of reassessing the legacy and identities of the people, who went through a similar process of wiping out from China's history. The most notable example of rethinking and uncovering Hu Shi's legacy was Ji Xianlin's paper 'A Couple of Words on Hu Shi' (Ji Xianlin 1988). Ji Xianlin, a scholar, who himself survived the torments and hardships of the Cultural revolution, set up the basis for further discussion and re-evaluation of Hu Shi's works that is continuing until this day. This rethinking came in times of reforms and openness, exactly when Hu Shi's ideas of pragmatism and liberalism were relevant and appreciated.

It is considered, that under Xi Jinping Chinese academia has witnessed a resurgence of Marxism, however, more as a symbol (Schulz Zinda 2019), not as a prevailing ideology. Thus, we see a mixed approach to discussing Hu Shi's legacy – there is capacity for both criticism and appreciation (Yang Xingdong 2015, Lin Jiangang 2017). It reflects the combination of Marxism and pragmatism, that is prevalent in Chinese politics nowadays.

Aside from analyzing the academic approach to managing the dilemma of deciding Hu Shi's place in Chinese history, it is important to review his presence in works of imagination. Hu Shi's character was fictionalized in several works of Modern Chinese literature from 1920's to 1980's. Among the more notable examples, are 'Song of Youth' (《青春之歌》) by Yang Mo, 'Fragile Heart' (《脆弱的心》) by Ye Shengtao, 'Caishiji' (《采石矶》) by Yu Dafu, 'Second Handshake' (《第二次握手》) by Zhang Yang. All written in different eras they give a fair representation of the collective image of Hu Shi at the time and some personal recollections on the spirit of time. Although these are works of fiction and do not necessarily represent any actual events or people, in all of these cases the authors were open and explicit about choosing Hu Shi to base their characters on.

'Fragile Heart' is a short story by Ye Shengtao in 1921, after his attending a lecture by Hu Shi in Suzhou. In the story Hu Shi's character is neither criticized nor praised, he has a thought-provoking part in the narration that reflects his actual ideas on pedagogy at the time. Ye Shengtao's image of Hu Shi here mostly represents how he was inspired by the lecture and saw him as an outstanding educator. It also captures the morale of young educators shortly after the May Fourth Movement – their enthusiasm

subsiding and depressing routine and lack of innovation in their work leaving them frustrated. Here Ye Shengtao echoes the words of Hu Shi through the character of doctor Xu, but does not give an explicit evaluation of either his character or his ideas, leaving that to the reader.

Only two years later, in 1923 Yu Dafu published his story 'Caishiji', in which Hu Shi is the prototype of one of the character – a famed scholar Dai Zhen. Another character, Huang Zhongze was based on Yu Dafu himself. In this short story Dai Zhen is praised for his knowledge, even called 小孔子 – 'little Confucius' only to be heavily criticized for his political stance, and accused of conspiring to use his scholarship as a method to become an official. Interestingly, in the story Yu Dafu's character confesses of being jealous of the fame and knowledge that Hu Shi's character has, he also ridicules 'this type of scholars', that are only willing to exclude outsiders from their field of study. Biographers point out, that plot of this story stems from a debate Hu Shi and Yu Dafu previously had over a translation of 'The Meaning and Value of Life' by Rudolf Eucken. But the greater context of this fictional interaction actually is that Yu Dafu was a great admirer of Hu Shi and after his return from Japan in late 1919 he wrote letters to him wanting to meet him. It is not known if they actually ever met in person or only exchanged letters, but in 1921 he wrote that 'there are one or two idols that are monopolizing the New Culture in our country' vaguely hinting at Hu Shi. And in 1922 he wrote the following in 'Diaries from Xiyanglou' (《夕阳楼日记》), clearly referring to Hu Shi and Dewey: 'There are some people that are going round and round, all over the place, following a new person, over and over translating their stupid foreign lectures, and being considered new thinkers'. This is a very direct and harsh reference to Hu Shi, that shows how disillusioned Yu Dafu became just in a couple of years. Even though later in life he did get to meet Hu Shi and they became good friends, these writings later became a part of the anti-Hu Shi campaign in the 50's.

In 1958, when Hu Shi was being dehumanized by the criticism campaign, Yang Mo published her novel 'Song of Youth', which gained great popularity at the time and became a 'red classic'. Unlike previously mentioned stories, in this novel Hu Shi is not hidden behind a fictional character, but appears as his actual self in a fictional setting. He is booed and called a 'Kuomintang dog' by the students of Beida during his speech (Hu Huishi 2004). There is a stark contrast between this unflattering depiction of a real person in an imagined scene and ambiguous portrayal as an invented personification. This contrast highlights the attributes of the periods these works of literature belong to. And it becomes even more obvious in the 'Second Handshake' by Zhang Yang, which came out in 1979, where Hu Shi is once again disguised as a minor, but completely positive character. There, he is a famous scientist helping a young heroine to find her inspiration on her way to become a scientist as well. Reference to Hu Shi here may not be obvious without mentioning that the heroine's prototype is renowned nuclear physicist

Wu Jianxiong (also known as Chien-Shiung Wu), who was actually inspired to pursue a scientific career after hearing Hu Shi's lecture when she was in primary school (Lin Jiangang 2019). While the novel was finally published in 1979, when the rehabilitation phase already started, its first draft was finished in 1972, before the general trend of reassessing the unfairly incriminated scholars took off. So, in a way, this depiction was a predecessor for the direction later set by Ji Xianlin and Liang Shuming.

Forming an image of Hu Shi in the PRC has been a long and complicated process. While he was revered by his contemporaries in the 30's and 40's as a pioneer in the New Culture Movement and language reform, in the 50's he gradually went from being harshly criticized to completely erased from the academia. In the late 70's a process of rehabilitation began for him and other scholars whose names were marred during the Cultural Revolution. This process went well into the 80's and in the 90's most research on Hu Shi was a continuation of that trend of rediscovering his works and heritage. In the 2000's once again we can see some criticism in the research on his ideas. There is certainly some mild backlash, which seems to be mostly addressing his personality, but not academic accomplishments and importance in modern Chinese humanities. The discourse on his role and personality changed drastically throughout these years and keeps changing to this day, perhaps, once again personal critiques will gradually transform into academic criticism. It is safe to say, that his personal and academic 'virtues' are still a subject of many heated discussions.

There are mostly two ways of interpreting his image in the intellectual discourse – for his scholarly and personal values. Judging one's scholarly achievements regardless their political views is a more recent approach, but seems to be overlooked in the newer research. For many contemporary Chinese researchers of Hu Shi his political stance cannot be taken away from his ideas on literature, history, logic etc. It seems that Hu Shi's image is still not solidified in any form and it will probably keep changing in the future as well, with the changes in political thought in the PRC. An honest and straightforward approach without bias, prejudice and oversight to his ideas, has probably become possible only in the recent decades, which brings hope for more attention to this subject. On the other hand, the changing image of Hu Shi has been very indicative of the state of intellectual circles of the era, their involvement in the politics.

There is a kind of poetic justice in that Hu Shi's ideas were given a new life after his death, the same way that he helped create a new start for Chinese language and literature through his involvement in the language reform and the New Culture Movement. However, it is quite possible that Hu Shi's figure will once again go through a period of backlash and criticism, if not for his scholarly works, but for his political views. In the recent years, China has made advances with implementing patriotic education in the school curriculum, which potentially may lead to yet another wave of anti-Hu Shi sentiments, although, hopefully nowhere near as destructive as the previous one.

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# Education for Sustainable Development in China

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## Abstract

We can track the origin of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) to 1992, when on the Earth Summit, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the member states decided to cooperate internationally on development issues. After the Rio Conference, the concept of ESD starts to penetrate China together with the idea of Environmental Education (EE), on the basis of which it was further developed. During the last more than 10 years, China has made significant progress in terms of ESD. After UNESCO adopted the “Incheon Declaration” and “Education 2030 Framework for Action”, Chinese authorities published two documents: “China’s Education Modernization 2035” – a plan that sets the direction for the development of the education sector, and an Implementation Plan for Accelerating Education Modernization (2018–2022). This paper reviews and summarizes China’s concepts and progress in the sustainable education and its future targets.

**Keywords:** Education for Sustainable Development, Chinese education, sustainability

“I hear and I forget. I see and I remember.  
I do and I understand.”

Confucius (551 BC–479 BC)

Learning is a life-long process. On the other hand, education supports learning and is often regarded as a process of acquiring knowledge during a certain time period, usually at the school or university level. In recent years, with the advance of digitalization, education is continuously reshaping and starting to use new forms and methods of teaching. Currently, the new concept of sustainable education is in focus worldwide.

## What is Education for Sustainable Development?

In our modern society we can track the origin of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD) to 1992, when on the UN Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the Earth Summit) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the member states decided to cooperate internationally on development issues. They created a doc-

ument named Agenda 21, which is a non-legally binding comprehensive action plan of the United Nations with regard to sustainable development. The governments of all of the 178 countries decided to take actions so that the Agenda could be executed at all local, national, and global levels. The Agenda includes four main sections:

Section I: Social and Economic Dimensions – it's focusing on tackling with poverty and other social and economic issues, especially in developing countries;

Section II: Conservation and Management of Resources for Development – targeting the environmental issues;

Section III: Strengthening the Role of Major Groups – these include children, youths, women, NGOs and other communities;

Section IV: Means of Implementation – this is the section from which ESD evolves (Agenda 21: 1-2).

In the Section IV, Chapter 36 of the Agenda the four major thrusts of ESD implementation are identified:

- Improving access to quality basic education;
- Reorienting existing education to address sustainability;
- Increasing public understanding and awareness of sustainability;
- Providing training for all sectors of the economy (Wals, Kieft 2010: 11).

During the next plenary sessions of the UN, the concept of ESD was developed and during the Sustainable Development Summit in 2015 the countries agreed on 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), where the quality education was set as the SDG 4 or Global Goal 4. Every goal includes some targets and indicators that help its measurement. The SDG 4 in particular has ten targets which are measured by 11 indicators. Target 4.7 is “By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development.” This target has one indicator: “4.7.1 Extent to which (i) global citizenship education and (ii) education for sustainable development, including gender equality and human rights, are mainstreamed at all levels in (a) national education policies; (b) curricula; (c) teacher education; and (d) student assessment” (Goals and targets 2018: 5).

There are plenty of possibilities as to how the ESD can contribute to quality education, including developing a new set of skills – to learn how to learn, to communicate, to collaborate with others, to apply disciplinary skills, problem solving, creativity, etc.

ESD is a very broad field and includes many disciplines. It could be found in Environmental Education, Religious Education, Citizenship Education, Computer Stud-

ies, Life-Skills Education, Resource-Management Education, Experimental Education, Media Education and more than a hundred other aspects (Hopkins: 2018: 8).

The implementation of the Agenda 21 was planned to be focused on all levels – international, national, regional and local levels.

## Development of ESD in China

After the 1992 Rio Conference, the concept of ESD starts to enter in China with Environmental Education (EE) at the beginning. With the recent speedy economic development in China and an increasing number of ecological issues, it was necessary for the EE to be integrated in the Chinese education system. ESD in China is developed based on the EE. It was for first time mentioned as a concept in the Chapter 6 of the White Paper of China's Agenda 21 from 1994, "Education and Capacity Building for Sustainable Development" (IGES 2009: 19). The large-scale promotion of ESD in China starts in 1998. Since then, it could be divided in five periods:

First Period (1998–2000) – during the first period the concept of ESD is highly promoted and the educational team is built;

Second period (2001–2003) – the mechanism is created and a rapid development starts;

Third Period (2003–2004) – the expansion stage;

Fourth Period (2005–2009) – developing of the meaning and model formation;

Fifth Period (after 2010) – it introduces the "Outline of Educational Planning" and the national advancement stage.

The official logo of ESD in China implements three meaningful symbols – "wilderness – human face – green leaves" The wilderness is the symbol of the environment; the human face symbolizes people; and the green leaves that are growing symbolize the sustainable development. Its connotation is: green life, rooted in the wilderness, can bring vitality to the sustainable development. (UNESCO: 9).



At the beginning ESD was firstly initiated in Shanghai, but its development was not so rapid as that in Beijing mainly due to the lack of financial support from the local government.

During the last more than 10 years China made significant progress in terms of ESD under the leadership of the Chinese National Committee for UNESCO and the Ministry of Education, the China National Working Committee on ESD (CNWCESD), the Beijing Academy of Educational Sciences, and Beijing Association for ESD which are the main organizations and coordination units in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong and Hong Kong. In the last 5 years CNWCESD held three national Workshops on ESD, two Beijing International Forums on ESD and four Asia-Pacific Expert Meetings on ESD, as well as a lot of international exchanges between teachers and experts in the field. (UNESCO: 5).

After UNESCO adopted the “Incheon Declaration” and “Education 2030 Framework for Action”, Chinese authorities published two documents accordingly:

“China’s Education Modernization 2035” – a plan, that sets the direction for the development of the education sector, and an Implementation Plan for Accelerating Education Modernization (2018–2022).

The sustainable development in Chinese education can be briefly expressed through China’s Education for Sustainable Development Roadmap (Wei Wang: 68).

(‘2-1-3-3-2-3-4’)

2	Two meanings of ESD	Education serves the sustainable development of the society, economy, environment, and culture.
		Education serves human sustainable development.
1	Core content	Sustainable development values (four types of respects: respect for others, differences, diversity, and the environment).
3	Three basic contents	Scientific knowledge of sustainable development (society, economy, environment, and culture).
		Abilities needed for ESD.
		Sustainable ways of life (e.g. low carbon lifestyle).
3	Three-level curriculum construction	National curriculum: ESD teaching model experiment.
		Local curriculum: development of local ESD curriculum and textbook compilation.
		School-based curriculum: development of school-based ESD curriculum and textbook compilation.
2	Two-type thematic education	Thematic education on resources and the environment (e.g., energy conservation, emissions reduction, low carbon lifestyle, and innovation education).
		Society-culture education projects (e.g. multicultural education and education for international understanding).
3	Three-level school construction	Experimental school.
		Model school.
		National experimental school.
4	Four goals	Significantly improve regional education function (administrative department for education).
		Significantly revise educational concepts (principal and leadership).
		Significantly improve teachers’ level of professional development.
		Significantly improve students’ achievements.

First of all, in order to understand what is the purpose of the ESD, we have to understand the meaning of this concept, which has two-layer meaning, as well as the content of the one core and the three basic points; Secondly, it is necessary to grasp the three-level

curriculum construction and the two types of thematic education methods; then, it is necessary to understand the three levels of school construction; finally, it is necessary to clarify the four expected goals.

The Core content, is “Sustainable development values” (includes four types of respects: respect for others, differences and diversity, environment and respect for resources).

Respect of others means to respect people of all generations and to build harmonious society for achieving sustainable social development.

Respect for cultural differences and promoting local culture is the basic prerequisite for protecting cultural diversity, which is the spiritual source of human sustainable development.

Respect for the environment is to establish environment protection of all living organisms, it includes also disaster preventions and mitigation climate change which can ensure the safe environment and sustainable lifestyle.

Respect for resources includes creating circular economy and recourse conservation.

According to the Road Map of ESD, Sustainable development education schools are divided into three categories: 1. Experimental schools; 2. Demonstration schools (Model schools); 3. National experimental schools. An experimental could be any type of school in primary, secondary or higher education level as well as vocational schools and universities which are officially registered and are able to fulfil the specific requirements and apply through the relevant procedures.

### **Recent progress of ESD in China**

According to the Brief review of the recent progress and suggestions in the last five years there are ten main initiatives to Promote ESD in China.

1. Studying, translating and disseminating a lot of ready-made documents issued by UNESCO, UN and those from the Chinese government.
2. Researching the theoretical and practical innovations related with ecological civilization and ESD and published in many related papers.
3. The Chinese Government promotes the integration of ESD into the national public education policy.
4. Improving teaching and learning innovation, advanced research on ESD curriculum and increasing the number of ESD schools and districts.
5. Carrying out many practical activities where adolescents learn how to practice sustainable lifestyle.
6. Organizing training and seminars for improving the principals and teachers' skills, exchanging experience and learning innovation in the new stage.
7. Establishing and expanding cooperative ESD alliances with different social organizations, museums and enterprises such as the Ministry of Environmental

- Protection, World Bank, DaAi Real Estate, Palace Museum etc. to build practice parks, activity bases, training centres and research projects for ESD.
8. Bringing out a large number of ESD-related publications through media such as magazines, websites and We Chat etc., and consolidating the platform for collecting, storing, exchanging and providing ESD information.
  9. Establishing a professional team of experts from CNWCESD agency, colleges, provincial and municipal educational and scientific research institutions and practical experts as a principals and teachers of primary and secondary schools.
  10. Exchanging experience and cooperation between experts on various international and domestic forums and conferences. Chinese professionals attending various meetings abroad as well as foreign experts participating in two international forums on ESD held in Beijing (Wang Q., Shi G.: 106–107).

As UNESCO opened a new stage of ESD for SDGs (2020–2030), ESD is becoming the mainstream of world education. China is an important member of the Asia-Pacific region and plays an important role in the international cooperation and exchange activities in promoting ESD.

China embraces the idea of sustainable education and has made significant progress in recent years, especially in trying to attract Western professionals and thus broaden the horizons of young people and give them a different perspective on the world. But it is important to emphasize that the unification of any idea without going into the specifics of the local culture can be challenging and very difficult.

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
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POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC  
AND ECONOMIC  
RELATIONS



ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИ,  
ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКИ И  
ИКОНОМИЧЕСКИ ОТНОШЕНИЯ

**Китайският Дигитален път на коприната:  
възможности, предизвикателства,  
стратегически последици**

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**China's Digital Silk Road: Opportunities,  
Challenges, Strategic Implications**

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**Abstract**

The paper aims to analyse China's Digital Silk Road (DSR) as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. In view of that, the concept, objectives, main pillars of DSR will be reviewed (such as digital infrastructure, e-platform economy, digital branding and "winning peoples' hearts" and policy regulation). Special attention will be heeded to the power of Chinese tech giants in the global digital connectivity as well as China's concept of digital sovereignty (incl. data localisation). Through DSR, China makes a strong case to move from a position of a rule-taker into a rule-maker in the digital globalisation. The paper will also assess the strategic implications of DRS from the point of Western strategic thinking and interests.

**Keywords:** DSR, digital infrastructure, Chinese digital expansion, Huawei, Alibaba, Beijing Consensus, Baidu, WeChat, 5G

От нейното анонсиране през 2013 г. китайската външнополитическа инициатива „Един пояс, един път“, която първоначално се реализира чрез наземното измерение „Икономически пояс на пътя на коприната“ и морското измерение „Морски път на коприната“, значително еволюира както на концептуално, тематично, така и на стратегическо ниво.

През 2017 и 2019 г. в Пекин се проведеха два структуроопределящи, институционализиращи и мащабни по представителност форума за международно сътрудничество на инициативата „Един пояс, един път“ (ИЕПЕП). На тях бяха очертани основните сфери на сътрудничество (известни още като сфери на свързаност), договорно-правната база, инструментариума и механизмите на политическа коор-

динация на ИЕПЕП. Първоначалният фокус беше поставен върху реализацията на проекти по линия на търговско-инвестиционната, транспортно-логистичната (инфраструктурна), енергийната, финансово-банковата свързаност и в сферата на образованието, науката, културата, спорта, медицината и прочие ключови сфери на човешкото развитие. Чрез ИЕПЕП Пекин изкрystalизира концептуално и стратегически визията си за глобалното управление (представен като модел на глобална свързаност, споделено развитие и споделена съдба на човечеството) и се адаптира към растящата геополитическа конкуренция в света. Във връзка с това, очертаните шест основни икономически коридора на ИЕПЕП показват амбициозния географски обхват (евразийски, южно-азиатски и югоизточно-азиатски, европейски, африкански, южно-американски) на китайската инвестиционно-икономическа, търговска, технологична и културна експанзия.

Чрез ИЕПЕП Китай се опитва да формира неформален алианс от сходно мислещи с него държави в рамките на „Пекински консенсус“, който да допълва господстващия след края на Студената война неолиберален „Вашингтонски консенсус“ (базиран на западната демократична система на управление, ценности и пазарна икономика). ИЕПЕП е китайското разбиране за мултилатерализма. Пекин остава защитник на икономическата глобализация (при укрепване режима на свободната търговия върху договореностите в рамките на Световната търговска организация [СТО]), но отхвърля политическата глобализация, която допуска и насърчава наднационалните форми и механизми на глобално управление, защото последната може да подкопае стабилността на китайската политическа система, националния суверенитет и териториалната цялост.

Колективният Запад бързо определи ИЕПЕП като китайска стратегия за глобална доминация. Пекин, от своя страна, разглежда инициативата като отговор на сложните едновременно протичащи глобализационни и анти-глобализационни процеси в света.

Глобализацията се е превърнала в онази инфраструктурна рамка, чрез която се реализира човешкият напредък във всички водещи сфери (като се започне с политиката, икономиката, финансите, културата, науката, образованието, здравеопазването, технологиите и прочие). Глобализацията засилва взаимната обвързаност на съвременния свят и затвърждава взаимната връзка между сигурност и икономическо развитие, търговия, инвестиции, миграция, климатични промени.

Ковид-пандемията ускори дигиталното измерение на глобализацията. Дигиталната глобализация напълно заличи разликите между времето и пространственото измерение в света. Тя преобразува моделите на човешко общуване, системите за правенето и управлението на бизнес (в това число в индустрията, търговията, инвестициите, услугите). Дигиталната глобализация (стъпила здраво върху основите на глобална интернет мрежа), за да бъде успешна, трябва да реши

въпросите, свързани с киберсигурността, защитата на дигиталната инфраструктура, юрисдикцията на интернет пространството и др.

Отчитайки важността на дигиталното измерение, Пекин разшири обсега на ИЕПЕП, лансирайки Дигиталния път на коприната през 2015 г.

### **Въведение в Дигиталния път на коприната (ДПК)**

През 2015 г. Комисията за национално развитие и реформи (КНРР), Министерството на външните работи и Министерството на търговията на КНР публикуват съвместния документ Бялата книга, в който за първи път се дава стратегическа визия на Дигиталния път на коприната (ДПК). В него ДПК е дефиниран като „информационен път на коприната“, а акцентът е поставен върху реализацията на международни проекти за изграждането на трансгранични и транс-континентални оптични кабели (наземни и подводни, по морското дъно), телекомуникационни инфраструктурни мрежи и системи за сателитна навигация. (Hong 2018: 2684)

През 2016 г. в 13-ия петгодишен план за национална информатизация, изготвен от Държавния съвет на КНР, е включен специален раздел за изграждането на „онлайн път на коприната“ и съвместно „информационно пристанище“ между Китай и АСЕАН (вкл. реализация на проекти за интернет свързаност на Югозападен и Южен Китай [по-специално провинция Гуанси] със страните от Югоизточна Азия) (Yu 2017: 1766).

Във връзка с това властите на провинция Гуанси, насърчени от централното китайско правителство, създават благоприятни условия за участие на водещи китайски телекомуникационни компании в подобряване на дигиталната свързаност между Китай и страните от региона по линия на ИЕПЕП.

През 2017 г. председателят на КНР Си Дзинпин акцентира върху желанието на страната му да изгражда бъдещите партньорства в рамките на ИЕПЕП при оптимално използване предимствата на дигиталната икономика и иновативните бизнес модели за транснационална свързаност. (Чрез осъществяване дигитализацията на собствената си икономика Пекин щял да стимулира икономическата модернизация в страните-партньори на ИЕПЕП) (Xi 2017). Пекин желае да участва в дигитализацията на икономиките на страните от Югоизточна и Южна Азия и африканския континент (което предполагало реципрочен достъп на тези страни на китайския пазар на високите технологии).

От китайска страна, освен КНРР (която отговаря за стратегическото планиране на китайските инвестиции за дигиталната свързаност, високо технологичните производства и научно-изследователската и развойната дейност), важна направляваща роля има също така Администрацията на киберпространство на КНР (АК), която се грижи за националната киберсигурност, изграждането на надежд-

на система за управление на данни (в дигитална среда, в т.ч. сигурно управление на онлайн платформи и услуги) и осъществяването на китайски международни инициативи за дигитална икономика. Сериозна институционална подкрепа на китайските компании, специализирани в предлагането на дигитални решения и услуги по линия на ДПК (вкл. тяхното позициониране на международните дигитални пазари, например в онлайн разплащанията, електронната търговия и прочие), оказват Министерството на науката и технологиите и Министерството на индустрията и информацията на КНР чрез сключваните от тях рамкови споразумения с партньорски ресорни ведомства на страните, участващи в ДПК.<sup>1</sup>

В рамките на първия Форум за международно сътрудничество на ИЕПЕП (2017 г.) КНР и АК съорганизируют нарочен форум „Изграждането ДПК на 21 век“, с участието на представители на 30 държави и 15 международни компании (сред тях е и китайският телекомуникационен гигант ZTE). Пекин стартира Инициатива за международно сътрудничество за дигитална икономика в рамките на ИЕПЕП по време на четвъртата Световна интернет конференция в китайския гр. Вужен. (SCIO 2017)

По време на втория форум на ИЕПЕП (2019 г.) е проведена специална сесия по темата за ДПК с участието на национални представители на близо 30 държави от Азия, Африка, Европа, Латинска Америка. Преговорната рамка на форума е използвана максимално от Пекин за да сключи двустранни споразумения с 22 страни (за осъществяване на конкретни проекти в сферата на науката, информационните и комуникационните технологии и конкретни бизнес сделки с участието на китайски компании (в т.ч. например договор на ZTE за изграждане на оптична кабелна мрежа на стойност от 28 млн. щ. д. в Аржентина) (Shen & Bai 2019).

Пекин активно използва водещите си държавни банки за финансиране на проекти по линия на ИЕПЕП, и в частност на ДПК. Наред с това Износно-вносната банка на Китай сътрудничи с Международния съюз на далекосъобщенията (специализирана организация към ООН, отговаряща за създаване на технически стандарти в сферата на комуникационните технологии и далекосъобщения, в т.ч. по отношение на интернет управлението). Сътрудничеството се изразява в изготвянето на регулации и политики за преодоляване на „цифровия разрив“ (разбиран като наличие на технологично изоставане на икономиките на развиващите държави в сферата на информационните и комуникационни технологии и ци-

<sup>1</sup> През април 2019 г. Пекин подписва двустранни междуправителствени меморандуми за сътрудничество с 16 държави-партньорки за изграждането на ДПК, допълнени със споразумения със 7 от тях за развитие на обща инициатива за Дигитална икономика в рамките на ДПК. От китайска страна споразуменията са подписани от Министерството на индустрията и информационните технологии. Географският обхват на тези споразумения обхваща Югоизточна Азия и Средния Изток (Камбоджа, Бангладеш, Иран, Афганистан), АСЕАН (съвместна разработка и приложение на информационните и комуникационни технологии), страни от Източна Африка (в т.ч. Етиопия) за изграждането на „информационни магистрални трасета“, изграждане на сухопътна трансгранична оптична кабелна връзка на Китай с Руската федерация, Киргизстан, Мианмар, Пакистан.

фровизацията спрямо развитите в икономическо отношение държави), като цел, заложена в Дневния ред за устойчиво развитие – 2030.

ДПК преследва вътрешно-политически (в т.ч. социално-икономически) и външно-политически цели. Във вътрешнополитически план Пекин иска да ускори модернизирването на националната си индустриална база чрез стратегическите предимства на високите технологии. Новата китайска индустриална политика цели да осигури прехода от трудоемък и екстензивен модел на производство към интензивен икономически модел, базиран на знанието, иновациите, технологичния напредък.

Във външнополитически план Китай се стреми да постигне глобално лидерство във водещи високотехнологични сфери (в рамките на стратегията „Направено в Китай – 2025“) (*Made in China 2025*). Това би помогнало на Китай да играе ключова роля в разработката и приемането на международните технологични стандарти и спецификации по отношение на следващото поколение технологии, в т.ч. мобилните мрежи 5-то поколение, изкуствения интелект, екосистемата на „интернет на нещата“ (*IoT*). В крайна сметка, чрез ДПК Пекин цели да постигне оперативна съвместимост между китайските и чуждестранните технологични мрежи (цел, която е заложена в китайската стратегия „Интернет Плюс“, 2016 (*Internet Plus 2016*)).

### ДПК: основни положения

Наред с експертите, изготвящи стратегическите документи на институционално ниво, важен принос за концептуалното оформяне на ДПК имат научно-изследователската и академична общност в рамките на китайските университети, приложно-изследователски институти и аналитични центрове. Във връзка с това в китайския университет в гр. Фудан е създаден специален Център за изучаване на основите на дигиталната икономика. Центърът е с възлов принос за концептуалното оформяне на дигиталния път на коприната като част от ИЕПЕП.

Според Синята книга, изготвена от учените в Центъра през 2018 г., ДПК е структуриран в изброените основни направления (Dekker, Okano-Heijmans, Zhang 2020: 3–12).

**Технологично-дигитална и сателитно базирана инфраструктура:** първото направление обхваща разработката и производството на телекомуникационно оборудване 5-то поколение мобилни мрежи, прокарване на оптични интернет кабели по дъното на океана, изграждане на „умни градове“, разгръщане на орбитално базирани системи за сателитна навигация и комуникация, създаване на дигитална инфраструктура, върху която работят съвременните онлайн платформи, базирани върху изкуствения интелект, облачното пространство, големи данни (*big data*), квантовия компютър, блок-чейн системите (*block-chain*), „интернет на нещата“.

Понастоящем китайските Хуауей (*Huawei*) и ZTE заемат челни места на пазара на телекомуникационно оборудване за Г-5 мрежите, конкурирайки се с европейските мултинационални компании Ериксон (*Ericson*) и Нокия (*Nokia*). През 2020 г. Хуауей е на първо място с 37.5% пазарен дял спрямо Ериксон с 26%, следвани от Нокия, ZTE, и южнокорейския Самсунг (*Samsung*). Хуауей и ZTE реализират близо 50% от продажбите на телекомуникационно оборудване (Skei 2020). Солидното пазарно присъствие е подсилено от притежаването на близо 40% от Хуауей на най-съществените патенти за изграждането на Г-5 мрежите (Clark 2020). Китайските технологични гиганти са доминирали пазара на смартфоните в Индонезия, Малайзия, Филипините, Сингапур и Тайланд през 2019 г. В качеството си на телекомуникационен оператор Хуауей се опитва да засили пазарното си присъствие в Африка, Близкия изток и страните от Латинска Америка.<sup>2</sup>

Проектите на изграждането на „умни градове“ са инициирани за справяне с предизвикателствата на ускорената урбанизация и предизвикателства, включващи високи нива на концентрация на население, замърсеност на въздуха, презастрояване, недостиг на чиста питейна вода, намалена енергийна ефективност на сградния фонд, съкращаване на зелените площи и др. „Умните градове“ създават благоприятни условия за развитието на ново поколение производства (базирани на дигиталните технологии и изкуствения интелект), които ще доведат до по-ниски нива на въглеродни емисии, опазване на околната среда и ще спомогат за устойчивото развитие на високо урбанизираните мегаполиси. В допълнение, корона пандемията засилва необходимостта от търсене на интелигентни устойчиви решения за управление на градовете. Китайските технологични компании, подпомагани от китайското правителство (с данъчни облекчения, субсидии и преференциални заеми), търсят пазарни ниши за участие в реализацията на международни проекти по линия на „умните градове“ в Централна Азия, Русия, Африка, Близкия изток и в страни от ЕС.<sup>3</sup>

Китай развива амбициозна космическа програма за постепенно усвояване на близкия и далечния космос. В ход е модулното изграждане на трето поколение китайска орбитална станция Тиенгун („Небесен дворец“), която ще остане единствена на околоземна орбита след приключване на работния ресурс на международната орбитална космическа станция. През май 2021 г. китайският космически апарат „Тяньвън-1“ кацна на Марс и по този начин Поднебесната се превърна във втората държава след САЩ, успешно приземила свой апарат за изследване на Червената планета. През 2019 г. Пекин пръв изпрати космическия апарат на обратната страна на Луната.

Космическата програма на КНР е обвързана с китайските цели и задачи в рамките на ДПК. Китайската държава изгражда с бързи темпове самостоятелна система

<sup>2</sup> Министерството на транспорта и технологиите на Мианмар работи съвместно с Хуауей в изграждането на Г-5 мрежите в страната. През 2019 г. Хуауей също така поема ангажимент да увеличи дигиталната грамотност и използването на „интернет на нещата“ в Мианмар.

<sup>3</sup> Китайски фирми участват в изграждането на „умни градове“ в различни страни. Хуауей и Алибаба съучастват в строителството на „Интелигентен Дубай“.

за сателитна навигация „Бейду“ (*BeiDu*), конкурираща американската *GPS*, руската *GLONASS* и европейската *GALILEO* сателитни системи. Пекин вече е инвестирал 10 млрд. щ. д. за извеждане в орбита на 35 сателита за постигане на добро сателитно покритие. Чрез своята навигационна система „Бейду“ Китай предлага услугите за сателитна навигация и позициониране в над 60 държави, което включва и износ на технологично оборудване за използването на тези услуги. (Woo, Gao 2020)

Освен това, Пекин подкрепя реализацията на двустранни и многостранни космически проекти. Така например, Китай и Пакистан реализират съвместен проект за извеждане в околоземна орбита на мултифункционален сателит (*PakSat Multi-Mission Satellite*) (Goh 2018). Китайски компании участват в осигуряване на техническо оборудване и финансово подпомагане за извеждането в орбита на афганистански сателит за телевизионна връзка. На многостранно ниво развитието на сътрудничеството в сферата на космическите изследвания в Азиатско-Тихоокеанския регион създава добри предпоставки за обмен на ноу-хау и технологично оборудване между Китай и страните от региона. „Бейду“ е приета от Пакистан, Бруней, Лаос, Тайланд.

И не на последно място, когато става въпрос за телекомуникационна инфраструктура, е важно изграждането на оптични подводни кабелни трасета (същите осигуряват почти 100% от интернет и телефонния трафик), които са част от критичната инфраструктура. За момента този инфраструктурен пазар е доминиран от САЩ. Китайското правителство се стреми да промени тази ситуация като осигурява институционална и политическа подкрепа на подразделение на Хуауей (*Huawei Marine Networks and Co.*) да реализира проект между Латинска Америка и Африка за изграждане на близо 6000 км. връзка по дъното на Атлантическия океан, между Бразилия и Камерун, през 2018 г. (Huawei 2018).<sup>4</sup> През 2019 г. са започнали работите по прокарването на 12 000 км. подводни оптични кабелни трасета с цел да се осигури добра магистрална интернет свързаност между Европа, Азия и Африка (Olander 2021).

**Е-бизнес измерение:** включва онлайн търсачки (локализиране и управление на уеб базирани данни и информация), онлайн платформи за комуникация и развлечения (в т.ч. социални мрежи), електронна търговия (поръчки и доставки на стоки и услуги през интернет, онлайн мрежи за логистично обслужване), електронни финанси (онлайн банкиране и разплащания), е-образование (обучение и получаване на знания във виртуален формат).

ДПК открива нови пазарни възможности за китайските корпорации за електронна търговия. Въпреки доминацията на пазара на онлайн пазаруването от страна на американските им конкуренти, като Амазон (*Amazon*), китайската триада „БАТ“ (*BAT*), водена от Байду (*Baidu*), Алибаба (*Alibaba*) и Тенсент (*Tencent*) засилва присъствието си на глобалните онлайн вериги на доставки и услуги. „БАТ“ се смята за диги-

<sup>4</sup> В допълнение, към края на 2017 г. китайски компании са изградили 17 международни наземни кабелни трансгранични станции с 12 съседни държави и 10 подводни оптически кабелни трасета с други 12 страни.

талната основа на икономическия модел на Китай. „БАТ“ се позиционира добре на международните дигитални пазари, благодарение на добрите обеми, конкурентните цени и качеството на предлаганите електронни търговски и логистични услуги. Слабата дигитализация на икономиките на развиващите страни позволява на Пекин да навлезе на тези пазари (чрез дигитална инфраструктура и онлайн е-бизнес платформи) и да участва в преструктуриране на отрасловата и индустриалната им база.

Редица страни допускат участието на китайски компании в дигитализация на техните икономики. Облачната платформа на китайската *EZ-Link Card* осигурява навременна информация на повече от 50 000 малки и средни предприятия в Сингапур (Gong, S., Gu, J. and Teng, F. 2019: 07). Създадената през 2012 г. филипинска фирма Лазада (*Lazada*) (водеща в Югоизточна Азия в онлайн пазаруването, след като Алибаба става неин основен акционер) предоставя онлайн платформата си на повече от 400 000 малки и среди предприятия в Югоизточна Азия (*Lazada Group*, 2021). Аржентина, от своя страна, подкрепя инициативата на Алибаба за изграждането на Дигитална световна търговска платформа (*Electronic World Trade Platform, eWTP*), която става инкубатор за създаването на нови търговски правила на дигиталната глобализация.<sup>5</sup> През 2017 г. Аржентина постига стратегическо споразумение с китайската компания за реализация на инициативата по време на министерската среща на СТО в Буенос Айрес.

Онлайн финансите са също важна част от китайската стратегия за дигитална свързаност, защото подпомагат търговско-икономическата и инвестиционна експанзия на Поднебесната по линия на ИЕПЕП. Онлайн банкирането чрез различните разплащателни системи улеснява работата на бизнеса и гражданите. Китайските компании в сферата на дигиталните финансови услуги навлизат на пазарите в Югоизточна и Южна Азия чрез участие в съвместни дружества с местни партньори. Така например, Алибаба (*Alibaba AntFinancial*) разширява е-бизнеса си в Пакистан (*EasyPaisa*), Индия (*PayTM*)<sup>6</sup>, Бангладеш (*Bkash*), Малайзия (*Touch'n Go*), придобивайки дялове на местни компании в сферата на разплащателните услуги и влизайки в съдружие с тях (Diniz 2019). Подобно придобиване на активи осигурява на Алибаба възможност за създаване на трансгранична финансово-счетоводна система за банков трансфер, което е от изключително значение за реализацията на проекти на компанията в сферата на електронната търговия.

<sup>5</sup> Основателят и собственик на Алибаба Джак Ма развива многостранната публично-частна инициатива „Платформа за световна електронна търговия“, която превръща в инкубатор за обсъждане и съгласуване на международно признати правила за онлайн търговия и за разработката на стандарти за дигиталната бизнес среда. Платформата на китайския магнат работи в тясна координация със Световната търговска организация и Организацията на ООН за индустриално развитие с оглед укрепване капацитета на малките и средните предприятия за работа в онлайн търговията, на базата на актуализация на съществуващите стандарти и правила в тази сфера (повече виж в: Hanzhi Yu and Hongying Wang, 2019).

<sup>6</sup> След придобиването на *PayTM* от страна на Алибаба (*AntFinancial*) в Индия, първата вече има четвъртия по големина електронен портфейл в света с близо 200 млн. потребители.

Пекин също така се стреми да интегрира своите дигитални финансови инструменти в системата на водещите финансовите институции на ИЕПЕП (Фондът на Пътя на коприната и Азиатската банка за инфраструктурни инвестиции).

**Дигитално брендиране „спечелване сърцата на хората“:** крайната цел на ДПК е да създаде положителен образ на китайските технологични гиганти сред обикновените потребители и предприемачи вътре в Китай и в чужбина, като по този начин осигури глобално технологично и дигитално лидерство на Китай. Така, наред с изграждането на технологичната (информационно-комуникационна) инфраструктура от страна на Хуауей, ZTE, Бейду, китайските платформени компании от сферата на е-бизнеса помагат за по-бързото интегриране на развиващите се страни в глобалната дигитална икономика.

Алибаба печели имиджово от привличането на външни партньори за реализация на съвместните си начинания за дигитална търговия чрез осигуряване на реципрочен достъп и реализиране на печалби на китайския пазар. През февруари 2016 г. Офисът на Източния икономически коридор на ИЕПЕП в Тайланд постига споразумение с Алибаба за използване на онлайн платформите на компанията от местните производители, което гарантира пазарна ниша за техните продукти на китайския пазар (Businesswire, 2016). Представянето на Дигиталната световна търговска платформа на Алибаба в Африка, в Кигали през 2018 г., помага за ръста на продажбите на руандийско кафе на китайския пазар (Луи, Т., Gashumba, J., 2019).

Китайските дигитални платформи за електронна търговия, е-образование, видео игри, социалните мрежи (напр. *WeChat*, *NewsDogs*, *TikTok*) се превръщат в средство за межкултурен обмен и са част от китайската „мека сила“ и китайската „народна дипломация“.

За ДПК китайското правителство заделя значителен финансов и институционален ресурс – за реализацията на проекти в сферата на е-образованието в развиващите се страни, за да подпомогне тяхната интеграция в дигиталната икономика. Хуауей и Алибаба работят за изграждане на местен капацитет в сферата на информационните и комуникационни технологии в страните, в които искат да затвърдят своето пазарно присъствие. Това включва организиране на специализирани обучения по базисна компютърна и по-широка ИТ грамотност за млади предприемачи. Създадените от китайска страна центрове за приложно-изследователска и развойна дейност се превръщат в притегателно място за формиране на кадрови потенциал за дигиталните икономики на страните, с които Китай партнира в рамките на ДПК.

**Стандартизиране и регулация на дигиталната икономика:** Достъпът до интернет данни и уменията за тяхната обработка, анализиране, синтезиране, съхранение и трансфер са ключови за успешното функциониране на всеки един бизнес. Във връзка с това установяването на общоприети международни правила и норми за управлението на дигиталните бази данни (лична, корпоративна, индустриална, търговска, институционална и прочие данни, информация и ноу-хау) са ключови за

е-бизнеса и са част от глобалното управление на дигиталната среда. Дигиталното глобално управление също така включва въпросите, свързани с киберсигурността, стандартите за международната електронна търговия, банкиране, комерсиализиране на технологичните технологии и др.

Веднъж трайно навлязъл на международните дигитални пазари чрез ново поколение дигитални технологии, решения и услуги, за Китай е важно да участва не само в следването, но и в определянето на технологичните стандарти и спецификации в сферата на дигиталната свързаност. Пекин засилва своето участие във водещи международни организации на стандартизация, както и в международни дигитални инициативи за разработка и въвеждане на норми и правила за работа в дигиталната среда, но най-вече в сферата на телекомуникационната и сателитна свързаност<sup>7</sup>, е-бизнеса и управлението на бази данни.<sup>8</sup>

Пекин активно преговаря с редица развиващи се страни от Азия, Африка и Латинска Америка за изграждане на мрежова инфраструктура на 5-то поколение мобилни мрежи. След период на първоначален ентузиазъм, в рамките на европейските институции и в редици държави-членки трендът се обърна против участието на Хуауей в изграждането на мрежова Г-5 инфраструктура в ЕС по съображения за сигурност (оставено е правото този въпрос обаче да се решава на нормативно ниво от отделните държави-членки).

На национално ниво Пекин приема съответстваща нормативна база, определяща червените линии относно китайския подход за стандартите и правилата за трансгранична дигитална свързаност.

Националната стратегия за информатизация на КНР (2016–2020) отчита ключовата роля на информационния ресурс (управлението на бази данни) на дигиталната икономика (Creemers 2016). В унисон с нея се оформят няколко важни вътрешни регулации относно начина на достъп и защитеност, управление на информационния дигитален ресурс в дигиталната икономика.

Първият сред тях е Законът за киберсигурност на Китай (от 2017 г.). Законът регулира начина на достъп и защита на личните данни в интернет пространството (лични, институционални, корпоративни). Неговото приемане е провокирано от подобен правен акт, приет в рамките на ЕС – Общият регламент на ЕС за защита на данните (ОРЗД). Разликата между двата закона е, че в Китай държавна институция следи за

<sup>7</sup> Хуауей участва в международни преговорни платформи за техническа стандартизация. Китайският технологичен гигант взаимодейства с други 7 партньорски организации (от сферата на телекомуникациите, доставка на интернет услуги, производството и продажба на чип-сетове) в разработката на технически стандарти за дигитална свързаност в рамките на платформата „Проект за сътрудничество 3-то поколение“. Приносът на Хуауей е фокусиран върху изготвянето на експертни доклади и технически спецификации за оборудването на Г-5 мрежите (за повече виж: Hanzhi Yu and Hongying Wang, 2019).

<sup>8</sup> Китайската интернет компания „Байду“ (*Baidu*), една от големите интернет търсачки, участва в разработката на стандарти чрез членство в учредената през 2016 г. инициатива „Партньорство за изкуствен интелект“ (Hanzhi Yu and Hongying Wang, 2019).

неговото прилагане, докато в случая с ОРЗД, надзорът се осъществява от нарочно създадена независима агенция. Китайският закон за киберсигурността установява правото и задължението на държавните органи да локализируют и анализират данни/информация, притежавана от граждани и фирми в интернет пространството в случаите, когато тя касае въпроси, свързани с обществен интерес, макро-икономиката, критичната инфраструктура, националната сигурност на страната (Wang, Cao, Xu 2021). Западни експерти смятат, че подобна мярка може да затрудни работата на чуждестранните компании, опериращи на китайския пазар, ако от тях под предлог за защита на китайската киберсигурност се изисква предоставяне на китайските надзорни органи чувствителна корпоративна и комерсиална информация, засягаща техния бизнес. Това включва и локализиране на техните интернет ресурси (уеб сайтове) от страна на местните власти и следене за трансграничен пренос на данни.

Във връзка с това следва да се отбележи и китайското виждане за управлението на глобалната мрежа. Китайският подход е базиран върху концепцията за суверенизация и секуритизация на интернет. Според тази концепция всяка държава е в правото си да упражнява контрол върху интернет пространството на нейна територия. Концепцията е формулирана за първи път в Бялата книга „Интернет суверенитет на Китай“, което на практика означава териториална юрисдикция върху интернет (White Paper: full text 2010). Китай е особено чувствителен, когато интернет ресурсите могат да бъдат използвани като източник за „разгласяване на държавна тайна“, „подкопаване на държавата власт“, „пропагандиране на измислици и фалшиви новини, които подкопават социалния ред и стабилността в държавата“. Изброените действия се третираат по Закона за киберсигурността като киберпрестъпление.

И накрая, Китай допълва стратегията „Направено в Китай–2025“ с важен нормативен документ Китайски стандарти – 2035 (*China Standards 2035*), в който са определят *националните индустриални и технологични стандарти за работа в дигитална среда. Пекин се опитва да ги универсализира чрез китайските дигитални платформени компании, работещи на външните дигитални пазари.*

### **Стратегическите последици, произтичащи от реализацията на ДПК, през погледа на Запада**

Западните наблюдатели смятат, че Китай създава собствена високо технологична индустриална база, която все по-малко зависи от заимстване на европейски, американски и японски технологични иновации и решения. За това спомагало увеличаването на стратегически вложения на китайската държава в научно-изследователска и развойна дейност. Западът смята, че Пекин провежда политика на вътрешен протекционизъм и външна експанзия на глобалните дигитални пазари. Като пример се посочва Алибаба, която развива своя бизнес на американска територия, докато американската компания Амазон не получавала реципрочен достъп на китайския пазар на

облачни услуги (поради невъзможността на американската компания да регистрира фирмени сървъри с автономни бази данни на китайска територия според местното законодателство).

Пекин изпреварвал своите западни конкуренти в утвърждаването на своите дигитални платформи за електронна търговия, разплащания, социално общуване, обмен на данни и информация. *WeChat* се трансформирала от обикновена платформа за изпращане на съобщения и данни в завършена виртуална екосистема за общуване. Тя активно се използвала от китайската държава за национално мобилизиране и консолидиране на китайската диаспора в целия свят.

Западът можел да предотврати оформящата се китайска доминация на глобалните дигитални високотехнологични пазари, ако предприеме навременни и бързи действия, в т. ч. да заделя значителен интелектуален, организационен и технологичен ресурс за развитие на иновативните индустрии. Особено място в западната стратегия е, че трябвало да се активизира работата по изкуствения интелект и неговото приложение в дигиталната икономика.

САЩ са особено обезпокоени от бързите темпове, с които Пекин изграждал трансконтинентални магистрални оптични кабелни трасета, собствена система за сателитна навигация, дигитална инфраструктура на Г-5 мрежите и максимално усвоявал и прилагал информационните и комуникационни технологии за засилване на геоикономическия си потенциал. Това неминуемо щяло да увеличи китайския контрол върху интернет трафика. Системата „Бейду“ можела да се превърне в заплаха за западната стратегическа сигурност, ако китайците започнат да я използват за милитаризация на близкия космос (чрез сателитно наблюдение, насочващи системи, сензори и прочие средства).

Вашингтон разглежда дейността на Хуауей като заплаха за националната сигурност на САЩ, защото не смята компанията за чисто корпоративен субект. В този смисъл решенията на американския съд относно китайската компания не са само юридически обосновани, но и геополитически мотивирани. Вашингтон разглежда казуса с Хуауей като елемент от стратегическата конкуренция и сфери на влияние. Хуауей не била просто една високотехнологична компания, развиваща производствена и търговска дейност зад граница, а важен инструмент в арсенала на китайската дигитална експанзия. Евроатлантическата общност и нейните азиатски съюзници и партньори трябвало да постигнат оперативна съвместимост на техните телекомуникационни системи и технологични стандарти извън стандартите и моделите, предлагани от Хуауей. Това било важно и от гледна точка на постигането на висока степен на защитеност от кибератаки.

Особено остри са разминаванията между Запада и Китай по отношение на киберсигурността и суверенизацията на интернет. Въпросът за киберсигурността е изключително важен за Запада, защото контролът върху киберпространството дава възможност за упражняване на нов тип икономическа и политическа власт. В очите

на Запада Китай е ревизионистка сила, която иска да промени правилата и нормите на дигиталната свързаност и киберсигурност чрез ДПК. Западните демокрации, в партньорство с Япония, Австралия и Индия, трябвало да станат инициатори за създаване на нов глобален дигитален търговски режим под егидата на СТО, базиран върху принципите на свободния трансграничен трансфер на интернет данни. Западните фирми, опериращи на китайския пазар, търпели търговски загуби от практиката на задължителна локализация на интернет данни, изразяваща се в невъзможността свободно да осъществяват трансграничен пренос на дигитална фирмена информация. Тъй като Пекин щял да се противопостави на приемането на такъв режим, Западът следвал да лобира и търси подкрепа сред развиващите се страни, в които Китай вече имал солидно дигитално присъствие. Тези страни, според него, могли да принудят Поднебесната (чрез местни законодателни решения) да преразгледа политиката си на локализация на интернет данни. Следвало също да се положат усилия за изграждането на собствени дата центрове в онези развиващи се страни, в които западните високотехнологични компании се конкурирали с китайските технологични гиганти.

Западните анализатори отбелязват уменията на китайските фирми да надграждат нивото на дигитална култура и грамотност в страните, в които оперират (в т. ч. през подготовката на местни ИТ кадри за работа в местните филиали на китайските фирми). Във връзка с това следвало да се помогне на западните компании успешно да се конкурират с китайските контрагенти в тези страни чрез създаването и финансирането на съвместни технологични стартъпи с местни фирми, включващо и дигитално обучение на кадри. Това би създавало условия за дигиталната им трансформация на базата на частната инициатива и свободата за работа в иновативна среда.

Западът трябвало да прояви инициативност по отношение на създаването на международно валидни технологични стандарти за работата с е-платформите за търговия, заплащане и прочие дейности, инвестиции, технологии, защита на личните данни, изграждане на базисна дигитална инфраструктура (най-общо за работа в условията на дигиталната глобализация). Концепцията за свободното движение на данни в глобалната мрежа следвала да бъде определящата в дигиталната стандартизация. САЩ, ЕС и Япония работили съвместно в международните организации за стандартизация по налагане на тази концепция.

Берлинският институт за китайски изследвания МЕРИКС (*Merics*), известен със своите критични анализи, разсъждава върху четири възможни сценария за европейската реакция спрямо ДПК (Shi-Kupfer, K., Ohlberg, M. 2019: 11).

- Отстояване на европейския интерес чрез формиране на обща консолидирана позиция спрямо ДПК и развитието на продуктивни и взаимноизгодни европейско-китайски отношения в дигиталната сфера;
- Брюксел и отделните страни-членки на ЕС пасивно наблюдават разгръщането на ДПК, което може да доведе до безпрепятствено и безконтролно навлизане на китайските технологични гиганти на единния европейски дигитален

пазар (което може да застраши европейската конкурентоспособност в дигитална сфера);

- ЕС се противопоставя на ДПК и ограничава участието на китайски компании в дигитализацията на икономиката на ЕС;
- Китай инициира изпреварваща политика в дигиталната сфера. На този фон ЕС остава фрагментиран и слаб в контекста на американо-китайското съперничество за лидерство в дигиталната сфера.

На фона на очертаващите се сценарии, сред западноевропейската експертна технологична общност и делови среди се чуват призови за отчитане на реалностите и на водене на трезва политика спрямо дигитален Китай. В доклад на Дойче Телеком (*Deutsche Telekom*) се предупреждават западноевропейските правителства, че ограничаването или забраната на бизнеса на Хуауей на европейския пазар на телекомуникационни услуги може да засегне напредъка на високотехнологичния бизнес и иновации в Европа, защото с дейността си китайският технологичен гигант поддържа европейската среда на иновации и развитието на новите технологии (CSIS-Simon Chair in Political Economy 2019).

## Заклучение

ДКП се реализира като гъвкава инициатива в рамките на ИЕПЕП. Проектите на ДПК се ползват с подкрепата на китайската държава. Осъществяването на ДКП остава важно измерение в реализацията на ИЕПЕП и ключов външнополитически приоритет.

Предполага се, че ДКП ще се реализира по модела на франчайзинга, в който основните двигатели на процеса ще са китайските технологични и платформени корпорации (от сферата на телекомуникационната инфраструктура до е-бизнес платформите). Последните ще използват марката на ДПК, за да разчитат на държавна институционално-политическа и/или финансова подкрепа за осъществяване на техните конкретни бизнес начинания и експанзия на регионалните и глобални дигитални пазари.

Китайското правителство насърчава китайски компании да участват в изграждането на финансови, информационни, телекомуникационни и прочие дигитално базирани мрежи и е-платформи, което ще им помогне да натрупат институционален и експертен капацитет за участие в международните организации по стандартизация на дигиталната, комуникационно-информационната и технологичната среда. От 2015 г. Пекин представя глобалната експанзия на китайските телекомуникационни оператори, платформи за електронна търговия, електронни финанси и банкиране, виртуално образование, социални мрежи и видео гейминг като ДПК.

Погрешна е тезата, че Пекин използва ДПК да наложи авторитарен модел на дигитална глобализация, в който китайски компании изнасят за развиващите се стра-

ни технологии за лицево разпознаване, технологии за наблюдение и контрол на съдържанието и преноса на интернет данни и информация в киберпространството. Въпросните технологии са търсени от правителствата на тези страни, а китайските компании задоволяват пазарното търсене. Никой вече не поставя под съмнение, например, използването на дигитално управляеми камери за сигурност и сканиращи устройства на ключови обекти от критичната инфраструктура (летища, пристанища, магистрали, метрополитени и др.), които най-често са обект на терористични актове. Тези действия не се третират като нарушение на човешките права (в т. ч. нарушение на индивидуални свободи чрез навлизане в личното пространство на индивида).

На фона на изострените американо-китайски отношения и консолидирането на евроатлантическата общност на антикитайска основа (в т. ч. извеждането на Китай от стратегически партньор на Запада в категорията на системен противник и икономически конкурент) се очаква Брюксел/ЕС да ограничи китайската технологична експанзия и влияние на европейския единен пазар. В допълнение, правителството на САЩ работи за ограничаване използването на е-бизнес технологиите на водещите китайски компании в глобален мащаб. В този ракурс следва да се разглеждат международната американска кампания срещу Г-5 мрежите на Хуауей и иниципирането на Индийско-тихоокеанското партньорство за дигитална свързаност (с привличане от американска страна на ключови азиатски съюзници и партньори – Индия, Япония, Австралия).

В този ред на мисли, може да се предположи, че Пекин ще бъде принуден силно да ограничи сътрудничеството с американски, европейски, южнокорейски и японски дигитални технологични компании относно договарянето на общи индустриални и технологични правила и норми на глобалната дигитална свързаност. И вместо това Пекин може да избере пътя на прокарването на собствените си виждания в рамките на международните организации за стандартизация, например по отношение на концепцията за локализирането на данни и дигиталния суверенитет.

Основният замисъл на Пекин е дигиталните технологии, създавани и патентовани от китайските софтуерни разработчици и доставчици, да бъдат международно стандартизирани и да бъдат утвърдени за технологична основа на глобалната дигитална свързаност. Това би осигурило стратегическо предимство на китайските технологични гиганти пред техните западни конкуренти в процеса на глобална дигитализация.

Китайската философска сентенция за опора на собствените сили се материализира в постигането на високотехнологична и дигитална самодостатъчност. Именно затова Пекин заделя значителен ресурс за научноизследователска и развойна дейност за изграждането на самодостатъчен, външно автономен и конкурентен високотехнологичен сектор. Пекин ще засилва своя технологичен и производствен капацитет за изграждането на дигиталната инфраструктура.

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# The 17+1 Format: Sunset or a New Dawn?

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## Abstract

The 16/17+1<sup>1</sup> initiative will celebrate its 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary next year but the prospects for its development seem vague. The initial enthusiasm among the Central and East European countries is being replaced by some scepticism and disappointment with the slow progress and the unsatisfactory economic results. The first 17+1 summit that was chaired by the Chinese president Xi Jinping witnessed unprecedented underrepresentation – six of the CEE countries were represented by ministers instead of presidents and prime ministers. The growing Western geopolitical pressure on the CEE region creates further impediments to the development of the China-CEE cooperation format.

The paper is focused on briefly analysing key achievements as well as failures of the 17+1 format. It will also explore the prospects for cooperation between China and the CEE countries against the background of growing polarization and deepening divide in the international system.

**Keywords:** China, Central and Eastern Europe, 16/17+1 format

Relations between China and the countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) are at a crossroads. Almost ten years after its establishment, the 16/17+1 initiative for Sino-CEE cooperation faces increasing challenges that question the future existence and development of the format. Lithuania's decision to quit the format opened the door to many pessimistic scenarios for the future of CEE-China cooperation. The aim of this paper is to briefly analyze some key achievements as well as problems and shortcomings of the 17+1 format. This analysis will allow for conclusions about the prospects for further Sino-CEE interactions.

## Achievements of the 17+1 format

After a period of divergent priorities and mutual political neglect in CEE-China relations, the two sides started a new stage in their relationship in 2012 when the 16+1 format was launched by Beijing.

China and the CEE countries had different interests and motivation for entering into that cooperation format. China, which initiated the format, regards it as a tool for pro-

<sup>1</sup> In May 2021, Lithuania announced that it quit the 17+1 format.

moting and further developing the ambitious Belt and Road initiative in the Central and Eastern part of Europe. As a rising economic and military power, China demonstrates growing ambitions to project its influence in different parts of the world.

The CEE countries joined the 16+1 format primarily for economic reasons. Hit by the 2008 financial and economic crisis, the countries in the region welcomed China's initiative as an additional mechanism that would help them overcome the negative effects of the crisis, stimulate economic growth and catch up with the West European states. There were certain expectations that the new format will allow them to take advantage of China's growth.

Some of the CEE countries were driven by non-economic motivations, as well. They aspired to further foreign policy diversification and stronger bargaining position in the discussions within the European Union and with the United States. China's increasing interest in the region was seen by some of these countries as an opportunity "to increase their influence within the European institutional and strategic balance and to evade their further marginalization within the Union itself" (Habova 2021: 195). Similar opinion is shared by Ivana Karásková, founder of China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe. Discussing the future of the 17+1 mechanism, she emphasizes that the format could "improve the (CEE) countries' bargaining position vis-a-vis their allies in the West" (MERICS 2021). Grzegorz Stec from the European Institute for Asian Studies notes that the very existence of the 16/17+1 format "helps the CEE member states to attract involvement from Washington eager to counter China" (MERICS 2021).

The new cooperation mechanism strengthened and intensified the relations between China and the CEE countries. It opened new channels for communication and provided for a more structured bilateral dialogue between China and each of the countries from the region. It provided a platform for regular communication, debate, exchange of opinions and policy coordination in a wide range of fields – trade, investments, infrastructure, energy, agriculture, science and education, culture, tourism, etc.

Apart from the conferences, forums, dialogues and exchanges organized within the mechanism, different coordination bodies were structured – China-CEEC Business Council, China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism, China-CEEC Association on Promoting Agricultural Cooperation, China-CEEC Association on Transport and Infrastructure Cooperation, China-CEEC Association on Logistics Cooperation, China-CEEC Center for Dialogue and Cooperation in Energy-related Projects, China-CEEC Association of Tourism Promotion Agencies and Businesses, among others.

Several projects that address real needs of the countries in the region have been implemented or are in a process of implementation by Chinese companies. For example, Chinese investments in infrastructure are highly welcome in the countries in the CEE region where the transport infrastructure is still underdeveloped and need to be modernized and further expanded. The International Monetary Fund notes that the infrastructure gap in the countries from Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe hinders their economic growth and convergence (Ari et al. 2020).

The development of a network of infrastructure facilities in the region corresponds to the goals of China to link its territory and Europe. That is why Chinese companies declared interest and participated in the construction of roads, railways and bridges (bridge over the Danube river in Belgrade, Peljesac bridge in Croatia) in the Western Balkans. China invested also in a number of energy projects in the CEE region. While the European Union is reducing funding for coal-related projects, Chinese companies are particularly active in the thermal power industry of the Balkan countries. Stanari Power Plant in Bosnia and Herzegovina became the first thermal power plant constructed by a Chinese company in Europe. Chinese companies and/or financial institutions are also involved in projects, such as the modernization of Kostolac thermal power plant (Serbia), modernization of Pljevlja TPP (Montenegro), the construction of a new unit at Tuzla power plant (Bosnia and Herzegovina), among others.

In a broader context, as it has already been mentioned, enhanced relations with China have side effects on the CEE countries position within the European Union. As the EU China policy is often dominated by the interests and priorities of the big powers within the Union, the 16/17+1 cooperation mechanism provides the CEE countries with the opportunity to declare and defend their interests in a regular direct communication with the Chinese side.

### **Problems and shortcomings**

After the initial enthusiasm and expectation of the CEE countries, scepticism about the 16/17+1 format is growing. It is largely provoked by the emerging gap between the initial expectations of the CEE countries for economic benefits related to this cooperation mechanism and the facts on the ground.

Slow progress in CEE-China economic interaction and the unsatisfactory economic results are among the key causes for the growing disappointment among the CEE countries. The Lithuanian Ambassador to China pointed out that the decision of Riga to quit the 17+1 mechanism was prompted by “less-than-expected trade benefits” and the lack of improvement in the access to Chinese market (Lo 2021).

Statistics indicate that there is an increase in China’s total trade volume with the CEE countries. In 2009, China’s trade with 16 CEE countries amounted to almost USD 45 billion (Pavličević 2019). In 2020, its total trade volume with 17 CEE countries reached USD 103.45 billion (Xinhua 2021). Chinese side emphasizes on the fact that China’s trade with these countries enjoys an average annual growth rate of 8% since 2012 – a growth that is three times the growth of China’s foreign trade and two times the growth of its trade with Europe (Xinhua 2021). However, this growth is mainly due to increasing exports from China and growing trade deficit for many of the CEE countries. According to China’s Ministry of Commerce, Chinese export to CEE amounted to USD 75.95 billion, while Chinese import from the region amounted to only USD 27.5 billion (Xinhua 2021). Moreover, China still constitutes less than 2% of the CEE exports and less than 9% of the CEE imports

(Bansal 2021). In this context, CEE countries are more and more dissatisfied with trade imbalance and uneasy access to the Chinese market.

In 2012, when the new format was launched, the CEE countries expected that it would help them increase the flow of Chinese capital to boost their economic growth. However, Chinese investments in the region also remain limited. Most of them are concentrated in the Central European countries (The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland) and Serbia. But the Chinese FDI remains very low as a share of total FDI stocks even in these countries (Matura 2021).

According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Chinese cumulative FDI in CEE countries totaled USD 3.14 billion (Xinhua 2021). According to Germany-based Mercator Institute for China studies, between 2000 and 2020 out of around 125 billion euro of Chinese investments in the European Union less than 11 billion euro were directed to the EU member states from the CEE region. In comparison, over the same period China invested more in Finland (13.3 billion euro) (Kratz et al. 2021). At the same time, the cumulative investments of the CEE countries in China over the same period amount to only USD 1.72 billion (Xinhua 2021).

Disappointment among the CEE countries is caused also by the fact that many projects were proposed and agreed upon with the Chinese side but then they were delayed or cancelled. The project for the construction of the Budapest-Belgrade high-speed railway is a clear example of this inconsistency. This was the first 16+1 flagship project and it is an important part of the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Route. Moreover, it involves two of China's closest partners in the region (Serbia and Hungary). Nevertheless, seven years after its announcement, the project is still lagging behind.

In the political arena, recent developments in Sino-CEE relations are not a cause for great optimism either. Lithuania quit 17+1 format and the latest annual review of the Estonian Internal Security Service points out that "the threat posed by Chinese intelligence to Estonia is a daily reality" (The Baltic Times 2021). There were also political tensions in Czech-China relations because of the decision of Prague to develop a certain level of separate relations with Taiwan. Poland was one of the EU member states that voted against speeding up work on EU-China investment agreement in the end of 2020 though it appears as a key recipient of Chinese investments in the CEE region. The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized on the EU's need to engage in discussion with the Biden administration before signing the investment deal with China (Przychodniak 2021).

It is the case of Lithuania that discloses some non-economic causes for the downgrading of Sino-CEE relations. There is a certain correlation, for example, between the US President Joe Biden's promise for a foreign policy centered on human rights and some CEE countries' growing emphasis on human rights issues when dealing with China. Lithuania's decision to drop out of the CEE-China cooperation format was preceded by a resolution of the country's parliament, which defines China's policy towards the Uyghur population as "genocide" and "crimes against humanity" (Global Times 2021). In October

2020, eleven CEE countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) supported a joint statement on behalf of 39 countries in the UN General Assembly Third Committee that criticized human rights situation in Xinjiang and developments in Hong Kong.

Obviously, there are different causes for the negative trends in China-CEE relations. Part of them is due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic but also to the lack of enough political initiative and will on both sides, Beijing's wait-and-see approach following the deterioration of EU-China relations as well as certain underperformance of Chinese companies. It seems also that there is some underestimation of the diversity of the Central and Eastern Europe in China's policy towards the region.

Another cause is related to changing policies of the CEE countries provoked by internal and/or external developments and influences. Rising tensions in the China-US relations, for example, strongly affect Sino-CEE relationship. Against the background of rising geopolitical pressure in the region, the CEE countries are pushed to choose sides – US/EU or China/Russia. A special report of the Atlantic Council, for example, aims to prescribe “a strategy of how the United States needs to engage with its allies and partners in Central and Eastern Europe to counter China and Russia's growing influence in those regions” (Blocher 2020: 1). US efforts for coupling China and Russia as a challenge to the CEE countries democratic systems and a key security threat prove successful in some of these countries.

The antagonistic relationship between part of the CEE countries (the Baltic states, Poland) and Russia, on the one hand, and the enhancing strategic partnership between Russia and China, on the other hand, causes additional strain on Sino-CEE relations. Chen Qingqing and Yang Kunyi discuss the case of Lithuania and note that “on the political and security issues, Lithuania has certain level of fear toward former Soviet Union and today's Russia. So when China and Russia are getting closer strategically, out of that fear, Lithuania has to keep certain distance from China” (Chen and Yang 2021).

In an attempt to confront the aspirations of Moscow and Beijing for projecting influence in the region and to prove themselves to be reliable partners and EU/NATO members, some of the countries in the region decided to close to Chinese investors strategic sectors of their economies like nuclear power and telecommunications. In Romania, for example, the government cancelled a deal with China for the construction of new nuclear reactor units at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant. A Chinese company was excluded from a tender to build a new nuclear unit at the Czech Dukovany NPP. Most of the CEE countries have joined the US “Clean Network” initiative aimed at preventing Huawei access to European markets.

### **Conclusion: Prospects for Future Development**

The decision of Lithuania to quit the 17+1 format has opened the door for many critical assessments and pessimistic scenarios for the development of the Sino-CEE cooperation. The 16/17+1 format itself was hurriedly defined as China's failure, “empty shell”, “zombie

mechanism, with yearly high-level summits that produce nothing but photos and communique” and “high-level venue for the display of souring CEE-China political relations – and perhaps even a lasting failure of Chinese diplomacy in a region of considerable strategic importance to Germany” (Karásková et al. 2020, Brînză 2021, Weidenfeld 2021).

At the same time, there is a consensus among experts that the 16/17+1 format will not collapse. Neither China, nor the CEE countries are interested in the format dissolution. The CEE countries need to maintain cooperation with China and the 16/17+1 format is a good platform for further enhancing interaction and dialogue with Beijing.

The envisaged EU 27+1 meeting or any attempt to dissolve the existing format in EU-China dialogue (27+1 format, as defined by the Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, for example) could not replace or overshadow the existing 16/17+1 mechanism as it will at least exclude the countries from the Western Balkans. Moreover, as it has already been mentioned, some of the EU member states from the CEE region are interested in the existence of this format as it gives them more opportunities for direct contact with Beijing and increase their room for foreign policy maneuver.

As for China, Plamen Tonchev from the Institute of International Economic Relations in Greece rightly notes that Beijing has already invested considerable political capital to give up on the 16/17+1 format (MERICS 2021). The format already has its institutional infrastructure (Secretariat, associations, centers, hubs, etc.) and the major objective now is to fill it with more concrete policies and projects. Current setback is a good opportunity for the Chinese side to better evaluate the development of the format and its weaknesses and to recalibrate its policy approach towards the region of Central and Eastern Europe. In this sense, the future of the format will also depend on the ability of Beijing to better catch and take into consideration the differences among the CEE countries, their specific needs, constraints, interests and priorities.

Last but not least, China-CEE relationship will continue to be strongly affected by the dynamics of Sino-US relations as well as the China’s strained relations with the European Union. The latter will be strongly influenced by the evolution of the political landscape in the major European powers (Germany, France).

A Chinese proverb says: “When the wind of change blows, some build walls, while others build windmills”. It is in the interest of both China and the CEE countries to find common ground and further develop their cooperation instead of putting up new walls.

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## The “Three Seas Initiative” vs. Initiative “16/17 + 1” – CEEC as an Area of Geopolitical Confrontation between the USA and China

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### Abstract

In recent years, the region of Central and Eastern Europe has gradually but increasingly become part of the tangled geopolitical tension between the United States and China. In this part of the world, the opposition of the two global centers of power in international relations is expressed in the development of the Chinese Initiative “16/17 + 1” and the US Initiative “Three Seas”. From the very beginning, the countries of the region have been gradually involved in the “16/17+1” Initiative launched in 2012 by Beijing, announced as a Cooperation Mechanism between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, the US political as well as economic presence in the region is also growing, especially after the US launched the so called “Three Seas” Initiative in 2015. It includes 12 European countries located between the Adriatic, Black and Baltic Seas. Although the two Initiatives seem to pursue similar goals in the field of infrastructure and socio-economic cooperation in the Eastern European region, it is clear that these are projects with strong strategic, geopolitical dimensions, which are a function of the global confrontation between PRC and USA.

At the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century, the two major geopolitical players that oppose each other on a global scale are United States and China. Their interests and actions are crossing in many regions around the world. One of these crossing points is undoubtedly the region of Central and Eastern Europe and in particular the region of the Balkans.

Over the past two decades, China has become a significant economic player on the international stage. This enabled it to become also an important geopolitical power worldwide. At the same time, Europe is a key element of China’s strategy to impose a new model of global governance. The EU is China’s largest trading partner and China is the EU’s second largest trading partner.<sup>1</sup>

The “Belt and Road” initiative (BRI), launched in 2013 became China’s most significant investment strategy for economic growth. One of its main political goals is to increase China’s influence abroad, including in the EU and on individual member states. The BRI pro-

<sup>1</sup> *Mapping and Recalibrating Europe’s Economic Interdependence with China*. <https://merics.org/en/report/mapping-and-recalibrating-europes-economic-interdependence-china>.

motes China's geostrategic ambitions for global expansion by sustaining domestic market growth, developing regional and global connectivity, introducing Chinese standards in less developed countries and further facilitating trade between the markets under the initiative.

Historically Eastern Europe and in particular the Balkans have always been an area of clash between the geostrategic interests of the so-called "Big players". On one side is the "West", now in the face of the EU and the United States, and on the other – the "East", 30 years ago represented by the USSR and now by the newly emerged "global player" in the face of the PRC.

China's entry into the region became more and more visible during the last 10 years.<sup>2</sup> According to a number of analysts, China aims to turn its investment capital into political, pursuing its own geostrategic interests in the Balkans and Southeast Europe. There are already some signs confirming this assumption. For example some countries in the CEE region, members of the EU, are voting against EU or UN declarations condemning China's human rights and so on.<sup>3</sup>

Beijing has long worked to build coalitions of convenience with ruling governments and dominant parties in the CEE Region, especially on the Balkans, often by signing direct agreements with them. Such governmental and party cooperation occurs at bilateral and multilateral levels, mostly through framework of the so called "17+1" Initiative, such as the China-CEEC Political Parties' Dialogue and the China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum.<sup>4</sup> China also takes part in the World Political Parties' Dialogue, as part of the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to complement interstate cooperation with that based on ideological affinity.<sup>5</sup>

The framework for cooperation in the "17+1" format includes 12 EU Member States. They interact with China on a bilateral basis in this framework, which according to the EU institutions poses a risk to the coherence of EU action. In addition, again according to Brussels the "17+1" framework may affect the implementation of EU policies in the Western Balkans, as five of the countries included are Western Balkan countries with candidate or potential candidate status.

Although the European Union has been forced to adopt this format of cooperation between China and the region of Central and Eastern Europe, in the Joint Communication on 'EU-China – A Strategic Outlook' of the Union from March 2019, China has been described as "*an economic competitor in pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.*"<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Kandilarov, E. China and CEEC Relations in The Past 40 Years: Achievements, Challenges and Prospect – Bulgarian Point of View. *Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University (social sciences)*, 2018, (6): 76–82. [doi:10.15896/j.xjtuskxb.201806009], ISSN: 1008-245x/CN:61-1329/c.

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-un-rights-idUSKBN1990FP>.

<sup>4</sup> *Five-year Outcome List of Cooperation Between China and Central and Eastern European Countries*. 2017-11-28. <http://www.chinaembassy.bg/eng/zbgs/t1514615.htm>.

<sup>5</sup> Liu Zuokui. *Cooperation between China and the Central and Eastern European Countries in Times of Major Changes*. <http://www.china-ceecforestry.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Cooperation-between-China-and-the-Central-and-Eastern-European-Countries-in-Times-of-Major-Changes%E2%80%94%E2%80%94Liu-Zuokui.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf>.

Meanwhile, in recent years, the political presence and pressure from the United States in the region of Central and Eastern Europe has been growing. The most significant example of this is the so called “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI) which is more and more often described as a political tool of the US designed to somehow counter China’s efforts to gain greater influence in CEE.

The Three Seas initiative, launched in 2015, brings together 12 European countries between the Adriatic, Baltic and Black Seas. They are Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The announced main goal of the Initiative was through joint projects to promote cooperation for infrastructure, digital and energy connectivity, to achieve sustainability and economic growth. Up to that moment the 3SI is not institutionalized and has no headquarters or secretariat. The Initiative is developing as a pragmatic platform for cooperation with a main focus on deepening the integration of the countries of the region between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas and creating greater connectivity between them on the North-South line in the field of energy, transport, communications, information technology and business.<sup>7</sup>

Since the very beginning, the “birth” of the Three Seas initiative was triggered by a report of the US think tank, the Atlantic Council, entitled ‘Completing Europe’ (2014) in which attention was drawn to Europe’s disparity in development. At the same time even in this strategic document there is a clear notion and suggestion about Russia and China considered as global threat that has to be counterbalanced.<sup>8</sup>

In 2017, when the recently elected president of the United States, Donald Trump, chose to attend a summit of the Three Seas Initiative in Warsaw before he had visited Western European allies like the UK, France and Germany, a number of commentators took note. Moreover, many insiders have argued that the Three Seas Initiative is becoming one of the most important European projects after the EU and NATO.<sup>9</sup>

During the third summit of the 3SI (September 17–18, 2018, Bucharest, Romania), an intention was announced to establish an Investment Fund to finance the approved projects proposed by the countries participating in the Initiative. From the countries of the region Poland has the biggest contribution – 500 million euro, and for Bulgaria and other countries the minimum is 20 million euro.<sup>10</sup> Thus far, the initiative has rolled out several infrastructure projects, notably the Via Carpatia, running from Klaipeda in Lithuania to Thessaloniki in Greece, the Rail Baltica railway connection from Warsaw via Riga to Tallinn with a ferry crossing to Helsinki, or the Danube-Oder-Elbe inland waterway connection.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>7</sup> <https://3seas.eu/about/threeseasstory>.

<sup>8</sup> [https://www.ceep.be/www/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Completing-Europe\\_Report.pdf](https://www.ceep.be/www/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Completing-Europe_Report.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> Lewicki, Grzegorz. *Meet the Three Seas Initiative: The Crucial International Project You Probably Know Little About, Notes from Poland*. <https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/01/08/meet-the-three-seas-initiative-the-crucial-international-project-you-probably-know-little-about/> (Accessed May 27, 2021).

<sup>10</sup> <https://3seas.eu/about/past-summits/bucharest-summit-2018>.

<sup>11</sup> The List of Priority Interconnection Projects was one of the main outcomes of the third Three Seas Initiative Summit held in Bucharest in 2018. As of July 2021 the total number of interconnection projects under the Three Seas Initiative has reached 90 grossing an estimated investment value of 180.9 billion euro or an increase of 112% in project value since the Summit in Tallinn. <https://3seas.eu/about/progressreport>.

At the summit in Bucharest (2018), on the initiative of the United States, was launched also a new format of cooperation with the 3SI member states called Partnership for Transatlantic Energy Cooperation.<sup>12</sup>

Most naturally this 3SI has to be considered not simply as an infrastructure, communication and economic strategy, but rather as a military-political project directed against China and Russia.

There is a concern of the geopolitical experts that the 3SI could become a trigger for a new division in the European Union. Reasons for that kind of concerns are coming from the fact that from the very beginning of the Initiative USA has been keen on supporting and investing in the region, aiming to roll back Russian influence and counter Chinese “17+1” and “Belt and Road Initiative” investments in the CEEC.

The US government, including some members of the Congress, has indicated strong backing for the 3SI. In November 2020, the House of Representatives passed a bipartisan resolution “expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security” (H. Res. 672, 116th Congress).<sup>13</sup> The resolution contains plans to increase energy security and connectivity in the region’s infrastructure. It says Russia “uses energy as a weapon to put pressure on or undermine freedom and democracy in Europe.”<sup>14</sup> This resolution is very indicative of the US strategic vision for the place and role of the Three Seas Initiative in the counterbalance of China as well.<sup>15</sup> In the document it is clearly stated that: “*The Three Seas Initiative provides a positive alternative for financing for transport, energy and digital connectivity projects in the Three Seas region to China’s 17+1 and Belt and Road Initiatives, which have exported corruption, debt traps, and poor labor and environmental standards*”<sup>16</sup>. Even more the one of the authors of the resolution, Congresswoman Marcy Kaptur, describes the meaning of the resolution as an expression of robust Congressional support against “*Russian and Chinese malign influence*” in Europe.<sup>17</sup>

Other officials from the Biden Administration and the Trump Administration have expressed diplomatic support for the 3SI, and high-level US officials (including then-President Trump in 2017) have joined its annual summits.<sup>18</sup>

At the Tallinn summit of the 3SI in 2020, the US delegation announced a \$300 million investment through the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in the Three Seas Fund. At the same time, US Deputy Secretary of Economic Affairs, Energy and Environment Keith Krach announced the US commitment to contribute 30% of the contributions of the 12 countries of the initiative, taken together, to a maximum of 1 billion euro.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.pacl944.org/featured-stories/partnership-for-transatlantic-energy-cooperation-p-tec/>.

<sup>13</sup> *The Three Seas Initiative*. <https://crsreports.congress.gov | IF11547 · VERSION 2 · UPDATED>.

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/672/text>.

<sup>15</sup> <https://kaptur.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/kaptur-kinzinger-resolution-supporting-three-seas-initiative-unanimously>.

<sup>16</sup> <https://kaptur.house.gov/sites/kaptur.house.gov/files/documents/BILLS-116hres672-SUS.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> <https://kaptur.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/kaptur-kinzinger-resolution-supporting-three-seas-initiative-unanimously>.

<sup>18</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>19</sup> <https://3seas.eu/about/past-summits/tallinn-summit-2020>.

Thus the US support reflects the primary geopolitical purpose behind the 3SI. The opportunity to drive a wedge between Russia and its former zone of influence in Central Europe not only appeals to the US, but promises the added advantage of beefing up US trade and other interests in the region.

In 2020, during his visits to the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Austria and Poland, US former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo summed up Washington's goals: "*We have the opportunity to keep countries in Europe strong, free and committed to the United States, just as my country wants.*"<sup>20</sup> At the time, Pompeo's main task was to gather support in Europe for anti-Chinese pressure, advising European countries not to use the technology supplied by the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei for 5G networks. Pompeo advised them to join the American plan "5G Clean Network Security".<sup>21</sup> Digital technologies (including 5G, AI, IoT) are the most critical investment factor of the Three Seas and infrastructure and energy projects. That is why the Three Seas countries are trying to develop an autonomous technological idea in digital solutions. This is to be achieved through activities such as the establishment of the CEE Digital Coalition in 2020.<sup>22</sup>

Nevertheless, the United States' political influence might be a decisive factor regarding China's participation in the digital infrastructure and services in 3SI. The US has been bringing its influence to bear on individual member states to ban Huawei and other Chinese suppliers from their digital infrastructure, as envisaged in its plan for a "Clean Network" of "trusted suppliers" and countries. By the end of October 2020, joint declarations with the United States on the security of 5G networks were signed by Romania (August 20, 2019), Poland (September 2, 2019), Estonia (November 1, 2019), Latvia (February 27, 2020), Lithuania (September 17, 2020), Slovenia (August 13, 2020), Slovakia, Bulgaria and North Macedonia (October 22, 2020). At the same time among the 3SI countries, there is more and more awareness that Huawei is a tool of Chinese geopolitics, aiming to gain a major position in the 5G and IoT market, and then impose standards and technological solutions through the economies. For most of the CEEC, the United States is the main security partner that ensures credibility to NATO commitments.<sup>23</sup>

When President Joe Biden met NATO and EU leaders in Brussels in mid-June 2021, he also stressed the need to push back against Russian aggression, as well as against Chinese influence through its 5G technology and Belt-and-Road investments.<sup>24</sup>

From the very beginning, the 3SI has enjoyed the strong support of the United States and has developed within the framework of the transatlantic partnership. Support from the new US administration was expressed personally by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken in a special video address during the first videoconference of foreign ministers

<sup>20</sup> <https://ee.usembassy.gov/2020-10-19-2/>.

<sup>21</sup> <https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html>.

<sup>22</sup> Lewandowski, Piotr, Paszak, Paweł. Three Seas Project (3SI) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The Security Dimension. *European Research Studies Journal*, Volume XXIV, Issue 1, 2021 pp. 1230-1239.

<sup>23</sup> Grochmalski, Piotr, Lewandowski, Piotr. US-China Technological Rivalry and its Implications for the Three Seas Initiative (3SI). *European Research Studies Journal*, Volume XXIII, Special Issue 2, 2020 pp. 840-853.

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.courthousenews.com/biden-goes-to-brussels-and-builds-front-against-china-russia/>.

and national coordinators of the 12 participating countries under the Bulgarian Chair in 2021.<sup>25</sup> The US-backed platform among EU member states in Central Europe aimed at expanding regional connectivity, including energy infrastructure.

Bringing all these facts together indicates that the United States began to see the project as a mean of winning the geopolitical battle for “hearts and minds” in the CEE region especially trying to reduce Chinese and Russian influence. With backing from the United States, the 3SI looks like Central Europe’s answer to China’s “17+1” and “Belt and Road” Initiative.

Recently many of the CEEC are becoming increasingly sensitive to the concerns that the “17+1” is being used to divide EU common policy on China. In a sign of growing skepticism in the region toward China, six countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia – elected to send ministers instead of their head of state or government at the last summit of the format which was held virtually on February 2021. On May 2021 Lithuania suddenly dropped out of the “17+1” group and called on other EU countries to also abandon the initiative. “From our perspective, it is high time for the EU to move from a dividing 16+1 format to a more uniting and therefore much more efficient 27+1”, the Lithuanian foreign minister said.<sup>26</sup> This development highlights a growing split that is taking place in the CEE, where many countries have more sober assessment of the engagement with China and are carefully positioning themselves between Beijing and Washington amid the deepening global geopolitical rivalry.

Since its inception, 3SI has become the geopolitical interest of leading great powers, including the US and China. In the post-Covid and post-Trump West, where deepened transatlantic cooperation and renewed focus on US-European shared democratic ideals seems inevitable, the 3SI carries vast geopolitical importance. In recent years, within the BRI, China has formed a “17+1” cooperation initiative with European countries, spending billions in FDI and investing in major infrastructure projects such as ports in Greece, Spain, and Belgium. Russia, on the other hand, remains the only energy supplier to many of these countries, and has used their energy dependence as political leverage. For many of the East European nations, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, attracting Chinese investments and ensuring low energy prices from Russia have seemed like obvious solutions to boosting economic growth.<sup>27</sup> But as the United States look to confront Russian and Chinese economic and geopolitical competition in Europe and across the world, the 3SI offers an opportunity to strengthen the economies of US allies in Central and Eastern Europe and to reduce their dependence on Moscow’s and Beijing’s economic overtures.

<sup>25</sup> <https://3seas.eu/media/news/us-secretary-of-state-antony-blinken-expressed-us-support-for-the-three-seas-initiative>.

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.politico.eu/article/lithuania-pulls-out-china-17-1-bloc-eastern-central-europe-foreign-minister-gabrieliuss-landsbergis/>.

<sup>27</sup> Otashvili, Maia. *Three Seas Initiative Promise for Black Sea Region Call for U.S.-Europe to Support 3SI*. [https://eng.majalla.com/node/140076/politicsthree-seas-initiative-promise-black-sea-region?\\_\\_cf\\_chl\\_captcha\\_\\_tk\\_\\_=pmd\\_Du4PdGPPdmp.8KwVMEuQkt4g\\_clwi3L9op2Mrfok9JM-1632994512-0-gqNtZGzNAvujcnBszQd9](https://eng.majalla.com/node/140076/politicsthree-seas-initiative-promise-black-sea-region?__cf_chl_captcha__tk__=pmd_Du4PdGPPdmp.8KwVMEuQkt4g_clwi3L9op2Mrfok9JM-1632994512-0-gqNtZGzNAvujcnBszQd9).

# The People's Republic of China Today – Achievements, Problems, Trends and Perspectives

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## Abstract

China's growing position in key areas of economic, scientific, technical and other development, as well as in major regions of the world, demonstrates the increasingly important place and role that this country plays in today's global dynamics.

All this makes the conversation about the achievements, problems, trends and prospects of development of the PRC an important and vital topic. The main purpose of this material is not only to demonstrate the above-mentioned successes, problems and prospects, but also to analyze the causes, factors and logic of this exceptional dynamics of China. These goals are achieved through the following tasks, structured in the main sections of the presented report, namely:

- A brief overview of the way traveled by China from ancient time to the present day – main dividing lines;
- Deployment of the reform process in the PRC and creation of the model of socialism with Chinese specifics;
- PRC as a global country – trends and prospects;

**Keywords:** *socio-economic dynamics of China from ancient times to present days; reforms in the PRC, socialism with Chinese characteristics; PRC as a global state*

## Introduction

The key thesis this article maintains is that the effective model of development, that the PRC invented, is a model that becomes a positive alternative to the world dominant neoliberal scheme and its variations. In addition, in the text is introduced the idea of PRC creating a new format of development of bilateral and multilateral relations and interactions, the basis of which is the principle of mutually beneficial development.

The topics above are presented in the article by the following methodological approaches:

- Systemic approach;
- Geopolitical and geo-economics approach (platform);
- Historical approach;

## **A quick overview of China's path from ancient times till nowadays – main dividing lines**

### *China as leading socio-economic country from ancient times to the Late New Age*

Let's start by saying that Mesopotamia, Ancient Egypt, Ancient India and of course Ancient China are the first centers of civilization in the history of mankind. As you may already know, the formation of Chinese civilization began in the Yellow and Yangtze rivers. So that, today's Henan Province is considered the birthplace of the first proto-state formations – the Earlitou (二里头文化, 1900–1500 BC) and Erligang cultures (二里岗文化, 1500–1300 BC). Henan province, together with the neighboring provinces of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Hebei and Anhui, cover most of the North China Plain – a place with extremely favorable conditions for agriculture, and hence opportunities for accelerated demographic development.

During the longest period of development of human history (for China, this is the time from the Shang dynasty, through the Zhou, Qin, Han dynasties, following the Sui, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and the Manchu Qing dynasties), China along with India were the most significant economic systems and social centers not only in ancient times and the Middle Ages, but also within the Early Modern period.

Throughout this period, which lasted more than two thousand years, despite foreign invasions and dominions, numerous uprisings and riots, change of dynasties, etc. China has demonstrated its exceptional civilizational resistance. This exceptional stability is based on the high demographic vitality, the traditional value and ideological-spiritual system – Confucianism and Buddhism, as well as a specific state-bureaucratic complex. However, without any doubt, one of the main factors remains agriculture, the development of which was very advanced. At that time many products such as silk, porcelain, tea, etc., were in great demand throughout the so-called “Old World”, due to their unique character. In addition, the trade system of China was of the highest technological level.

### *China in the century of socio-political and economic collapse (1840–1949)*

In the beginning let's say that with the arrival of capitalism and colonialism in the West and especially after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in England, the world situation changed rapidly. In terms of China, the First (1840–1842) and Second (1850–1856) Opium Wars became a deep dividing line in the political and socio-economic development of the country.

It is important to mention the name of Kenneth Pomeranz who first introduced the idea of ‘The Great Divergence’ – a term used to name the process by which the Western world (Western Europe and the parts of the New World where Western Europeans became the dominant population) emerged in the nineteenth century as the most powerful and rich world civilization. This civilization managed to eclipse Qing China, Mughal India, the Islamic world and Tokugawa Japan.

Moreover, there is a heated discussion among researchers, offering a wide variety of hypotheses and ideas to explain why and how the 'Great Divergence' happened. Among these hypotheses and ideas are such causes and factors as geographical and natural environment, traditional culture and archaic institutions, colonialism, invasions, available resources and simply the historical chance of all this to happen.

Unfortunately, The Opium Wars marked the beginning of a century of humiliation for China and its people. Thus, within the so-called 'Late New Age', China, although a pre-industrial but prosperous country, became in about 100 years (in the late 40s of the twentieth century) the poorest country in terms of income per capita, along with India and Ethiopia. In 1949, the average life expectancy of the Chinese was only 35 years.

*First elaborate steps to the great revival of the Chinese people*

The new dividing line in Chinese history dates back to 1949. With the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Civil War, a new type of statehood and socio-economic system was formed in China. The country faces a number of serious problems caused by the country's chaos, devastation and social decline, which have resulted from decades of civil war and the war with Japan.

During these years, the Chinese people received the support of the USSR. It began in the 1930s with military aid to China during the war against the aggression of Imperial Japan and continued through the liberation of Northeast China in 1945. After the establishment of the PRC, the training of highly qualified specialists in various fields of economics, education and medicine began. This further supported the implementation of 156 large industrial projects, achieved with Soviet assistance in the 50s of the twentieth century. In terms of the USSR, from 1949 to 1959, tens of thousands of Chinese students were educated and upon their return to China those students succeeded in creating industries, educational institutions and scientific fields.

However, from 1949 to 1978, the socio-economic processes can be described with only one word – difficulties. The severe conditions are generally typical for any revolution, because it means implementation of qualitative changes in a belated traditional society, which seeks to emerge from its own conservatism. Talking about the period from 1949 to 1978, it's a must to mention that it is actually a stage in the completion of the 'Great Peasant War', which began in the XIX century in China. At the same time, it was a part of the world 'peasant wars', which emerged a century and a half ago in Western Europe with the idea to replace the feudalism with capitalism.

In China, the revolution was an attempt to skip a whole stage of development – capitalism. It also aimed to end China's dependence on both the West and neighboring Japan. Such a transformation was accompanied by extreme tension in society and in the governing core – the CC. Despite hesitations and deviations, such as the 'Great Leap Forward' (1958–1961) and the 'Great Cultural Revolution' (文化大革命, 1966–1976), the period played a key role in the PRC making an initial modernization leap thus stimulating further de-

velopment. This progress happened under the influence of the iconic and monumental figure of Mao Zedong. Undoubtedly, his impact was ambiguous and sometimes internally contradictory. But as noted in the PRC, “Mao was the man who, when China was on its knees, made the country stand up.”

### **Deployment of the reforming process in the PRC and creation of the model of socialism with Chinese specifics**

The model of the so-called ‘State socialism’ in the international arena in the mid-70s of the twentieth century, given the exhaustion of the positive potential inherent in the principle of centralization as a comprehensive scheme of functioning, falls into a state that can be described as a ‘crisis of the model’. In economic terms, the main point in this crisis are the difficulties within the model to make a transition from extensive to intensive type of socio-economic dynamics. This crisis was particularly acute in the PRC due to the significantly lower socio-economic and technological level than in the USSR and the countries of Eastern European socialism. This sharpness is also determined by the situation of deteriorating ideological, political, etc. relations with the ‘Soviet bloc of socialism’.

In these circumstances, the CCP and China’s leadership, represented mostly by Deng Xiaoping, embarked on a ‘geopolitical maneuver’ – integration into the capitalist system of division of labor, however, not as a periphery but as a relatively equal partner. The means of achieving this integration was the conclusion of a ‘geopolitical and geoeconomics deal’ with the United States.

The American leadership agreed to such a ‘deal’ given the desire to involve China in its ‘Cold War’ with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, there was the hidden desire to reform the PRC into a capitalist format. Last but not least, to use a number of important aspects of the Chinese economy at the given historical moment as low labor costs at a relatively high level of qualification. This was made in order to sharply get up the rate of return of American capital invested in China for increasing its own competitiveness against Western European and Japanese capital.

The initial period of reforms was based on the principle ‘state regulation is primary; market regulation is secondary’. This followed a certain logic. The steps of this logic can be presented as follows – strengthening the investment activity by the state – increasing the purchase prices of agricultural products – reforming the village (transition from collective land cultivation to family contract farming) – stabilization of agricultural production – enterprise reform – increase in production and wages – trend of increasing demand for agricultural and industrial products as a result of increased incomes. At the same time, factors to dynamize the economy at the next stage are being prepared – contacting ‘华侨, Huáqiáo’ (representatives of the Chinese diaspora around the world) – preparation and creation of structures, as well as channels for export of goods – preparation of conditions

for achieving 'free zones' to attract foreign direct investment in production technologies and to increase exports of goods.

Within the reform process, uncertainty is inevitable, and hence mistakes, wrong moves, and as a result, strong social tensions and even conflicts, such as the one in Tiananmen Square. In resolving this conflict, the CCP, led by Deng Xiaoping choose to act from the standpoint of the dichotomy 'order against chaos'. This action turned out to be crucial for stabilizing the society and continuing on the path of reforms and positive socio-economic dynamics.

For the decade of reforms and development of the PRC in the 1990s, it should be noted that important steps are being taken in the reform process, primarily in the restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This happens in particular in the large enterprises sector. Restructuring is focused on the management system, ownership structure, their consolidation, i.e., mergers and acquisitions, as well as the overall environment of their operation. The aim is simple – strengthening the market elements of regulation and competitiveness. A process of privatizations begins, and the privatization happens mostly with the transformation of SOEs into joint stock companies.

Moving to the aspect of the banking sector – this one is actually undergoing an interesting transformation. This sector 'learns' to work quickly in market conditions, and in the meantime still remains state-owned. This is where Special Economic Zones (SEZs) play an important role. These zones become a wonderful experimental site, where new practices are tested. Once proven in the SEZ, these practices become immediately implemented in the country.

China's 'discovery' of foreign direct investment is a key to the success of the reform. A pioneering and important role for FDI is played by the Chinese diaspora in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, etc. But over time, FDI from Japan, the United States, South Korea, Britain and Germany have become key. Through FDI, important new high technologies, management and marketing know-how are entering China, as well as tunnels for access to foreign markets, which have contributed to a leap in China's foreign trade. The attractiveness of the PRC as an object of FDI is the low cost of labor, allowing to maximize the profits of investors, the huge and growing market of China, government policy, creating the most favorable conditions for foreign investors, and providing stable conditions for foreign capital.

An important factor for the success of the PRC in the 1990s is the development of NIS – China's national innovation system. During these years the perception of the market model of functioning is carried out. Programs of strategic importance are at stake. But at that time the innovation process in China is still incomparable to those in Western countries and Japan.

In the meantime, the American-Chinese synthesis is formed. The name of this synthesis is 'Chimerica' – a combination of the name China and the name America. In the 1990s, the PRC continued its successful integration into the international system of divi-

sion of labor. The success is due to the fact that through a complex set of policies, compromises, positions and actions, China overcomes the risk of becoming a periphery and semi-periphery of the Western countries. Although playing by the rules of the system in the creation of which China has not participated, the Asian country has turned its weaknesses into strengths and managed to change the rules in its favor.

Another thing to mention is the 'global crisis' that erupted in 2008–2009. The Crisis had a major impact on China's socio-economic development and as we already know, China was deeply integrated into this system. In the first phase of the 'Global Crisis' there was a decline in foreign markets. As said earlier, major part of Chinese production was implemented in the foreign markets. China began to make changes in its trade system and if till then exports had been the engine of the Chinese economy, they made a significant change and implemented the domestic consumption model.

In the second place, the 'crypto phase' of the 'global crisis', in the centers of the crisis – the US and the EU, carried out 'quantitative easing' (QE), i.e., printing of banknotes. This only 'hid' the open signs of the crisis, but did not resolve the contradictions. In China, the second phase of the global crisis resulted in the formation of problems such as the accumulation of debt, which was twice the country's gross GDP. It was created mainly by regional administrations investing in civic projects to support economic development in the respective regions.

### **PRC as a global country – trends and prospects**

In the autumn of 2013, during his visit to Kazakhstan and Indonesia, the President of the People's Republic of China announced the 'One Belt and One Road' project (EPEP, — 帶 一路 ), as a union of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.

The changed situation is forcing the PRC leadership to begin a new phase of 'reform and opening up' policy, called the 'second reform'. In November 2014, in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping came up with the concept of the 'New Normality'. This means that the economy is transforming from high growth rates to medium growth rates because of the restructuring of the economy.

Meanwhile, the country became the first global economic power with a gross domestic product (GDP) of 17.63 trillion US dollars, calculated on PPP – purchasing power parity. In the following years, although China's GDP growth rate slowed, the PRC continued to show the highest economic dynamics among developed countries in the world. In 2018, the world witnessed a fierce conflict initiated by the United States, affecting trade and economic relations with China. The development of this conflict today, as well as in the perspective of the near or distant future, undoubtedly has and will have global dimensions and consequences, given the fact that these are the two largest economies in the world. This 'trade war' with the United States is undoubtedly one of the important

reasons why China's GDP growth rate for 2018 is 6.6%. This is the worst rate indicator since 1990. Despite tariff increases as well as other US restrictions, China's GDP growth in the first half of 2019 was 6.3 percent per year. China is increasingly relying on domestic consumption as a basis for the stability of the national economy and independence from the external environment. In the first eight months of 2019, China's retail sales total 26.22 trillion yuan, which is 8.2 percent higher than the previous year. The growth of retail sales is a result of online and rural trade. The increase in rural incomes strengthens the purchasing power of the Chinese countryside.

In 2020, the world entered the Global Lockdown, passing under the sign of COVID-19. The PRC, which was first affected by COVID-19, has demonstrated a successful response to both the coronavirus and the economic downturn that accompanies measures to tackle the epidemic. The economic recovery of the PRC is simply impressive. After the expected decline in the months of the emergence and spread of COVID-19 in the first half of 2020, a process of rapid recovery followed. In the third quarter of the same year, the growth was 4.9% compared to the same quarter of 2019. The pace of this recovery is growing at an extraordinary rate. In the fourth quarter of 2020, growth was already 6.5%. Particularly successful was the industrial production, which in December 2020 jumped by 7.3% compared to the same month a year earlier. China is taking advantage of the high demand for coronavirus protection goods on the one hand and electronics on the other, as COVID-19 has sharply accelerated the number of people around the world who have started working remotely from home. China's trade surplus for 2020 reached a record of 35 billion US dollars, which is 27% more than in 2019.

As a whole in 2020, China's GDP grew by 2.3% to 15.7 trillion dollars. For the first half of 2021, GDP was 8,217 trillion dollars (the growth compared to the same period of the previous year is 12.7%). 2021 was a huge success in tackling poverty and achieving the so-called 小康社会 (xiǎokāng shèhuì) i.e. 'moderately prosperous society'. From the beginning of the reforms in 1978 until today, 770 million people have overcome poverty, and since 2012, when Xi Jinping announced the long-term program 'Chinese Dream', the entire poor rural population (98.99 million people, living in 128 thousand villages in 832 counties) has been lifted out of poverty, outworn homes have been renovated for more than 25 million poor people, and approximately 9.6 million people have been relocated from poor areas. China has achieved the UN's poverty eradication target 10 years before the 2030 deadline, and China's contribution to global poverty reduction has exceeded 70%.

### **Instead of conclusion**

A decisive factor for the sustainable development of China is the transition to a new technological platform for development – the so-called 'Fourth Industrial (Technological) Revolution'. China has a very clear strategy for technological improvement of the country – the 2025 Program.

The model of 'Socialism with Chinese characteristics', born of the reforms that began in the late 1970s, has successfully proven throughout the past decade to be beneficial in terms of both economic dynamics and creation of material wealth over the world-dominant neoliberal model.

The development plan until 2035 was discussed at important state forums in 2021. There are two crucial platforms on which the country's development is planned to be realized: The first is 'China's openness'. The country is actively accelerating the process of creating a new system for integrating domestic economic cycles with international markets. The aim is for China to further open its internal market, thus enabling countries seeking mutually beneficial cooperation with the PRC to gain practical opportunities for development.

The last but for sure not the least crucial platform for China's further dynamics is innovation, understood in the broadest sense – technical and technological, organizational and social. The goal is to form the basis for the next achievement by 2035 – the level of a Medium developed society 中等发达社会 (Zhōngděng fādá shèhuì). The same is planned to happen by the middle of the XXI century, i.e., by 2049, which will mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.

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# Socio-Economic Dynamics of the “New Silk Road”: The China–Europe Rail Service and the Belt and Road Initiative

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## Abstract

Ever since the proposal of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is also known as the New Silk Road, the grand initiative has received extensive global attention and interpretation. A particularly popular approach to this issue so far has been the traditional geopolitical one, with a central focus on the geographical situation and power structure of the region. Given the plurality of ideas for a New Silk Road in the contemporary world, the geopolitical approach is, nevertheless, weak to explain the prosperity of ongoing international cooperation under the BRI among other Silk Road-related development proposals. Against this background, this paper explores the inner dynamic of the BRI and focuses on the launch and development of the China-Europe rail service (China Railway Express 中欧班列), which started actually before the proposal of BRI, but is currently often deemed as a signature project of it. By case studies of Yuxinou trains (渝新欧班列) from Chongqing and YXE trains (义新欧班列) from Yiwu, this paper illustrates the key role of contemporary international development of the supply chain in China in actualizing the BRI. By boosting the Eurasian connectivity, the international development of the Chinese supply chain has substantially facilitated the BRI, especially the Silk Road Economic Belt. It is argued that this process is credited to inclusive development of regional business circles, constructive central-local interaction in China, and effective international coordination among different sectors, which have been unleashing socio-economic dynamics of the “New Silk Road” linking China and the world.

**Keywords:** New Silk Road, socio-economic dynamics, China–Europe rail service, Yuxinou trains, YXE trains

## Introduction

In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the idea of building the “Silk Road Economic Belt” in a speech at the Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan. The idea and the “21<sup>st</sup>-Century Maritime Silk Road,” which was put forward in October that year, constitute the development proposal “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI 一带一路倡议). Since its appearance, the BRI has received growing regional and global attention. The regional

economic cooperation and communications between China and countries along the Belt and Road have increased rapidly. When people mentioned the “New Silk Road” in the recent discussion, they referred always to the BRI from China.

It is beyond any doubt that geographical imagination plays an important role in shaping people’s understanding of the initiative. The New Silk Road is linked geographically closely to the Ancient Silk Road. The transcontinental route across Central and Western Asia, for example, reminds people of ancient legends about the Silk Road. Nevertheless, when it comes to the analysis of the BRI, the traditional geopolitical approach, a particularly popular one, lays a focus not only on the geographical situation but also the power structure of the Belt and Road region. Such a view can be traced back to Halford Mackinder. According to his famous heartland theory, the core region of the Silk Road belongs to the pivot area that is the key to controlling the Eurasian continent and even this planet. This view was put forward against the background of the so-called “Great Game,” that is, the competition between Britain and Russia for dominance in Afghanistan and Central Asia in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The influence of such a view has been so far-reaching that in recent three decades, a notion “New Great Game” has been applied to re-conceptualize the situation of Eurasia, signifying a new round of the geopolitical competition after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup>

The traditional geopolitical approach assumes homogeneity of the Silk Road-related development proposals, based on their largely overlapping geographical settings and the assumption that the state is the dominant actor in regional affairs and thinks alike about influence expansion. As is illustrated below, in the contemporary world, the BRI is not the only idea for a New Silk Road but the most successful one so far. The traditional geopolitical view is, therefore, weak to distinguish the BRI from other contemporary ideas related to the New Silk Road. This paper argues for the necessity of exploring inner dynamics of the BRI cooperation and investigates the China Railway Express (中欧班列) as a signature project of the BRI. By case studies of Yuxinou (渝新欧) and YXE (义新欧) trains, this paper intends to show how the BRI has been actually supported and thus influenced by real projects and different actors.

## **A Plurality of Ideas for a New Silk Road and the Belt and Road Initiative**

Although the “New Silk Road” is currently often regarded as a synonym of the Belt and Road, the BRI from China is not the only contemporary idea for a New Silk Road. Early in the 1960s, a Silk Road initiative was already discussed. “The initial plan was to build 14,000 kilometers of railway line linking Singapore and Turkey.”<sup>2</sup> This idea of the Trans-

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<sup>1</sup> For legacies of Mackinder in contemporary Central Asia international relations, see Megoran and Sharapova 2013. For discussions of “New Great Game,” see Cuthbertson 1994, Menon 2003, and so forth.

<sup>2</sup> China International Publishing Group et al., 129.

Asian Railway, known as the Iron Silk Road, was frustrated by the Cold War situation but again brought into discussion in the 1990s and 2000s.<sup>3</sup> The UN Development Program formally launched an initiative in February 2008 to revitalize Eurasian land arteries.<sup>4</sup> In October 2013, the then South Korean President Park Geun-hye raised a conception of “Silk Road Express” to integrate the transportation network in the Eurasian continent, which was nonetheless hindered by the tension on the Korean Peninsula and other difficulties.<sup>5</sup>

Japan’s “Silk Road Diplomacy” and the USA’s “New Silk Road Plan” also predated the BRI from China and gained substantial influence. In 1997, the then Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro put forward the “Silk Road Diplomacy” to conceptualize Japanese diplomatic contacts with Central Asia and the Caucasus. To secure the energy supply to Japan and the Japanese regional influence, Japan started to establish its strong presence in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus in the 1990s. In 2004, the “Central Asia Plus Japan” dialog was launched in Kazakhstan and to strengthen the cooperation between Japan and Central Asian countries.<sup>6</sup> Following the “Silk Road Diplomacy,” the Japanese government’s investment in infrastructure in Central Asia was among the earliest in the post-Soviet time.

Moreover, the New Silk Road Plan, formulated by the then US secretary of state Hillary Clinton in 2011, was probably the most famous Silk Road-related proposal before the BRI. The New Silk Road Plan proposed to connect Central and South Asia to Afghanistan and was, therefore, to build Afghanistan into a regional hub of regional transportation and trade, with “energy going southwards and goods going northwards.”<sup>7</sup> The planned retreat of the US and NATO military forces from Afghanistan was obviously connected to this development plan. Yet in fact, even before the Afghanistan War, the concept of the plan already appeared in the US. It was first proposed by Prof. Frederick Starr at the Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University. At the government level, there were forerunners of the New Silk Road Plan: the “Silk Road Strategy Act (1999)” the “Silk Road Strategy Act (2006).”<sup>8</sup> The past two decades have witnessed the failure of US military presence in Afghanistan and in 2021, the military retreat was realized accompanied by the regional security crisis. In the present day, these US versions of the Silk Road Strategy are nevertheless not so well-known as the BRI. Despite overlapping fields such as infrastructure connectivity in Central and South Asia, cooperation between the New Silk Road Plan and the BRI seems unlikely so far.

As a development initiative related to the transcultural concept “Silk Road,” the BRI appears similar to those previous ones in many ways. Its actualization is, nonetheless, distinguishable from other proposals. For instance, the China Railway Express (CR Ex-

<sup>3</sup> Wang 2018, 90–91.

<sup>4</sup> China International Publishing Group et al., 129.

<sup>5</sup> China International Publishing Group et al., 149.

<sup>6</sup> China International Publishing Group et al., 151.

<sup>7</sup> Wei 2019, 508.

<sup>8</sup> Wei 2019, 508–509.

press), which is written on the white paper of the Chinese government on jointly building the Belt and Road, has experienced dramatic development since the appearance of BRI.<sup>9</sup> The freight trains operating between China and other countries on the Eurasian landmass increased from 80 in 2013 to 12,406 in 2020, which means an extraordinary growth of 15,407.5% in only eight years.<sup>10</sup> Booming China–Europe rail service has vitalized and sustained the New Silk Road. It concerns not only infrastructure connectivity, but also policy coordination, trade cooperation, financial integration, and people-to-people bond along the rail route. In order to explore the inner dynamics of BRI projects, in the next section, two cases of the initial development of the CR Express are to be examined.

### **The China–Europe Rail Service and Actualization of the Belt and Road Initiative**

As a matter of fact, the infrastructure the CR Express relies heavily upon, the (First and Second) Eurasian Land Bridges, already existed decades ago. After its disconnection in the Cold War, the transcontinental railway network was reconnected in the 1990s. In 1995, the US company DuPont succeeded in utilizing Lianyungang Port and the Trans-China Railway to transport its products to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.<sup>11</sup> In April 2004, a test freight train from Lianyungang Port to Almaty in Kazakhstan was organized by the CRIMT (China Railway International Multimodal Transport Co. Ltd).<sup>12</sup> However, communications through the Eurasian Land Bridges were still limited until the early 2010s. Only since the birth of CR Express, the regular China–Europe rail service has gained momentum.

### **The Case of Yuxinou Trains**

Nowadays, there are already tens of Chinese cities operating the CR Express. Among them, Chongqing was the first to organize such a container train transporting freight directly to Europe. With China’s strategy to develop the western region and the reconfiguration of the global supply chain in the financial crisis, multinational notebook computer giants such as HP and Foxconn began to lay their production bases in Chongqing in the late 2000s. The inland Chinese city quickly became a new headquarters for laptop production.<sup>13</sup> It was estimated that in 2011, “one out of three notebook computers sold in the world” were from Chongqing, and “around half of the computers produced there” were for the European market.<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, there were logistic problems with Chongqing’s export to the European market. Owing to Chongqing’s location as an inland city, the ex-

<sup>9</sup> National Development and Reform Commission et al., 2015.

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zoblPc.htm>.

<sup>11</sup> Wang 2018, 140.

<sup>12</sup> Wang 2018, 141.

<sup>13</sup> Gao et al 2017, 31.

<sup>14</sup> Esteban and Li 2020, 44.

port of Chongqing's electronic products had to rely on deep-water ports in Shanghai or Canton, which is far away from Chongqing. In this case, the time of delivery by sea did not meet the need. Yet the transportation of laptops by air would not be an economical solution.

There were attempts from Foxconn and HP to use the Eurasian Land Bridges for transportation from China to Europe. Yet international coordination still posed problems to it. It was difficult to make it by multinational corporations alone.<sup>15</sup> Things began to change when the Chongqing Municipal Government took an active part in it in 2010. The mayor of Chongqing Huang Qifan was ready to solve the problem and accepted HP's proposal to use the Second Eurasian Land Bridge. Huang led a team to visit Beijing and get support from the General Administration of Customs and the Ministry of Railways for Chongqing–Europe freight trains. Tony Prophet, senior vice president of HP, was also on this team.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, HP and Chongqing managed to approach European railway companies such as DB Schenker and TEL.<sup>17</sup> During the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Russia on November 23, 2010, China, Russia, and Kazakhstan signed agreements to facilitate the customs clearance procedure of freight trains from Chongqing through Alashankou Port to Europe.<sup>18</sup>

Thanks to the support from these relevant parties, the domestic and international trials of the prepared freight train were conducted respectively in October 2010 and January–February 2011.<sup>19</sup> On March 19, 2011, the first formal operation of the Chongqing–Duisburg freight train was launched in Chongqing West Station. The Yuxinou service (Chongqing–Xinjiang–Europe rail service) was established. After that, Chongqing continued to optimize the operation of Yuxinou trains. International workshops and conferences in this regard were convened. In September 2011, Chongqing hosted the Conference on “Coalition of Trans-Eurasia Rail among Five Countries and Six Parties,” which paved the way for the establishment of the joint venture YUXINO (Chongqing) Logistics Co. Ltd in 2012. It became the operator of Yuxinou trains and its shareholders are five state-owned logistical enterprises from China (one on the Chongqing municipal level and the other on the central level), Germany, Russia, and Kazakhstan.<sup>20</sup>

### The Case of YXE Trains

The first operation of the YXE rail service, that is, the container train transporting goods between the Chinese commercial town Yiwu and other cities in Europe and Asia, began in April 2013.<sup>21</sup> It happened later than the Yuxinou logistics but still belongs to the

<sup>15</sup> Shan and Zhang 2019, 22. Wang 2018, 159–160.

<sup>16</sup> Gao et al., 2017, 32–33. Wang 2018, 160–161.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Gao et al., 2017, 29.

<sup>19</sup> Gao et al., 2017, 29–30.

<sup>20</sup> Gao et al., 2017, 34–36.

<sup>21</sup> Wang 2019, 28.

early explorers of CR Express that started before the proposal of BRI. Different from the case in Chongqing, the exploration of YXE was initiated not by a global industrial giant or local authorities but by a young Yiwu entrepreneur. It was possible because it was in Yiwu. In the past four decades, Yiwu has amazingly grown from a poor county into the “world capital of small commodities.” In the 2000s, Yiwu International Trade Center was already the largest market of small commodities around the world. Born in the historical commercial town, Feng Xubin was already a successful businessman at the age of 30. When he entered the sphere of logistics in 2010, he discovered that there was a large number of goods transporting from Yiwu to Central Asia and Russia but without direct freight rail service. A new business enterprise occupied his mind: Yiwu–Central Asia–Europe rail service.<sup>22</sup>

Many difficulties were faced by the young man. For instance, Yiwu Customs was not entitled to inspect exports through railway and the freight charge of railway transportation was often not so competitive. Despite these difficulties, Feng and his team did not stop striving for it. In the fall of 2012, the establishment of the customs inspection point in Yiwu West Railway Station was approved.<sup>23</sup> In 2013, relevant facilities were ready and the Yiwu–Central Asia freight train began to operate. In the first few months of operation, there were no regular YXE trains, and the service was based on the unstable supply of goods to export.<sup>24</sup> In September 2013, the initiative for New Silk Road Economic Belt was announced and Feng saw the business opportunity behind it. In October, he submitted a report concerning the opening up of Yiwu railway port and the launch of YXE freight trains to the Yiwu Government. On January 20, 2014, the first Yiwu–Central Asia block train was formally launched.<sup>25</sup> According to Feng’s plan, the next stage was to extend the rail service further to Europe.

A dramatic event occurred on September 26, 2014. During his meeting with the Spanish Prime Minister in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping said, “the YXE railway started from Yiwu, Zhejiang province, with a planned destination of Madrid, the capital and largest city of Spain.”<sup>26</sup> He stressed, “China welcomes Spain’s participation in the construction and operation of a transcontinental railway, and will provide a good way for China and Spain to upgrade trade and economic cooperation.”<sup>27</sup> Feng was truly excited when knowing this, and it was followed by strong support from the provincial and local governments. On November 18, 2014, the Yiwu–Madrid freight train, the first YXE train to Europe, departed from Yiwu. It successfully arrived in Madrid on December 9 and accomplished the longest rail freight service in the world. Since then, the YXE train (Yiwu–Madrid) has

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<sup>22</sup> Wang 2019, 20.

<sup>23</sup> Wang 2019, 191.

<sup>24</sup> Wang 2019, 28.

<sup>25</sup> Wang 2019, 32.

<sup>26</sup> Wang 2019, 35.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

born Xi Jinping's endorsement at the diplomatic arena six times.<sup>28</sup> The routes of YXE have reached 14 in 2021, which is the most among all the CR Express operators. Conspicuously, it is the sole CR Express service so far that is run by a private firm in a county-level city.

## Conclusion

The CR Express, which is often called the Belt and Road on rail, actually came into being before the announcement of BRI. Both in Chongqing and Yiwu, it was the growth of the supply chain that extended business circles and created the demand for increasing rail links in the region. Not only that, constructive central–local interaction in China and effective international coordination facilitated the China–Europe rail service based on the Eurasian rail network. Only through the collaboration of these factors can the regular operation and ongoing rapid development of CR Express be possible. Arguably, it unleashed the socio-economic dynamic of the China–Europe rail service which has boosted the Eurasian connectivity and underpinned international cooperation under the BRI. Since the BRI was proposed, the New Silk Road linking China and the world has largely been sustained and developed in this way.

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<sup>28</sup> <http://www.yixinou.com/detail.htm?id=198>.

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# Chinese Pop-Culture: The Soft Power Tool for Cultural Diplomacy in China's International Relations

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## Abstract

Cultural diplomacy has been, since Joseph Nye coined the term 'soft power', at the forefront of nations' policies when projecting soft power on the international stage. In recent decades China has also embraced soft power and cultural diplomacy. Insofar, Chinese cultural diplomacy has generally focused on China's rich cultural heritage in addition to the study of Chinese language and culture through Confucius Institutes, conventions, and international events. Yet, China has a further opportunity to ameliorate its cultural exchange with the world.

With the rise of technology and mass media entertainment, China is presented with a soft power tool in the form of its popular culture which can serve to ameliorate the international community's understanding of Chinese culture and society. Chinese popular culture, notably Chinese animations, TV dramas, music and the promotion of domestic artists abroad presents an immense opportunity for China to be understood in a different light by the international community. The case is especially relevant for the younger generations – 'millennials' which can be introduced to modern-day China through technology and mass media.

Thus, this article argues that China could employ popular culture on a large scale as a tool of cultural diplomacy to further deepen the international community's understanding of its culture, which would prove beneficial for its international relations. Further, popular culture's vast reach to many audiences, especially to the younger generations, can not only improve understanding for Chinese culture and society but also elevate China's status on the world stage, making it a modern cultural powerhouse.

**Keywords:** Chinese international relations, soft power, cultural diplomacy, pop-culture.

Throughout recent decades China's leadership considered international relations through the lens of traditional Chinese culture and values, assuming that "national strength is an index of international image"<sup>1</sup>. It was considered that China would be respected by the international community for its phenomenal economic performance and cultural and rich history. However, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to rec-

<sup>1</sup> Yiwei Wang, "Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power," *The Annals of the American Academy*, Vol. 616 (2008): 261.

ognize that historical significance does not automatically convert into contemporary influence on the international stage. In accordance, the Chinese government's approach has shifted from inner virtue projected outwards to a more active stance on soft power<sup>2</sup>, which is deemed vital in 21<sup>st</sup> century international relations.

Since the 17<sup>th</sup> Communist Party Congress in 2007 when the concept of soft power was officially adopted, China has taken a more active approach towards soft power<sup>3</sup>. President Hu Jintao highlighted the strategic significance of soft power and emphasized the vital importance of culture on an international level: "in today's world, culture has increasingly become a crucial source for national cohesion and creativity"<sup>4</sup>.

Since then, China has placed an ever-growing importance on soft power specifically culture. Notably in December 2013, President Xi Jinping's speech at the Politburo of the 18<sup>th</sup> Central Committee highlighted the importance of culture by stating that China needed to "showcase the unique charms of Chinese culture"<sup>5</sup> and that the nation "should disseminate Chinese culture in a popular way"<sup>6</sup>. Furthermore, at the 19<sup>th</sup> Party Congress, President Xi highlighted that "culture is the soul of a country and a people"<sup>7</sup>.

This demonstrates the importance of soft power, notably culture for the CCP. Recognizing its significance for China, this paper focuses on soft power specifically cultural diplomacy in the form of Chinese popular culture (hereinafter pop-culture). The paper argues that pop-culture as a tool of cultural diplomacy has the potential to improve international society's understanding of Chinese culture and society, thereby ameliorating relations between China and the international community.

This paper firstly defines 'soft power' and 'cultural diplomacy' and highlights the importance both play in Chinese international relations. Secondly, the paper focuses on the significance of cultural content adapted to modern audiences outside of China and finally, it gives cases of specific industries which can play a major role in Chinese cultural diplomacy in the form of pop-culture. The latter consist of the Chinese music industry and the movie and TV industry.

## Soft Power

Joseph Nye defines soft power as the "ability to shape the preferences of others"<sup>8</sup> and argues that it is based on attractiveness which is utilized by actors in international relations to achieve strategic imperatives. A country's soft power according to Nye, rests on

<sup>2</sup> Zhiqun Zhu, *China's New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance*, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010, 10.

<sup>3</sup> Barthélémy Courmont, "What Implications for Chinese Soft Power: Charm Offensive or New Hegemony?" *Pacific Focus, Inha Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2013): 343.

<sup>4</sup> Qing Cao et al. ed., *Discourse, Politics and Media in Contemporary China*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014, 176.

<sup>5</sup> Jacques deLisle, and Avery Goldstein ed., *China's Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century*, Brookings Institution Press, 2017, 398.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Nigel Inkster, "Chinese Culture and Soft Power," *Survival*, Vol. 60, No.3 (2018): 68.

<sup>8</sup> Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2009, 5.

three main resources: “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)”<sup>9</sup>. This paper focuses on culture which is defined as a “set of values and practices that create meaning for a society”<sup>10</sup>.

According to supporters of the cultural school, China’s main elements of cultural soft power encompass: “Chinese language (characters and calligraphy), Chinese philosophy, Chinese music, movies, arts, architecture, Chinese food, Chinese medicine, [and] Chinese martial arts”<sup>11</sup>. However, this emphasis on traditional Chinese culture fails to take into consideration modern resources for Chinese soft power such as a proactive participation in international affairs, educational exchanges, tourism, and the mass media among others.

National cultural soft power has been strengthened largely through the Confucius Institute project, which began in 2004 seeking to provide resources for Chinese language instruction and cultural outreach around the globe<sup>12</sup>. However, such efforts are not sufficient for ameliorating exposure to Chinese culture internationally, because individuals who frequent Confucius Institutes have an active interest towards China. That is not the case with a vast majority of the population which does not have such an active interest nor exposure to Chinese culture. Nevertheless, pop-cultural content consumed by international audiences via the Internet can increase exposure to modern day China. As such, this highlights the importance of pop-culture for China’s soft power as it gives the opportunity for Chinese cultural content to be showcased on a large scale, reaching audiences around the globe.

## Cultural diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy is vastly considered as a sub-category of public diplomacy. Nicholas J. Cull’s conception of public diplomacy defines the latter as “an actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through making its cultural resources and achievements known overseas”<sup>13</sup>. Public diplomacy can be used to create and project a favourable image worldwide as it is an instrument used to create attraction through exposure of foreign audiences to domestic content.

By reaching audiences worldwide, China can help soften its image as a rising power. Chinese soft power in the form of popular culture can introduce peoples from countries participating in the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) to Chinese culture and modern society. This

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 11.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Xin Li and Verner Worm, “Building China’s Soft Power for a Peaceful Rise,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 16, (2011): 75.

<sup>12</sup> deLisle, and Goldstein ed., *China’s Global Engagement: Cooperation, Competition, and Influence in the 21st Century*, Brookings Institution Press, 2017, 393.

<sup>13</sup> Nicholas J. Cull, “Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vol. 616, *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World* (2008): 33.

would help achieve the goal of carrying “forward the spirit of friendly cooperation of the Silk Road by promoting extensive cultural and academic exchanges, [...] so as to win public support for deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation”<sup>14</sup>, which is one of the goals outlined for the BRI. Popular culture can achieve this due to its characteristics of being more readily available through the Internet and social media.

Furthermore, pop-culture has the power to add to China as a ‘brand’. Nation branding creates a distinctive national “identity and reputation of entire countries by using persons, symbols, colours and slogans”<sup>15</sup>. China has already engaged in branding exercises through the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai Expo among others. Branding China as a modern cultural powerhouse can have significant advantages in its international relations, easing interactions with the international community.

### **Culture and importance of social media platforms**

Contrary to popular narratives claiming that Chinese culture is ‘too different’ to be sought out by Western countries’ populations, this paper argues against such claims. Due to the rise of interactive video-sharing services on the Internet, such as YouTube, which attract global audiences due to the availability of culturally diverse content at the click of a button, there has been an increase in consumption of cross-cultural content. This means, that Chinese cultural content can be consumed by Western audiences despite the cultural barriers which present themselves in the form of language, norms, and values.

In a 2006 study in ‘Exploring the psychology of interest’, Paul J. Silva examined the existence of two forms of aesthetic pleasure among audiences consuming cultural content<sup>16</sup>. Silva found that familiar content tended to be enjoyable, meaning that people “enjoy culturally familiar media entertainment because they can competently and successfully comprehend the entertainment”<sup>17</sup>. On the other hand, the subjective novelty of foreign entertainment caused audiences to perceive the content as discomforting<sup>18</sup>. That is because such content was deemed too dissimilar from that of their own culture. Yet, in cases where novelty did not put too much stress on audiences’ cognitive resources, the content was perceived as interesting<sup>19</sup>. This means, that despite cultural content being cognitively challenging, audiences would still have the willingness and interest towards it.

Silva’s findings are particularly relevant to Chinese cultural diplomacy and its successful implementation in international relations. Firstly, Silva’s study demonstrates that despite cultural differences between China and the rest of the world, international audi-

<sup>14</sup> Belt and Road Portal, “Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road”, May 8, 2017, <https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/zchj/qwfb/12479.htm> (accessed June 10, 2021).

<sup>15</sup> Michael Barr, “Nation Branding as Nation Building: China’s Image Campaign,” *East Asia*, Vol. 29 (2012): 83.

<sup>16</sup> Young Min Baek, “Relationship Between Cultural Distance and Cross-Cultural Music Video Consumption on YouTube,” *Social Science Computer Review*, Vol. 33, No.6 (2015): 731.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

ences could have the willingness and even interest in consuming Chinese cultural products, specifically in the form of mass entertainment. This would mean higher levels of exposure of foreign nationals to Chinese culture on a large scale. In turn, increased frequent interactions by global audiences would prompt a better understanding of Chinese culture.

Secondly, Silva's study highlights a deficiency in Chinese cultural diplomacy. Foreign audiences do not have a high enough level of exposure and understanding of Chinese culture and society to be able to find Chinese content intriguing rather than confusing. Undeniably, Confucius Institutes and international events have achieved great feats in terms of ameliorating international understanding of Chinese culture. However, on a broader societal level continues to exist misunderstanding and prejudice towards China.

Individuals who frequent international cultural events linked to Confucius Institutes have an active interest in Chinese culture. However, a vast majority of the population has a passive stance towards Chinese culture and is intimidated by the perceived cultural differences. Nevertheless, social media and exposure to Chinese culture and society in a more novel way through pop-culture distributed online, can increase frequent daily interactions of foreign nationals with Chinese culture.

Due to the growth of technology in recent years which has given rise to exposure of global audiences to different kinds of cultural entertainment, China is given the opportunity to disseminate its culture in a novel way. Exposing foreign nationals, especially millennials who are the largest and fastest growing demographic of users creating and accessing alternative online media platforms such as YouTube<sup>20</sup>, can increase understanding and knowledge of Chinese culture. This is especially beneficial when showcasing modern Chinese culture and society to the international community.

## Chinese pop-culture

Pop-culture in China in the 21<sup>st</sup> century takes many forms, two of which will be outlined below as potential sources for cultural diplomacy, deepening the understanding of foreign populations towards modern Chinese culture and society.

Firstly, and most importantly is Chinese music, specifically pop-music and other genres which appeal to younger generations – dubbed millennials. Pop-music is of high significance because musical formats can more “easily overcome linguistic barriers than products that need translation, such as books, films and television series”<sup>21</sup>. The contemporary Chinese music industry which includes singers such as Jay Chou, Wang Yibo, Cai Xukun, Kris Wu, and Lay Zhang among many others has gained major interest globally.

<sup>20</sup> Nobuko Kawashima, and Hye-Kyung Lee ed., *Asian Cultural Flows: Cultural Policies, Creative Industries, and Media Consumers*, Springer Singapore Pte. Limited, 2018, 60.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid*, 200.

Lay Zhang's video "LIT" is a prime example, having gathered more than 20 million views on YouTube. The importance of Lay's video is rooted in its introduction of traditional Chinese culture with a modern twist making viewers interested and awed in accordance with Silva's study.

The Chinese music industry has attracted a large amount of interest; however, the lack of accessibility remains an important barrier for international audiences. Young people interested in Chinese pop-music lack the tools necessary to expose themselves to it. This is because, although many Chinese pop-songs are streamed on platforms such as Spotify or YouTube, the titles of the songs are in Mandarin meaning streamers have a difficulty interacting with the content. However, simple steps such as having the song titles translated into English can make a significant difference for audiences worldwide easing access to music and increasing exposure to Chinese language and culture.

Secondly, the movie industry, specifically Chinese movies and TV series can impact foreign audiences' understanding towards modern-day China. Chinese drama series such as 'Eternal Love' being on popular Western streaming sites such as Netflix, can have a huge impact on the exposure of Western audiences to Chinese culture. Furthermore, many dramas produced by companies such as Tencent Video and IQiyi have been uploaded on YouTube with English subtitles. These procedures are a positive step towards exposing Western audiences to Chinese culture.

Additionally, Chinese animation has an incredible potential to enter the homes of all audiences. Animations such as 'New Gods: Nezha Reborn' streamed on Netflix have an enormous potential in showcasing the beauty of Chinese animation styles and can introduce Chinese cultural content to Western audiences regardless of their age. Other streaming platforms such as YouTube have also accommodated the rise of such animations whereby animated series such as 'Soul Land' have been uploaded with English subtitles. These series and animations are just a few examples of the vast media content uploaded to platforms and then streamed by audiences worldwide. Thus, China's modern movie industry which incorporates movies, TV series and animations has a vast potential to promote Chinese culture to international audiences, specifically millennials around the globe.

## Conclusion

China has a vast cultural heritage, which it has drawn on for its soft power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Yet, modern cultural resources such as pop-culture in the form of music, TV series and movies, have the potential to demonstrate China in a positive light. Exposure to Chinese pop-culture online, creates a greater understanding for Chinese culture and society and can help strengthen people-to-people bonds in countries along the BRI and across the globe. Consequently, this can positively affect China's international relations and increase exchanges with foreign nations. Thus, this paper concludes that pop-culture

as a tool of cultural diplomacy has the potential to introduce China to foreign audiences on a large scale and present China as a cultural powerhouse worldwide.

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# Azerbaijan as an Intercultural Unit in the South Caucasus on the Silk Road

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## Abstract

The topic of this study is part of a research project on intercultural factors within different educational systems and for a more in-depth analysis of the effects of learning foreign languages in a specific multicultural environment. For the second year I am a visiting lecturer in Bulgarian language and literature at the Baku Slavic University (Azerbaijan Republic) and during my work I observed several interesting features and trends as an example of sociolinguistic development of this nation from the South Caucasus. Particularly typical of this country is the "bilingualism" that has prevailed over the years, which is a supreme manifestation of intercultural unity. One of the main factors for the emergence and preservation of this socio-cultural phenomenon is the geopolitical situation of the country over the centuries – as a specific section of the "Great Silk Road". Other important factors are related to the historical and economic development of the multicultural society in the last two centuries, which inhabits the territory of today's Azerbaijan, the language policy of its government in recent times. It is an indisputable fact that this country demonstrates a specific development of the cardinal decision-making process in view of the rivalry between the great powers, combined with intelligent national attitudes. The main thing is that these national policies have a direct impact on the form of the education system related to foreign language teaching.

**Keywords:** Great Silk Road, Azerbaijan, multicultural society, bilingualism, language policy

## 1. Introduction

The study of intercultural factors within different educational systems is necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the effects of learning foreign languages in a specific multicultural environment. An important place on the route of the "Great Silk Road" is occupied by the Republic of Azerbaijan. The most striking feature that immediately impresses the foreigner, sinking into the atmosphere of this country and especially in its capital Baku, is bilingualism, often turning into multilingualism. The present study analyzes the combination of diverse historical and economic socio-cultural factors that determine the specific development of the people of this country with a decisive role in the "Silk Road",

where one of the most important characteristics of society is the prevailing *bilingualism*.

*Bilingualism* or *diglossia* is a kind of socio-cultural phenomenon that occurs in many societies. Bilingualism arises from the coexistence of social groups of different ethnicities who speak different languages and seek to overcome the language barrier between them. It is a major topic in many scientific fields, such as linguistics, psychology, ethnology, history and more. There are different definitions in sociolinguistic science, but the classic definition remains: "The practice of alternative use of two languages will be called bilingualism, and the participant – bilingual (Weinreich 1968: 1)."

This study reveals an interesting perspective on the language situation of the inhabitants of a city of one million, located in the easternmost part of the European continent. It is about the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku. The observations on the phenomenon of "bilingualism" in the Azerbaijani capital are the result of my active foreign language training as a lecturer of Bulgarian at the Slavic University in Baku. The interest in the problem of Azerbaijani-Russian bilingualism is intensified by the everyday situations of verbal communication with representatives from different strata of urban society, as well as by observations on various communicative acts.

The research focuses on the various *preconditions* for establishing Azerbaijani-Russian bilingualism, its *specifics*, *foreign languages* in the life of the population and the *language policy* of the state in the context of bilingual communication, so characteristic of the urban society in Baku today.

## 2. Prerequisites for bilingualism in Baku

Bilingualism is formed with the participation of a whole complex of social activities – economics, politics, culture, social life. Bilingual communication is constantly correlated with the social, linguistic and cultural behavior of individuals, it models them and their development. Due to the participation of a number of factors in its formation, "linguistic contact can be best understood only in the broad psychological and sociocultural context" (Weinreich 1968: 4). This is also shown by the analysis of the preconditions for bilingualism in Baku.

Since 1991, the official language in the Republic of Azerbaijan is Azerbaijani – an agglutinative Turkic language, close to Turkish, but strongly influenced by Persian and Arabic. Along with the Azerbaijani and regardless of their ethnicity, the majority of the city's inhabitants simultaneously use the Russian language – an inflected Slavic language belonging to the Indo-European language family. *Azerbaijani* and / or *Russian speech* can be heard everywhere in Baku during daily personal and professional verbal contacts. The preconditions that led to the establishment of today's bilingual communication among the residents of the Azerbaijani capital are factors that played a major role in the formation of the Baku urban society. These are the geostrategic position of the city, and the historical, socio-economic and cultural development of the population.

## 2.1. Geostrategic position of the city

Baku is located in the Caucasus, in the southwestern part of the Absheron Peninsula, on the shores of the Caspian Sea. The city is located not far from the southern branch of the famous *Great Silk Road* in ancient times. It is no coincidence that Baku's strategic location turned it from the capital of the Baku Khanate in 1747 into a political, administrative, trade and cultural center in the region in 1858, and later in the twentieth century in a capital of today's Azerbaijan.

The region is an important crossroads where the two continents of Europe and Asia meet, a "unique bridge connecting Turkish, Chinese, Arabic and other cultures with the Russian culture" (Aliyeva 2017: 56), each of which enriches the local socio-cultural and linguistic relief with its diversity and color.

## 2.2. Ethnic and demographic picture of the people of Baku

According to the information agency *Report* as of February 1, 2020 (State Statistics Committee of Azerbaijan<sup>2</sup>) the population of the country is about 10,073,200 inhabitants, which is 0.8% more than the previous year (Report 2020<sup>3</sup>). At the beginning of 2021, the population of Azerbaijan already numbers 10,119,100 inhabitants (Report 2021<sup>4</sup>), which unequivocally shows resilience in the upward demographic curve. In 1807 the population of Baku was about 5,000, their number in 1897 was 112,000, in 1920 it doubled and reached 255,600 people (Evropa 2001 2012: 35), and according to today's data, they are already approaching up to 4 million (Zeynalov 2016), of which about 1/3 are children and young people. The city is a *conglomeration of ethnic groups*: mostly Azeris, followed by Lesgins, Russians, Ukrainians, Talish people, Jews, Armenians and many more.

Here, processes such as population demographic growth, preservation of ethnic diversity and stimulation of linguistic diversity run in parallel.

## 2.3. Historical development

The history of the Caucasus has preserved the memories of too many conflicts, battles, struggles and wars fought on the territory connected with today's Azerbaijan, between tribes, khanates, kingdoms and empires. Their representatives leave peculiar cultural and linguistic traces on the modern Azerbaijani population, including the inhabitants of the capital.

Crucial to the future development of the country and Baku was the spectacular battle for supremacy in the nineteenth century between the Russian Empire and Iran. After the end of the two Russo-Iranian wars, the two empires concluded two treaties (1813 and

<sup>1</sup> Author's translation from Russian.

<sup>2</sup> The data are from Gostkomstat of Azerbaijan (Госкомстат Азербайджана).

<sup>3</sup> Report. Численность населения Азербайджана возросла. [*The population of Azerbaijan has increased*]. 2020. <https://report.az/ru/socialnaya-zashhita/chislennost-naseleniya-azerbaydzhana-vozroslo/>, 17.08.2021.

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.stat.gov.az/source/demography/ap/>, 17.08.2021.

1828) and according to their terms divided the territory, part of which is today's Azerbaijan, with the northern part joining Russia and the southern part joining Iran (Khudazarov 2009: 7). Today, the number of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia is about 5 million, while in Iran live about 20–25 million. Centuries-old ties with the two empires are the reason for the strong influence of the Arabic and Persian languages on the Azerbaijani language in the past, mostly lexically. For almost 200 years afterwards, the Russian language has been dominant.

At the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, in 1918, the northern part of today's Azerbaijan was proclaimed an independent state, which lasted only two years. In 1920, against the will of the local population, it was included in the USSR, known in history as the Azerbaijani SSR. During this period, the *Cyrillic alphabet* became the official script, which has not lost its significance for the country, but as the official language – at the level of government of the republic, for the purposes of administrative services and in socio-political, economic and cultural life, as well as as the main language of science, technology and in the field of education, the *Russian language* was introduced and used mainly.

It is an interesting fact that today *three* scripts are officially used for the Azerbaijani language: *Latin* – since 1991 in Azerbaijan, *Arabic* – for the needs of the Azerbaijani diaspora in Iran and *Cyrillic* – in Dagestan (today within Russia) and as a second script in today's Azerbaijan.

#### 2.4. Economic prosperity

A major role in the economic recovery of the city of Baku is played by oil production in the region and the oil industry. For centuries, oil has been used here for domestic use and for export abroad. In the ninth century, Ahmad Al Belauri, an Arab historian, geographer and traveler, later Marco Polo, in the thirteenth century, described the importance of oil to the local population. The drilling of the first oil wells in the *Bibiheybat settlement* (Azerbaijani “Aunt Eibat”), near Baku, marked the beginning of industrial mining of black gold. The Baku-Tbilisi railway line was built, which directed a huge amount of labor to Baku from various adjacent and distant regions of the Russian Empire and beyond. Heavy industry factories were built, the Rothschild family, the Nobel brothers and a number of entrepreneurs, merchants and art patrons from Russia and other countries near and far founded their companies here. In 1907, “at the suggestion of the famous chemist Dmitry Mendeleev, the Baku-Batumi oil pipeline was built”, which ensured the export of Azerbaijani oil to world markets (Evropa 2001 2012: 22).

The influx of labor and productive capital led to the transformation of Baku into a remarkable economic, trade and cultural center of great magnitude, also known as “Caucasian Paris”. Along with the rapid industrialization of the city, there was an improvement and development of transport connections, Baku residents acquired tram transport, albeit with horse-drawn traction, and the construction of a port complex. This facilitated the

arrival of more members of the Azeri ethnic group and many foreigners wishing to find a livelihood and home in Baku, including Russians, Georgians, Jews, Germans, Turks, Iranians, Armenians and other European countries.

The oil boom created excellent conditions for the development of all kinds of cultural activities. A number of educational institutions were founded in Baku, theaters were established, the opera house was erected, schools and lyceums were built. Until 1918 the city was located on the territory of Tsarist Russia, after 1920 – in the Soviet Union, so the main means of communication in public life among the inhabitants of the city was the *Russian language*. M. E. Rasulzade (M. Ə. Rəsulzadə<sup>5</sup>) points about the *Russification* of the Bolsheviks in the 1930s as a purposeful policy of the Bolsheviks against the local Turkic languages.

### 3. Bilingualism, foreign language learning and language policy

Even a cursory glance at the language situation in Baku reveals the interesting aspects of Azerbaijani-Russian bilingualism with its advantages and disadvantages for the urban society, the position and language policy of the state and institutions.

#### 3.1. Specifics of banking bilingualism

Azerbaijan is the only post-Soviet republic where Russian is used on an equal ground with Azerbaijani, with demonstrated tolerance by the government. Residents born in the capital, aged over 30–35, easily switch from Azerbaijani to fluent Russian and vice versa. Many young people from Baku speak excellent or good Russian or English, and often both languages. There are different types of bilingualism – coordinative or symmetrical and asymmetric, first and second, primary and secondary (J. Pohl, R. T. Bell)<sup>6</sup>, the four types of individual bilinguals – “Deserter”, “Chauvinist”. “Marginal” and “Mediator” (according to the classification of S. Bochner)<sup>7</sup> and any other forms and combinations of bilingualism.

In the traditionally multinational Baku, the Russian language has attracted Azerbaijanis from the country and other former Soviet republics. Today it is the *lingua franca* of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia and the ethnic groups in the city (Anl 2017). A publication in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* shows that as of 2017, the Russian diaspora in Azerbaijan is *the largest* among the republics in the South Caucasus, and for more than 200 years it has considered the country as its homeland (Bugulova, Shtraus, 2017). Another education expert points out that by 2019, 90,000 of the 1.5 million students are studying in Russian (Musavi, 2019). If we refer to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, according to which 70% of the entire population in Azerbaijan today speaks Russian, then by 2020 their number has reached 7 million<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Citation from Aliyeva (see Aliyeva 2017: 57).

<sup>6</sup> Citation from Aliyeva (see Sotirov 2003: 1).

<sup>7</sup> Citation from Aliyeva (see Aliyeva 2017: 59).

<sup>8</sup> Citation from Bugulova, Shtraus (see Bugulova, Shtraus 2017).

These data lead to another topic, the so-called “Sectors”, which is specific to the educational system of Azerbaijan and is open at all levels. The division of the “Azerbaijani sector” and the “Russian sector” means the teaching of general education subjects in the language of the respective sector. “Sectors” are also available in the kindergaten – they are taught in Azerbaijani, Russian or English. They are included in the general education school, lyceum and all universities. The choice for the children between the free education in the sectors, which is covered by the state, or the expensive private school is made by the parents, depending on their culture, upbringing, education, ethnicity, financial possibilities.

In a poll conducted in Baku, some described the presence of the Russian language as an “endless dispute”. There is an unspoken perception of the advantages of the “Russian sector”: a) it provides *more extensive, in-depth and reliable knowledge* due to the better quality of Russian textbooks (content and translation) than the Azerbaijani ones; b) creates a *wider culture*; c) guarantees *access* to Russian universities; d) promises *better realization* of the graduate in the profession or holding a public office (Musavi, 2019). Practice shows that graduates of university education in the “Russian sector” meet the three conditions: professional opportunities, foreign language skills (in Russian and English) plus computer skills, a requirement to be hired by most institutions and companies.

However, the problem has already crossed the boundaries of the educational sphere and has acquired social dimensions, “two social groups with different worldviews, etiquette, interests and way of life”<sup>9</sup> have been formed (Musavi, 2019).

### 3.2. Bilingualism – pros and cons

In this sociological study, the question often asked by foreigners is why the Russian language is still so widespread in Azerbaijan today. The answers are summarized in three types of arguments *in favor* of bilingualism in Baku:

The first type includes arguments about the possibility of education – *accessibility, free education* and *better quality* of Russian teaching aids (Musavi, 2019) – a tradition from the time of Soviet Russia.

The second type of argument refers to the *presence of trained specialists* still working in the field of science and technology, educated in the USSR, but also in post-Soviet Russia, as evidenced by the staff of habilitated lecturers at Baku universities or other educational and cultural institutions; a sufficient number of qualified *teachers with Russian as their mother tongue* and the mention of the *high status* of education before 1991.

The third type of arguments refers to the *organization of the modern learning process in a foreign language*, reflected in a publication from October 2017 in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. This is the need for *new methodological tools* for the development of modern educational standards, adapted to the *Azerbaijani conditions* and in accordance with the “Russian scientific,

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<sup>9</sup> Author’s translation from Russian.

economic and cultural *context*". The creation of these textbooks and manuals would open up a new wide field for work and joint activities of Russian philologists, but also for specialists in fields such as pedagogy, psychology and oriental studies (Bugulova, Shtraus, 2017). The same publication emphasizes the *good prospect* of the readiness of *transnational publishing corporations* to ensure the publication of all types of teaching materials; *new ideas* for compiling and publishing *joint textbooks*, especially in the humanities, where the nature of the curriculum (history, fiction, etc.) allows the *cooperation* of specialists from both countries, Russia and Azerbaijan (Bugulova, Shtraus 2017).

But bilingualism also has *opponents*. The contradiction between the "sectors" creates a social imbalance in society. This is not just a rivalry between two languages, but an expression of a "linguistic and psychological barrier between the Russian-speaking minority, well integrated in the world around it, and the Azerbaijani majority, which is in a narrow information field and deprived of many opportunities for development" (Musavi 2019).

Not only the predominant tourist flow, amounting to about 30% Russians (Atalar 2018), predetermines the mass speaking of Russian. The preference for the Russian language, although a hidden fact, deepens the socio-psychological conflict between two social groups – "Russian-speaking" and "Azerbaijani-speaking", which creates and strengthens a social and personal complex among those who speak only Azerbaijani. The Russian-speaking population enjoys the authority of an *elite society*, a remnant of the socialist way of life imposed "from above". The invisible cultural and linguistic division in society is becoming almost a behavioral norm for a large part of the local population. Regardless of ethnicity, the Russian language is preferred, e.g. when visiting certain, centrally located Baku cafes and restaurants. In urban society there are two subcultures, people are divided into "own" and "foreign", according to the sign of "language of communication", there are two different types of worldview and interests. There is a fear of "negation and neglect" in one group or guilt over "Russianness" in the other – this is how language becomes an integral part of a code and pattern of behavior (Musavi 2019).

The present analysis also proves the following important statement: "Practice shows that in multilingual communities usually one of the languages dominates for some reason (one of them is the higher social status of its speakers), so that other individuals in the community are forced to learn this language that becomes a mediator for all multilingual individuals. Therefore, sociolinguistics usually speaks of bilingualism (bilingualism) and not of poly- or multilingualism. Persons forced by circumstances to master another language (or other languages) are called bilinguals or polyglots, respectively" (Videnov 2000: 208).

### 3.3. Language policy

The social, economic and cultural significance of Azerbaijani-Russian bilingualism is highly valued. Bilingualism is encouraged by three factors: the *language policy* of the Gov-

ernment of *Azerbaijan*; *close cooperation* with the educational and educational institutions of the Russian state; the *language policy* of the *Ministry of Education of Russia*. The government is making serious efforts to overcome the social contradictions between the “sectors” and the negatives of bilingualism, e.g. insufficient knowledge of the mother tongue by Russian-speaking ethnic Azerbaijanis (“deserters” bilinguals), which is a public secret by applying adequate measures, or against the limited knowledge and capabilities of bilingual “chauvinists” (Atalar 2018). Language policy today tolerates the learning of even a third and fourth language in schools.

The activity in this direction is comprehensive and effective, it fully deserves the assessment that “today Russian de facto appears as a second national language of communication in the Republic of Azerbaijan” (Bugulova, Shtraus 2017). Specific measures of this policy, which are carried out in Azerbaijan, are the *preservation and maintenance* of the centuries-old tradition of learning the Russian language; very high level of *organization* of the Russian diaspora; maintenance of Russian Orthodox *churches and churches* (there are three in Baku alone); maintaining the *Orthodox schools* attached to these temples; stimulating the *motivation* in the foreign language teaching in Russian through bonuses for the benefit of the students, e.g. providing other additional opportunities for growth in education and career with the help of the Russian state; activities related to the effective maintenance of *good neighborly relations* and effective cooperation.

Azerbaijan is the only country of the former Soviet republics that maximally *encourages the study of Russian* at the highest level – there are 683 preschools, 379 secondary schools with Russian language teaching, and 16 schools – only in Russian. Newspapers, magazines, scientific and fiction literature are published in Russian, the sites of electronic sources are translated, in almost all public institutions the instructions are written in both languages, TV and radio programs are conducted, there is a “House of the Russian Book”, it is developed scientifically and artistically in Russian; the graduates continue their higher education at Russian universities, as well as at the Baku Slavic University, the Baku State University, the Baku branch of the Moscow State University, the Azerbaijan University of Foreign Languages, and since 2015 the first branch of the Moscow Sechenov State Medical University, there are “Russian sectors” in other universities in Baku.

The main *goal of language policy* is to meet the requirements of the modern labor market, which applies to all specialties, especially philologists – teachers or translators, journalists, psychologists and others (Bugulova, Shtraus 2017). In confirmation of the growing trend of learning Russian on the eve of September 2017, the Minister of Education of Azerbaijan signed a *Decree* to continue the project “Intensive training in Russian”<sup>10</sup> (Kaspiy 2017) in 50 secondary schools of the republic, of which in Baku find 33, as well as 2 lyceum schools (BakuInform 2017, Kaspiy 2017).

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<sup>10</sup> Author’s translation from Russian.

## 4. Conclusions

*Azerbaijani-Russian bilingualism* is a characteristic feature of Baku. Whether “rivalry” or “cooperation” between the two languages dominates, it is a fact that this phenomenon exists today and is developing dynamically in the modern city.

The *preconditions* for establishing and preserving multilingualism and bilingualism are due to the geostrategic position of Baku, the ethnic and cultural diversity, the historical development, the economic and socio-political conditions.

Today, Azerbaijan, through the territory of which the “Great Silk Road” passes, is the *only country* that has not received and does not need financial support from the Chinese government to implement various economic or cultural projects.

The *language policy* of the state, for which the Russian language is a means of expanding the scientific horizon, the educational opportunities and the cultural image of the citizens, provides a better basis for developing the economic potential of citizenship. It is a pledge to maintain sustainable mutually beneficial relations with Russia, and last but not least, it strengthens the political positions of the ruling intelligentsia.

Today, the citizens of Baku are aware of the role of language knowledge, skills and needs, highly value *foreign language learning*, and therefore approve measures to preserve and promote not only bilingualism but also multilingualism. *Trends* for the future of the city are associated with the promotion of learning both native and foreign languages in kindergartens, schools, lyceums or universities.

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# Greening the Dragon: Trends in China's Renewable Energy Revolution

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## Abstract

In the last decades, the subject of renewable energy provokes special attention on a global level in view of the climate change concerns and the call for sustainable development. China is also facing the challenge to adapt to new realities in the energy field and the measures undertaken and planned to improve the domestic energy situation transform the country's foreign image. In the light of recent developments, the paper explores the principal dimensions of China's renewable energy revolution and its repercussions for boosting energy security and green growth. Especially interesting are not only the ecological but also the geopolitical reasons for China's leadership in renewable energy as the green reforms can mitigate international tensions by making the country less reliant on unstable regions or transit choke points in energy transportation routes. The research showcases the main vectors in the Chinese renewable energy sector with emphasis on contemporary transformations in the context of the impact of the 2020 pandemic crisis. The author discusses different aspects of the Chinese renewable energy policy from the perspective of the evolutions in the last years, outlining the conceptual frame of the diversification efforts of the country and its attempts to resolve the national energy dilemmas. Special attention is paid to the significant focus on global plans, launched with the goal of achieving "sustainable recovery", so as to take advantage of the opportunities generated by the current crisis to switch to a new energy model. In view of these trends, the aim of the study is to discuss the main dimensions of the green energy transformations in China and its potential to embark on an energy transition in line with worldwide ambitions in this area.

**Keywords:** China, renewable energy, energy security, pandemic crisis

## Introduction

Presently, the global energy landscape is undergoing substantial shifts with regard to the recent challenges for this crucial sector, induced by the decreasing reserves of fossil fuels, evoking competition between buyers in the energy markets, which is additionally dynamized by the emerging new resource-hungry countries. Moreover, the growing energy rivalry triggers the activation process of militarization of energy policy. Consequently, energy security obtained the rank of a fundamental foreign policy goal. The complexi-

ty of energy issues is also driven by their bond to the ecological footprint considering that energy resources are an essential part of the natural capital and their consumption represents an important component of the human impact on the environment. The alarming necessity to protect the biosphere transforms slowly but surely our perceptions about the practices and the ways in which we should manage the use of resources throughout the economy and in our daily lives. Humans have always altered their environment, but technological advances over the past three centuries have assisted mankind in every aspect – not only to create and produce but also to ruin and ravage with improving expertise. The pace and scale of such human-induced change has accelerated, thus contributing to hastening the speed of ecological degradation. As a result, the issue of the environmental protection in general, and in particular, the efficient use of energy resources and the quest for finding alternatives to traditional fossil fuels entered both the worldwide public awareness and international political scene.

Nowadays, the subject of renewable energy provokes special attention on a global level in view of the climate change concerns and the call for sustainable development. Even before overcoming the shocks of the financial and economic crisis of 2007–2008, the energy sector had to withstand the heavy blows of the COVID-19 recession in 2020. However, the pandemic is changing the world energy pattern at a deciding point in time, when the set of pressing problems in this significant industry targets the political ability to use the momentum to push for a broader energy settlement, to introduce profound measures and to reshape the fundamentals and the structure of the sector. The prospects to make a much-needed leap into a new energy paradigm remain distant and controversial but the impulses towards metamorphosis of the energy order cause large spillover effects on the political and economic trajectories of many countries.

China is also facing the challenge to adapt to the new realities in the energy field and the measures undertaken and planned to improve the domestic energy situation transform the country's foreign image. In the light of recent developments, the paper explores the principal dimensions of China's renewable energy revolution and its repercussions for boosting energy security and green growth. Especially interesting are not only the ecological but also the geopolitical reasons for China's leadership in renewable energy as the green reforms can mitigate international tensions by making the country less reliant on unstable regions or transit choke points in energy transportation routes. The research showcases the main vectors in the Chinese renewable energy sector with emphasis on contemporary transformations in the context of the impact of the 2020 pandemic crisis. The author discusses different aspects of the Chinese renewable energy policy from the perspective of the evolutions in the last years, outlining the conceptual frame of the diversification efforts of the country and its attempts to resolve the national energy dilemmas. Special attention is paid to the significant focus on global plans, launched with the goal of achieving "sustainable recovery", so as to take advantage of the opportunities generated by the current crisis to switch to a new energy model. In view of these trends, the aim of the study is to discuss

the main dimensions of the green energy transformations in China and its potential to embark on an energy transition in line with worldwide ambitions in this area.

## 1. China's energy pattern: adjusting and redefining priorities

In the context of limiting available resources and consequent modifications in world energy markets, the adjustment process is of essential significance for several countries. The noticeable depletion of fossil fuels results in a gradual decrease of production. Additionally, the rapid economic growth in the so-called "new economies" in Asia has turned them into serious competitors to the West on the demand market. Undoubtedly, the expansion of China's industrial and commercial power bolstered its position as the forerunner of the continent. In 2010, the country assumed the role of world's largest consumer of energy. In the face of ever-rising demand, the exhaustion of domestic resources is inevitable. Hence, the logical consequence was the trend towards rising import-dependency to meet energy requirements. Due to the increasing concerns over the security of fuel supplies, energy has moved to the top of China's political agenda in its dealings with the outside world. Beijing's dynamism in securing energy supplies in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America was emblematic of the novel directions of the reconstructed national approach. China has developed a strategy based on negotiating long-term supply contracts, accessing exploration rights, acquiring stakes in energy companies and infrastructure investments around the globe, which was complemented by a new model: loan-for-oil deals with governments in search of financial assistance and arms exports to countries involved in external or internal conflicts.

Synchronically, PRC obtained the position of the top emitter of CO<sub>2</sub> owing to its status of world's largest coal consumer. Since the early 1980s, the government has begun to support national coal production. However, the significant coal reserves have proved as unreliable basis for the Chinese energy progress, because their large-scale use has a negative effect on the environment. For these reasons, Beijing's plans are to gradually reduce coal consumption and replace it with natural gas. The renewable energy is given a supporting role in the implementation of the plans for diversification. China's primary energy consumption in 2020 was structured in the following manner: coal accounted for 57%, prior to oil – 20%, natural gas – 8.2%, hydro – 8.1%, renewables (excluding hydroenergy) – 5.4%, nuclear – 2.2%. In the electricity generation also dominates coal – 63%, followed by hydro – 17%, renewables – 11%, nuclear – 4.7%, natural gas – 3.2% and oil – 0.1% (BP 2021).

With the decrease in coal's share in China's energy mix (to the above-mentioned 57% compared to 72% in 2009), the country solidifies its commitment to promote the green vector of development. The efforts to improve its energy security enhance the external reputation of the Asian giant. It has learned valuable lessons from the experience of the EU and US in the field of renewable energy. For years, Europe invested political capital in positioning itself as the world leader on climate change and therefore has to juggle

between economic competitiveness and environmental sustainability. Renewables were advertised as a magic solution to drastically reduce the carbon footprint. The campaign provided fuel to sparks of criticism towards the new green technologies, which were condemned as a costly experiment and as Western products, used by the EU to revive its economy after the sharp downturn in 2008. Despite the indications of negative attitude, the rush for renewables was embraced as a modern trend in many regions. This kind of energy is no longer perceived as an expensive luxury only confined to developed nations. Presently, it is recognized as likewise affordable for countries in the developing world, suffering from frequent power outages and insufficient energy supply access. Investments in renewable energy technologies are proclaimed as more cost-effective than fossil fuels.

Theoretical advancements towards understanding of energy issues further assisted in gaining new attitude on renewables. Thanks to the emergence in the early 1980s of the Ecological Modernisation Theory, capitalism, industrialization, economic growth, and technological development were announced as reconcilable with ecological sustainability. From this perspective, renewables play a key role in resolving environmental problems. The theory opens the door for unfolding of renewable energy, by postulating that companies can generate profits through adopting new environmental technologies and practices. The Strategic Industry Theory is also a proper tool for providing a motive for renewable energy boost. Looking through the prism of public good, national prosperity and welfare, it suggests a mode for state policies, actions and investments in essential sectors, where the market and the private business alone is incapable to provide the desired results (Dent, 2015). This approach is especially fitting for renewables as an emerging strategic industry, as they rely on state support for securing incentives for initial and early-stage development, innovations and commercialization. Taking into consideration the specifics of the Chinese economic model, it is easy to interpret the reasons for the favoritism of this theoretical outlook in the Asian country. Not only regarding renewables, but also in other strategic industries, the government seeks more direct involvement, using the apparatus of state-owned enterprises (new and existing ones) and cultivating mechanisms for cooperation with business entities.

## **2. China's ascend to renewable energy superpower**

Undeterred by the judgements, that renewable energy is applicable as a local solution, but not suitable to power a large (not to mention the global) economy, China introduced this kind of technologies and articulated both a vision and a practical platform for their dissemination. The government incorporated in the national macro-development plans definitive goals for expansion of renewables with a view to place the country on the track to a lower carbon future. Currently, PRC is the largest global producer and exporter of clean energy technologies, as well as the biggest power generator from renewables. In 2020, China was the largest contributor to renewables growth (1.0 EJ), followed by the US (0.4 EJ), then Japan, the United Kingdom, India and Germany (all 0.1 EJ). Europe, as

a whole, contributed 0.7 EJ. The renewables consumption in the Asian country grew by 15%, accounting for 25% of global renewables demand and 36% of global growth. In the profile of primary energy consumption, the wind energy has a share of 2.8%, solar energy – 1.6% and other types of renewables such as biomass, geothermal and biofuels – 0.9%. Solar energy grew by 15,8%, wind – 14% and other renewables – 16.2% (BP 2021).

China gained the status of world's largest producer of wind and solar energy thanks to targeted efforts for improving the basis framework for expansion of renewables. Its evolution is driven by the formation and enrichment of the normative corpus for development of green technologies. A pivotal point for the acceleration of renewable energy deployment was the adoption of the Law of Renewable Energy, (effective since 2006), that incorporated regulations for pricing of electricity, tax, investment, etc. (Schuman et al. 2012). Correspondingly, the national authorities introduced a subsidy system regarding pricing and a special fund for renewable energy development. In 2007, China's national programme to address climate change announced the progress of wind energy and biomass as central element in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. In the same year, with the provisions in the Medium-and Long-term Program for Renewable Energy Development were established the targets of increasing the share of renewables in total energy consumption to 10% by 2010 and 15% by 2020.

Thanks to the adjustable procedures for enhancement of wind energy, PRC grew into world leader in this type of installations. In 2003, the government initiated new rules for wind power concession projects, based on selection of investors via public tendering and purchase of the generated electricity through a bidding process by provincial grid companies (ESCAP, 2012). Furthermore, the new guidelines aimed at attracting foreign investments in the sector through the medium of the requirement that at least 70% of all wind turbines have to be purchased domestically and all wind turbines should be assembled within the country. The Law of Renewable Energy added in 2006 extra prescriptions for: 1) approving of wind power projects larger than 50 MW by the central authorities and all others by the provincial governments; 2) purchase of the generated electricity at a preferable price and sharing of the supplementary charges by all electricity consumers in the country. In 2007, the targets for boosting wind energy manifested the ambition to reach 5GW by 2010 and 30GW by 2020 (with two following revisions for 100GW and 150GW by 2020). In 2008, the Asian country has its first 1.5MW wind driven generator with completely independent intellectual property in Haerbin (Xinyu 2011: 1285).

The implementation of the envisaged measures helped China to nail in 2009 the leading position for investments in renewable energy, overtaking the USA, regardless of the abolishment of the 70% local content requirement in the same year. Moreover, the new concept for switching to feed-in tariff replaced the mode of tendering for wind power concession projects. In 2010, PRC became the global top producer of wind energy. The comprehensive efforts to foster domestic industry for renewables stimulated the creation of 4 million jobs (by that moment).

Other renewable energy sectors scored success as well. Currently, China holds the champion rank for solar energy engineering and solar energy utilization. The country owns several renowned large solar-module manufacturing companies. Likewise, it dominates in the field of tidal power generation technologies. PRC is also the leader in utilizing geothermal energy even with the slower speed of development in the sector due to the limitation of high temperature geothermal resources.

### 3. Specifics of China's renewable energy model

Undeniably, the Asian leader has proved in the last decades its ability to adapt the legal basis for the development of renewable energy, implementing a consistent optimizing process on its energy policies. However, behind China's current prosperity of the renewables sector lies a specific chain of motives, driving its expansion. In the skeleton of strategic energy planning, the compendium of domestic reasons is deeply intertwined with impulses, coming from the international realm. The internal impetus to develop an "ecological civilization" is associated with a cross-industrial concept to reduce pollution level, mitigate climate change, minimize fossil fuel use, and to ensure energy security. Air pollution outranks any other concern of Chinese citizens. This continuous challenge has not only health consequences, but also repercussions. Lowering carbon dioxide emissions through renewable energy deployment will also enable the country to diminish risks of socioeconomic instability.

Incorporating diversification as a fundamental ingredient in the recipe for national energy progress, China aims not only at dealing with ecological complications, but also with geopolitical hardships. Via the path of renewables, PRC will become less reliant on unstable regions or transit choke points in energy transportation routes. In 2020, the country's oil import dependency ratio was stable at 73%, while as regards natural gas the import dependency ratio fell to 41%. In the light of the „Malacca Strait dilemma“, Beijing is confronted with the challenge of providing military protection of indispensable maritime routes, vital for energy supplies shipments. A reduction of the reliance on volatile regions such as the Middle East and North Africa for conventional fossil fuels through the medium of renewables devalues the imperative for securing oil and gas transportation routes. A drop in Chinese energy dependence would create geopolitical advantages for the country and lessen the burden of militarization of energy security. In consequence, the increase of renewables' proportion in its energy mix should be encouraged in the international context.

Another distinct feature of China's renewable energy model is the generation of incentives for cultivation of domestic industry for green technologies. The long-term approach for development of the sector was based on the principle of arranging a shift from import of components, devices and equipment to building of own internal capacity for construction and production. Such turn was achievable by strengthening domestic

markets through protectionist measures in the early development stages. A starting vulnerable industry in an emerging economy should not be exposed to foreign competition from solid, skilled and experienced companies, before significant technological advances are available. Following this logic, the government invoked provisions for domestic purchasing and production. These requirements were invalidated after the end of the initial market introduction phase, when due to the implemented innovations the Chinese business was stable enough to deal with global competition. Nevertheless, the actions of the national authorities, directed towards support of home-grown renewable energy enterprises, became a target for criticism by the West. The applied “negative list” helped to bar foreign investment in several strategic sectors and sparked various trade disputes (Chiu, 2017). Anyhow, Beijing’s protectionist policies fulfilled their mission in pushing China to narrow the gap with industrialized countries. Sequentially, the Asian country turned back to openness towards foreign renewable products.

As regards the blueprint of the Chinese renewable energy model, notable is also the architecture of the policies on its development, formed on three-level system (NREL 2004: 1). The central government is responsible for the design of the first two levels. Primarily, it provides general direction and guidance for the improvement of the sector. Secondly, it is in authority to introduce plans, define goals and milestones, and propose regulations and standardizations. Additionally, local governments on provincial, municipal, and county level are bound to set up the third level of policy, forging the practical and managerial modus for the deployment of renewable energy. Several provinces and autonomous regions in the country arranged their own tailored policies in this field, presenting numerous supporting measures such as subsidies and tax reductions.

Peculiar trait of the Chinese style of renewable energy development is the specific relationship between government and business. Many experts have pointed out the prominence of the complex multi-layered configuration of the renewable energy business, marked by the collaboration and competition among various types of state-owned enterprises alongside a large number of private companies. Quite logically, state-owned enterprises are the more pushing agent in the renewable energy expansion, definitely with consideration to their nature – large-scale central government administered corporations or smaller local government-owned companies. Regardless of both types’ close ties with the authorities, they enjoy large operational autonomy and are able to compete among each other. This advantage distances them from a classification as inert or paralyzed policy instruments.

Generally, China’s complex renewable energy business model is inclined to possess unique properties, encompassing an energetic public and private sector entrepreneurship, a special amalgam of state-owned enterprises and private companies, escalating multi-dimensional competition, and intense intersectoral networking. With its problematic demarcation lines between state and business activities, this renewable energy layout is recognized as unparalleled, yet especially debatable remain the question, if its mechanisms could be replicated in other countries.

#### 4. Getting out of the pandemic quagmire: energy dilemmas and ventures

In 2020, the global primary energy consumption was reduced by 4.5%, marking a record decline since 1945. Countries like the US, India and Russia assumed the role of the main culprits for this drop. By contrast, China was not only among the luckiest ones, scoring an increase, but also contributed the highest rise in energy demand of 2.1%. The economy of the Asian leader showed its excellent abilities to recover expeditiously from the impact of the Covid-10 pandemic. On a global level, the widespread restrictions caused a reduction in industrial, commercial and transport activity. Even so, economic disturbance proved as an environmental blessing. Per contra, PRC was one of the few countries posting an increase in carbon emissions (by 0.6%), resulting in a rise in its share in world's total to 31%.

The largest recession since the end of World War II was driven by an unprecedented collapse in oil demand. Nearly three-quarters of the total drop in energy consumption derived from oil downturn. Natural gas demonstrated better adaptability, mainly owing to the continuing growth in China. Renewables exhibited not simply outstanding resilience – wind, solar and hydroelectricity expanded contrary to the overall energy demand fall. China's role in this achievement is undeniable. For example, its capacity additions in regard to wind power hit 72 GW, more than the total numbers for the previous three years combined. According to the report of the Global Wind Energy Council, 2020 was initially expected to be a record-breaking year for the industry, but the forecasts were impacted by the ongoing pandemic by cause of disruptions to global supply chains and project execution (GWEC 2020).

As regards the prognosis, that the COVID-induced dip in carbon emissions will be short lived, the power of the slogan “Not just green but greening” seems to be a captivating manifest – it remains to be seen whether it will prove as highly contagious. The threat of long-term global recession adds fuel to the concerns that a further collapse could mean a far-reaching shock for investment in renewable energy. The calls for not wasting the momentum kindle the launch of different plans worldwide with the goal of achieving “sustainable recovery”, in order to take advantage of the chances generated by the pandemic crisis to switch to a new energy model. In Europe, the Green Deal is identified as a core element in the EU recovery vision. In like manner, the International Energy Agency recommends the use of stimulus packages to ensure the building of sustainable energy future (Brown 2020).

As concerns the green energy transformations in China, its potential to embark on an energy transition in line with worldwide ambitions is quite promising. With regard to the goals for the current decade, China specified fixed target of increasing the share of non-fossil energy in its total primary energy consumption to 20% by 2030. Renewable energy (including hydro energy) is planned to account for at least 35% of electricity consumption by 2030 (REW, 2018). These targets are considered as realistic although it is de-

batable whether they are truly impressive. Nonetheless, the country's ambitions to reach carbon emissions peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060 are remarkable with reference to the interval between the goals, which with its 30 years stands in high contrast with the 43 years for the US and the 71 years for the EU.

## Conclusion

As a result of the challenges, generated by the pandemic crises, the world is currently at an energy crossroad. The increasing environmental pressure in the last decades serves as a constant reminder that nature is the final arbiter for our decisions. In the context of the global political consensus on the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, China is demonstrating its determination to move beyond the label of largest pollution source to the status of leader in the field of renewable energy deployment and investment. In times of economic crisis, green technologies were verified once as a relevant driving force for recovery. It is a matter of future, whether this kind of Western experience will be replicated and perfected in an Asian manner. For now, China proved as a game-changer in the green technologies industry. In the race for domination in the renewable energy realm, Beijing is apparently a factor that should not be underestimated. Undoubtedly, the pandemic crisis modifies worldwide perceptions on the ways we use and source energy. In these deciding times, the Asian colossus is attempting to transform itself into a paragon on renewable energy development, gaining wisdom from the Chinese proverb "When the wind of change blows, some build walls other build windmills".

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# China and Iran – A New Dynamics Within the Strategic Cooperation

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## Abstract

China has been rising steadily diplomatically. The signing of a 25-year cooperation document between Iran and China has become a subject of debate, but it brings Iran into China's Belt and Road Initiative, intended to stretch from East Asia to Europe. The article attempts to present this strategic alliance as a roadmap for future cooperation and prosperity for both countries.

Historical analysis and political anthropology are used as methodological tools while making the authenticity of the traditions appear in the public space. Global dynamics indicate a smooth change in the international order in which Asian players, specifically China, will play a significant role. Therefore, regional dynamics address the emergence of a new 'Road'.

In conclusion, China's foreign policy requires that it defines its interests in regional stability rather than instability. Therefore, unlike Western powers, China pursues its national interests along with the interests of other nations.

**Keywords:** China, Iran, dynamics, cooperation, 'peaceful development'

## Introduction

Over the past century, Western powers' foreign policy has always been based on interfering in the internal affairs of Asian countries. In addition, their purposes have been shaped based on unilateral rather than multilateral benefits.

China actively participates in the progress of bilateral relationships, including multilateral formats such as 17+1, based on the Chinese initiative "Belt and Road" (Wang, 2010: 556). It initiated the establishment of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), in 2001, together with Russia and the countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) to combat "separatism, terrorism and religious extremism" and to increase its neighborhood influence (Chung, 2004: 989–1009). To stabilize and strengthen its international relations, China has established bilateral partnerships with Russia and the European Union (Wang, 2010: 554–567).

Since the early '80s of the last century, China has chosen the path of reinterpreting national traditions in the process of modernization<sup>1</sup> and building the so-called *epoch of culture* in which the role of traditional Confucian-Buddhist values increases.

The idea of reinterpreting traditions in the spirit of modern reforms must show people the relevance of their historical heritage. It will serve as a basis for the dynamic development of society and give the necessary motivation for political action. China and Iran have linked the political renaissance of their civilizations to a new reading of the traditional strata of political culture and political consciousness, and have managed to formulate “the great goals of politics” based on tradition. Through the initiative “One Belt, One Road”, China seeks to realize the idea of mutual knowledge, understanding, mutually beneficial cooperation between different civilizations and cultures without attempts at domination. This project aims to radically change the geopolitical, geo-economic, and sociocultural scenario for world development. The “One Belt, One Road” project is talked about and written about as a unique historical, political, economic, and cultural phenomenon that appeared in 2013. We can find a prototype of such a project back in time, in the ancient history of China, when a Pope and a King, sent Franciscan monks to study it on the spot.

Two essential motivations whetted the appetite of the Franciscan monks – Jean Plan Carpino (1182–1252) on behalf of Pope Innocent IV and Guillaume of Rubrouck (1220–1270), on behalf of King of France Louis IX (“Saint Louis”), centuries ago:

- *Religious* (especially for Jean Plan Carpino) because it was necessary to learn about the “oriental hordes” and their beliefs in order to know them better and to fight them (Michel, 1992);
- *Diplomatic* (especially for Guillaume of Rubrouck), because King Louis IX was looking for alliances to circumvent the Muslim world at a time when the West was engaged in the “epic of crusades” (Rubrouck, 1985);

The two monks discovered and described the existing model of religious tolerance, which could unite different ethnic groups. The so-called “then government” aimed to achieve mutual understanding between people within the country and nearby countries.

#### *‘Peaceful Development’*

The Chinese Doctrine of “Peaceful Development” is related to tradition. The term is the result of skillful and diplomatic transformations of the concept of *‘peaceful rise’*, which has its origins in the idea of China’s rise, beginning with the doctrine of Deng Xiaoping for “open doors” and contacts with the West, a process related to the economic growth of the Chinese state. (Broomfield, 2003: 256–284)

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<sup>1</sup> S. Eisenstadt was one of the first who attempts to rehabilitate tradition within the framework of the theory of modernization, emphasizing the need to reassess the basic postulates of modernization. Huntington is also one of the authors who draws attention to the advantages of traditionalism in the field of modernization. (Eisenstadt, 2003, 34, cited in Arnason, 2010: 174).

The idea has as its cultural basis the old imperial tradition of Confucianism, and an ethical system, based on virtue, peace, and harmony. According to Bijian, China will achieve a “peaceful rise”, by:

- consolidating a peaceful international climate without which development is not possible<sup>2</sup>;
- mobilizing specific capabilities and resources to promote “own institutional innovation”;
- “development, prosperity, and stability of other Asian countries, especially neighboring”<sup>3</sup>;

“Peaceful Rise” is built on “coexistence” and “sharing prosperity” with all countries in the world.<sup>4</sup> It is in favor of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation”, moving away from the interest in gaining power and their spheres of influence, hegemony, and “export of ideologies”. It is also proposing an order in which all parties involved have an advantage<sup>5</sup> and countries that have more decision-making power are not being favoured (Bijian, 2005: 18–22). China plans to reform perceptions of world order by implementing strategies to support the changing global dynamics of power – from hegemony to global cooperation, from aggressive development to peaceful development.

Hu-Wen’s Path of Development, outlining the direction of China’s development on the path of cooperation, harmony, and peace, is fundamental in the domestic and foreign policy strategies of the Chinese leadership today. China’s independent development, Wen refers, “contributes to the development of the whole world, the sustainable evolution of the society, the promotion of multilateralism, the liberalization of economic, globalization and cooperation through bilateral partnerships and economic diplomacy, to move to universal harmony and world peace.”<sup>6</sup>

“Mankind has one home – the Earth, so the fears of states should not be for their benefit, but the benefit of all and the world at large.”<sup>7</sup> In this way, China advocates diversity in unification at the expense of homogenization, given that the entire international community has a responsibility to “protect the diversity of civilizations and models of development” and “to build together a world in which all civilizations coexist mutually.”<sup>8</sup>

Global dynamics nowadays indicate a smooth change in the international order, in which Asian players, specifically China, will play a significant role. Therefore, regional dynamics address the emergence of a new regional and global ‘Road’.

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<sup>2</sup> See: The Brookings Institution, *China’s Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997–2005*, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> See White Paper on Peaceful Development Road. China.org.cn. 2005. Available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.htm>, 7 June 2019.

<sup>7</sup> Idem.

<sup>8</sup> Idem.

### *China-Iran strategic cooperation*

In the past seven decades, the five principles of peaceful coexistence have guided China's policy toward different countries. These long-standing principles include mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. The signing of a 25-year cooperation document between the Islamic Republic of Iran and China will be significant and effective for both sides in the transition era to new regional and global orders. As emerging Eastern powers, expanding Sino-Iranian cooperation can bring about many short- and long-term benefits for both countries. The accord brings Iran into China's Belt and Road Initiative, intended to stretch from East Asia to Europe and a big step taken by the Asian powerhouse in undermining American policies in the region. This partnership does not change the balance in the region, but it will affect the dynamics there. The agreement undercuts U.S. efforts to isolate Iran economically and, to some extent, diplomatically.<sup>9</sup>

China is Iran's leading trade partner and was one of the top customers of Iranian oil before the U.S. re-imposed unilateral sanctions in 2018. Even after the re-imposition of the U.S. sanctions, China has taken serious measures for challenging Washington's hostile policies towards Iran and has tried to maintain its economic relations with the Islamic Republic as much as possible. China has often spoken out against U.S. sanctions on Iran and contested them. The relationship with Iran will reach the level of strategic partnership as China seeks to comprehensively improve it.

Iran has embarked on a journey of developing domestic production and reducing reliance on oil by following new strategies for promoting a resilient economy. Reaching the long-term partnership with China will further cement the Islamic Republic's position against the U.S. and open a new window to further gear up for battling the U.S.'s unilateralism.

The agreement between Iran and China has increased the chances of the Chinese giant economy to participate in the development of Chabahar port and to further contribute to the improvement of its global status. China is currently one of the world's most advanced countries in terms of maritime and port industries. As Iran's only oceanic port on the Gulf of Oman, Chabahar port holds great significance for the country both politically and economically. Iran has taken serious measures for developing this port to improve the country's maritime trade. In this regard, the Islamic Republic has been welcoming investors from all over the world to take part in the development of the port and benefit from its distinguished position as a trade hub in the region.

"China's entrance into Chabahar port could lead to significant growth because shipping lines and operators are key issues in port development. The activity of Chinese shipping lines could increase the port's trade exchanges with the world to a very significant

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<sup>9</sup> Oxford professor Mohammad Mazhari comments how Iran-China cooperation undercuts U.S. efforts to isolate Iran, Available at: <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/460291/Oxford-professor-says-Iran-China-cooperation-undercuts-U-S-efforts> , 26 April 2021.

degree. Three of the world's top shipping companies and operators are Chinese companies, for instance, COSCO is currently the world's fourth-biggest shipping line, which is operating at 45 ports worldwide. Six of the world's top 10 container ports are in China, which means about 60 percent of the world's container operations are taking place in this Asian country... We have called the Chabahar port the "Gate of Nations", which is an indication of our view about the port's future. Our priority is to cooperate with the countries, which can be more beneficial for the country's trade and economy."<sup>10</sup>

This priority is enshrined in China's new Great Strategy on Regional and Global Diplomatic Action, as a means of internal and external balance. The author uses the term "peaceful development" to name this strategy (Wang, 2010: 79).

According to Wang, China's internal balance is based on a program of economic development and modernization, to strengthen China "in front of strong players" (Wang, 2010: 554-567). He describes it as a "soft balance" because it is not a direct military threat, but seeks to use diplomatic instruments (bilateral partnerships, economic diplomacy) (Wang, 2010: 556). The aim is to "weaken" a unilaterally conducted aggressive military policy and an opportunity for China to be a legitimate global power (Pape, 2005: 7-45).

The strategy is a roadmap for future cooperation, real benefits and smart decisions. A tool for better understanding the metaphor of the concept 'Road'. The road is not a spatial description, nor a physical movement in time and space, it is not a better economic and political project. For China, the Road is a complex phenomenon. Unlike the West, for which the historical past and future are only voluntaristic constructions, China and Iran live in divergent temporal worlds and regimes. They consider present, past, and future all in one, to create a long-term perspective in which culture and religion are included. At the heart of the uniqueness of the project "One Belt, One Road" is also the assumption for future spiritual transformation.

#### *The 'Ideal society'*

In addition to establishing high-tech projects, the two countries focus their efforts on constructing and implementing new spiritual and cultural infrastructure and new values and norms.

The fifth fundamental principle that President Xi Jinping, which proclaimed spiritual renewal, dialogue, and mutually beneficial cultural communication, is crucial for the practical realization of the aims, outlined in this project. It is no coincidence that the Chinese politician, the successor of the Doctrine of peaceful development, has made it clear that China intends to form a partnership through dialogue and friendship, where there is no room for confrontation. Such a new spiritual and cultural background would be useful to overcome the neoliberal crises and conflicts arising from today's globalization

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<sup>10</sup> See Ebrahim Fallahi, *Iran, China partnership to raise Chabahar port's global status*. Tehran times. Available at: <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/460316/Iran-China-partnership-to-raise-Chabahar-port-s-global-status>, 27 April 2021.

scenarios. The idea of president Xi Jinping is to embark on a new “path” – that of dialogue and cultural integration.

At the beginning of the 21st century, in the conditions of radical changes in the country and of the global changes worldwide, the invocation for “purity of Islam” reveals its vitality and activity. Iran frequently speaks about the hypocrisy of the West and America, and the lack of spirituality in western politicians, the western consumptive society, and refers to the heritage of Ayatollah Khomeini and his idea and attempt to create an “ideal society”, based on knowledge (Sabzian, 2016: 24). The society, referenced by Khomeini, rests on the purity of spirit and actions and leads to the new approach of practical and ethical Islamic reform, qualitative transformations from the pure religious Islam to a cultural-religious Islam, with it being responsible for the evolution of the Iranian society and the Muslim world, as a whole, to build the inter-religious and international relations, in which justice takes a central place (Todorova, 2017: 117).

Imam Khomeini believes that the term “society” has a full meaning, unlike the famous statement of Margaret Thatcher ‘There is no such thing as society’ (Rendueles, 2017: 262). Society should stimulate the evolution of some traditions and customs rather than block them. Personal liberty should not endanger the freedom of others and individual liberty should not harm social liberty. A truly recommendable system of human relations will appear as soon as human values become a factor for estimation of people. He develops the idea for an ‘*ideal society*’, a new type of collaborative society based on knowledge and morals. Moral values reflect the relation man – society – nature, and not the interests of a definite privileged group of individuals.

Defining bright horizons for a new society, based on the values, ayatollah Khomeini hopes for a new ‘*virtuous city*’. The “virtuous city” (al-Madinat al-Fadilah)<sup>11</sup> is the place where, according to al-Fārābī, all goods are distributed between citizens due to existing principal for solidarity between the ruler and his citizens (Netton, 1985). People will be happy only if they help each other. Therefore, justice concerns not only individual interests but also and public interest (*maslaha*), which is a keyword in Islam.

This idea corresponds to the Lao – Tzu’s idea of the ‘*ideal society*’. In “*Dao De Jing*”, known as “The book of the Way”, Lao – Tzu presents the idea of man as “part of all”, whose road is inevitably “going away and returning to the beginning”, realized not by manifestation of action, but by the force of non-action. Proper behavior in society creates a sense of the right path to the original, to Tao. The ‘*ideal society*’ is a society that knows and follows the principles of the Tao. The form of the relationship is represented by the figure of the sage, who transmits to the community the law of the Tao, without compromising the ability to act idly:

<sup>11</sup> Al-Fārābī’s (870–950) best-known work *Mabādī’ ārā’ Ahl al-madīna al-fādila* (The Principles of the Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City) is informed by the idea of the virtuous city. *Madīna* is a Quranic word and means the city in general and the city of the Prophet in particular (*Madīnat al-nabī*). As a reader and interpreter of the Platonic Republic, he relied on the Greek concept of the polis.

“The sage has no own heart. The heart of the people is the heart of the sage” (Laozi, 1997). He resembles Plato’s demiurge through the virtue of the Tao and builds the ideal society.

To create a condition for maximizing the benefits of the mentioned partnership by providing the necessary bases for the attraction of investment by all the country’s foreign trade partners, including the Chinese, Iran promoted the idea of a ‘*perfect city*’ (the excellent nation and the excellent state are unions of cities), in the sense of al-Fārābī’s *madīna*, signifies the polity, the citizens, and the area and reflects the Persian political traditions. Iran demonstrates the ability to meet modern challenges and responsibly seek integrated solutions to its national interests, in line with the diplomacy of the Great Silk Road.

## Conclusion

Western powers interpret Iran’s partnership with China as a serious challenge to their regional and international interests. The United States and their regional and Western allies might not easily allow the cooperation to pursue regional stability and new arrangements beyond their interests.<sup>12</sup> Over the past century, Western powers’ foreign policy has always been based on interfering with the internal affairs of Asian countries. In addition, their purposes have been shaped according to unilateral rather than multilateral benefits. But based on China’s approach toward international relations, mutual understanding and dialogue between civilizations, China’s foreign policy requires that China defines its interests in regional stability rather than instability in the region.

We can conclude that it is too early to judge its merits or disadvantages, and we cannot see how it will turn out until it is implemented. The Chinese Doctrine of peaceful development is a benefit for all humanity and not a threat to the global order. The foundation of “Peaceful development” is an organic symbiosis between internal development based on resources, capabilities, realities, and own tools and a constant openness to and cooperation with the outside world.<sup>13</sup>

The principles of Confucianism and Persian culture have been reconceptualized and adapted to modernity for peace, harmony, and prosperity. Therefore, unlike Western powers, China pursues its national interests along with the interests of other nations in the frame of a new project for radical change in the logic and the spirit of the world. We can believe that China is a great opportunity in general and its nearby countries in particular as it can provide an option to many countries to follow a development model different from the West.

<sup>12</sup> Amir Mohammad Esmaeili, a Ph.D. Candidate in International Relations and Public Affairs at Shanghai International Studies University, *Strategic cooperation of emerging powers: Beyond regional instability, towards a new global order*, Available at: <https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/459505/Strategic-cooperation-of-emerging-powers-Beyond-regional-instability>, 6 April 2021.

<sup>13</sup> See: White Paper on Peaceful Development Road Published. China.org.cn. 2005. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005/Dec/152669.htm>, 7 June 2019.

Iran can rely on China to boost and reconstruct its infrastructure. Iran-China partnership fixes many issues. It gives energy security to China and provides an assured market to Iranian petroleum products. We can support the idea of the editor of Delhi's Hardnews magazine, Sanjay Kapoor, that when Iran's financial troubles end, it will rediscover itself as a civilizational power it is and enlarge its influence in Central Asia and other parts of the world.

Can a strategic Iran-China 25-year partnership be a game-changer<sup>14</sup>, the future will show. The Belt and Road initiative (BRI) allowed enlarging China's global footprint.

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<sup>14</sup> See: Sanjay Kapoor, Iran-China partnership can be a game-changer, *Tehran Times*, Available at: <https://www.tehrantimes.com/> 4 July 2021.

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## China's Arctic Dreams – Projects, Partners and Realities

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### Abstract

In 2014, China announced the new “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which was focused on cooperation with the rest of Eurasia and development of The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road. In 2017, the project was extended with another Arctic component – the ‘Blue Economic Passage’ (蓝色经济通道) as an important element of the future Chinese economic interests. In the following year, the Asian country released its official White Paper on Arctic policy. In the past few months with the “2021 Suez Canal obstruction”, the Arctic region and its shipping routes and traffic opportunities are back on focus. In this regard, the paper describes the main Chinese projects and partners in the North. With the growing relationship between the Asian country and its new European friends, the ambitious Arctic projects seem even more achievable than before. This new collaboration, however, affects directly the old Sino-Russian relations and changes the Arctic geopolitical situation. On the other hand, an eventual comeback for America in the region is also possible. Correspondingly, the study looks not only at the challenges such as the harsh conditions of the Arctic and the projects, which require a lot of funds, but also at the political partnerships in the region. There is a good reason to discuss in more depth, how The High North development affects international relations. The Arctic has the power to reunite the countries of interest, divide them in new coalition clusters or separate them on the basis of their personal interests alone. However, China is still learning how to be a true “Arctic power”, which understands the importance of cooperation and partnership for sustainable use and exploration of the region.

**Keywords:** Arctic, China, Nordic region, US, Russia, Arctic Railway, Chunnel Helsinki-Tallinn, Arctic corridor

Over recent decades, the Arctic region has grown steadily in political and economic relevance. With regard to its core interests, China has not only developed its own polar policy but has also gained an observer status in the Arctic Council. Nowadays, the experts often discuss the interest in the Northeast Passage, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) or the future Transpolar Sea Route (TSR) as new alternatives to the Suez Canal, forgetting the Chinese complex multifaceted approach towards the region. It is not questionable that the “Arctic Silk Road” might be the most important between the main four priorities, but the

PRC has proved to be a valuable partner, providing human, economic and environmental security in the circumpolar north. For the Chinese industries, however, operating in the Arctic region can be a challenge. That is why the need for cooperation is acknowledged among all countries with territories or interests in the High North.

### **1. The Sino-Russian alliance in the Arctic**

A prospective Sino-Russian alliance is increasingly a concern for many world nations. Such cooperation could not only challenge the American influence and interests, but affects also the geopolitical balance in the region. For Russia, the Arctic represents a strategic area for extracting important resources. However, concerning these interests, the country remains highly dependent on foreign investments. Additionally, the United States' and European Union's sanctions forced Moscow to build closer ties with the PRC. So far, their strategic partnership in the Arctic exists only where mutual interest is present. From the Chinese perspective, Russia is only one of the various partners. In order to be recognized as a legitimate Arctic stakeholder, the Asian country is seeking cooperation with all Arctic states. The fact that the Yamal LNG (the first overseas megaproject since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative) remained the largest investment in Russia highlights the Chinese perception of Moscow as one of the world's biggest energy exporters. The lack of infrastructure in the Russian Arctic is a major obstacle not only for the Russian economy but also for China as a major energy importer. Despite the Chinese contribution, the development of the region has not advanced notably in the last years.

There is also evidence that Russia is still not a top priority in the Chinese Arctic policy – where countries such as Norway, Finland and Iceland are more in focus. In general, the Sino-Russian alliance ends where their opposing interests start to overlap. While Beijing is promoting a wider global governance of the Arctic, Moscow stands up for strictly regional one. Russia even fears a potential change, which could question its sovereignty rights in the Arctic. China, for its part, is not willing to invest in immense Arctic projects with a chance for potential exclusion from the region. Under such uncertainty, the Arctic remains outside the priority zone of the Chinese foreign policy. Additionally, the PRC wishes to avoid issues that could jeopardize its political relations, for example with the USA, in order to pursue closer cooperation with Russia in the region.

In this context, both countries are trying to avoid such alliance that fastens them into a long-term dependency. Thanks to concerted efforts, PRC has developed its own Arctic strategy encompassing polar research interests, energy resources and minerals extraction plans, Arctic sea routes development and involvement in the governance regime. Meanwhile, Russia has adopted the new *“Strategy for Developing the Russian Arctic Zone and Ensuring National Security through 2035”* (Kluge 2020: 4). It includes not only economic reinforcement goals, such as development of the region's abundant resources, Northern Sea Route amendment and improvement of the living conditions for the

local communities, but also ambition to increase military presence in the region. Although there are many similarities between “Basic Principles 2020” and “Basic Principles 2035” – the last one encompasses not only the previous plans “*to preserve the Arctic as a region of peace, with stable and mutually beneficial partners*”, but also new tasks “*to ensure Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity*” (Klimenko 2020). The Russian ambitions are enhanced by a “15-year grand plan for Northern Sea Route” that implements a wide range of projects, aimed at improving the Arctic coast. Building 16 new SAR-ships, 13 hydrographic survey vessel and 6 icebreakers is only a part of the immense plan. Other examples cover the new class helicopters for icebreaking ships and the new transport aircraft, which will be able to carry up to 10 tons for 4,000 km and to land and take off on the ice in the remote Arctic zones (Staalesen 2020). With the launch of Moscow’s official plan for the NSR, it is clear that a possible Chinese involvement in the Russian Arctic is not acceptable.

## **2. The Nordic countries – a new friend of China in the Arctic**

On the economic level, China identifies the Northern countries as Arctic “know-how” partners, which already possess technologies for direct access to the ice desert. One of the major partners for Asian giant in the Arctic zone is Norway, especially the city of Kirkenes. The little Nordic town is ready to become the major logistical hub, including a massive port and train line to Finland. While the Europeans label Kirkenes as the “North China town”, the locals do not share their concerns. The new container terminal and a 300-mile railway to Rovaniemi (Finland) are planned to handle about 1 million containers per year, with 10 trains departing every day.

The Arctic Railway is another controversial issue, involving the interests of many countries. Different proposals have been made with four line options, but after a cost of €2.9 billion was estimated, the project was suspended. In 2019, a new alternative emerged with private investments from China and the European Union. In 2020, PRC set on the negotiation table a new investment plan for building a Chunnel between Helsinki and Tallinn. On that project, China is determined to pay €15 billion, perceiving the Finnish-Estonian Chunnel more like a metro line rather than a train connection.

Another Chinese investment is aimed at mining or more specifically at rare earth elements and uranium extraction (essential to high technology products). The Greenlandic mining sites are particularly appealing to the Asian companies, especially the mines of Kvanefjeld. A breakthrough in the Sino-Greenland relations was achieved in 2016 with the establishment of research station on the island. The Chinese facility will be not only responsible for the arctic research and climate change monitoring, but also for China’s civil-military “BeiDou-2” satellite navigational system. In 2018, the Asian country has made an attempt to bid on a contract for new airports on the island. However, it raised certain concerns in Denmark and fears of the growing Chinese economic power in the

North. The case of Grønnedal is another key component of Beijing's emerging „Ice Silk Road“. In 2016, the Hong Kong-based company “General Nice” offered to take over the abandoned naval base Grønnedal, but the Greenlandic infrastructure turns to be another sensitive question for Denmark. Beijing also threatens the American business and military interests in the region. Nevertheless, the US companies are already in special dependences with the Chinese enterprises, operating in Greenland, and the exchange of loans and capitals may affect the politics as well.

### 3. The Great American Comeback

The North American Arctic (NAA) has been a controversial issue for the Government since the Alaska Purchase in 1867. In contrast to the Russian Arctic and even the polar territories of the Nordic countries, the NAA region lacks proper infrastructure, developed industries and populated settlements. There are several reasons for its constitution, such as harsher environmental conditions, absence of severe Arctic national policies and opposite development directions by the Canadian and the United States governments. (Higginbotham 2018: 11)

The United States are losing constantly strategic ground in the region to its geopolitical rivals Russia and China. Recently, Trump administration demonstrated a renewed interest, driven especially by Beijing's growing presence in the Arctic. Presently, the US Coast Guard has only one operative icebreaker since “the Healy” was put out of commission after a fire outburst destroyed its shipboard. During that time, “The Polar Star”, which was operating in the Southern Ocean and securing the influence over the Antarctic continent, was diverted back to the North. The incident with “the Healy” called the attention of the White House on the urgent need to own more than just one icebreaker. By contrast, Russia has 53 and Canada – 7 icebreakers. Additionally, the US as the leading NATO member, are responsible not only for safeguarding their national territory, but also for maintaining the peace in the region. As a result, the new „Polar Security Cutter“ program was introduced with the aim of providing a fleet of 6 new icebreakers. However, the first vessel is expected to be launched in 2024, leaving meanwhile the American icebreaking capabilities to operate in the Polar regions at the mercy of foreign aid. In fact, the White House is negotiating leasing private icebreaker for the domestic Coast Guard. At that point, possible partners are Sweden and especially Finland, which has designed about 80 percent of the world's icebreakers fleet. (Humpert 2020)

So far, the government has not accepted the deal, as it does not solve the problem permanently and is suitable only for short-term missions. In general, the debate on the Polar Security Cutter fleet has turned into a controversial issue. While the Trump administration and the Pentagon outlined the need of nuclear-powered icebreakers or at least more heavy Polar Security Cutters, the Coast Guard demanded medium icebreakers or the so-called Arctic Security Cutters. (Shelbourne 2021) The fact that both options aim for

defending the American territory against threats near or away the coastline, highlights the lack of interests in the future economic and trade development of the Arctic region.

#### 4. The Frozen conflict

In the beginning of 2021, the United States Army released its new Arctic strategy, which emphasizes the American dominance in the region. As we read in the document, the Army identifies the Polar zone as *“an arena of competition”, “a line of attack in conflict”* and *“a platform for global power projection”*. Russia has also prepared an ambitious program to renew its fleet of Arctic vessels. Several observers even predicted a total military domination in the region and proclaimed the country as the new icebreaking superpower. In September 2020, the shipyard in St. Petersburg finished the construction of *“Arktika”*, which sailed straight to the North Pole on a test sailing. Just a few months later, the historic Baltic Shipyard finished its improved version *“Sibir”* – a 173-meter icebreaker, designed to resist extreme weather conditions and smash through ice up to 2.8 meters thick. With 3 more icebreakers – *“Ural”, “Yakutia”* and *“Chukotka”* under construction, the country’s Arctic fleet pushes even further the remilitarization of the region.

In the last decade, another important player emerged on the Arctic scene. With its new Arctic strategy, Beijing has shown great interest in Polar resource exploration and shipment. In that matter, China seems to be more prepared than some of the real Arctic states. Its first icebreaker Xue Long (The Snow Dragon) was a Soviet-built vessel, purchased from Ukraine in 1993. For years, the icebreaker has to supply both the Arctic and the Antarctic stations and even participated in a rescue mission, when a Russian ship with 52 passengers was stuck in Antarctic ice. In 2019, the Snow Dragon II enhanced the Chinese Arctic fleet.

After the official announcement of the project, the experts presumed that the new vessel would be constructed under a technology agreement between Russia and China. However, PRC preferred cooperation with the Finnish company Aker Arctic Technology. This Sino-Finland collaboration is another evidence of the technology conjunction between China and the Nordic countries. In fact, the two countries have a long history of cooperation. The first commercial ship agreement was signed in 1953 for 6 steam cargo ships, delivered between 1955 and 1957.

In May 2019, the first home-built icebreaker departed from Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai and after several sea trial tests was sent on its first voyage with the 11th Chinese expedition to the Arctic. Additionally, the government is planning the next icebreaker – Snow Dragon III. It will be the first nuclear-powered icebreaker aircraft carrier. Incorporating the technology of Snow Dragon II, the future Chinese ship will represent a new kind of vessel that the world has never seen before. In this context, many observers believe that behind the enhancement of the Arctic fleet and the new Chinese research stations and shipping route investments lies the country’s ambition to claim the land and

its resources. There have been numerous media reports distressing the public with an upcoming war in the Arctic. Anyhow, it is debatable, if the shipbuilding truly represents the first step of militarization of the area.

Indeed, the Arctic is a strategic region, where the interests of China, Russia, US and even the European Union overlap. In this context, China has played a role of a partner in all scientific, economic and political developments. Additionally, the Asian country possibly envisions security components to ensure its investments. The costs for adding “security” as an element to its Arctic policies could be higher than the economic benefits. Currently, the main priority for Beijing is to ensure a stable economic presence in the region and secure its shipping ambitions in the framework of the Belt and Road initiative and the new element – the ‘Blue Economic Passage’ added in 2017. Despite the concerns for military involvement of the Asian country, there are no indications for specific actions so far. In fact, the 2018 White Paper promotes the peaceful use of the Arctic and cooperation in non-military security areas including emergency responses as search and rescue.

Lately, Russia is also trying to regain its military presence in the Arctic. Taking into account the reconstitution of its Arctic capacities, which are fundamentally defensive, there are currently no indications, that the Russian navy is ready for a potential conflict. In fact, the militarization of the Arctic has no positive impact on any of the countries with aspirations in the area. Moreover, in terms of future war, Moscow has a lot to lose and nothing to gain. First, on the international scene, the country has increased its prestige as an Arctic superpower. Second, Russia benefits from its absolute domination in the region, governing all shipping activities along the NSR. Most importantly, the vast resources of the zone are mainly concentrated in the Russian Arctic. With the ongoing climate change and the increased marine traffic, Moscow is focused on protecting its own territory and benefit as much as possible on the economic front. In fact, the latest serious tensions between NATO and Russia in the region were in the framework of the Ukrainian crisis. (Laruelle 2020: 15)

In the long term, Russia and China will probably benefit the most from today’s investments in the region. This opens a field for discussion, if the United States with its limited Arctic fleet will be excluded from the competition between Russia and China in the Deep Arctic Ocean? Indeed, the last two administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump showed little interest in Arctic environmental affairs. Even the idea of the US government to work on a revised policy paper on the Arctic strategy in the last years, was prompted mainly by concerns for the Sino-Russia cooperation and the development of the NSR, rather than by actual aspirations for the Arctic region. In this context, the latest Polar cutter-building program may bring the US back into the competition, only if the icebreakers are the key for winning the battle for the Arctic.

In fact, an icebreaker fleet is not able to address the most commonly identified defense challenges in the Arctic. Nevertheless, the vessels are under the command of the Coast Guard, which is part of the Department of Homeland Security in peacetime. From the

American perspective, the lack of polar vessels is often misunderstood. As Andreas Kuersten from CAAF observed, in time of war all surface warships behind the icebreaker will be like “sitting ducks for aerial, undersea, and shore-based enemy forces” (Kuersten 2016). Moreover, the expensive icebreakers are built to battle the harsh Arctic environment, not the foreign naval fleets. In many respects, the Polar cutters are responsible mainly for emergency responses, law enforcement, RAS missions and maintaining the polar bases. Other important examples for the use of the US icebreakers include the heavy icebreaking capability on the Great Lakes to assist in keeping channels and harbors open during the winter season. While the number of polar vessels is an easy indicator for measuring the completion in the Arctic, the real instruments for military uses remain under the surface.

## Conclusion

Because of its seclusion, the Arctic region was always neglected even by the countries with actual territories in the Polar zones. Despite its great potential and resource wealth, the Arctic development demands huge amounts of capitals without reliable profit prospects. Another feature of the Arctic is its geophysical specification, which comprises different sovereign territories with almost opposite political and economic developments. While the Nordic subregion represents an advanced zone with transport infrastructure, populated cities, industries and open water all year round, the Russian Arctic is struggling with harsher environmental conditions in order to gain from its resource potential. Meanwhile, the NAA region is mainly suffering from the changing US federal priorities, which undermine all local enterprises and private capital investments. In contrast, China with its unique system of governance, has more stable policy in the High North. As a non-Arctic country, Beijing has no sovereign territory, which allows it to implement more resilient and flexible approach and pursue new projects, partners and opportunities in the Arctic.

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## Иранският детонатор в Геостратегическия проект на Китай „Един пояс, един път“

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## The Iranian Fulminator in China's Geostrategic Project “One Belt, One Road”

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### Abstract

*The authors imply some ideas and possibilities concerning the place and importance of Iran over the process of development and building of new geostrategic project of China's government. For that reason, we need to estimate the place, role and problems among the collaboration between Iran and other countries in the region and to reveal its positive or negative influence over the project.*

**Keywords:** “One belt, one road”; geopolitics; Eurasia; geopolitical knot; project; Iran

### Увод

Третото десетилетие на XXI в. ще се окаже може би най-динамичния и наситен откъм събития отрязък от време, който засега като че ли привидно е укротил своята динамика и засега всички събития минават под голямата сянка на глобалната пандемия от Covid-19. Привидно спокойно или притихнало е времето, но заредено с много нестабилност и нарастващо напрежение между основните по-големи и по-малки геополитически играчи – САЩ, ЕС, Китай, Русия, Турция, Иран, Индия, Пакистан и други.

И може би след сто години отново се потвърждава верността на тезата на Халфорд Маккиндер, че световните процеси се определят в най-голяма степен от това което се случва (или не се случва) в посочения от него „Хартланд“ на Евразийския мегаконтинент. Защото това е не просто най-голямото парче от сушата на Земята, а защото именно там се намират едни от най-древните цивилизации и културни феномени, там са съсредоточени едни от най-големите и богати на ресурси страни, там живее

две трети от населението на планетата, а напоследък именно там са и едни от най-динамично развиващите се икономики, основани на съвременни технологии и научни изследвания.

Сред този сложен конгломерат от религии, култури, народи и останки от древни цивилизации обаче има и множество различия, често възникват спорове и противоречия, припламват дори и военни конфликти. Но повечето изследователи са единни в мнението си, че ако този мегаконтинент се обедини в икономическо, инфраструктурно, търговско, енергийно, транспортно и т.н. отношение, то това би било едно от най-великите събития в историята на света и би променило коренно геополитическата, геоикономическата и геостратегическата обстановка.

Разбира се, подобна идея е резонно да има както поддръжници, така и твърде много противници, защото изместването на икономическия, финансов и технологичен център на световната индустрия би променило установения от векове баланс на интереси. Съществуват и някои естествени подводни камъни, условно наречени „детонатори“, на подобни положителни тенденции, един от които е и темата на настоящия доклад. Става дума за Иран, една от най-интересните и древни държави на света.

В тази връзка целта на настоящия доклад е да се изследва ролята, мястото и геополитическата тежест на Иран в процеса на изграждане на новите връзки, отношения и взаимодействие между страните от проекцията на новия геостратегически проект на Китай „Един пояс, един път“.

### За новия евразийски проект

„Един пояс, един път“ е глобална стратегия за развитие, приета от правителството на Китай през 2013 г. и включваща инфраструктурно развитие и инвестиции в около 70 страни и международни организации. Тя се счита за опорна точка във външната политика на китайския президент Си Дзинпин, който я анонсира за пръв път по време на държавни визити в Индонезия и Казахстан през 2013 г. Терминът „пояс“ се отнася за сухопътните маршрути на автомобилния и железопътния транспорт, докато „път“ се отнася за морските пътища на водния транспорт. Важността на тази геополитическа цел се потвърждава и от факта, че Стратегията е инкорпорирана в конституцията на Китай през 2017 г.<sup>1</sup>

Инициативата „Един пояс, един път“ е амбициозно усилие за подобряване на регионалното сътрудничество и свързаност в трансконтинентален мащаб. Тя се състои предимно от *Икономическия пояс на Пътя на коприната*, свързващ Китай с Централна и Южна Азия и напред към Европа, и *Новия морски път на коприната*, свързващ Китай с държавите от Югоизточна Азия, страните от Персийския залив, Северна Аф-

<sup>1</sup> Вж.: <https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/beltandroadinitiative>.

рика и с Европа<sup>2</sup>. Определени са шест други икономически коридора, които свързват други държави с пояса и пътя. Обхватът на инициативата все още се оформя – напоследък инициативата се тълкува като отворена за всички държави, както и за международни и регионални организации.

Проектът обхваща страни и територии, които колективно представляват над 30% от глобалния БВП, 62% от населението и 75% от известните енергийни резерви. Китайското правителство счита инициативата за „предложение за подобряване на регионалната свързаност и приемането на по-светло бъдеще“<sup>3</sup>. Някои международни наблюдатели виждат в нея план на китайците за световно господство, крепящо се на глобална търговска мрежа, центрирана в Китай. Проектът има зададена крайна дата на завършване 2049 г., което съвпада със стогодишнината от основаването на Китайската народна република.

Проектът се простира върху голяма част от Евразия, съединявайки развиващи се страни с развити такива. Той е съсредоточен в богати на ресурси страни, а предполагаемият му икономически мащаб е около 21 трилиона долара. Към 2019 г. Китай развива икономически отношения със 138 страни и 30 международни организации като част от плана „Един пояс, един път“. Инфраструктурните проекти включват пристанища, железопътни възли, магистрали, електроцентрали, летища и телекомуникационни центрове<sup>4</sup>.

И независимо от факта, че глобалната пандемия Covid-19 влияе отрицателно върху темповете на развитие на някои от страните обхванати от проекта, огромният поток от инвестиции, включващ мащабни разходи за инфраструктура в други страни, не спира. Според експерти, това е добра политика по време на пандемията, която в обозримо бъдеще ще насърчи глобалния поток от стоки, капитали и технологии и заедно с тях ще гарантира бързия икономически растеж на региона.

## **Мястото на Иран в проекта „Един пояс, един път“**

Иран и Китай са търговски партньори от дълбока древност по Великия път на коприната и незаслужено дълго време бяха пренебрегвани от Великите сили до началото на XX в. До средата на XV в. Изтокът и Западът са тясно свързани именно с този търговски маршрут, по който също така се извършват социално-икономически и културно-религиозен обмен между тогавашните общества, живеещи по Пътя на коприната. Днес Китай не е онази екзотична, изостанала и самоизолирала се от света страна, а се надига с бързи темпове и заплашва да измести САЩ като най-големия геополитически играч на света.

Подобна геополитическа заявка се разчита именно в предложената от президен-

<sup>2</sup> Вж.: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative>.

<sup>3</sup> Вж.: <https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/beltandroadinitiative>.

<sup>4</sup> Пак там.

та Си Дзинпин инициатива „Един пояс, един път“ и вероятно потвърждава пророчеството, приписвано на Наполеон Бонапарт че „когато Китай (Драконът) се събуди от своя сън, целият свят ще се разтрепери“.<sup>5</sup> И съвсем естествено е твърдението, че успоредно с бурното и динамично развитие на Евразия към настоящия момент, се наблюдава зачестяване на периодите на припламване на регионални войни и опити от външни сили за спирането на този невиждан от дълго време подем.

В следващите редове ще разгледаме географското положение на Иран, позициите на световните и регионалните сили, тяхното виждане за инициативата на Китай и ще изведем някои доводи в подкрепа на тезата, че Иран може да бъде смятан както за своеобразен „геополитически възел“ или „детонатор“ на процесите, но едновременно с това и за „катализатор“ на проекта „Един пояс, един път“.

### Геополитическият възел Иран

Ислямска република Иран, или за кратко Иран, е геополитически възел с ключово значение в региона на Близкия, Средния и Далечния Изток, Каспийско море, Индийския океан и Кавказ. Географски се намира точно по оригиналното трасе на Великия път на коприната от Античността и Средновековието, поддържа връзки както с Китай, така и с цивилизации и култури, чиито наследници днес са пръснати из държавите от Централна Азия, Индия, Пакистан, Афганистан, Турция, Кавказкия регион, Леванта (дн. Сирия и Ливан) и Арабския полуостров.

Независимо дали говорим за монархическия или за републиканския период на Иран, неговото значение като свързващо звено между Европа и Азия остава непроменено, и като такова всеки по-голям играч иска да го привлече на своя страна, за да си сътрудничат и за да може да използва територията на Иран като отправна точка за експанзия към други примамливи пазари в евразийското пространство – с други думи, да си осигури достъп до местата, нужни за неговото геополитическо оцеляване и продължителен просперитет. През вековете Иран е съюзник и партньор с много на брой държави, сред които се открояват Китай, Великобритания, Португалия, Испания, Русия, Турция и САЩ, но на друг етап от развитието на техните двустранни и многостранни взаимоотношения се явява техен основен конкурент и противник, именно заради своята неизменна важност в Каспийско-Кавказкото и Централноазиатското направления.

В етнически и културен план Иран е мултиетническа държава с множество малцинства, пръснати по периферията, или границите на страната. Може би най-важните малцинства, които трябва да споменем в хода на това изследване са: азери, тюркмени, пушунни, белуджи, таджики, араби и кюрди. Открояваме тях като по-важни, защото влизат в поставените критерии за разположение по границата със съседите. Освен това някои от тях биха служили като идеален проводник за прокарване на една или друга държавна политика, която би била в ущърб на Иран.

<sup>5</sup> Вж.: <https://www.forumnauka.bg/topic/1015>.

Към днешна дата Иран е в хладни отношения с една страна от региона – кралство Саудитска Арабия, тъй като за разлика от по-голямата част от Близкия Изток, Иран е с преобладаващо шиитско направление на исляма, докато Саудитска Арабия следва сунитското направление. Следователно, от казаното дотук можем да заключим, че Иран е с напрегнати взаимоотношения със сунитските фракции в целия регион и дори води т.нар. „проху wars“ или посреднически войни със саудитите в Йемен, Сирия и на други места из региона, които обаче не влизат в дневния ред на големите водещи медии. Но в последните няколко седмици има изгледи, че най-накрая е възможно да бъде осъществен някакъв компромис между шиитите и сунитите, представени съответно от Иран и Саудитска Арабия във водените помежду им преговори на закрито. Тепърва ще стане ясно докъде ще доведат те и до каква степен ще се разглежда „религиозната“ карта в колодата на двустранните отношения между Саудитска Арабия и Иран.<sup>6</sup>

### **Позиции на световните сили и регионалните играчи**

Глобалната инициатива на Китай предизвиква в значителна степен вниманието на целия свят, в това число и на най-важните играчи на сцената – Русия (и респективно воденият от нея Евразийския икономически съюз), Индия, САЩ, ЕС, Турция. Но в целия този контекст много често се изпуска един важен играч от региона, а именно Иран, през чиято територия също предстои да мине тази толкова важна за цяла Евразия инициатива за „Нов път на коприната“. Ще обърнем преди всичко внимание на един пренебрегван район в целия мегапроект за възстановяване на класическия Път на коприната, в този случай цял един континент – Африка. Трудно е да дадем цялостна оценка на 55-е африкански страни и членове на Африканския съюз, тъй като разногласията и позициите им за проекта „Един пояс, един път“ са прекалено разнообразни и изискват много по-задълбочен анализ. Ето защо ще се спрем само на някои от тях, по-специално на тези, намиращи се на източното крайбрежие на континента.

От поне четири-пет десетилетия Китай е здраво стъпил и е установил трайни дипломатически отношения с редица африкански държави, сред които са: Танзания, Кения, Зимбабве, Египет, Северен Судан, Мадагаскар и Република Южна Африка (РЮА) (с която Китай е партньор в организацията БРИКС – Бразилия, Русия, Индия, Китай и Южна Африка). Всяка една страна от изброените гледа с добро око на инициативата за „Един пояс, един път“, в чиито измерения ще влязат и техните територии.

Най-голям интерес от инициативата биха имали обаче Република Южна Африка (РЮА) и Танзания. РЮА има желание да се облагодетелства и да модернизира своята икономика и инфраструктура, и да даде нова надежда на младите поколения да останат на нейната територия, а не да емигрират към Европа и САЩ, но едновременно

<sup>6</sup> Вж.: <https://www.mediapool.bg/iran-potvardi-che-pregovarya-sas-sauditska-arabiya-news321642.html>.

с това и да неутрализира негативното влияние на расизма сред населението именно чрез инициативата „Един пояс, един път“. Танзания в миналото е била използвана като първото пристанище при посещението на китайската експедиция в началото на XV в., преди последвалата капсулация и самоизолация на Китай за следващите векове, и има исторически корени в това отношение. Но едновременно с това Танзания е и най-старият партньор на Китай, тъй като именно китайската страна първа стъпва там и изгражда инфраструктурни проекти – в това число и панафриканската железница.

Най-сложно е да се определи позицията на Зимбабве спрямо Китай, тъй като след свалянето на президента Мугабе от власт през 2017 г. страната се намира в много сложен преходен процес и прокитайските визии на предишния президент е възможно да не бъдат продължени от новите власти. Факторът икономика обаче може да склони Зимбабве да продължи да си сътрудничи с Китай, тъй като след управлението на Мугабе страната е в положение на още по-голям банкрут.

По-лесно е да се предскаже поведението на Египет и Северен Судан, които биха използвали своите стратегически позиции в географски принцип да привлекат китайските инвестиции в своите предели. Египет спокойно може да използва Суецкия канал, а също така и течащата през неговата територия река Нил, и респективно инициативата за Пътя на коприната в своя полза. Северен Судан може да използва своите природни богатства основно от петрол и природен газ, за да изтъргува изгодна за него сделка, особено след като през 2019 г. в Судан се извърши военен преврат срещу управлявалия три десетилетия президент Омар Башир и беше формирано преходно правителство начело с военните. Но самата смяна породи финансова криза, която обезцени паундът още повече и докара страната до още по-голямо положение на несигурност. Тоест Судан в момента е на почти същата позиция като Зимбабве, с разликата, че не изпитва недостиг или неналичност на национална валута. Отделно загубата на територии на Северен Судан, върху които се образува Южен Судан преди едно десетилетие, допълнително затруднява развитието на Судан, който вероятно ще успее да компенсира загубите си, породени от това разделение, чрез участието в „Един пояс, един път“.

Кения и Мадагаскар, влизачи по-скоро в условно наречената прозападна част на континента, са по-нови партньори на Китай и диалогът с него все още набира подемна сила, следователно това ще са страните които по-трудно могат да се включат в Новия път на коприната. Можем дори да ги наречем слабите звена на инициативата в Африка, нищо че Найроби (столицата на Кения) фигурира като важен пункт в морската част от „Един пояс, един път“.

Русия и воденият от нея Евразийски икономически съюз (ЕАИС) гледат двойко на инициативата на Китай. От една страна, Русия и членовете на ЕАИС съдействат на Китай и неговата инициатива, тъй като ще получат допълнителен тласък на идеята за евразийското обединение, но от друга страна, Русия също така не иска да отпус-

не напълно контрола върху постсъветското пространство и да позволи на Китай да оказва по-сериозно влияние в регионите на Централна Азия и Кавказ. Едновременно с това Русия гледа да превърне ЕАИС в един от най-влиятелните и незаобиколими субекти на международните отношения. ЕАИС ще съдейства до определен момент на Китай в неговата инициатива, но не може да се гарантира какво би се случило, веднъж щом Русия и Китай проявят еднакъв, но противоположен на другата страна интерес към Иран, чието географско положение го поставя точно на мястото на такъв потенциален сблъсък на интереси.

Индия, смятана за потенциално втората най-голяма икономика на света след време, също има своя евразийска инициатива, за която много не се говори, но също е в ход – Made in India. Тя също би представлявала интересен противовес на Китай и Русия, с които са общи партньори в две глобални организации – БРИКС и ШОС (Шанхайската организация за сътрудничество). Тя също гледа на Иран като потенциален маршрут за прокарване на трасе за Европа и Централна Азия. Интересен противовес на ЕАИС и „Един пояс, един път“ е именно индийският вариант на инициативата, тъй като Иран може да повлияе за реализирането на един или друг проект, пускайки руски, китайски или индийски капитали да минават през неговата територия и по този начин да наклони везните в една от трите изброени евразийски идеи, а защо не и интеграционни проекти, за свързване на Изтока със Запада.

САЩ и ЕС за пръв път от много време насам са на едно мнение, а именно че проектът „Един пояс, един път“ трябва да бъде саботиран, тъй като ще гарантира световната доминация на Китай, както и заливането на европейските, а много вероятно и на американските пазари, с много по-евтини китайски стоки, а също така икономиките на 27-е членки на ЕС дори и комбинирано не могат да смогнат на бързите темпове на китайската. Едновременно с това ЕС и САЩ гледат да въведат санкции в своите парламенти за евентуално потенциалните партньори на Китай и всеки, който би решил да действа с китайски търговци, инвеститори и прочие. Пример за сближаване на позициите на ЕС и САЩ спрямо Китай са техните декларации за осъждане по-тъпкването на правата на уйгурското население в автономен регион Синдзян<sup>7</sup>. Освен всичко изложено дотук, на провела се на 11–13.06.2021 г. във Великобритания среща на групата на най-развитите икономики в света G-7 (САЩ, Канада, Великобритания, Германия, Франция, Италия и Япония) беше взето решение за контриране на „Един пояс, един път“ чрез инвестиране на 40 трилиона долара в инфраструктурата на развиващите се страни от Азия, Африка и Южна Америка.<sup>8</sup> Тоест вече ясно се очертава, макар и с по-бавни темпове, противниковият блок на китайския мегапроект.

Турция, един също така важен и комплексен играч, но и регионален конкурент на Иран в районите на Близкия Изток и Кавказ, гледа на китайската инициатива „Един пояс, един

<sup>7</sup> Вж.: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0375\\_BG.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0375_BG.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> Вж.: <https://btvnovinite.bg/predavania/tazi-sabota-i-nedelia/posleden-den-na-sreshtata-na-g-7-liderite-shte-obsazhdad-plan-za-razvivashhtite-se-strani.html>.

път“ като възможност да осъществи свои геополитически цели, сред които е да се превърне в 11-а глобална икономика на връх 100 годишнината от основаването на републиката през 2023 г. Едновременно с това Турция гледа да изгради потенциален икономически коридор с близкия тюркоезичен Азербайджан, по който ресурсите на Далечния Изток и Централна Азия ще преминават и през нейната територия на най-новите тежкотоварни влакове. Едновременно с това Турция най-вероятно ще гледа да пренасочи въпросните ресурси и да заобикаля територията на Иран, като залага на алтернативни маршрути през Каспийско море и Персийския залив, но и нарочно ще се намесва по-мощно в регионалните конфликти, за да държи вниманието на Иран концентрирано върху тях и неконцентриран за реалните ѝ действия по алтернативните трасета на Пътя на коприната.

### **Израелско-американският антагонизъм и опитите за пряк сблъсък с Иран**

Към момента отношенията между Иран и Израел, от една страна, и между Иран и САЩ, от друга, са в много нисък спектър на търпимост. Специално по въпроса за Израел, Иран поддържа своята позиция, че не признава правото на съществуване на държавата и че нейните територии принадлежат на Арабския свят (Сирия, Палестина и Йордания по-специално). Израел, от своя страна, вижда най-голямата заплаха за своето съществуване именно в Иран, като на този етап му противодейства с две стратегии:

Първата от тях е да търси начини за съдействие и помощ от САЩ, за да въведат санкции в ООН, и едновременно с това американски санкции по различни сектори от икономиката на Иран, особено на промишлеността и енергетиката. Ето защо, когато САЩ излязоха едностранно от Виенското споразумение през 2018 г., Израел беше един от най-доволните от това решение. Така САЩ и Израел могат спокойно да продължат по плановете си за изпълнение на политиката на санкции спрямо Иран, позовавайки се на установени според тях самите критерии за спазване на международното право.

Втората предполага да се извършват секретни операции за въздействие и създаване на ситуации на кризи на ръба на войната, или т.нар. „brinkmanship war“. По-често обаче САЩ се възползват от тази опция, докато Израел предпочита да води вече споменатата „проху war“ с Иран на териториите на Сирия и Ирак, където нередко въоръжени групировки влизат в сблъсък помежду си. Тук влизат в употреба бойните дронове на САЩ, с които те отстраняват опасни, влизащи в техните черни списъци, личности от най-различни прослойки на иранското общество – от ядрени физици, работещи по програмата за обогатяване на уран, до видни генерали от армията.

Не е по-различна ситуацията със САЩ, която от началото на 80-те години на ХХ в. Ислямската република непрекъснато изобразява като „Сатана“ и също така придава качеството на необходимия „образ на врага“. Противопоставянето между Иран

и САЩ е най-остро именно през управлението на аятолах Хомейни и кризата с американските заложници в посолството в Техеран. Временното успокоение в американо-иранския противовес, започнало след смъртта на аятолаха, от 90-те години обаче не се задържа за дълго време, тъй като настъпва периода на борбата със „световния тероризъм“.

След атентатите от 11.09.2001 г. САЩ сякаш искат да затвърдят този образ, като атакуват и окупираат Афганистан и Ирак, разполагайки над 400 хиляди военни в двете държави и построявайки множество бази с цел дестабилизация на Иран и района на Средния Изток чрез създаването на ситуация на „организиран хаос“. Най-смелото предположение сред част от изследователите е, че САЩ искат да установят някакъв вид контрол над провинция Хузестан, където се намират два от най-важните геоикономически ресурси на Иран, а именно суровият петрол и атомната електроцентра „Бушер“, и също така да започнат продажба на иранския петрол с долари, като по този начин запазят пазарната стойност на щатската валута и статуса ѝ на резервна.<sup>9</sup> Но изследователят не посочва идеите си за АЕЦ „Бушер“, която спада към критичната инфраструктура на страната, и какво според него американците искат да направят с нея, веднъж щом влязат в района. Едновременно с това, не бива да се забравя, че в провинцията живеят голям брой етнически араби, които нееднократно се опитват да се отделят от Иран, засега обаче без никакъв успех.

### Защо „ирански детонатор“?!

След като разгледахме сложните и противоречиви отношения между страните от региона и отчетохме наличието на значителни и разностранни интереси на основните геополитически играчи по отношение на Иран и региона, можем да изведем твърдението, че Иран се явява своеобразен „костелив орех“, пречка и дори „детонатор“ на проекта „Един пояс, един път“. Ето и някои аргументи в подкрепа на тезата, защо смятаме Иран като детонатор за инициативата на Китай:

На първо място, защото територията на страната се явява много важен, ключов елемент от геополитическата шахматна дъска, според разбирането на З. Бжежински в неговия труд „Голямата шахматна дъска“<sup>10</sup>. Според него, за да задържи своето геополитическо превъзходство, Америка трябва да „дирижира“ най-големия континент в геополитическо отношение – Евразия, като играе своята игра на „евразийската шахматна дъска“, подобно на шаха, със специфични „геостратегически играчи“, които се стремят да овладеят „ключови геополитически зони“. Именно Иран, според Бжежински, е един от тези зони, които осигуряват влияние в Черно и Каспийско море, Централна Азия, Персийския залив и Далечния Изток. И това е лесно обяснимо, ако се вгледаме в картата на региона: Иран не е просто една от най-големите

<sup>9</sup> Иванджийски, Красимир. В. „Строго секретно“, 08.2019 г., стр. 14.

<sup>10</sup> Бжежински, З., Голямата шахматна дъска. С.: Обсидиан, 1997.

страни в региона, но тя се простира от Каспийско море до Индийския океан, като така прегражда изцяло сухопътните артерии от запад на изток. Иран контролира Персийския залив и частично Оманския залив, както и корабоплаването в тях, и така се превръща в един незаобиколим фактор в новата геостратегическата проекция на Пътя на коприната. Ето защо може да се твърди, че опитите за въздействие, натиск и дори провокации срещу Иран от страна на великите сили ще продължават с нарастваща интензивност и това в голяма степен може да предопределя и нестабилността в региона, при това с определен взривоопасен потенциал.

На второ място, защото ако се вгледаме в картата на региона, ще отбележим, че в лицето на Иран имаме една добре различима религиозна бариера, граница или петно. Иран е обграден почти отвсякъде от сунитски държави, докато той самият е шиитски от началото на XV в., освен това вече близо 1400 години шиитите и сунитите са в кръвна вражда помежду си. Но тъй като този конфликт е прекалено комплексен и специфичен, ние няма да му отделяме внимание в тази публикация. Можем обаче да предположим с висока степен на достоверност, че е напълно вероятно и възможно при определени условия Саудитска Арабия и коалиция от няколко сунитски държави да се опитат да предизвикат въоръжен сблъсък с Иран и в страни, където живеят малцинства на шиити. И в хода на хипотетичен военен сценарий Китай няма да може да прокара планираните инфраструктурни трасета и да придвижва колоните от товарообороти, в следствие на което ще бъде блокирана цялата инициатива.

На трето място, Иран не е от държавите, които се притесняват да изразяват открито мнение по защита на своите национални интереси и да поставят проблемите на масата, което означава, че непрекъснато демонстрира готовност да защитава суверенитета си, а не го отдава на други страни, за да може наднационални организации да просъществуват по-дълго време. Може да се твърди, че страната провежда относително самостоятелна и праволинейна вътрешна и външна политика, без да се съобразява с някои общоприети схващания и принципи на страните от Западния свят. Така се засилва израелската пропагандна машина в посока очерняне името на страната и всичко свързано с нея по един или друг начин. Всичко това обаче повдига един належащ въпрос: дали Израел няма да пожертва всичко, за да намери начин да саботира инициативата „Един пояс, един път“ на Китай, само за да спре бъдещия възход и просперитет на Иран, независимо от всички идващи с това последици. И съвсем възможен хипотетичен опит за саботаж от страна на Израел би изглеждал така: Мосад изпраща свои агенти, предрешени като ирански инженери и говорещи безупречен персийски, да дерайлират няколко влака, при възможност с колкото се може повече пътници. В следствие на което да се предизвика спор между няколко ирански и китайски корпорации, занимаващи се с жп транспорта и това да доведе до анулирането на сключени до този момент споразумения за сътрудничество и премахването на Иран от картата на „Един пояс, един път“.

Ще спрем дотук с излаганите аргументи. Не че техният брой не може лесно да бъде продължен, но главно защото вероятно тук е място да посочим и някои доводи в посока на положителните ефекти, които тази древна страна може да изиграе в подкрепа на инициативата „Един пояс, един път“.

### **Иран като потенциален мост между Китай и Запада**

Както вече споменахме, Иран е твърде голям и значим като геополитическа тежест, за да има само и единствено негативно въздействие върху процесите по изграждане на проекта на Китай. Ако се вгледаме в китайската история, култура и философия има страшно много примери за това, как за всяко нещо в реалния свят може да има повече от една перспективи. Ето защо убедено считаме, че Иран може да играе и позитивна роля в проекта „Един пояс, един път“. Това са и нашите аргументи:

На първо място, може да направим извода, че позицията му дава голям положителен потенциал и надежда за просперитет във финансово и икономическо, инфраструктурно и транспортно, културно и религиозно отношение, дори и социално-политически за всички съседи в региона. Иран все пак е и най-голямата държава по площ в района на Близкия Изток и втората по население след Турция. Иран поддържа приятелски взаимоотношения с Афганистан и Пакистан и често съдейства в съвместните операции по изкореняване на маковите и опиумните насаждения в района на т.нар. „златен полумесец“, както и в пресичането на опитите за сепаратизъм на пущуните и белуджите. Но както отбелязахме преди, всички те могат да получат сериозни положителни дивиденди от успешното реализиране на проекта „Един пояс, един път“. Всъщност, преминаването на трасето през иранската територия е повече от естествено, като това обстоятелство може да изиграе сериозна интеграционна роля за превръщане на територията на страната в своеобразен кръстопът между района на Персийския залив и Каспийския регион, и от Мала Азия и Източното Средиземноморие към страните от Средна Азия и Далечния Изток. Всъщност, известната теза на Ото фон Бисмарк, че „който владее Балканите, владее Европа“ в случая може да бъде перифразирана така: „който владее Иран, владее пътя от Азия към Европа“.

На второ място, Иран поддържа и доста добри взаимоотношения с държавите от Централна Азия и Кавказ, и единствено по-резервирани с Турция. Основната причина е честата смяна на визията и геополитическите цели от управляващия ѝ елит, както и отношение към народите с тюркска принадлежност, живеещи в евразийското пространство, и опитите ѝ да бъде техен покровител и обединител. Това според наблюдателите, е много опасна игра от страна на Турция, която представлява своеобразна заплаха за инициативата „Един пояс, един път“. На този фон Иран може да окаже положително влияние за региона, както с добрите си и предсказуеми отношения с всички страни, с което ще осигури добри условия за развитието на тази част от света, но и да контрира и дори да неутрализира опасната игра на Турция. Както

впрочем беше позицията ѝ по време на войната в Нагорни Карабах през есента на 2020 г. Един от възможните способности за това е насърчаването на износа на полезни изкопаеми, нефт и газ от неговите недра, както и множество вторични продукти, разпространението им във всяка от посоките на света именно чрез мегапроекта на Китай. Допускането на инвеститори с едри, средни и дребни капиталовложения на негова територия също би осигурило катализиращ ефект, спомагайки за модернизацията на поостарялата инфраструктурата на страната след дългите години на международни санкции.

На трето място, Иран сам по себе си не представлява заплаха за нито един от своите съседи, нито пък за останалия свят, но други държави (по-специално външни за региона сили) биха искали да го използват за детонатор и да предизвикат изкуствен конфликт между него и съседите му в Каспийско-Персийският район, което подкрепя мнението ни, че Иран де факто е по-скоро катализатор и външни сили биха искали да го използват като детонатор за китайската инициатива за Новия път на коприната.

## Заклучение

Цялостната стратегия зад евразийската инициатива на Си Цзинпин „Един пояс, един път“ се осъществява без много шум, но с впечатляващи темпове и е на път да трансформира геополитическата карта на света. Във времена, в които американската хегемония е под въпрос, инициативата „Един пояс, един път“ нанася пореден удар на геополитическата стратегия на САЩ. Според Уилям Енгдал, днес евразийският век е неизбежен и необратим<sup>11</sup>. Всъщност може да се твърди, че така се възражда наново идеята на Макиндер за Хартланда, но в неговия съвременен вариант. Става въпрос за превръщане на евразийското пространство в единен икономически, ресурсен, транспортен, технологичен и социален колос, вече напълно независим от възможна американска блокада по море, с което в средата и края на настоящия век земната сила отново ще бъде в състояние да доминира над морската в глобален аспект.

Също така, за първи път от век насам концепцията на друг виден геополитик – Алфред Махан – може да се окаже тотално ревизирана. Неговата известна концепция за „морската мощ“ на САЩ и възможностите тя да доминира над „сухопътната сила“ (страните от Евразия) се преобръща изцяло, а заложените в нея „Обръчи на Анакондата“ ще бъдат разчупени от прикования за момента Бегемот (сухоземното същество в геополитическата мисъл) и възможностите на телуросократичните държави да достигнат морската шир.

Вероятно в резултат на всичко това се появиха и първите геостратегически предложения за решение от американския политолог З. Бжежински. В публикувана статия в списанието „The American Interest“<sup>12</sup> той твърди, че Вашингтон трябва да стане инициатор на

<sup>11</sup> <http://a-specto.bg/evrazijskiyat-vek-veche-e-neizbezhen/>.

<sup>12</sup> [http://www.blitz.bg/svyat/zbignev-bzhezinski-erata-na-svetovnoto-gospodstvo-na-sashch-priklyuchva\\_news406770.html](http://www.blitz.bg/svyat/zbignev-bzhezinski-erata-na-svetovnoto-gospodstvo-na-sashch-priklyuchva_news406770.html).

промяната в баланса на световните сили, защото в противен случай ерата на господство на САЩ приключва.

Ако това е така, със сигурност ще има още много „детонатори“ по маршрута на „Един пояс, един път“.

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
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HISTORICAL LINKS  
AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE



ИСТОРИЧЕСКИ ВРЪЗКИ  
И КУЛТУРЕН ОБМЕН

## “一带一路”倡议下中国文化在保加利亚传播的新特点

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### New Features of the Promotion of Chinese Culture in Bulgaria Under the “One Belt, One Road” Initiative

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#### Abstract

Bulgaria is a traditional friendly country of China, being one of the earliest countries to establish diplomatic relations with New China. It is also a partner of the Belt and Road Initiative and member of the Cooperation mechanism between China and the Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the host of the first Chinese cultural center in CEEC. The spread of Chinese culture in Bulgaria has lasted for more than a century and a half, laying a solid foundation for the prosperous development of the Sino-Bulgarian cultural exchange, which entered a period of rapid and in-depth development since the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative. The number of publications, carriers and platforms for the promotion of Chinese culture in Bulgaria have shown new characteristics.

**Keywords:** “Belt and Road” initiative; Bulgaria; Chinese culture; communication

保加利亚是中国传统友好国家,是最早与新中国建交的国家之一,也是中国“一带一路”倡议沿线国家和中国—中东欧国家合作机制成员国。随着两国传统友谊和各领域交往的不断加深,尤其是“一带一路”倡议实施以来,中保两国政治、经济等各领域合作关系愈加紧密,与之相随的文化交流也呈现繁荣发展趋势。

相较于欧洲其他国家,中国文化在保加利亚的传播起始较晚。自14世纪末起保加利亚经历了5个世纪的异族统治,这在一定程度上影响了其自身社会文化的发展,也影响了外来文化在保加利亚的自然传播。自18世纪起,保加利亚开始了其一个多世纪的反抗异族统治的民族解放运动,保加利亚社会经济、政治和文化生活等领域也发生了根本性变化,保加利亚民族开始自我觉醒,并意识到了民族身份认定的重要性,也正是在这种重新界定和架构民族文化的进程中,开始加快了解和接受外来文明,其中也包含中华文明。

## 1. 中国文化在保加利亚的传播

中国文化在保加利亚的传播已历经一个半世纪有余，纵观这一时期的中保两国文化交流的发展脉络，每一个重要发展时期，保加利亚国家和社会的自我发展都为中国文化在保加利亚的传播提供了良好条件和优势平台。

### 1.1. 保加利亚民族复兴时期报刊业的兴盛为中国文化传播提供了必要载体。

有学者揣测，出版于1849年的《皮提亚或占卜》一书可能是保加利亚对中华文化的最早触碰，认为这本书毫无疑问与中国古代典籍《易经》有着直接的关联性。保加利亚民族复兴运动的兴起为其民族文化发展奠定了良好的社会经济基础，也为外来文明的传播提供了必要载体和良好的社会大环境。保加利亚报刊业的快速发展为其民众接触和了解中国文化提供了先决条件。

19世纪中期至20世纪初，保加利亚大量发行的期刊出版物成为中国文化在该国传播的重要媒介。保加利亚第一份杂志出版于1844年（土耳其），两年后即1846年出版了第一份报纸（德国），又过了两年，于1848年在皇城（君士坦丁堡）出版了“皇城报”，这是保加利亚报刊名称里首次使用“报纸”一词。据统计，截至1878年保加利亚民族复兴运动结束的30多年里，仅在奥斯曼帝国首都君士坦丁堡出版的保加利亚文期刊就有近30种。这一时期的报刊杂志，登载有许多关于中国的历史大事件和文章，内容涉及当时中国社会生活的多个领域，从中国的政治、经济、军事等大政消息到中国的医学、宗教、教育、人口、民俗民风等国情知识。

### 1.2. 19世纪中期至20世纪初中国文化书籍的出版为中国文化传播创造了良好的人文基础。

19世纪中期，保加利亚学者开始关注和研读中国的古代哲学思想书。1856年12月8日的“皇城报”首次登载了关于中国古代哲学典籍的出版资助公告，书名译作《孔夫子或社会生活之规则》。20世纪上半叶，保加利亚文化在迅速发展以及融入欧洲文化的同时，中国思想家孔子和老子的学说、名言语录等也被保加利亚学界引用。

1895年保加利亚文学月刊《保加利亚文集》第1辑中关于“甲午战争”一文章中提及了中国古代诗歌总集《诗经》，中国古代经典文学作品开始进入保加利亚文学界的视野。中国神话故事、民间故事以及中国历史典故等在出版图书中占据比较重要的地位。进入20世纪后，中国的戏曲和音乐开始受到保加利亚传媒界关注，对中国语言文化也表现出了极大兴趣，中国的谚语、俗语成为译介首选。经过这一时期的发展积累，自20世纪40年代起，中国文化在保加利亚的传播得到了进一步发展，突破了先前“东方就是东方，西方就是西方”的文化观。

### 1.3. 20世纪50年代至21世纪初中国文化书籍的集中出版为中国文化的更广泛传播奠定了坚实基础。

保加利亚是世界上第二个承认中华人民共和国的国家，随着中国和保加利亚两国外交关系的正式建立，1952年7月中保两国正式签订文化合作协定，中保两国文化合作协定的签署为中国文化在保加利亚的传播提供了良好的政治社会氛围，两国人民之间的深厚情谊也带来了两个民族文化领域交流的进一步发展。

保加利亚著名作家瓦列里·彼得洛夫访华后于1958年出版了《关于中国的书》，这也是保加

利亚国家图书馆收藏的最早的中国游记，作家从东西方文化比较视角，详细阐释了中国文化的独特之处和迷人魅力，一如作家写在书扉页的诗句：桂花很特别——她的香味离远了更易捕捉。50年代，保加利亚出版了茅盾、巴金、老舍、鲁迅等中国著名作家的作品近20部，可以说在20世纪50年代，保加利亚中国文学作品的翻译出版无论是数量还是质量都是历史性飞跃。经过之后几十年的积淀，中国文化在保加利亚已经形成了比较广泛的读者群和研究人員。

20世纪80年代中国改革开放后，中保两国文化交流又进入加速发展时期，保加利亚汉学家致力于中国古典文学的翻译与研究，笔耕不辍，成绩斐然。20世纪90年代，中国的气功、武术、中医等书籍的翻译曾盛极一时。进入21世纪，中国古代思想家的理论学说在保加利亚的出版再次兴盛起来。除《论语》、《道德经》版本多次再版外，孙子、庄子、列子、韩非子、诸葛亮等思想家的学说及《易经》陆续辑集出版。

纵观21世纪前中国文化在保加利亚的百年传播，翻译出版书籍累计超过百部。可以说，“翻译”一直是保加利亚人民了解中国文化最积极有效的方式，保加利亚出版的中国文化图书内容涉及多个领域，其中中国文学作品占据主要地位。图书出版在保加利亚的中国文化传播中发挥的主体作用显著。中国文化在保加利亚一个半世纪的积淀为“一带一路”倡议下中国文化在其繁荣发展奠定了坚实基础。

## 2. “一带一路”倡议下中国文化在保加利亚的传播

中国的“一带一路”倡议是“丝绸之路经济带”和“21世纪海上丝绸之路”的简称。自2013年提出以来，也得到了保加利亚政府的认同和积极参与，保加利亚既是“一带一路”倡议沿线国家，也是开始于2012年的中国—中东欧国家合作机制成员国，这两项倡议在保加利亚落地后，中保两国政治、经济等领域合作广度和深度不断提升，各领域合作成果斐然。保加利亚民众了解和认知中国文化，参与中保两国文化交流的意愿和积极性也呈现上升态势，这从汉语热、中国文化活动参与人数和活动地域广度，以及中国文化市场化运营机构的出现等可窥见一斑。中国文化在保加利亚的传播也由成熟走向繁荣发展，中保两国文化交流成果的数量和质量都创下历史新高。中国文化在保加利亚的传播呈现新的发展特点。

### 2.1. 中国文化书籍的出版继续呈现热态，且增量明显，译研并行，成果社会影响力增大。

自20世纪50年代出现中国文化书籍出版的第一个高潮之后，近几年再次出现出版高潮，中国文化书籍出版数量相较过去快速增长，其中研究成果占比增量明显，突破了先前以翻译为主的态势，译研并行，且直接从中文译介书籍占比高。

通过查阅保加利亚国家图书馆书目和互联网平台的不完全统计，自“一带一路”倡议实施以来，保加利亚出版的中国文化相关图书就已经超过前期百年传播量的一半，其中文学作品仍占据过半比例，但相较前期出版成果，中国文学外的其他文化类书籍出版增量明显，而且关于中国文化研究的论文集和专著也有十几部之多，研究领域涉及中国的语言、文学、艺术、民俗民风、历史、宗教、哲学思想等。

不仅书籍出版数量取得突破，书籍的社会影响力进一步彰显。除传统的小说、诗歌、散文体裁中国文学作品外，保加利亚读者首次接触到了中国话剧经典作品《雷雨》和《茶馆》；《红楼梦》保文版（第一册）获得了保加利亚文化部颁发的“赫里斯托·格·达诺夫”文学大奖，这也是中国文学翻译作品首次获此殊荣，保加利亚也因此成为继罗马尼亚、匈牙利、捷克、斯洛伐克

之后翻译出版《红楼梦》的少数中东欧国家之一。此外，保加利亚首版《走遍中国》中国教材保文译本和首部汉语语言学专著《汉语的词法体系》等的出版都是近些年的突出出版成果。

## 2.2. 中国文化专门推广机构的品牌作用日益显著，为中保两国民心相通发挥重要作用。

保加利亚的孔子学院和中国文化中心是从事中国文化推介的专门性机构，组织的文化活动不仅越来越受到当地民众的欢迎，而且活动的品牌作用愈加显著，为当地民众了解中国和中国开展交流合作发挥了重要的民心相通作用。

保加利亚高校的汉语教学开始于20世纪50年代初，自90年代初开始汉学专业高层次人才培养，服务于保加利亚的翻译、教育及与中国各领域交流的需要。于2006年和2012年相继成立了两家孔子学院，其下属孔子课堂和汉语教学点遍布保加利亚东、西、南、北、中各行政大区，承担保加利亚全境汉语教学和中国文化推介任务。在孔子学院的努力下，保加利亚开设汉语教学和组织中国文化活动的城市已达二十多个。孔子学院的语言文化推广活动不仅越来越丰富，而且已经形成自己的文化品牌，比如汉语日、中国电影节、翻译及绘画等中国文化主题比赛、中国传统节日等庆祝活动，每年组织的中国文化活动愈百场，成为保加利亚学习和推广中国文化的重要教育机构。

索非亚中国文化中心是中国在中东欧国家揭牌运营的首个中国文化中心，自2017年成立以来，已经在保加利亚组织了多场大型文化演出和展览、展示活动，为保加利亚民众面对面、沉浸式走进中国文化提供了更多可能和机会，以多元形式的文化交流活动为媒介，不仅助推了两国文化领域交流，而且推动了两国及民间的经贸交往，中国企业逐步参与到保加利亚中国文化的传播工作中，中国企业在合作城市开展汉语和中国文化活动，或者参与中国文化图书的出版资助等都是最好的体现。企业在文化传播中提升自身形象，而当地民众通过了解中国文化进而加深了彼此了解，又会参与到两国的经贸交流之中，形成了契合保加利亚地理优势特色的两国民间合作模式，更好地发挥了文化的桥梁和纽带作用。

## 2.3. 保加利亚的中国文化图书出版向专业化和市场化方向发展。

中国文化在保加利亚的百年传播中，有三、四十家出版社参与过中国图书的翻译出版，近些年，对中国文化图书的出版兴趣依然有增无减，已经形成十几家相对稳固的中国文化出版单位，涵盖保加利亚的文学艺术领域、综合性及教育机构下属等各类出版社，确保了每年的中国文化新书投放市场。

“一带一路”和中国—中东欧国家合作倡议在保加利亚推进以来，中国的出版社主动走进保加利亚，与当地出版社的合作交流不断向专业化和市场化方向发展。中保两国专业出版机构的参与，使得中国文化书籍在保加利亚的出版水平不断提高，图书的出版选择越来越多地依据市场和读者需求规则而定。2018年成立了中国—中东欧国家出版联盟，目前已有5家保加利亚出版社成为该联盟成员单位。两国出版社合作推出了中国古代经典系列著作的出版，其中就包括《红楼梦》、《中华思想文化术语》、《中国文化读本》等一系列有影响的作品。诺贝尔文学奖获得者中国作家莫言的《生死疲劳》、《檀香刑》等多部作品、获得世界科幻文学大奖的中国作家刘慈欣的《三体》和《三体II:黑暗森林》、《雷雨》和《茶馆》等具有世界影响力作品保文译本的出版即是最好佐证。

## 2.4. 保加利亚媒体对中国文化活动的关注常态化，并与中国媒体开始深度合作。

保加利亚的电视台、电台、报纸等主流媒体非常关注中国文化活动的组织、开展和中保双边文化互访活动。比如保加利亚国家电视台、新电视台、Darik电台以及保加利亚通讯社、保加利亚新闻网、报社等大型传媒对有关中国文化的重大活动及重要访问等均会跟踪报道，活动举办地的各类媒体也会积极跟进，报道日益常态化。

除时效性强的音、视频及网络传媒外，纸质传媒在中国文化传播中的载体作用也不断提高。保加利亚多家主流报社也承担了中保两国文化交流的职责，比如“24小时报”、“言论报”等。近些年首发的中国主题期刊的推出更为保加利亚民众了解中国提供了又一选择。保加利亚“今日中国”周报是保加利亚首份中国主题报纸，致力于介绍中国各领域发展情况以及取得的成就，其中也包括中国文化领域。保加利亚语杂志“中国视角”是中国传媒主动走进保加利亚的首份中国主题杂志，内容涉及中国的政治、经济、社会、文化等。保加利亚《黑与白》杂志，设有“未知的中国”栏目，介绍中国的传统文化。这些期刊出版社与中国相关机构合作，还出版了关于中国“一带一路”倡议和中国—中东欧国家合作成果及中国世界遗产等方面的图书。

保加利亚媒体与中国媒体合作向纵深发展。《24小时报》网页版与中国国际广播电台建有合作关系，设有“中国视角”栏目，登载中国媒体的保加利亚语部提供的时政新闻、中国历史文化、采访等视频节目。保加利亚通讯社与中国新华社建立有长期合作关系，也是中国文化活动的主要报道方。

## 2.5. 保加利亚的中国文化自媒体发展迅速

除保加利亚主流媒体外，中国文化相关自媒体也为中国文化在保加利亚的传播发挥着重要作用。近些年，保加利亚的中国文化自媒体快速发展，逐步兴起的中国文化自媒体也越来越多得到中保两国文化爱好者的关注，也为保加利亚的中国文化爱好者的语言和知识学习及文化体验提供了信息平台。保加利亚的中国文化企业经营者、中国文化爱好者和汉学家等建有许多自媒体网络平台，比如：<http://china.edax.org/>（中国大观园）、<http://mychinesenow.com/>（我的中文）、<http://www.chine-culture.com/bg/>（中国文化）、<https://petkohinov.com/>（吾保国与吾中国）、<https://toest.bg/society/china-inside-out/>（翻译作品节选）、<https://www.taiji-bg.com/>（保加利亚陈小旺国际太极拳协会）、<https://yangfamilytaichi.com/>（杨氏太极）、<https://bg-wushu.com/bg/>（“黑龙”武术和太极拳网）、<https://liwestbg.com/bg/>（中国传统医学）、<http://massage.city-relax.com/>（中医按摩）、<https://www.tarkaleta.com/books>（中国文学作品出版信息）等。

## 2.6. 中国文化在保加利亚的繁荣也极大促进了保加利亚文化在中国的传播发展。

“一带一路”倡议在保加利亚的实施，不仅对中国文化在保加利亚的传播提供了更多动力，也同时促进了保加利亚文化在中国的快速传播。中国开设保加利亚语言文学专业的高校已有4所，还有更多高校将之纳入未来发展规则中；自2019年中保两国关系提升为战略伙伴关系以来，保加利亚文化在中国的传播，除传统高等教育机构外，也已经走进了中国的中小学校。保加利亚的文化产品宣传推介和特色文化活动的组织已经遍布中国的多个省份和城市，保加利

亚已经成为中国民众关注和向往的文化旅游目的地。

总之,随着“一带一路”倡议在保加利亚的实施,更多中方机构主动走进保加利亚,已逐步形成稳定多元的中国文化传播载体和平台,保加利亚民众了解中国文化的渠道日益多样,中国文化在保加利亚的传播更加广泛和深入。中国文化在保加利亚的繁荣发展也大大促进了保加利亚文化在中国的传播,中保两国政府和民间文化交往双活跃,彼此文化品牌意识强,交流形式多样、人员广泛、内容丰富。中保两国文化交流的繁荣发展也必将给两国其他领域的交流合作带来新的机遇和发展空间。

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## Technique Adoption and Artistic Adaption: Silk Weavings of the Khitan Liao (907–1125)

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### Abstract

This paper aims to cast an insight into the unique craftsmanship of silk weavings of the Khitan Liao dynasty (907–1125) and to discuss the cultural interactions between the Khitan and the Han-Chinese as reflected on these textiles. The main focus is laid on selected silk textiles excavated from famous Liao tombs in present Inner Mongolia and Liaoning. A comprehensive analysis of the materials and the weaving techniques is made, with particular attention to specific motifs and patterns. In addition, historical records are extensively consulted to establish a link between written sources and tangible artifacts. Through an analysis of the weaving techniques and artistic expressions, this paper aims at a more nuanced comprehension of Liao textile craftsmanship and a more grounded understanding of the cultural identity of the Khitan..

**Keywords:** silk, Khitan Liao, weaving techniques, artistic expression

The Khitan (Qidan 契丹) began to rise in the beginning of the ninth century and were active with their Liao 遼 dynasty (907–1125) and Qara-Khitai khanate (1124–1218) in north China and Inner Asia between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. For more than two centuries, the Khitan Liao had dominated the large region from Central Asia to Manchuria, posing immense threats to the native Chinese Song 宋 dynasty (960–1276) in the south. More insights into this dynasty have been provided by the spectacular archaeological finds from the former Liao territory in the past three decades, in particular the large number of silk textiles unearthed from recently excavated Liao tombs (Standen 1997: 75–7; Kuhn 2006: 25–7).

Until the Liao perished in 1125 at the hands of the Jurchen from Manchuria, the Khitan engaged actively in trade with its neighbors and built a commercial network that extended across Asia. Trade with the Song in the south was conducted primarily through markets along the borders to the Song, while the Liao River also connected the Khitan to the main ports of China's coast. While horses from the Liao were especially valued in the Song, the Liao imported from the south silk, tea, ginger, and medicines among other products. The economy of trade in the Liao was also enriched by tribute goods from the

Uighur, Mongol, Korean, and Jurchen.<sup>1</sup> The special role the Khitan played in the commercial network of Eurasia is shown through the fact that the European name for China, “Cathay,” and the Russian, “Kitai”, reflect the direct contact of these societies with the Khitan peoples – but not the Chinese (Hansen 2011: 34).

To the Chinese, silk has fulfilled a wide range of artistic, social, economic, and political roles in the Chinese civilization for many thousands of years. During the Song dynasty, silk weaving designs and technologies reached another height of perfection in China’s history and silk played a significant role in not only Song’s domestic economy but also the mainstream of its external relations.<sup>2</sup> In early nomadic cultures, fine textiles in silk probably ranked close to gold as treasurable objects. Whereas gold could be worked “locally”, silk could only be acquired by trade – or by other more forceful means, because the bitter-cold climate on the steppe made the cultivation of mulberry trees and the raising of silk worms impossible. However, after conquering part of north China where there was a tradition of sericulture and fine weaving, the Khitan were able to command their own production of silks. An imperial workshop for silk, filled with Chinese weavers from the south, was established in the Liao Supreme Capital (Tuotuo 1974: 441; Wittfogel / Feng 1949: 116-7). Yet, even if the fabrics were designed and woven to suit the Khitan’s own sartorial and aesthetic requirements, the woven patterns and embroidery techniques were overwhelmingly determined by the traditions carried by Chinese craftsmen. This paper endeavors to explore the unique craftsmanship of Liao silks and to cast an insight into the cultural interactions between the Khitan and Chinese as reflected on these textiles.

### Liao Silk Textiles Excavated from Liao Tombs


Because of the paucity of extant historical records, the material culture of the Khitan serves a particularly vital function in enriching our understanding and appreciation of their past. In my effort to explore the technique and cultural characteristics of Liao silks, the main focus is paid to selected silk textiles excavated from eminent Liao tombs. Although not many Liao dynasty textiles have so far been discovered from archaeologically secured sites, some do catch the attention of art historians and archaeologists. The most famous and most researched ones were found in the tomb of Yelü Yuzhi 耶律羽之 (d. 941) near Chifeng, the tomb of an unidentified noble couple at Daiqintala sumu 代欽塔拉蘇木, the tomb of an unknown woman at Tuerjishan 吐爾基山, and the tomb of Princess Chenguo 陳國公主 (d. 1018) and her husband at Qinglongshan 青龍山, all located in Inner Mongolia; and the tomb of an unidentified woman in Yemaotai 葉茂臺, Liaoning province.<sup>3</sup> Textiles were either worn by tomb owners or placed as burial items inside the tomb. Substantial parts of these textiles are preserved in the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Re-

<sup>1</sup> See Shiba 1983: 97–8 for a profound study of the commercial activities of the Khitan Liao.

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed study of silk production in China under the Song, see Kuhn 1981.

<sup>3</sup> On these tombs, see Gai 2004; Zhao 2002; Neimenggu wenwu kaogu yanjiusuo 2004; Neimenggu wenwu kaogu yanjiusuo 1993; Liaoning sheng bowuguan 1975, respectively.

gion Museum (Hohhot), the China National Silk Museum (Hangzhou), the Metropolitan Museum of Art (New York), the Cleveland Museum of Art (Cleveland), and the Abegg-Stiftung (Switzerland) (Fig. 1).



**Fig. 1.** North China in the year of 1111. Capitals of Liao: 1: Supreme Capital, 2: Eastern Capital, 3: Middle Capital, 4: Southern Capital, 5: Western Capital. Capital of Northern Song: 6: Bianjing (Kaifeng). Important Liao excavation sites: A: Alike'erqin Banner (Yelü Yuzhi), B: Daiqintala sumu, Keyou Central Banner, C: Qinglongshan, Naiman Banner (Princess Chenguo), D: Yemaotai, Faku County, E: Tuerjishan, Kezuo Rear Banner.

### *Headwear*


To the Khitan, headwear was of great importance for their daily life. Various examples of hats worn by the Khitan were depicted on the murals in the Liao tombs.<sup>4</sup> Although only a small number of Liao silk headdresses have been found during archaeological excavations, these findings can offer much information on their material, shape, and style. A well preserved wadded silk tapestry hat with woven gold threads and a pattern called *makara* was discovered in 1992 in the Liao tomb at Daiqintala (Zhao / Yu 2011: 43–4; Kuhn 2012: 289) (Fig. 2). Shaped like a helmet, this hat has a round top, which covers the forehead and nape, and ear flaps that protect the wearer from cold weather. Four strips made of yellow silk gauze and brown complex gauze are attached to the sides and earflaps so as to bind the hat firmly. A *makara*, a mythical beast of Indian origin with a dragon's head, falcon's wing, and fish tail that later became known as a flying "sea beast" (*haishou*, 海獸), accounts for the main motif of the hat. Indeed, this "sea beast" was not a Khitan creation but was already a common motif for decoration, often together with grapes, during the Tang dynasty. Such patterns are already popular decorative elements of Tang gold-gilded silver plates. Similar patterns are also to be found in many Liao metal objects, for instance the well-preserved silver plate unearthed from the tomb of Yelü Yuzhi (Zhang 2011: 89).

<sup>4</sup> Several winter caps were illustrated in detail on the corridor walls of the Liao tomb at Kulun, see Wang / Chen 1989: 22–3; Zhao 2004: 220, fig. 278.



**Fig. 2.** Wadded silk tapestry hat with silk makara pattern and lotus woven with gold threads. Liao dynasty, ca. 938–946. H. 30 cm, w. 27 cm. Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region Museum.

Another precious silk hat is to be found in the collection of the China National Silk Museum (Zhao / Yu 2011: 44) (Fig. 3). This hat, its front surface made of damask with a gold floral design, has two damask tapes which start at the ear flaps and are seamed with five colored tassels on each end. When the flaps are turned up, the tapes are sewn onto the top and allowed to hang down naturally. Purple damask makes up its exterior side, while yellow complex gauze is used on the interior. Gold leaf and ink design are to be found on the purple damask on the left, right, front, back, and top. Gold leaf borders with painted cloud surround the brim. Quite similar to the case of the “sea beast,” gold leaves as motifs for silk weavings started to be produced in the latter half of the Tang, and flourished in the Liao.



**Fig. 3.** Padded hat with purple damask, tabby, yellow complex gauze, and gold leaf. H. 18 cm (flaps up) or 28 cm (flaps down), w. 30 cm. Late Liao dynasty. China National Silk Museum, donation from the Mengdiexuan Collection.

### *Robes*

In an elaborately carved stone coffin in the tomb at Yemaotai, the female occupant wore more than ten silk garments, and her shroud of gold and silk tapestry weave is one of the finest textiles surviving from the tenth century (Vainker 2004: 116–7) (Fig. 4). The robe is composed of several layers of silk tabby (*juan* 絹) and gauze (*luo* 羅). Lined with yellow gauze, the dark yellow ground is woven in gold thread with phoenixes and flaming pearl amidst mountains, water, and sea creatures. Its cut is comparable to that of Chinese robes, while the style of the decoration is characteristic of the Liao. The robe was originally embroidered with several phoenixes, though only one complete pair survived the severe damage. This pair on the back of the garment is embroidered in silk floss and gold thread, while the gold was applied to an animal derived material rather than to paper as it commonly was in the Chinese tradition. The phoenix, together with a dragon, was a common motif already in ornaments of the Tang dynasty, yet this more fluid version is a typical Liao adaption.



**Fig. 4.** Woman's robe embroidery (with detail of pair of phoenixes), silk and gold thread on silk gauze ground. Liao dynasty, probably 11<sup>th</sup> century. Overall h. 130 cm, w. 170 cm.  
The Cleveland Museum of Art.

Apart from motifs of dragons and phoenixes, floral depictions are also popular as decorations for Khitan robes. In the outer layer of a robe made of complex gauze with a lozenge pattern, restored by and preserved in the Abegg-Stiftung in Switzerland, there are vertically aligned peony motifs (Schorta 2007: 169, 171). The three-dimensional embroidery of the peony-branch is remarkable: the leaves overlap in different shades of green and are portrayed both from above and from the side (Fig. 5). The buds are arranged in

various positions so that depth is created, in particular by placing one bud in front of the blossom. Depictions of individual and botanically accurate flower sprigs are omnipresent in several murals in Liao tombs, for instance in the tombs no. 3, 7, and 10 at Xiabali near Xuanhua, Hebei province.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, the images from the flower-and-bird genre known to the Khitan must have influenced the designer or weaver of this embroidery. In Chinese tradition, the peony is regarded as the queen amongst flowers and represents good fortune and fame. At the same time, the peony motif has strong female connotations and was thus a favorite subject in Chinese painting throughout history (Cahill 1960: 166; Laing 2003: 42–5, 51–4). Their popularity as ornament grew as the connoisseurship of flowers began to flourish over the course of the eleventh century. Ronald Egan has recently elucidated the pioneering role of Ouyang Xiu’s 歐陽修 (1007–1072) 1030s *Luoyang mudan ji* 洛陽牡丹記 (“Account of the Tree Peonies of Luoyang”) for this new attitude toward peonies, pointing out the enthusiasts’ demand for ever more amazing peony varieties during the Song (Egan 2006: 109–61). Apparently, the passion for peony also crossed the border and was popular among the Khitan as well. Presumably, the owner of this robe was probably an aristocratic Khitan woman, possibly related to the Liao imperial clan or the consort clan, although we do not know where this robe came from, nor is there further information about this robe available.



**Fig. 5.** Red gauze robe embroidered with peonies (with detail of a peony). Liao dynasty, mid to end 11<sup>th</sup> century. H. 149 cm, overall w. 239 cm, w. at lower edge: 131.5 cm. Abegg-Stiftung.

It is also interesting to observe that the Chinese knot-button preserved at the end of the left collar band no longer has a counterpart on the right side, but there are a few

<sup>5</sup> For detailed visual materials, see Hebei sheng wenwu yanjiu suo 2001, vol. 2, pl. 42 (tomb no. 3), pls. 21, 30, 31 (tomb no. 7), pl. 10–11 (tomb no. 10).

stitches that might indicate the original position of the knot-button. Another noteworthy and important issue is the direction in which the front of the robe overlaps. Conventional views of historians believe that non-Chinese peoples in the north wore robes with the front overlapping to the left (*zuoren* 左衽) and this has been considered as a characteristic of Liao clothing, known as the Khitan-style dress (Zhao 2004: 75). Among the Song elite, the Confucian dress code of fastening the robe to the right seems to have been followed rather carefully, likely as a conscious intention to emphasize Song cultural boundaries. In addition, the Liao once issued explicit reference to the fastening style, ordering that not only the emperor (Khitan) but also all high officials, including the Han-Chinese ones, were to wear martially accessorized, dark-green robes that closed to the left (Tuotuo 1974: 907). Two robes excavated from the Liao tomb at Daiqintala support this historical record as they both have front openings that overlap to the left (Gremli 2007: 25–7). While the Daiqintala tomb can be dated from the early tenth century, many robes excavated from and depicted on the murals in tombs of the latter half of the Liao and toward the latter half of the Liao dynasty have front opening to the right. It is not impossible that rules for wearing Khitan-style dress became increasingly relaxed.<sup>6</sup> This may explain the robe's front overlap toward the right, which accords with Chinese custom.

### **Boots**


Boots were practical and necessary footwear for the nomadic Khitan. They provided warmth and protected their wearers not only from the coldness but also from chafing when riding. Judging from extant mural paintings, boots of the Liao dynasty were mostly in black and white, made of leather.<sup>7</sup> Although only a very small number of Liao leather boots have been found, many soft boots made of woven textiles, on the other hand, have been discovered by archaeologists. Some well-preserved Liao silk boots can be seen in the collections of Chinese, European, and American Museums, such as the boots with phoenixes and geese in the collection of the Cleveland Museum of Art (Watt / Wardwell 1997: 87, 89) (Fig. 6). The tapestry from which these boots were made is exceedingly fine woven, using silk yarns of subtly varied densities and the “incised silk” (*kesi* 緯絲 or 刻絲), a particular kind of exquisite silk-and-gold weaving (Watt / Wardwell 1997: 59–60). *Kesi* silk tapestries were probably introduced from Central Asia into China and were first woven during the seventh or eighth century.<sup>8</sup> The silk wefts of *kesi* produced in the Liao are famous for their extraordinary fineness, ranging from about 60 to 240 per centimeter. Gold thread was used, sometimes extravagantly, and eccentric weaving was used sparingly,

<sup>6</sup> A typical Khitan-style dress (*zuoren* 左衽) is a robe made of polychrome warp-faced tabby compound weaves (*jin* 錦) excavated in 1992 from the Liao tomb at Daiqintala sumu, Inner Mongolia. Together with this robe, four robes of various materials are also found in the tomb, all of them have their overlaps toward the left. On these robes, see Qi 2002: 114–23; Kuhn 2012: 273.

<sup>7</sup> See for example the boots of Khitan riders depicted on the corridor walls of the Liao tomb at Kulun (Wang / Chen 1989: 22–3), and the boots of Khitan polo players illustrated on the murals in Liao tomb no. 2 at Pijianggou (Neimenggu Chifengshi Aohanqi bowuguan 1998: pl. 59).

<sup>8</sup> See Cammann 1948 for a profound study of the origin of the *kesi* weavings.

usually along the contours of motifs. The amount of gold used and the close association of the phoenix with the empress evidently demonstrate that these boots were probably intended for female members of the Liao imperial family.



**Fig. 6.** Boots made of “incised silk” embroidered with phoenix (with drawings of “incised silk” designs and their placement). Liao dynasty, mid to late 10<sup>th</sup> century. H. 47.5 cm, w. 30.8 cm. The Cleveland Museum of Art.

From excavated textiles specimens we know that Liao boots were usually seamed, mostly with three sections: front, back, plus heels and instep (Wang 2002: 41–2). A pair of gauze boots from the Abegg-Stiftung collection is decorated with rows of staggered waves, worked with strips and gilded paper (Schorta 2007: 261) (Fig. 7). Inside each wave there is a small light blue element, with a dark dot in the middle, and out of the wave a gilt coil emerges. A dragonfish head with wide-open jaws arises from the waves. More dragonfish heads are around the ankle and instep. The surface is made of red gauze embroidered with gilded samite (*zhijin* 織錦), and it has a samite interior, which was probably used to make a thicker inside layer and to give the boots a more defined form. In fact, boots made of samite and gauze account for the majority of found Liao boots.<sup>9</sup> In the case of two pairs of boots made of silver and gold sheets belonging to the Princess Chenguo and her husband, on the other hand, it is quite certain that they were not worn during the lifetime of the royal couple, but were specially produced for the burial (Shen 2006: 104).

<sup>9</sup> For other examples, such as a pair of boots made of gauze, samite, and tabby in the collection of the China National Museum at Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, see Zhao / Yu 2011: 45–6.



**Fig. 7.** Boots made of red gauze with gilded embroidery, soles and trimmings made of yellow samite. Liao dynasty, late 10<sup>th</sup> century. H. 32.5 cm, w. 33 cm. Circumference at upper edge: ca. 58 cm. Abegg-Stiftung.

### Concluding Remarks

For the Chinese Song dynasty, silk had always played a substantial role in both its domestic economy and external diplomatic relations. After a successful incursion into north China in 1004, the Khitan managed in the beginning of 1005 to force the Song to sign the Treaty of Shanyuan, in which the Chinese agreed to send an annual payment of 100,000 teals of silver and 200,000 bolts of silk north to the Liao.<sup>10</sup> While surviving Song silk is very few today, a relatively large number of weavings are known from its neighboring states, especially from the Liao. Among all extant Liao weavings, most types had been already known in China, with the exceptions of *kesi* and samite, both of which made their first appearance in the seventh century.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, both types had strong Central Asian connections and they eventually became major types of silk weavings in the Liao.

Apart from an analysis of the materials and weaving techniques, special attention of this paper is drawn on specific motifs and patterns on these textiles, in particular with regard to their Chinese origins and Khitan adaptations. Perhaps the stylistic characteristics

<sup>10</sup> Several decades later, the Song were somehow forced to offer a large increase in the annual peace indemnity by 100,000 units of both silver and silk, for the reason that it was under pressure from the Tangut Xi Xia 西夏 (1038–1227) incursions in the northwest and vague threats of impending Liao military action in concert with them. On the Shanyuan Treaty, see Schwarz-Schilling 1959; Wright 2005.

<sup>11</sup> See Cammann 1948; Sheng 1998, for detailed studies of the issue.

in Liao textiles can be traced back to an earlier pastoral nomadic tradition in central and North Asia. At the same time, those silk textiles may have been the products either of local Chinese craftsmen living under the Liao, or of central Chinese workshops that had supplied them as tribute. The above-mentioned examples of silks demonstrate that the Khitan, at least the aristocratic Khitan, could commission silk production designed and embroidered to their own taste. However, even the fabrics were woven to suit the sartorial and decorating specification of the Khitan, most of the patterns and weaving technologies were determined by the traditions carried by Chinese weavers. Although the Liao only occupied a relatively small section of China proper – the region around modern Beijing and north Shanxi, it was a particular region because it maintained continuous contact with Central and north Asia which had for centuries been the source of enrichment of Chinese weaving technologies and art. Therefore, Liao textiles are of special importance in both the history of medieval China and the overall history of Chinese silks as they mirror the multi-ethnic nature of North China and enrich our understanding of China's connections to Central and Western Asia through the Silk Road.

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# China's Cultural Heritage in a Historical Perspective

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## Abstract

The aim of the paper is to show the process of changing the Chinese approach to its own cultural heritage, the appreciation of its value both in itself and as a component of the image of the state, as well as an element of domestic and international politics. In contemporary China, its cultural heritage is a phenomenon of both domestic and international significance. In the internal dimension it is used for strengthening the national identity and patriotic attitudes, while on the international arena it has become a useful tool, applied in moral or symbolic contexts. It may be observed in the process of recovering some Chinese antiques from abroad at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The Chinese heritage policy has been, to some extent, forged by the West. The discussion on own cultural heritage started to emerge in China as a result of Western attitude to the significance of historical objects, as well as after numerous cases of looting Chinese cultural, religious and archaeological sites by foreigners in the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. The Communist Revolution classified cultural heritage sites as remnants of feudalism, and therefore many of them were either neglected or destroyed, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. Nowadays, however, the Communist Party of China has assumed the role of a main defender of the Chinese heritage, trying to recover Chinese historical artefacts from abroad, and protect historical monuments in the country.

**Keywords:** China, Chinese culture, cultural heritage

Chinese approach to its own cultural heritage, the appreciation of its value both in itself and as a component of the image of the state, as well as an element of domestic and international politics, has been changed in the history. This article will present how the imperial collections went from the ownership of the emperor himself and his court to the status of Chinese cultural heritage.

Chinese emperors and their courts had gathered collections of precious items of ritual or religious importance. They had a practical or symbolic meaning in worship and in confirming the mandate of Heaven, such as bronze sacred vessels, jade objects, clothes and headgear. Astrological charts, population registers and other documents, imperial seals were passed down from generation to generation within the dynasty or acquired by force when the dynasty changed. For instance, the collection of Emperor Qianlong (r.

1735–1796) included several hundred seals from the Han dynasty (202 BC–220 CE). Decorative everyday items such as ceramics, porcelain, furniture, and silk were also valuable collections that belonged to the imperial courts.

Some of the emperors began to collect art for its beauty, and some of them got fame as generous patrons of artists. Emperor Wudi (r. 141–87 BC) of the Han dynasty ordered the construction of an art gallery in which he collected portraits of ministers and generals. Also at the courts of later rulers, portraits of officials, scholars and military men were presented. Other paintings featured genre scenes; some of them were meant to be educational, others were simple a display of wealth. The rulers of the Northern Wei Dynasty (386–535) were famous patrons of Buddhist art; they financed Buddhist caves such as Yungang, Longmen, as well as temples and pagodas. In the 4<sup>th</sup> century, calligraphy began to be collected not because of the written content, but because of the beauty of its form. Emperor Sui Yangdi (r. 604–618) of the Sui Dynasty inherited more than 800 scrolls from his father, including calligraphy by Wang Xizhi and Wang Xianzhi, and ordered two towers to be built in Luoyang: one for storing collected books, the other for paintings, calligraphy and other treasures. Unfortunately, after the first emperor of the Tang Dynasty, Gaozu (r. 618–649), took power, the Luoyang collections were lost in transport to the new capital, Chang'an. During the Tang Dynasty (618–907), artists such as Zhang Xuan and Zhou Fang depicted emperors and court ladies in their daily activities, including famous paintings of polo players. Emperor Taizong (r. 626–649) set himself the goal of collecting all the existing scrolls of Wang Xizhi's calligraphy, and wished to be buried with the most perfect of them, "Preface to the Poems Composed at the Orchid Pavilion" (*Lantingji Xu*). Empress Wu Zetian (625-705, reigned as Emperor of Zhou dynasty 690–705) generously financed the creation of Buddhist paintings and sculptures (Shambaugh Elliott, Shambaugh 2005: 9–19).

Emperor Huizong (r. 1101–1125) of the Song dynasty (960–1279) was himself an outstanding calligrapher and painter, specializing in birds and plants. He was also an admirer and patron of artists; as a result, his collection reached over 7,000 scrolls. Although not many of them have survived, the scale can be estimated on the basis of the catalogs of the collection of calligraphy, paintings and bronzes. Huizong also established the Hanlin painting academy (*Hanlin Huayuan*). After the fall of the Northern Song Dynasty, Huizong's ninth son, Emperor Gaozong (r. 1127–1162) of the Southern Song Dynasty, after unsuccessful attempts to find his father's collection, rebuilt a painting academy in the new capital, Lin'an (today Hangzhou), and urged private art collectors to donate their collections as an act of patriotism. Gaozong managed to assemble a collection larger than that of his father. Part of Huizong's collection was taken over by Emperor Zhangzong (r. 1190–1209) of the Jin dynasty, and then by the Yuan dynasty. Nevertheless, most of Haizong's collection has been dispersed and lost (Shambaugh Elliott, Shambaugh 2005: 20–28).

The rulers of the Yuan dynasty (1279–1368) commissioned their own portraits and

expanded the collections inherited and acquired in the Song, Jin and Southern Song dynasties. They generously supported Buddhist art. The Mongolian princess Sengge Ragi (1283–1331), educated in the Confucian spirit, and her brother, Emperor Renzong (r. 1311–1320), collected calligraphy and paintings. The son-in-law of the princess, Emperor Wenzong (r. 1329–1332) also engaged in calligraphy and painting. The portraits of the emperor and his ancestors presenting them as Confucian rulers were part of the legitimacy of their recently acquired power – the intention is clearly seen in the paintings of the first Ming emperor, Hongwu (r. 1368–1398). The emperor was very sensitive to his majesty and suspected mockery, which is why at least a few artists ended their lives in prisons when their works did not satisfy the emperor. In the mid-15<sup>th</sup> century, the court eunuchs took over the role of art specialists, and they selected artists at court and also created their own collections (Shambaugh Elliott, Shambaugh 2005: 28–40). Many artists found employment during the construction of the new imperial headquarters in the Northern Capital – the Forbidden City in early Ming dynasty.

After the Manchus defeated the Ming dynasty and captured the imperial palaces, the art collections initiated by the father of the first Qing emperor were enriched. As in the case of earlier rulers – antiques and works were gifts to and from the emperor. Emperor Kangxi (r. 1661–1722) was bringing artworks from his six Southern inspection tours as gifts from local officials and entrepreneurs (Hearn 1988: 91–97). The Qing emperors were also famous for supporting artists, not only Chinese artists such as Yuan Jiang at the Yongzheng's court (r. 1722–1735), but also occasionally foreigners such as the Jesuit Giuseppe Castiglione at the Qianlong's court. The greatest art collection among all Chinese rulers was gathered by Emperor Qianlong (r. 1711–1799), who spent 64 years after his accession to the throne, and in fact already as a prince, devoted a lot of time, energy and money to expanding his collections until the end of his life. He supported the painting academy, employed artists in his residences. Nevertheless, the emperor himself did not become a sophisticated connoisseur, and many of the exhibits from the Qianlong era are not of the highest quality. Especially in his youth, the emperor had difficulty recognizing valuable works or distinguishing between originals and copies. What is more, imperial collecting ambitions sometimes led to the damage of valuable scrolls by the emperor affixing his seals to them or adding poems and commentaries (Kohara 1988: 56–73).

Apart from the emperors, private persons also collected paintings, calligraphy, bronzes, porcelain and books. Scholars-officials, who received a humanistic education in the spirit of Confucianism, were the intellectual and political elite of ancient China. They were selected mostly on the basis of a meritocratic criterion, and largely replaced ancestral aristocracy. Knowledge of classical literature was more important than practical knowledge of science or even law, and culture (*wen*) was valued higher than the art of war (*wu*). Scholars-officials were familiar with fine arts such as painting, calligraphy, music, poetry, and the art of creating gardens. They not only played musical instruments, created poetry, paintings and calligraphy themselves, but collected works of art; there were

famous collections of thousands of valuable and rare manuscripts in private hands (Zemanek 2007: VI–XII).

The palaces were owned by the members of imperial families, aristocrats and scholars-officials. In ancient China, no regular registers of monuments were kept, but even during the Southern Song Dynasty (1127–1279), the elites had kept lists of historical figures to whom they were related, and even the palaces belonged to them. Imperial lists of objects in their possession to this day serve as references in describing monuments, although they were not as accurate as the list of items carried out in the Forbidden City in 1924. On a local scale, the illustrated list of monuments in Shaanxi Province, “Traces of Guanzhong Victories” (*Guanzhong shengji tu zhi*) from 1776 should be mentioned. The author was Shaanxi Governor, scholar Bi Yuan. In this text, Bi Yuan encouraged the protection of these places by designating borders and buffer zones, fencing them off and delegating personnel to guard them (Lai 2016: 62–63). That was a very early and unique example of awareness of the value of cultural heritage and the necessity of its protection in China.

The first signs of systemic care of cultural heritage and awareness that the protection of it is necessary appeared in the late Qing dynasty. Main reason of that was a growing number of Chinese relics taken abroad. The Chinese Archeological Society estimates that since the Opium Wars more than 10 million Chinese relics were supplied to foreign art collections, particularly in Europe, the United States, Japan, and Southeast Asia. According to UNESCO statistics, over 200 museums in 47 countries have 1.64 million Chinese antiques, while private collections worldwide contain at least ten times more (“How many Chinese”). Indeed, one of the results of foreign presence in China starting from the mid-nineteenth century was looting of cultural, religious and archeological sites mostly by Europeans and Americans. Some Chinese were also selling them their own finds, like oracle bones (Liu 2016: 42) or the treasures from the Buddhist Mogao grottoes in Dunhuang (Liu 2016: 38–40).

The imperial residences also became the subjects of plunder. The most infamous looting and destruction occurred at the Old Summer Palace (*Yuanming Yuan*) during the Second Opium War in 1860. Between 1.5 and 2 million valuable items were either robbed or destroyed there by Anglo-French forces (Hevia 2003: 74–118). This act became a symbol of the humiliation experienced by the Chinese nation from foreigners. The Forbidden City was plundered during the intervention of Eight-Nation Alliance after the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 (Hevia 2003: 195–240). In both cases the humiliation of the emperor and his residence by foreign troops acquired a symbolic meaning as elements of “century of humiliation” (*bainian guochi*) in the Chinese historical narrative. On the other hand, all these events contributed to the creation of both protection of historical objects legislation and state cultural institution building. The first public museum in China was established in 1905 in Nantong, Jiangsu Province (Claypool 2005: 567–604). The most valuable collections were in the Palace Museum in the Forbidden City, opened several years after the fall of the Qing dynasty, in 1925.

As a result of the Xinhai Revolution, on February 9, 1912 the Qing heir, six-year-old Emperor Aisin Gioro Puyi abdicated. It ended the epoch of 268-year rule of the Qing Dynasty and over 21 centuries of the empire in the Middle Kingdom. Nevertheless, former emperor remained in the Forbidden City in Beijing. With the fall of the empire and the establishment of the Republic of China, it became necessary to define the status of imperial palaces, historic collections and tombs of previous rulers. Were the art collections and luxury items in imperial palaces owned by six-year-old Puyi as the heir of collectors or they should belong to the Chinese nation? A nation – what should be mentioned – which in that period of time was emerging as an autonomous entity (Wardęga 2014: 63–87).

The conditions for abdication were defined in the „Articles of Favourable Treatment of the Qing Emperor“ (*Qing shi youdai tiaojian*, 1914), signed on behalf of the minor emperor by the regent, Dowager Empress Longyu. Several points of the agreement briefly referred to the status of the post-Qing dynasty heritage. The former emperor was temporarily allowed to continue to reside in the Forbidden City, pending the preparation of the quarters in the Summer Palace (Yihe Yuan). Temples and mausoleums of the imperial family were to be kept forever with proper sacrificial rituals. The Republic of China has also assumed the responsibility of providing guards to protect them adequately. The private property of the emperor was to be protected by the Republic of China, but the rules of ownership were not specified, although from the emperor’s point of view this property was in his private disposal. This was indicated by the joint expedition of representatives of the republican government and the administration of the imperial court to four imperial residences – in Mukden, Rehe (Chengde) and two in Beiping (Beijing) – in 1914 to collect over 70,000 valuable items. It was stated that these items, with the exception of private ones, were to be purchased from the emperor by the government at a price reflecting their real value. There was no evidence that the payment had actually been made, so they had borrowed status from the imperial family and were eventually confiscated (Johnston 2008: 289–293).

Before the actual Palace Museum was established, the Ministry of Public Affairs organized in November 1914 in the southern part of the Forbidden City the first public exhibition of items from the imperial palaces. The exhibitions included imperial collections from different imperial residences, incl. bronzes, jade ornaments, porcelain, everyday items of the emperor and his court, calligraphies, paintings and embroidery. Presenting items previously owned by the Son of Heaven and opening up a part of the Forbidden City, which had been closed for half a millennium, was a revolutionary change. The exhibition was quite modest, and tickets were extremely expensive (about 1/3 of the average Beijing resident’s salary). Therefore, the exhibition was visited only by representatives of the elite, officials and foreigners, and it became more accessible to wider society in 1916, when discounted tickets were introduced (“The Transition from Palace to Museum”).

It soon turned out that valuable items in the Forbidden City were insufficiently secured against theft. Part of the collection was stolen by members of the imperial court,

who sold the items taken out in order to make up for the budget deficit. Others were stolen by corrupt eunuchs who, in order to cover up the scale of the theft, in 1923 set fire to the Palace of Universal Happiness (Xianfu Gong), which contained emperor Qianlong's favorite valuables. According to the inventories, there were 6643 valuable antiques in the palace: golden Buddha statues, paintings, manuscripts, porcelain, bronzes and robes. After the fire was extinguished, only 387 items survived. The eunuchs and officials who were expelled from the city as a punishment by the emperor reportedly founded antique shops (Shambaugh Elliott, Shambaugh 2005: 61–63).

The discussion about the imperial monuments flared up again when Puyi left the Forbidden City. In May 1924, Qing's loyalist and scholar Wang Guowei asked former emperor, who still lived in the Forbidden City, to set up a museum in a part of the palace, in order to secure imperial property in politically uncertain times (Yuan, Liu 1996: 416–417). The emperor refused. In October 1924, after general Feng Yuxiang entered Beijing, the 1912 agreement was revised; as a result, the emperor was forced to move out of the palace. As for the protection of property, in the document a division was made between private imperial property, protected by the authorities, and public property, which was to belong to the republic. In practice, the former emperor could officially only take a small amount of valuable items, such as clothes, personal belongings and memorabilia. Nevertheless, the number of artefacts previously secretly removed and removed from the Forbidden City at the emperor's order was considerable: thousands of items in more than 70 boxes were stored in the Japanese district of Tianjin in case of escape ("The Transition from Palace to Museum").

In 1924, the University's Archaeological Society issued a "Manifesto for the Preservation of the Ancient Site at Dagongshan" (*Baocun Dagongshan guji xuanyan*), in which it condemned the imperial family for disposing of property that should belong to the entire nation – it was about destroying the Dajue temple in the suburbs of Beijing. The manifesto called on the national government to stop the destructive actions of the former emperor Puyi. On the other hand, there were Qing loyalists such as Wang Guowei and Luo Zhenyu, who supported the imperial right to the private disposal of property, including art and antiquity collections, accumulated for generations (Lai 2016: 47–48). They opposed the seizure and display of imperial collections in exhibitions open to the general public. Wang Guowei, in correspondence with scholars from the Peking University, argued that although the protection of ancient objects is important, it cannot contradict the emperor's property, resulting from law and morality (Yuan, Liu 1996: 433).

Shortly after the former emperor and his court left the palace, the liquidation commission started to secure the residence and inventory the palace treasures. It was headed by Li Yuying, a leading art historian, and involved representatives of the national government and the imperial court, as well as many scholars from Peking University and students. The main task of the commission was to assess which antiques belonged to the state, and which everyday objects could be treated as private property of the former em-

peror. The result of almost a year of work were 28 volumes of catalog, listing 1.17 million objects (“The Transition from Palace to Museum”). Even though in the inventory works there were mistakes, such as recognizing copies of calligraphy and paintings as originals, incorrect dating or attributing authorship, that was a necessary step towards the opening of the Palace Museum.

The Palace Museum in the Forbidden City (*Gugong Gongli Bowuguan*) was officially opened on October 10, 1925, which was the National Day of the Republic of China. The museum had the term “public” (*gongli*) in its name and the ticket cost only 1 yuan. The establishment of the museum and the renovation of the buildings were possible thanks to the efforts and donations of Chinese and foreign sponsors (“The Transition from Palace to Museum”).

The fate of antiques taken by Puyi to a house offered to him by the Japanese in Tianjin was quite interesting. In 1932 he moved to Manchuria to become a puppet head of the Japanese-created state of Manchukuo (*Manzhuoguo*). After the Japanese surrender in 1945, he prepared to flee the communist army, taking only the most valuable jewels and the most important imperial seal. All the other items taken from the Forbidden City were left behind, and looted by his former soldiers. Elements of this so-called The Northeast collection (*Dongbei Huo*) returned to the Forbidden City only in the 1960s (Shambaugh Elliott, Shambaugh 2005: 90–92).

During the Second Sino-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War many museums suffered, and only 18 of 37 major museums in China survived until the end of the war. It is estimated that three-quarters of university museums and libraries were destroyed (Liu 2016: 35). The most valuable items from the Forbidden City were evacuated to areas beyond the reach of the Japanese troops. After the war most of the collections from the Forbidden City returned to Beijing, but some valuable collections in the end of the civil war were transported to Taiwan with Guomindang army (Shambaugh Elliott, Shambaugh 2005: 88–92). Nowadays one of the richest collections of Chinese art in the world is owned by the National Palace Museum in Taipei (*Guoli Gugong Bowuguan*).

In the continental China during the Maoist rule museum collections were not entirely safe. The Communist Revolution classified many cultural heritage sites as remnants of feudalism, and therefore many of them were either neglected or destroyed. The ideological campaigns that began in the 1950's led to the persecution of, among others, staff of cultural institutions, who were sent for re-education through labor. In the “battle for steel” during the Great Leap Forward (1958–62) even fully functional items were melted, and antique bronze vessels and coins, whether found in the ground, private houses or in museums, were often thrown into the furnaces. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), the Red Guards (*Hongweibing*) struggled with “four olds”: old ideas, old culture, old habits and old customs, and attacked everything and everyone who could be accused of sentiments towards feudalism (Dikötter 2016). Historical objects were deemed unnecessary and harmful, hence destroyed.

The Palace Museum remained safe thanks to the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, who ordered the protection of the most important historical objects. The Palace Museum's collections were secured against the Red Guards, but the museum staff wasn't safe from persecution in political campaigns. As adherents of the old feudal order, they were deprived of their jobs, publicly humiliated, forced to self-criticize at struggle sessions (*douzheng dahui* or *pidou dahui*). Nevertheless, the special importance of this historical object for Chinese domestic and foreign policy even during the Cultural Revolution should be recognized. When in 1971 as part of the so-called "ping-pong diplomacy", a delegation of table tennis players and sports activists from the USA came to Beijing, and the Forbidden City has become one of the places they visited (Boggan 2005). Later on, delegations of foreign heads of states, starting with Richard Nixon, were invited to visit the Forbidden City.

The Forbidden City, turning 600 years in 2020, survived wars, fires, conflicts, periodic neglects, and even attempts to erase it from the map of the new communist capital city. Millions of people visit the Palace Museum every year; in 2019, the last year open to tourists before the COVID-19 pandemic, there were 19 million tourists there, of which as many as 18 million were Chinese ("19 million people"). Foreigners visit the Forbidden City as one of the main tourist attractions in the Middle Kingdom, and for the Chinese it is a key place for pride in Chinese civilization.

In 1987 the Forbidden City was listed at UNESCO World Cultural Heritage List, along with the Great Wall, Mausoleum of the Qin Shi Huangdi in Xi'an, Mogao Caves in Dunhuang, Mount Tai and Peking Man Site at Zhoukoudian. Since then, Beijing is trying to include an increasing number of Chinese historical sites on the World Cultural Heritage List, which can also be interpreted as appreciating cultural heritage. In 2019 China has caught up with Italy, previously the unquestioned leader, having 55 Chinese objects on the list, 17 of them added in the last decade. China also has 42 items on the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, and that is more than any other country.

Chinese historical monuments, although treated as unnecessary remnants of feudalism in the past, are becoming a convenient tool for strengthening national identity. This identity includes elements of pride in the richness of Chinese civilization, but also the memory of the humiliation caused by actions of Western countries, such as in the case of the ruins of Old Summer Palace with the information board stating that "they continued to stay there for over a century, reminding people of the national humiliation". Chinese institutions make efforts to recover Chinese historical artefacts from abroad. This process has intensified in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and some of recovered objects evoke great emotions among Chinese people, e.g. the bronze animal heads of the Chinese zodiac looted from the Old Summer Palace (Kraus 2010: 201–221). Nowadays the Communist Party of China has assumed the role of a defender of the Chinese heritage. Recovering looted artifacts, emphasizing the importance and richness of Chinese culture, and necessity of defending cultural heritage would help to keep the mandate of cultural nationalism and strengthen legitimacy of the political leaders in the eyes of the people.

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## 唐代丝绸之路与中印关系

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### The Silk Route in the Tang Dynasty and Sino-Indian Relations

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#### 摘要:

印度和中国是世界上最古老的两个文明,两国间有着两千多年的漫长交流历史。在中国历史上,唐代被认为是中国发展的黄金时期,这段时期中国经济文化高速发展,国力昌盛,同时统治者实施宽容的对外政策,通过丝绸之路和沿线国家进行双向的贸易交流往来,呈现出“大规模、长距离”交流的鼎盛局面<sup>1</sup>,这段时期同时也是亚洲文明文化和印中友好关系的黄金时期。丝绸之路拉近了两个古老文明的距离,加强了它们之间的经济、文化联系。中印之间进行了大规模的物质和精神交流,奠定了两国友好的基础,中印友好关系在此后的几个世纪中保持不变。本文将简要研究丝绸之路对唐代中印关系的影响及以及两国互通有无的概况。

**关键词:** 丝绸之路, 唐代, 印度——中国, 文化交流

中国和印度地域相临,人文相亲。从秦汉到隋唐、经过宋元至今,中印两国有着两千多年的文化交流史,在漫长的文化交互历程中,两国文化包容互惠,互通有无。鲁迅先生有言,“印度则交通自古,贻我大祥,思想信仰道德艺文,无不蒙赐,虽兄弟眷属,何以加之。”当印度的佛教、音乐、舞蹈、天文、文学、建筑、制糖技艺和一些稀有动植物等传入中国的同时,中国的造纸、蚕丝、瓷器、茶叶、音乐等亦传入印度。经济贸易不仅仅是经济活动,同时也是文化交流。丝绸之路上的商人来自不同国家和地区,相距甚远,因而带有鲜明的地域气息,具有不同的文化风貌,而他们所交换的商品又蕴含着劳动者的智慧,这些生活用品渗透到人们的生活之中,成为一种精神物化产品。因此,这种商品交换不经意间进行了普遍意义上的深层次文化交流。在进行经济贸易往来的过程中,各种文化因素随着这些载体在两个文明古国之间互相碰撞、交融,最后形成新的文化因子留存在各自的文化体系中发光发热,最终内化成为文化的有机组成部分,并推动两国文化的发展,使文化体系更加丰满。比如在历代高僧所翻译的印度佛经中的很多词语在中文中被广泛运用,而一些印度来的物什也被中国文人固化成意向在文学作品中使用;同时,中国历代前往印度游学的高僧大德所撰写的游记更成为印度构建古代历

<sup>1</sup> 贺茹. 唐代丝绸之路中外文化交流研究[D].西北农林科技大学, 2014.

史的十分重要的一手材料。<sup>2</sup>

据中国驻印度大使馆的数据显示,目前印度约有20所大学设有中文课程,8所设有中文专业,在校生中学习汉语专业学生约2000人,印度全国学习汉语人数约2万人。<sup>3</sup>正如历史学者所言:数千年唇齿相依而鲜有战乱,数千载文化相融而鲜有对垒,在世界史上亦是罕见。印度和中国是世界四大文明的主要支柱,两国都为创造有五千年文字历史的人类文明作出了巨大贡献;从目前的研究来看,这个时间将有可能被延长到一万年。两千多年来,中国和印度在经济、文化、政治方面的交流鲜有中断,这两个伟大的文明不仅推动两国彼此文化的发展,同时极大地丰富了全世界的精神文化。

尽管目前由于边界问题和新冠疫情的原因两国之间出现了一些矛盾和龃龉,国际局势也同样风云变化、波谲云诡、百废待兴,但是中国和印度并没有结构性矛盾<sup>4</sup>,同样中国也秉持善意希望能同印度以其合作,携手共同发展,再者鉴于中国和印度都是人口大国,且发展空间巨大,因此本文主要研究唐朝时期丝绸之路对中国和印度关系的影响,希望通过这样的研究从“全球史观”出发,有助于打破“西方中心视野”,帮助之后的研究者从东方学的视角来看待中国和印度的关系,从而更好地为将来中国和印度互相理解做出努力,同时让两国在保持相互尊重、互利互惠的基础上为全亚洲和全世界的发展贡献力量。

从历史和文化的角度来看,唐朝(618年—907年)无疑是中国最强盛、最自信的历史时期之一,这番繁荣强盛的观景,究其原因离不开唐朝统治者对本土与外来文化所持有的“开放包容”政策与态度,丝绸之路是连接东西方文明的重要通道,是唐代社会包容万象、海纳万物精神的重要体现。借由这条通道,唐王朝和西域进行了广泛而深入的交流,不仅唐代文明在世界各地产生了重要影响,唐人也以空前开放的心态和包罗万象的气度接纳了其他民族的文明,丰富和完善了唐代文明。鲁迅先生曾经说过“唐人大有胡气”。由此可见唐代的包容开放程度之高,文化交流、融合的程度之高。<sup>5</sup>

众所周知,中国是世界上最早养蚕织丝的国家,并且是公元六世纪前唯一一个饲养家蚕和织丝的国家,这种唯一性和丝绸轻软细滑的特性使得我国丝绸大受欢迎。据史料记载,丝绸之路开辟以前,我国的丝绸产品已经通过少数民族传到了中亚和印度。《穆天子传》记载,公元前九世纪周穆王游历西域时,曾把内地的铜器、贝币,尤其是丝绢等物赠送给当地的酋长们,受到当地贵族的喜爱。在公元前卷世纪的印度创作文学《摩诃婆罗多》和《罗摩衍那》诗歌中,就有了“支那”的称谓和关于中国丝的记述。公元前140年张骞奉命出使西域,主要目的是联络西域各国,阻止匈奴的势力扩张,以打开河西通道。这一路历经艰难险阻,路经匈奴时被俘,逃脱后西行至大宛,经康居,抵达大月氏,再至大夏,尽管此行没有达到预期的目的,但是客观上却了解了西域各地的风土人情、政治经济情况,促进了丝绸之路的形成,成为中西关系史上的重大事件。史书将这次具有划时代意义的事件成为“凿空之旅”。欧洲史学家狄雅可夫评价说:“其在中国史的重要性,绝不亚于美洲之发现在欧洲史上的重要”。公元前119年,张骞再次出使西域,这次不仅顺利到达西域,而且顺带访问了西域许多地区,而西域各政权也纷纷派使者回汉答谢。从此以后,“自葱岭以西,至于大秦,百国千城,莫不附,胡商贩客,日奔塞下”<sup>4</sup>由于这条通往西域的道路运送的商品主要是丝绸等物品,而被命名为“丝绸之路”。

<sup>2</sup> SHEHZAD Adeel. 唐代中印海上丝绸之路对印度的影响(英文)[J]. 华东师范大学学报(自然科学版), 2020 (S1): 40-43.

<sup>3</sup> 腾讯新闻网 <https://news.qq.com/a/20180428/023881.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> 郭岚. 丝绸之路背景下的唐代胡风文化传播研究[D]. 河北大学, 2016.

<sup>5</sup> 贺茹. 唐代丝绸之路中外文化交流研究[D]. 西北农林科技大学, 2014.

丝绸之路在两汉开通之后,经由魏晋南北朝时期的发展,到了隋唐时期,更是由于政清明、经济繁荣而进入全盛时期。唐代的丝绸之路将长安至咸阳两侧更远的地区纳入这个交通系统之中,故其已经不单单是一条、两条连接中西方的通道,而是枝杈纵横,形成了一个发达的网络交通系统。商贸活动的兴衰与否与道路交通有着密不可分的关系,正是由于唐朝政清经济稳定,国力强盛,才保证了丝路的畅通无阻<sup>6</sup>,史载“是时中国强盛,自安远门(开远门)西尽唐境,凡万二千里,闾阎相望,桑麻翳野,天下称富庶者,无如陇右。”<sup>7</sup>

丝绸之路,是指西汉(202-8年前)张骞使臣西域开辟的陆路通道,从长安(今西安)出发,途经甘肃、新疆,到达中亚、西亚,连接地中海各国(这条公路又称为“西北丝绸之路”,以区别另外两条交通路线以后改名为“丝绸之路”)。其基本方向定于汉代,包括南线、中线、北线三路。丝绸之路是穿越欧亚大陆,促进欧亚非国家与中国友好往来的历史性贸易往来线路。中国是丝绸之乡,丝绸是中国通过这条路线进行的贸易中最具代表性的出口商品。

19世纪下半叶,德国地理学家利希霍芬将这条陆路交通路线称为“丝绸之路”。

南方丝绸之路是历史悠久的路线,从中国到印度,经缅甸再到阿萨姆邦。这条贸易路线长约2000公里,连接中国云南省和印度东北部。这条贸易路线在中亚丝绸之路流行之前就已经存在。这条贸易路线在公元前3世纪为人所知,并在公元前2世纪流行起来。



贸易商贩从中国云南省运送丝绸和其他物品通过缅甸,进入了阿富汗的主要丝绸之路。据中国重要的历史著作《史记》记载,公元前二世纪,张骞被中国派到大夏(今阿富汗)当大使,在那里看到了中国制造(酒泉制造)。他问这些货物是从哪里来的;他们被告知,这些货物是通过南方丝绸之路从印度运来的,那里是中国商人的大市场。显然,在公元前二世纪,印度和中国开始了贸易关系。宗教、艺术、文学、政治、哲学、科学、经济和贸易进行了交流。这一时期,两国之间通过丝绸之路进行的对外贸易十分发达。

古印度—中国从事对外交流活动的人主要有三种,即僧侣、使节和商人。如果说玄奘是唐代僧人舍身求法的典型代表,那么王玄策则是官方使节的杰出代表,在中国唐朝与笈多王朝的交往史上占有重要地位。王玄策是河南洛阳人,公元643年至661年三度出使天竺,为唐朝的对外交往和古代中印关系做出了重要贡献。

王玄策初出使时,路过古印度的利查维国,受到悉拉帝亚王的热情接待。悉拉帝亚王赠予了他榕树,郁金香花和菠菜,这三样东西是从印度传入中国的,其他还有比如菩提树,贝叶树也是从印度传入中国的,这些物中的输入不仅仅丰富了中国的物产资源,也为中国文人的文学创作提供了新的意象<sup>8</sup>。接下来笔者将按照模块,分别叙述中印之间艺术、文化、外交关系、语

<sup>6</sup> 郭岚. 丝绸之路背景下的唐代胡风文化传播研究[D]. 河北大学, 2016.

<sup>7</sup> 司马光:《资治通鉴》[D]. 长长: 吉吉大学出版社, 2015.

<sup>8</sup> 丝路外来植物与唐代文学: 以 11 种代表植物为重心的考察, 李娜.

言等几个方面的互相影响:

印度是世界甘蔗的发源地之一,也是发明蔗糖和红糖加工技术的国家。据《新唐书》221上《西域列传·摩揭陀》所记载:摩揭陀,一曰摩伽陀,本中天竺属国,环五千里,土沃宜稼。有异稻巨粒,号供大人米。王居拘阁揭罗布罗城,或曰俱苏摩补罗,曰波叱厘子城。北濒菟伽河。贞观二十一年(647年)始遣使者自通于天子,献波罗树,树类白杨。太宗遣使取熬糖法,即诏扬州上诸蔗,柞沈如其荆,色味愈西域远甚。<sup>9</sup>

《新唐书》的这一段描述十分有名,影响深远,以至于之后如王灼和洪迈在各自所著的《糖霜谱》中都沿用了这一说法<sup>10</sup>。中国的甘蔗种植始于春秋战国时期。那个时候,甘蔗只是用来榨汁或者直接吃,没有掌握比较精致的制糖技术。汉末,中国开始用甘蔗汁制作甜麦芽,但生产工艺仍十分落后。

唐朝时期,马加德大使抵达中国当时的首都长安(西安),在那里见到了中国皇帝,并向他进贡印度粗糖。中国皇帝唐太宗派使者王玄策到摩揭陀(印度)学习印度粗糖的制作方法。中国使者在学习了粗糖制作工艺技术后从印度归来,并开始指导国内的工匠生产“糖”,它的颜色和味道都比印度粗糖好。后来用甘蔗制糖的技术传到了印度。印度还有一句俗语,“师尚苦涩,徒弟成糖”,寓意学生胜过老师,描述了印度和中国之间用粗糖制作糖的技术交流(下文会提到这个问题),同时印度制造精糖的技术通过丝绸之路传入中国和世界各地。

当然,对于唐太宗派人去印度学习的制糖技术到底是比较初级的砂糖制糖技术还是较为高级的石蜜的制糖技术,季羨林先生经过详细论证之后认为还是难以确定,但是大部分学者都一直认为:唐朝时期,中印在蔗糖加工技术方面的相互学习和交流,在中印文化交流史上是一件大事,有深远的影响,极大地促进了两国制糖业的发展,增进了两国人民的福祉。堪称古代中印科技交流与互利合作的典范。

## 二、艺术:

在艺术方面,印度对中国的影响是多方面的,同时中国对印度的影响也表现在这里。本文难以详细论述,只列举几个比较重要的方面。首先是乐舞方面,中国唐代传入印度的乐舞作品最有名的当数《秦王破阵乐》,玄奘在到达印度东部邦国伽摩缕波国的时候,拘摩罗王问他:“今印度诸国多有歌颂摩诃至那国(指中国)《秦王破阵乐》者,闻之久也,岂大德之乡国邪?”曰:“然。此歌者,美我君之德也。”<sup>11</sup>当时传入中国的印度乐舞很多,其中最具代表性的是苏祇婆之琵琶七调,尽管印度七调是辗转经由龟兹国传入中国的但追溯其根源仍起源于印度,印度七调对中国音乐产生了深远的影响。唐代宫廷十部乐中即有《天竺乐》,此外,唐代的大曲和杂曲中还有《霓裳羽衣曲》、《菩萨蛮》等曲目。这些乐舞作品都与印度有一定关系;<sup>12</sup>其次印度在绘画、雕塑方面同样对中国有很大影响。唐代的山水画受印度“凹凸画法”(就是现在所说的明暗法、透视法,是指由浅入深或由深渐浅地层层赋色,从而形成层次分明的色阶。而色阶的浓淡疏密则使画作呈现出光影、明暗等效果,从而具有立体感和质感。)的影响很大,尤其是自画家吴道子之后,中国山水画就多采用印度犍陀罗艺术中的凹凸画法<sup>13</sup>;壁画同样受

<sup>9</sup> 季羨林. 唐太宗与摩揭陀——唐代印度制糖术传入中国问题[J]. 文献, 1988 (02): 3-21.

<sup>10</sup> 同上.

<sup>11</sup> 赵喜惠. 唐代中外艺术交流研究[D]. 陕西师范大学, 2012.

<sup>12</sup> 同上.

<sup>13</sup> 孙玉娟. 印度佛教对中国唐代人物绘画的影响[J]. 大众文艺(理论), 2009 (11): 118-119.

到这种凹凸画法的影响,至于雕塑,中国的佛像造像深受印度犍陀罗造像艺术的影响,比如唐代敦煌石窟壁画中,女性摆出“S”状曲线,充满了生机感,女性服饰妩媚而开放,这些美丽动人形象的源头都可追溯到印度的药叉女。只不过在进入中国后这些女性雕像的姿态不再那么过激,而具有中国式的典雅。<sup>14</sup>

### 三、外交关系:

#### 大唐玄奘

在印中文化遗产的共同祖先中,玄奘对印中关系的贡献尤为重要,我们可以效仿玄奘大僧的贡献,将印中友好关系推向新的方向。玄奘法师出生在公元7世纪的盛世唐朝,他是中外文化交流的杰出使者,被后世誉为伟大的旅行家、翻译家、哲学家、佛学家、外交家。

玄奘西行取经之路,是险象丛生的丝绸之路,尽管自公元前2世纪张骞就已经开辟了这条路上通道,但是这条取经之路仍然充满艰险,前去西方取经之人可以说是九死一生,玉门关外是一望无际的戈壁,水草皆无,渺无人烟。玄奘法师秉持着超人的意志力克服重重困难向理想中的天竺国进发。到达印度后,玄奘法师孜孜不倦学习梵语和佛教经典,并周印度各国写下重要历史典籍《大唐西域记》,后来由于学术造诣高深,北印度人赋予“解脱天”得称号,最终携带大量重要的佛经资料回到中国并翻译成汉语,可以说大唐玄奘法师是民族精神的脊梁骨,是中印文化交流的杰出代表人物。<sup>15</sup>

公元629年,玄奘西征(印度),历经17年,途经5万里,110多个国家,从印度带回520本和657部佛经。回到长安后,玄奘立即投身于译经工作。20多年后,他翻译了75本书和1335卷佛经。玄奘法师的西行之旅不单单为中国文化发展作出杰出贡献,他的游记——《大唐西域记》对于重现古印度历史十分重要,如果没有玄奘的游记,那烂陀、鹿野苑等大约80处印度佛教圣地至今恐怕还被掩藏在黑暗之中。玄奘法师游记为我们了解有关7世纪上半叶印度生活的社会、政治、经济、宗教和行政方面提供了充足的信息。

#### 义净法师

唐代高僧义净立志西行印度求法佛经,与玄奘齐名。义净(635—713年)。俗姓张,字文明,从小出家,聪明利根,内外典籍无不通达。咸亨二年义净从广州出发,由海路辗转到了印度。经二十五年,历三十余国,于695年回到洛阳。他从印度带回来了梵本经律论近四百部,合五十万颂,金刚座真容一铺,舍利三百粒。武则天亲迎于上东门外,各寺和尚具幡盖歌乐前导,可见欢迎仪式之隆重。同时,和玄奘法师一样,义净法师还撰写了几部有关印度的书,其中以《大唐西域求法高僧传》和《南海寄归内法传》为最重要。这两本书对于后来的学者研究印度历史以及印度佛教史,其意义仅次于玄奘《大唐西域记》,至今被学者视为瑰宝。<sup>16</sup>

### 四、语言影响:

唐朝时期印度地区语言对汉语的主要影响是通过汉译佛经实现的,尽管一直以来有很多

<sup>14</sup> 苏丹. 印度药叉女像对唐代敦煌石窟女性造像的影响[J]. 艺术科技, 2014, 27 (11): 79-80.

<sup>15</sup> 《丝路追梦: 探秘玄奘西行》——时代需要民族脊梁董煜焜中国新闻出版广电报2021年7月14日第 T18 版.

<sup>16</sup> 季羨林. 唐太宗与摩揭陀——唐代印度制糖术传入中国问题 [J]. 文献, 1988 (02): 3-21.

中国学者在研究外来词对汉语的影响,但是鲜少有学者研究印度语言对汉语的影响,由于笔者的主要研究时间范围限定在唐王朝时期,因此可以把范围缩小到汉译佛经中的梵语对汉语的影响。本文主要把这个影响分为两方面讨论,第一方面是印度语言对汉语发音的影响,第二方面是对汉言词汇的影响:

### 1、发音影响:

中国古代并没有字母。汉语并非拼音文字,这就导致古代中国僧人尝试翻译佛经的时候(尤其是遇到音译一些专有名词的时候)不可避免的会遇到一些语音转换上的困难,因此古人专门对汉语的发音进行了规范和整理。沈括说“切韵之学,本出于西域。”他又说:“音韵之学,自沈约为四声,及天竺梵学入中国,其术渐密。”到了清代,王鸣盛和钱大昕也都谈到这个问题,尽管态度不十分明朗,但总之承认中国的切韵学是受到印度影响。<sup>17</sup>

### 2、词汇影响:

佛教最初在东汉时期传入中国,和本土的道教、儒家思想共存、融合并进一步发展,对中国的社会、文化、政治制度等产生了较大影响。而在佛经汉译的过程中,有很多印度外来词被译作汉语并不断地发生着变化,这些变化发生在读音、词义、构词方式和感情色彩等方面。这些印度外来词在使用过程中,通过同反义联合、偏正式造词、动宾式造词和不同语素联合等方式<sup>18</sup>被逐渐汉化,含义也被扩展,最终成为汉语言词汇中重要的一部分。

唐朝时期,以玄奘法师为首的高僧大德所组织的大规模的佛经翻译对现有汉语构成产生了深刻的影响。按统计,当时汉语里大概有三万多条词汇是印度不同古语言的外来词。而有印度的汉语学者统计了一下近人丁福保所编《佛学大辞典》发现其亦收有佛教语词近三万条,这些佛教用语是汉晋至唐朝八百年间诸师所造,而后并入中国的汉语词汇系统中,并在漫长的使用过程中逐渐演变为汉语中的新成分,这些外来词汇极大地丰富了汉语体系,拓展、加深了汉语表达能力的深度和广度,促进了汉语的发展,同时,语言是思想文化的重要载体,这些新增的汉语词汇也推动了汉语言文学和哲学的发展,由此可见,印度梵语词汇在很大程度上影响了汉语以及中华文化的发展。

尽管随着时代变化过程中,由于生活环境的变化,有很多和宗教高度相关的词汇便很少在人们的日常生活语境中出现,但根据印度学者冠俊杰的调查研究<sup>19</sup>,我们仍然能够在现代汉语中找到梵语的影子,比如在现代汉语中使用率很高的如平等、方便、地狱、世界、魔、因果、缘分、菩提、佛、菩萨等词汇,其中有一些是从梵语音译而来的,有一些则是高僧大德在翻译佛经的过程中根据含义新造出来的词汇,这些词会有很多已经非常好地融入到汉语体系中,以至于很难将它们分辨出来。

由此我们可以得出结论,唐朝时期中国和印度地区经由丝绸之路传播到中原地区的佛教不仅仅丰富了中国的哲学思想文化,同时大型的佛经汉译活动也丰富了汉语词汇,对汉语以及汉语言文学产生了源远流长的影响。

<sup>17</sup> 同上。

<sup>18</sup> 冠秀杰. 汉语中源于印度外来词研究[D]. 沈阳师范大学, 2014.

<sup>19</sup> 同上。

## 五、文学影响：

正如笔者上文所提到的，唐王朝统治者采取的宽容的统治措施是各种思想文化得以在中原地区迅速传播、彼此碰撞并产生新的文化因素，推动中国文学快速发展。唐代的中国文学最突出的成就是诗歌和志怪小说，志怪小说始于六朝，在唐代有比较大的发展。唐代印度佛教的大规模引入和迅速发展为佛经文学的传播奠定了基础，而唐王朝统治者宽容的执政措施和开放的社会环境则为佛经和佛教故事的传播提供了广阔的社会空间（比如武则天本人就信奉佛教，并在国内大力推崇佛教）。民俗佛教承担了唐代佛教社会性发展的主体，不仅有力地推进了外来宗教与中土传统文化的融合，也成为经典阅读之外，佛经传播的主要途径。民俗佛教通过各种组织形式，以及宗教节日、法会等一系列仪式行为极大地推动了佛经的传播。<sup>20</sup>带有异域色彩的佛教故事在民间广为传播，这些新奇的故事为小说写作者们提供了大量的素材。同时唐代佛寺世俗文化娱乐功能空前发达，文人骚客游寺、与僧人交往以及习业山林寺院风气盛行，佛寺作为佛教文化的集中体现和传播载体，为唐代小说创作及小说家接受佛经影响提供了场所。复次，变文讲唱作为在佛教影响下的一种通俗性艺术形式，也极大地促佛经文献也为佛经文学的传播和影响唐代小说作出了贡献。<sup>21</sup>

志怪文学主要是中国古典小说形式之一，以记叙神异鬼怪故事传说为主体内容，产生和流行于魏晋南北朝，在受到印度的佛教、印度教的神话影响后，内容和体系进一步发展，佛经不仅仅具有宗教意义，同时具有文学意义，1921年，梁启超编写了《翻译文学与佛典》，在这本著作中首先使用“佛典翻译文学”的概念，直接赋予了汉译佛经以文学的概念，并分别从“第一，国语实质之扩大”、“第二，语法及文体之变化”、“第三，文学的情趣之发展”这三个方面，论汉译佛经的影响，并断言“我国近代之纯文学—若小说、若歌曲，皆与佛典之翻译文学有密切关系。”<sup>22</sup>在这之后，文学家胡适所著的《白话文学史》特地把汉译佛经视为“翻译文学”来讨论，认为汉译佛经把印度本土的文学文化乃至新的文学形式带入了中国文化，汉译佛经本身在中国文学史上可以说是一种新创的文体，并且这种新文体在中国文学史上产生了深远的影响。在中国文学陷入矫饰造作的时期，在中国散文与韵文都走到骄偶滥套的路上的时候，佛经的翻译者们，竺法护，鸠摩罗什诸位大师用朴实平易的白话文体来翻译佛经，但求言辞畅达了义、不在字词的矫揉上下过多功夫，遂行造成一种文学新体。这种白话文体虽然不曾充分影响当时文人，甚至不曾影响当时的和尚，然而宗教经典的尊严究竟抬高了白话文体的地位，留下无数文学种子在唐以后生根发芽，开花结果。<sup>23</sup>同样，尽管不在本文讨论范围内，但是汉译佛经的这种简单直接的写作方式是之后白话文产生的重要诱因。<sup>24</sup>

唐代汉译佛经对唐传奇小说的影响主要可以归纳为以下几个点：1、观念的影响：鲁迅先生在《中国小说史略》里说：“魏晋以来，渐译释典，天竺故事亦流传世间，文人喜其颖异，于有意或无意中用之，遂蜕化为国有”。<sup>25</sup>唐朝时期佛教的广泛流传使得一些印度特有的宗教理念（比如轮回、解脱、业、因果报应等）在中原地区散播开来，使人们的思想拓展到了前世和来世。这种思想的拓展在文学领域的影响主要表现为唐传奇小说变得更复杂、深刻；2、情节和

<sup>20</sup> 孙鸿亮. 佛经叙事文学与唐代小说研究[D]. 陕西师范大学, 2005.

<sup>21</sup> 同上.

<sup>22</sup> 同上.

<sup>23</sup> 同上.

<sup>24</sup> 张焯. 汉译佛经的语料价值及其对汉语的贡献[J]. 大连民族大学学报, 2018, 20 (04): 358-362.

<sup>25</sup> 鲁迅. 鲁迅全集 (第九卷) [M]. 北京: 人民文学出版社, 1991: 50

人物的演化: 释迦牟尼佛在传播佛教的时候为了使高深复杂的教义更加容易理解, 使用了大量的譬喻故事, 而高僧大德在翻译佛经的时候也将这些譬喻故事译出; 同时, 佛教经典还带有很多其他印度外道的故事 (比如婆罗门教的《摩诃婆罗多》《罗摩衍那》), 而这些故事的模板或人物就被很多传奇作家套用或借用撰写了新的故事, 比如沈既济的《枕中记》<sup>1</sup>, 以及《宣室志》中“韦思玄”的故事;<sup>2</sup>3、文学体裁的影响: 唐传奇除了在思想上和故事来源上大量接受了佛教文学, 在结构方面、体裁方面也给唐传奇以很大的影响。印度文学写作中有一种特别的文学体裁, 既首先使用散文记叙之后, 往往又会用韵文再将三文的含义再重复一遍, 名之为偈, 或者是韵文与散文交替成文。比如初唐张鷟的传奇《游仙窟》是叙述一文人与神女邂逅交接的故事, 这个故事虽然思想上没有创新之处, 但是叙事的技巧上可以看出汉译佛经的影响。<sup>3</sup>

### 结语:

中国和印度在唐朝有千丝万缕的交流和联系, 仅靠这一篇文章的篇幅实在难以全面叙述, 笔者在文章中主要着墨于文化类的交流, 对科技、动植物方面的交流来往提及不多, 但这并不代表唐代中国和印度的交流仅限于此, 比如琉璃最早就来源于印度, 而钢铁则很有可能是由中国传入印度的<sup>4</sup> (钢铁在梵语中写作Chinaj, 从词源学的角度看, 这个词很可能说明了钢铁是来源于中国的), 由此可见, 在唐朝那个交通不算十分便利的时代时, 中国和印度地区的交往是多么的频繁, 程度是多么深, 影响是多么广泛。

在中国和印度交流交往、互相认识的过程中, 丝绸之路发挥了不可取代的、极其重要的作用。了解学习和研究这段历史有助于我们更加清楚并直接地认识到中国和印度的关系, 有助于我们发现自己文化中被内化的、隐藏的那些实际上是来源于对方的文化因素, 从而增进相互之间的理解, 让中国和印度未来携手并进, 互信互敬, 共同发展。

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<sup>1</sup> 霍世休. 唐代传奇文与印度故事[J]. 中国比较文学, 1985 (01): 130-161+404.

<sup>2</sup> 海力波. “金液”与“苏摩”——唐代志怪中的印度-伊朗文明元素[J]. 民族艺术, 2020 (01): 23-32.

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<sup>4</sup> 季羨林. 唐太宗与摩揭陀——唐代印度制糖术传入中国问题[J]. 文献, 1988 (02): 3-21.

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# Typological Characteristics of Prehistoric Burials in Xinjiang

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## Abstract

The burial practices of ancient societies flourishing on the territory of Xinjiang during the prehistoric era reveal abundant information about the material culture, social organization, ecological environment and beliefs of the first inhabitants of these inhospitable lands. The earliest burials discovered so far date back to Eneolithic times, but the Bronze Age displays to the fullest extent the elaborate culture of the first Indo-Europeans, as well as their interrelations with other nomadic and oasis societies at a very early stage of human history. By adducing contemporary data from archeological and scientific research, this article provides an overview of the geographical and temporal distribution of prehistoric burials on the territory of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, briefly introduces some of their typological features and discusses other related issues.

**Keywords:** Xinjiang, burials, Eneolithic, Bronze Age, Gumugou, Xiaohe, stone stelae, burial masks, wooden sculptures, kurgan, Ephedra

## Preface

The archaeologically rich region of Xinjiang, which has preserved in its depths valuable information about the interactions between ancient ethnicities and cultures, has attracted the attention of an increasing number of scientists over the past few decades, who recognised its important role in restoring the early historical picture of Eurasia. The studies of the material and spiritual culture of prehistoric Xinjiang are predominantly based on field and archeological research of burials, which accounts for a certain imbalance in the number of excavated and explored settlements of this period. It is generally accepted that around the end of the third millennium BC the regions of north-west China successively entered the Bronze Age and 1000 BC marks the beginning of the early Iron Age. Reliable historical information about these remote lands appears in ancient Chinese chronicles towards the beginning of the Western Han Dynasty (206–23 BC), that is why the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC represents the time boundary which divides Xinjiang's history into two major periods – prehistoric and historical.

The early 20<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the first extensive explorations of this vast region, which were undertaken by Russian, German and Japanese expeditions as well as foreign

pioneering archaeologists. They were able to discover, record and excavate many prehistoric and historical sites in Chinese Turkestan, although at that time their knowledge of the cultural context of the finds was quite limited. Through systematic research work conducted between the 1950–1980s, the Chinese archaeologists identified hundreds of prehistoric burials, mainly located in the Turpan Basin (吐鲁番盆地) and the Ili River Valley (伊犁河盆地), especially during the large-scale excavations of the Astana cemetery (阿斯塔那墓地) and Halahezhuo cemetery (哈拉和卓墓地), when more than 400 graves were excavated, containing thousands of written documents, carvings, clay sculptures and other valuable artifacts, which revealed important information about the history of the Jin and Tang Dynasties (晋唐朝) (XWZWJ 2011: 1).

In the late 1980s, in the course of large-scale excavations of prehistoric burials located in the valleys of the Tianshan mountain (天山), as well as in the oases at its southern foothills and the northern foothills of the Kunlun Mountain (昆仑山), more than 1000 graves were explored, which further clarified the prehistoric picture of the region and revealed the characteristics of local cultures (XWZWJ 2011: 1). As it entered the 21<sup>st</sup> century, archeology in Xinjiang started to evolve with the pace of the economic growth of the region and was closely linked to the large-scale construction activities in it. As a result of targeted research work and rescue excavations, thousands of burials have been discovered in the Ili River basin and the Turpan basin, most of them dating from prehistoric times. In the period 2007–2011, within the frame of the “Third National Cultural Relics Survey” (第三次全国文物普查) large-scale explorations of immovable cultural relics in North and South Xinjiang were conducted in accordance with the strict regulations and requirements of China’s National Administration of Cultural Heritage (国家文物局), through which more than 9500 immovable cultural heritage sites were researched and registered, including over 4000 burials (XWZWJ 2011: 1).

### **The earliest burials on the territory of Xinjiang**

Human presence in Xinjiang in the Stone Age is evidenced by numerous finds of lithic artifacts (i.e. chipped stone tools, blades and flakes) discovered during field studies in the region since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>5</sup>. But due to the fact that most of the collected artifacts come from the ground surface, their association with specific cultural layers and the exact dating are very difficult. The archaeological excavations in 2016 of the bronze age site Tongtiandong in Jeminay county in Altay Prefecture (阿勒泰地区吉木乃县通天洞遗址) opened a new important page in Xinjiang’s prehistoric studies, revealing a well-preserved Paleolithic layer (Wang et al. 2017: 128). Within two years of excavations, a total of over 2000 lithic artifacts and animal bone fossils dated to about 45 000 BP have been dis-

<sup>5</sup> Up to 2004, about a hundred Stone-Age sites were surveyed, and in 2004, as a result of the Paleolithic survey, conducted in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region in Northwest China by the Institute of Vertebrate Paleontology and Paleoanthropology (Chinese Academy of Sciences) and the Xinjiang Institute of Cultural Relics and Archaeology, another 24 localities were discovered and more than 500 lithic artifacts were collected (Gao et al. 2004: 500).

covered, 2/3 of them being stone tools demonstrating great typological diversity (Wang et al 2018: 129).

At the time of writing this article the author was not able to find scientific information about burials in Xinjiang which could be attributed to the Stone Age. Three Copper Age graves discovered in 2017 in Nilka county in Ili prefecture (伊犁哈萨克自治州尼勒克县) and two graves from the same period in Hoboksar County in Tacheng Prefecture (塔城地区和布克尔县), collectively dated to around 3000–2700 BC, are considered to be the earliest burials in this region (Wang et al. 2018: 129). The tombs represent a vertical shaft soil pit (竖穴土坑) or a vertical shaft with a side chamber (竖穴偏室墓), covered by a mound constructed of earth, mixture of earth and stones, or just stones. As a rule, the head of the dead is oriented to the west, the legs to the east, and the burial goods comprise stone tools, grindstones and clay pots (Wang et al. 2018: 129). Particularly noteworthy is the fact that in both Eneolithic graves from Hoboskar County, the use of hematite powder has been reported – in one case it was found on the right side of the skull and in the second case it was on the skeleton (Wang et al. 2018: 129). Large amounts of hematite powder next to the feet and on the skeletons of the dead are also reported from an Eneolithic burial in Emin County (额敏县)<sup>6</sup>, dated to 2920–2750 BC, as well as from two Eneolithic graves from the same period in Habahe County (哈巴河县) (Wang et al. 2018: 129; XWKYS 2017: 19–39). Some Chinese scholars accept the ritual use of red ochre in these funerals as reliable evidence for connections with the burial practices of the Andronovo culture (Li 2018), but we cannot neglect the fact that various quantities, modes and shades of red ochre and hematite pieces have been massively discovered in Paleolithic and Mesolithic burials not only across all parts of Europe, but also in Asia, Africa and Australia, their quantity and distribution depending on age, gender, social status of the deceased, circumstances of death and other factors (Grunberg 2015: 254, 262). Besides that, the tomb owners of the Eneolithic graves in Habahe County are of Europoid physical type and the genetic analysis reveals that they probably came from western Eurasia (Li 2018).

### **Some features of the Bronze Age burials in Xinjiang**

Although the discovery of the above described burials fills to a certain extent the information gap regarding the Eneolithic cultures in Xinjiang, the knowledge they provide is still far from sufficient for the reconstruction of the overall appearance of these cultures, their distribution, continuity and relationship with other parts of the Eurasian continent. At the end of the third millennium BC, Xinjiang entered the early Bronze Age, which lasted until the first half of the second millennium BC. Research of burials from this period<sup>7</sup> reveals very strong local characteristics and on their basis several cultures such as Linya

<sup>6</sup> Situated in the northwestern periphery of the Dzungar Basin.

<sup>7</sup> Regarding the different spatial-temporal frameworks and cultural categories applied to the organization of the Bronze Age and Iron Age relics in Xinjiang, as well as some related issues, see: Festa 2017.

(林雅文化), Xiaohe (小河文化) and Qiemuerqieke (切木尔切克) are distinguished, which are believed to have been strongly influenced by cultures outside Xinjiang (Long 2018: 108; Wei & Betts 2010: 279, 284).

In the Hami Valley (哈密盆地), the Lopnor (罗布泊) and Altai (阿尔泰) regions, relatively large burials dating from the early Bronze Age have been discovered, usually interpreted as public cemeteries of certain clans or tribes<sup>8</sup>. Large necropolises from the late Bronze Age, which lasted until the beginning of the first millennium BC, have been found in the areas north and south of Tianshan, containing hundreds of densely arranged burials whose structure and overall location reveal an even more elaborate tribal or clan organization. The Yanghai Cemetery in Turfan (吐鲁番洋海墓地) and the Chawuhugou cemetery in Hejing County (和静县察吾呼沟古墓群) are classic examples in this respect (XWZWJ 2011: 2).

Bronze Age burials in Xinjiang reveal rich cultural content at the background of mutual influence between different local societies, which are reflected in the structure of the burial facilities, as well as in the funeral inventory and the burial customs<sup>9</sup>. During this period, the burials in the foothills and in the valleys of eastern Tianshan are predominantly in the form of pit graves, with very few aboveground burial facilities. The construction of the graves also undergoes changes, for example in the Turfan and Hami basins and the surrounding areas, the number of graves with a rounded or bag-like structure, as well as the graves sealed with a piece of round wood, has increased noticeably (XWZWJ 2011: 2). Graves with stone construction, whose tradition presumably originated in the steppes of Central Asia and spread to the south thus influencing the burial practices in Xinjiang, are mostly found around the Altai Mountains, as well as in the steppes northwest of Tianshan. The above-ground part is usually made up of piled up or stacked stones, while the underground part is built of stone blocks, flat stones and breakstone (XWZWJ 2011: 2).

During the Bronze Age, adjoining structures appear next to aboveground stone circles and stone fences that mark the graves. Some of these adjoining structures represent complex sacrificial facilities, while others are standing stones or erected anthropomorphic stelae (石人), placed next to the burial mound, which may have earlier antecedents in the Yamnaya and Kemi-Oba cultures (Wei & Betts 2010: 306, 309, 310). The Kemi-Oba Culture (3200–2600 BCE) is a Kurgan-building culture centered in the Crimean Peninsula, characterized by the placement within the graves of huge tombstones with engraved human faces, hands, clothes and weapons. This tradition gradually spread to the northern and western Pontic steppes, where hundreds of such anthropomorphic stelae have been discovered (Anthony 2010: 339). Their function is not yet fully understood, but except for symbolical marking of the grave, it is possible that the stelae were a representation of the dead person or an imperishable embodiment of his/her soul, since the rock is resistant to decay.

<sup>8</sup> See: Cong et al. 2015.

<sup>9</sup> In early cultures, including the ones on the territory of Xinjiang, the dead were usually buried in the ground, but there are also isolated cases of cremation burials. For more detail see: Xiao 2016.

The style of the burials, as well as the burial goods from this period also reveal certain religious beliefs of the ancient inhabitants of Xinjiang. An important site for studying the community life and the funerary practices of early Bronze Age societies is the Xiaohe-Gumugou Burial Complex (小河—古墓沟墓地), which has produced the oldest and best-preserved Europoid mummies in the Tarim Basin, providing a wealth of information on the material, environmental and social context of life in this era. The deceased were buried in boat-shaped wooden coffins, with wooden planks or poles marking their graves; they were wrapped in huge felt mantles, fastened by wooden or bone pins, and usually wore a felt headgear and a pair of leather boots (Chen & Hiebert 1995: 253). The bodies from the Gumugou cemetery had no garments under the wrapping, while the ones in the Xiaohe cemetery wore only a loin cloth, the shape of which varied for men and women (Yang 2019: 37). Sometimes the deceased were also adorned with personal ornaments like necklaces, earrings or bracelets, the latter generally fastened on the right wrist (Yang 2019: 31, 37). The common burial goods included grass baskets (usually placed on the right side of the body<sup>10</sup>), wooden food containers (pots, cups and spoons), stone artifacts, cattle and sheep horns, grains of wheat and/or millet, arrows, Ephedra twigs, animal ears (spread around the neck and shoulders) and tendon-made strings, but no pottery has been discovered (Chen & Hiebert 1995: 253; Yang 2019: 31, 37). There are also some special wooden artifacts, which appear in different formats in the Xiaohe and Gumugou cemeteries and may have had different purpose. These include: carved wooden masks with protuberant human facial features; wooden sculptures covered with animal hides, which were laid down in the coffin to represent the dead (the so called “wooden corpses, 木尸”); tall wooden human images erected as monuments in the cemetery; small wooden human images used as burial goods; and phallic objects arranged near the female dead (Yang 2019: 26, 32, 38). Other female burial goods include leather bags (containing wool in some cases), and combs that are usually placed under the right hip of the dead and are believed to possess the protective powers of an amulet (Yang 2019: 43; Bergman et al. 1939: 78).

The various types of wooden human statues in the burials of Xiaohe and Gumugou have long been the subject of lively scholarly debate, but their purpose remains unclear. Drawing parallels to the stone and clay female idols common in prehistoric Europe, scholars such as Chen Xingcan (陈星灿) believe that the wooden statues, as well as the phallic objects from the Humugou burials, are abstract symbols of fertility, used as props in prayers for abundant harvest, and after death they were placed in the grave to protect the dead and banish evil (in Liu 2008: 90). By carefully examining the features of the Xinjiang wooden statues, Professor Liu Xuetang (刘学堂) refutes this thesis, arguing that their function was rather to represent or embody the soul of the deceased, which assigned them the status of sacred idols in the original shamanistic practices of the local community (Liu 2008: 91).

<sup>10</sup> “The ornate, fine weaving skills reflected from the delicate geometric pattern on these baskets reveal people at that time have already developed relative high level of aesthetic pursue on pattern, shape and decoration of the basketry, apart from merely the function of that” (Xie et al. 2013: 665).

Also worthy of note are the small wooden masks (app. 9x5 cm) with elliptic shape that were placed on (the right side of) the chest of the dead and are found mostly in burials from the Xiaohe cemetery. Some of the masks were covered with a thin layer of skin and then painted red, above the noses there are often seven transverse twined woolen strings, the eyes are marked with white beads and the teeth are usually made of white stems of feathers (Yang 2019: 51). Unlike the golden masks from the historic era found in other parts of Xinjiang and Tibet<sup>11</sup>, the Gumugou and Xiaohe wooden masks were placed as burial goods possessing magical functions, and were intended to accompany the dead, not to be worn on the face. Burial masks are widespread in many ancient cultures on the Eurasian continent, as well as in ancient Egypt, which provides a wide field for comparison and hypotheses regarding their presence in the Xinjiang burials. It is interesting to note that the earliest burial masks in human history were discovered in symbolic graves (cenotaphs) at the Varna necropolis in Bulgaria and date from the fourth millennium BC (Yordanov 2000: 128). They are made of clay, while the eyes, mouth, nose and teeth are marked with golden plates (Tzanev 2006: 51), thus signifying their highly ritualistic role in the Eneolithic funerary practices of the Balkan region.

Another remarkable feature of the burials in the Xiaohe cemetery is that the face, hair, arms and/or legs, even the boots of some of the male and female mummies were painted with whitish sticky material, and only in one instance the whole body of the deceased was painted in black (Yang 2019: 37). Concerning the composition of the white film, since traces of fermented dairy products have been found on some of the burial goods (Xie et al. 2016: 158), scientists have suggested that it may be a type of dairy product or milk-based material (Yang 2019: 37) but its exact function cannot be determined. It is possible that the dead were symbolically “embalmed” with it to protect the body from decay, or, like the ancient inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula, they treated milk as sacred liquid that was associated with the spiritual world.

The medical and religious role of the Ephedra plant in the ancient Xinjiang communities during the Bronze age has also been the subject of much research and speculation<sup>12</sup>. In the Gumugou, Xiaohe and Tiebanhe<sup>13</sup> burials, Ephedra twigs were usually placed in plant bags and attached to the mantle which enveloped the body, or were spread on and under the dead (Abduressul et al. 2004: 341, 343, 347; Qi & Wang 2008: 26). This practice shows that the properties of the Ephedra as a medicinal and narcotic plant, which have been well known to the Chinese since Neolithic times, were also recognized by the inhabitants of the oases in the Tarim Basin. Perhaps by placing the twigs in the grave, they hoped that the healing and magical (resurrectional) powers of the Ephedra would benefit

<sup>11</sup> For instance, the hemp mask with a strip of gold leaf from the Yingpan tomb (营盘古墓) and the golden mask from the Boma tomb (波马古墓) in Xinjiang, as well as the golden masks from the Quta tomb (曲踏墓地) and the Gurujiamu tomb (故如甲木墓地).

<sup>12</sup> See: Xie et al. 2013; Mallory & Mair 2008.

<sup>13</sup> The Tiebanhe cemetery (铁板河墓地) is situated near the Lopnor lake and reveals many similarities with the Xiaohe and Gumugou burials.

the deceased in their last journey by providing them with energy and strength. Although the Ephedra has traditionally been associated with Indo-Aryan societies and Chinese medicine, a more systematic study of its use in the burial practices of Central Asia could shed light on the links between the Lopnor settlers and the nomadic groups in the Eurasian steppes.

### **Development of burial typology during the Iron Age**

During the Iron Age, which lasted from the beginning of the first millennium BC to the Han Dynasty, the distribution range of burials in Xinjiang is even wider – archaeologists have discovered tombs from this period in extremely remote places, even in high mountain valleys or in the periphery of the Taklamakan desert, where there are hardly any traces of human presence. In contrast, the size of the cemeteries is greatly reduced – some contain only a few or a few dozen graves, which probably reflects the gradual disintegration of the strict structure of the tribal formations and the increasing power of individual ethnic or clan groups. Research of Iron Age burials reveals a wide variety of burial types, which is particularly pronounced in the basins and river valleys of Tianshan, where the oasis cultures on the southern side of the mountain intersect the steppe cultures on its northern flank.

During the early Iron Age, the stone tomb traditions in North Xinjiang develop further and spread to the western parts of Tianshan, reaching as far as the Kunlun Mountains. The burials in most areas of Xinjiang combine the styles of both earth pit graves and stone pit graves, the main features of the latter including stone burial mounds, circular or rectangular stone kerbs and stone pit graves (Yang 2019: 24). In the Tianshan regions vertical-pit style burials remain dominant during this period, but the practice of erecting a wooden bed for the dead becomes popular, turning into one of the main characteristics of prehistoric burials in the Turfan Basin (XWZWJ 2011:4; Chen & Hiebert 1995: 264). At the same time, thousands of graves with massive tumuli and rich burial goods reflecting the high social rank of the tomb owner, such as horse gear and gold decorations, emerge in the vast East Eurasian steppes under the influence of the formation of large nomadic societies<sup>14</sup>.

During the first half of the first millennium BC, presumably under the influence of the burial culture of the oases in Central Asia, tombs with a side chamber appeared in the regions of the Ili river, gradually spreading across the Turfan and Hami basins, as well as across the regions at the southern foot of Tianshan (XWZWJ 2011: 4). Regarding the burial goods during this period, the tradition of placing clay vessels with stamped or carved patterns is preserved in the Altai Mountains, while the earlier practice of arranging paint-

<sup>14</sup> Scientists are raising awareness that due to the richness of the tombs, a significant part of the Early Iron Age cultural heritage in North Xinjiang is under threat of being destroyed or looted, advising rescue excavations of potentially untouched burials (comprising only around 25% of the total number of burials from that period). For more detail see: Caspari 2018.

ed pottery in the graves is carried on in the Tianshan regions. The use of black pottery pots with angular shoulders becomes popular in the Kunlun area, which is associated with influence from the Chust culture in the Fergana valley (XWZWJ 2011: 4).

Studies of prehistoric burials in Xinjiang not only allow us to reconstruct the material and cultural interconnections between early local societies, but also to trace the channels of dissemination of important elements of their daily life, such as painted pottery, weaving techniques, metal casting, etc. The appearance of bronze vessels in prehistoric Xinjiang is believed to have a close relationship with the eastward spread of bronze casting techniques that originated in Europe, reached the Tianshan area around the third millennium BC, and in the process of propagation across the oases north and south of Tianshan formed many types of local bronze cultures (XWZWJ 2011: 4).

From the Han Dynasty onward, Xinjiang societies entered the historic era. Burials from this period are found in all parts of the region, but are far scantier than the prehistoric ones. The burial traditions from the Iron age are inherited in the northern and northwestern periphery of the Dzungar Basin, where burial mounds reflecting the higher social status of the rulers in the nomadic states dominated as the main tomb type. In contrast, almost no mounds from the historical period have been found in the oasis kingdoms located in the Tianshan valleys and around the periphery of the Tarim basin (XWZWJ 2011: 4).

## Conclusion

The burial customs of the ancient inhabitants of Xinjiang are extremely rich in typology, cultural content and semantics. They reveal the presence of well-organized local communities that have successfully adapted to the harsh living conditions in the periphery of deserts and high mountains, and who possessed mature religious beliefs and entrenched eschatological practices. The burial goods from the Bronze age graves reflect the high degree to which these capable people have mastered the gifts of nature and have developed their agriculture, animal husbandry, crafting techniques and artistic skills, in the context of abundant spiritual life.

Based on some characteristics of the burials from the third and second millennium BC, such as the building of tumuli (kurgans), burials in supine flexed position with the head facing to the west, use of red ochre, placing of animal remains in graves, etc., many archaeologists assume that these burials have close relationship with, or are remnants of the Afanasievo culture. But it should be noted that all of these traits are common to much of the prehistoric cultures of the Eurasian continent and the Afanasievo culture is often seen as the “easternmost extension of the European steppe cultures” (Mallory & Adams 1997: 4). Taking into account the existence of advanced Neolithic civilization on the Balkan peninsula, which has not only greatly influenced the evolution of human societies in Western Europe, but has undoubtedly left its imprints on the history of the East as well<sup>15</sup>,

<sup>15</sup> For more detail, see Marinova 2017.

it is high time in future interdisciplinary studies of Xinjiang prehistory to overcome the narrow scientific framework that strongly emphasizes its cultural continuity with Central and Northeast Asia. In order to achieve objective results and conclusions, the research work should be carried out in close collaboration with archaeologists, anthropologists, historians and linguists from (Eastern) Europe, who are well versed in the prehistory of the western parts of the Eurasian continent and have access to first-hand archaeological and scientific information from that region. Only then can we restore the overall picture of the ethnic and cultural interactions along the prehistoric Silk Road and gain better understanding of the material and spiritual culture of the first settlers in Xinjiang.

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# Представления на Съчуанска традиционна опера Чуандзю (Chuanju 川剧) в България през 1959 година и тяхната рецепция

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## Performances of Traditional Sichuan Opera (Chuanju 川剧) in Bulgaria in 1959 and Their Reception

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### Abstract

This article has been conceived as a part of a larger research work aimed at evaluating the reception of traditional Chinese opera in Bulgaria. The present paper examines performances of traditional Sichuan opera in Bulgaria in 1959 and their public and critical reception. The text is based on: archives and publications in Bulgarian in Chinese and English, as well as on interdisciplinary approach, which combines historical, analytical, comparative, music-theoretical, socio-anthropological, etc. knowledge.

**Keywords:** Sichuan traditional opera in Bulgaria, Chuanju, 1959, reception, Chinese Sichuan Opera Troupe, “The White Snake”, “Autumn River”, “Shooting eagles”, Li Xiaofei, Wang Yang, Xu Qianyun, “face changing”, “changing faces”, 保加利亚川剧演出, 1959年, 接受, 受容, 中国川剧团, 《白蛇传》, 《秋江》, 《射雕》, 李笑非, 汪洋, 许倩云, 变脸

Предлаганото изследване е част от по-голямо проучване върху рецепцията на китайска традиционна опера в България. Текстът е посветен на първото, установено до момента от мен, посещение у нас на китайска трупа за традиционна опера; изграден е върху публикации в научни издания, в периодичния печат и електронните медии, върху архивни материали и спомени на китайски актьори. Своеобразен акцент е поставен върху рецензия от български композитор и музикален педагог, тъй като това е една от най-ранните (издирени до момента) публикации от български автор върху аспекти на китайската традиционна опера.

За рецепцията на представления на китайска традиционна опера у нас са от значение процесите на двустранно сътрудничество между Китай и България. Важни са и представите за китайските изкуства и култура, изградени у българската об-

щественост чрез четенето на свързана с темата литература. Най-непосредствени впечатления за китайската традиционна опера безспорно възникват в самия процес на взаимодействие между изпълнители и публика при протичането на представления на китайска традиционна опера у нас. Ще се спра накратко върху така изведените процеси, за да потърся в техния контекст мястото на представленията на Съчуанска традиционна опера, осъществени у нас през 1959 г.

След като през октомври 1949 г. България е сред първите държави в света, които признават Китайската народна република (КНР), през петдесетте години на ХХ в. двустранните отношения се задълбочават (Орбецов 2020; Ма 2020). Едно от следствията на разширяващите се двустранни контакти е, че издания, свързани с китайски изкуства и култура, стават част от български библиотечни фондове<sup>1</sup>. Според „Архив на културния обмен между Китай и България“, поддържан от Посолството на КНР в България, първите китайски трупи, гастролирали у нас, са акробатични (1954 и 1955 г.), а още първото им посещение е „приветствано от българската публика“. През 1959 г. шейсет и четирима представители на „Китайската съчуанска оперна трупа“ (*Zhongguo Chuanju tuan* 【中国川剧团】) посещават България (“*Zhongguo he Baojialiya wenhua jiaoliu dang’an (Yishu tuan zu)*” 2004). Многочислеността на китайската трупа свидетелства, че гастролът е бил посветен на отбелязването на 10-годишнината от Освобождението на КНР (с времето се е утвърдила практиката значими за китайската култура събития да се отбелязват с мащабни представления на китайска традиционна опера).

От публикации на китайски език – в периодичния печат, електронните медии и научни изследвания – беше установено, че трупата е отпътувала от Пекин (свидетелство за представителността на гастрола) през месец юли 1959 г. Пристигнала е първо във Варшава, Полша, където е изнесла представления. Впоследствие е представила изкуството си в бившата Чехословакия и в бившата Германска Демократична Република (ГДР). Като последна европейска дестинация е посетила и България (Tan 2017: 355; “*Chuanju de di yi ci chuguo*” 1997; “*Chuanju Liyuan naxie jiao er*” 2012; “*Chuanju taidou Li Xiaofei xiansheng xianshi xiangnian 95 sui*”, 2020; “*Koushu lishi. Chuanbei deng xi chuancheng ren Wang Yang*” 2021; “*Li Xiaofei*” 2021). По спомени на китайския актьор Уан Ян (Wang Yang 汪洋) пътуването е осъществено с влак, като придвижването във всяка посока е отнело седем денонощия (“*Koushu lishi...*” 2021). Самото обстоятелство, че нашата държава е била избрана за подобна визита, е показателно за постигнатите приятелски двустранни отношения още през първите десет години от сътрудничеството.

Допълнително проучване показва, че гастролът е и първото представяне на Съчуанската традиционна опера извън Китай (Tan 2017: 355; “*Chuanju de...*” 1997). Инициативата е осмислена от китайска страна като „прецедент“, „постигнал неочаквани

<sup>1</sup> Последната тенденция е изведена на основата на собствени проучвания и наблюдения.

результати“: „Това представяне в чужбина изчисти неразбирането, че само бойни изкуства и танцови драми могат да бъдат приветствани в чужбина“ (“Chuanju de...” 1997). Успешните първи срещи с *Чуандзю* на публики в четирите европейски държави, между които и България, поставят солидна основа за следващи визити, популяризиращи китайската традиционна опера. Отчетеният успех свидетелства за положителна зрителска и критическа рецепция на представленията. Китайската актриса Сю Циенюн (Xu Qianyun 许倩云) определя срещите си с чуждестранните публики по време на гастролата като „най-ярките спомени в целия ѝ живот“ (“Chuanju Liyuan...” 2012; виж и: “Chuanju taidou...” 2020; “Koushu lishi...” 2021). В китайски източници се посочват и положителни рецензии за изкуството на *Чуандзю*, публикувани в полски, чешки, немски и английски издания (“Chuanju de...” 1997; “Chuanju Liyuan...” 2012).

Към публикациите в европейски издания от 1959 г. днес ще добавя и една рецензия във вестник „Култура“ от български композитор и музикален педагог – Георги Златев-Черкин (Златев-Черкин 1959: 6). Към времето на китайската визита у нас той е утвърден професор, работил в Държавната музикална академия в София (от 1929 г. с прекъсвания) и в Държавната академия за музика и драматично изкуство във Виена (1936–1938). От 1955 до 1958 г. той преподава с успех вокално майсторство в консерваториите в Пекин, Тиендзин и Шанхай, Китай („Zlatev-Cherkin“ 2005–2020). Може да се допусне, че Златев-Черкин е запознат в детайли и има преки впечатления от китайските изкуства и култура. За българската култура и за рецепцията на китайска традиционна опера у нас е от значение, че именно Златев-Черкин пише тази рецензия от първото посещение у нас на Съчуанска традиционна опера, защото на основата на собствените си знания и разбирания за китайската култура той представя пред българската читателска аудитория изнесените представления по възможно най-разбираемия, интригуващ и професионален начин. Неговата публикация информира и за зрителската рецепция на представленията. Още в началото на текста авторът споделя, че гастролът е „едно щастливо събитие за българската публика“, което „имаме днес удоволствието да видим в България“, от което става ясно, че българското общество е приело с радост посещението на китайските изпълнители на *Чуандзю*. По-нататък в текста Златев-Черкин подчертава, че „Това сложно изкуство, постигнато чрез много труд и постоянство, е присъщо на характера на китайския народ“, с което той обрисова традиционната опера като представително изкуство за китайското общество. В цитираната статия Златев-Черкин запознава българския читател не само с майсторството на изпълнението на *Чуандзю*, а и със самата същност на китайската традиционна опера; извежда онова, което в най-голяма степен удивлява и очарова чуждестранната публика, особено при първите ѝ срещи с това изкуство: „Учудваща е техниката и точността на всеки детайл в походка, в движение съобразно характера и рода на лицето, съчетанието на пластика, пение и танц, сложният грим и костюмировка, липсата на декор, за допълването на който е предоставено на артиста да определи както времето, така и несъществуващи предмети чрез

своята игра и мимика“. Авторът на публикацията се спира и върху произведения от репертоара на *Чуандзю*, изградени върху „исторически събития, народни легенди, биографии“; коментира тяхната структура и други специфики: „композицията им е стегната, без ненужни отклонения, епизодите вълнуват зрителя (к. м. – М. Ц.), характерите са ясно очертани, като особено живи са характерите на сатиричните комедийни лица“. Наред с извеждането на същностни черти на Съчуанската опера, се усеща и постигнатото въздействие върху българската публика. Авторът информира читателите, че репертоарът на *Чуандзю* „съдържа над 1400 пиеси, от които 200 пиеси се играят постоянно“ (Златев-Черкин 1959: 6). В текста се подчертава, че за гастрол са подбрани най-добрите изпълнители сред наследниците на вековните традиции на *Чуандзю* (Там). Ли Сяуфей (Li Xiaofei 李笑非) например, оставил ярки впечатления у българската публика, е сред „осемте най-добри актьори“ на „Китайската Съчуанска опера трупа“. Впоследствие той става един от най-големите майстори на *Чуандзю* – изпълнител, режисьор, педагог с десетки последователи, академичен изследовател на Съчуанската опера и пазител на вековните традиции на *чоудзяо* (Choujiao 丑角) – тип персонажи в *Чуандзю* (“Chuanju taidou...” 2020; “Li Xiaofei” 2021). Според Златев-Черкин, потвърдено и в други източници, сред произведенията, изпълнени у нас, са включени едни от най-обичаните от китайската публика фрагменти и цели творби от репертоара на Съчуанската опера: „Легенда за Бялата змия“ (*Baishhe chuan* 《白蛇传》), „Река Есенна“ (*Qiujiang* 《秋江》), „Стрелящият по орли“ (*She diao* 《射雕》) и др. (Там; виж и: “Koushu lishi...” 2021).

Златев-Черкин насочва вниманието на читателите и към традицията *биенлиен* (bianlien 变脸) – „сменящи се лица“ или „смяна на лицата“: „изумителната вещина, с която божественият генерал сменя своя образ няколко пъти на самата сцена“ в „Легенда за Бялата змия“ (Златев-Черкин 1959: 6). Изключително атрактивната за зрителите традиция се асоциира именно със Съчуанската опера. Тъй като е логично с всяка следваща творба взаимодействието с публиката да се задълбочава, изпълнението на „Легенда за Бялата змия“ като последно произведение в програмата насочва към идеята, че организаторите на гастролa и изпълнителите са очаквали представянето на тази традиция да предизвика ярки реакции у българската публика. Предвид написаното от Златев-Черкин, майсторското изпълнение на *биенлиен* не само е изумило българските зрители, а им е доставило и естетическа наслада.

Златев-Черкин отделя специално внимание на музикални аспекти при *Чуандзю*, като осъществява и някои паралели с Пекинската опера. Тук следва да се подчертае изведената от него важна функция на ударните инструменти и водещата „роля“ на изпълнителя на барабан в представленията на *Чуандзю*: „Ударните музикални инструменти (...) играят много важна роля в усиливане на сценичната атмосфера. Те изразяват както силното напрежение в боя, така и радостта в преживяванията на действащите лица. При липса на декор и светлинни ефекти гонгът и барабанът са тясно свързани с артиста, за да изразят шума от вятъра, вълните, тихото течение на реката,

плавното или развълнувано плуване на лодката, капките на дъжда и т.н. Затова барабанчикът трябва добре да владее своя инструмент, за да може изкусно да ръководи оркестъра, като съчетава действието на сцената и пението на артиста“. Златев-Черкин открива основания за наблюдаваните специфики и в китайската мисъл: „Да бъдеш майстор-барабанчик – казват китайците – не е лесно изкуство“ (Там). С представянето на важността на ударните музикални инструменти и на изпълнителя на барабан сред останалите инструменталисти Златев-Черкин подготвя българската общественост за пълноценното възприемане на китайската традиционна опера като цяло, включително и на Пекинската опера (виж и: Ценова-Нушева 2009: 27–41). Златев-Черкин насочва вниманието на читателите и към важните функции на хора в представленията: „на места се обажда задкулисен хор“ „или преди пението на артиста, или след него, а понякога [хорът] има и самостоятелна роля, чрез която предава душевното състояние на артиста, това, което той вижда, чува, слуша или мисли“ (Златев-Черкин 1959: 6). Изследователски интерес към „задкулиския хор“ (*the offstage chorus*) в Съчуанската опера проявява и Колин Макерас, анализирайки представления, осъществени през втората половина на осемдесетте години на ХХ в. (Mackerras 1987: 191-204). Според материал в китайския периодичен печат, позоваващ се на китайски и чуждестранни публикации от 1959 г., посетилата България „Китайска съчуанска оперна трупа“ е обхващала голямо число музиканти – двайсет и двама (“Koushu lishi...” 2021) – потвърждение за важното място на музиката в представленията на *Чуандзю*, изведено и от Златев-Черкин.

По спомени на Уан Ян с трупата е пътувал преводач, което само по себе си свидетелства за търсенето на пълноценна комуникация с чуждестранните общества и публики и за стремежа към постигане на рецепция на представяното изкуство. Според същия актьор, репертоарът е бил толкова добре обмислен, че след кратките въвеждащи разяснения не е имало необходимост от допълнителни преводи или субтитри, защото публиката разбираше без затруднения и съпреживявала случващото се на сцената (Там). Стремекът към пълноценно общуване с чуждестранните публики доказва, че зрителска рецепция е била търсена – продължително и с внимание.

В заключение, според издирените до момента документи и публикации представленията на Съчуанска традиционна опера през 1959 г. са първите срещи на българското общество с китайската традиционна опера. Предвид обстоятелството, че същият гастрол е и първо представяне на Съчуанска опера извън Китай, осъществените представления и тяхната публична рецепция в България, както и в Полша и бившите Чехословакия и ГДР, са от голямо значение за разпространението на китайските изкуства по света. За целената пълноценна рецепция в четирите източноевропейски държави свидетелстват много обстоятелства: многочислеността на китайската трупа; внимателно подбраните изпълнители и произведения от репертоара на Съчуанската опера; изпратеният преводач, разясняващ специфики и имащ готовността да добави преводи и субтитри към изпълняваните произведения. Идеите изкуството на *Чуандзю* да бъде

разбрано и съпреживяно от чуждестранните зрители, да се постигне въздействие и активен диалог с чуждестранните публики са осезаеми. Присъствието на България сред посетените четири държави при първия изобщо гастрол на Съчуанска традиционна опера извън Китай отразява нивото на задълбочени двустранни отношения между Китай и България и е предпоставка за следващи успешни срещи с китайски традиционни изкуства у нас. Ангажирането на вероятно най-подготвения български музикант в полето на китайската традиционна опера с написването на рецензия за представлението на *Чуандзю* и за запознаването на българската културна общественост със специфики на китайската традиционна опера, е показателно за вниманието, с което българските професионални среди се отнасят към китайската култура. Публикуваната статия от Златев-Черкин със сигурност е допринесла за рецепцията на китайска традиционна опера у нас и е подготвила българската общественост за по-нататъшните ѝ срещи с това изкуство. Постигнатата публична рецепция явно е мотивирала и китайските изпълнители на Съчуанска опера, защото именно гастролът в четирите държави през 1959 г. се оповестява като един от най-представителните в тяхната дейност. Отправяйки поглед към XXI в., китайски трупи, представящи песенни и танцови традиции на различни етноси от Съчуан, гостуват у нас през 2013 г. и техните изяви се радват на голям интерес сред българските граждани, отразени са в български и китайски електронни публикации. Младежки трупи за Съчуанска опера планират визити у нас през 2017 и 2018 г. Идеята днешните най-млади пазители на традициите на *Чуандзю* да споделят своето изкуство с българската общественост е възможно да се дължи и на успешните взаимодействия с българските зрители през 1959 г. Десетките публикации в периодичния печат и електронните медии през 2017 и 2018 г. показват, че българската общественост очаква с интерес и нетърпение представлението на Съчуанската опера. Някои от планираните изяви се осъществяват, други, за съжаление, са отменени поради неблагоприятни метеорологични условия. Големият брой публикации, свързани с посещенията на Съчуанска опера и с представянето на песенни и танцови традиции от същия регион у нас през XXI в., могат да се приемат и като следствие на разрастващите се процеси на рецепция на китайска традиционна опера у нас, започнали през 1959 г., продължили с прекъсвания през следващите две десетилетия, интензифициращи се от осемдесетте години на XX в. до момента. Процеси на рецепция на представлението на китайска традиционна опера у нас ще бъдат осмислени и в перспектива. Благодаря на Институт *Конфуций* в София за възможността да споделя с международната аудитория резултати от научните си изследвания.

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# Cultural Heritage in China: Protection and Restitution of Chinese Cultural Goods

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## Abstract:

China has the longest history in the world and thus a fruitful cultural heritage. There are many Chinese cultural objects being inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Unfortunately, many Chinese antiquities have been objects of illicit activities such as looting, smuggling and different illegal means since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. The aim of this article is to investigate the most significant Chinese legal acts for the protection of cultural relics and to analyse recent cases on the restitution of Chinese cultural goods.

**Keywords:** China, cultural heritage, restitution, protection

## 1. Cultural heritage in China

The People's Republic of China is widely known to be a country with a long history and most notably, the Chinese culture is the only one lasting continuously from Ancient times till today. As a consequence, China has become an important "source" of cultural heritage. It is worth referring to John Meryman who said that "China, with its many centuries of high civilization and its vast area and large population, may be the richest source of cultural property of all" (Huo 2015: 151)<sup>1</sup>. Hence, a significant number of antiquities must be considered as priceless treasures belonging to the Chinese nation and having their roots in ancient times (Huo 2015: 151).

The People's Republic of China became a member of UNESCO in 1946, while being the founding state of the organization. China is also a signatory to UNESCO's Constitution. Bearing in mind the desire to ensure an adequate level of protection of cultural heritage on a global scale, under the UNESCO Convention, the so-called UNESCO World Heritage List was adopted. Of note, the List may include cultural and natural objects, as well as cultural sites and landscapes (Marcinkowska 2010: 227).

Despite these positive aspects of the development of Chinese civilization, many antiquities have been objects of illicit activities such as looting, smuggling and many other illegal means since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century. Based on the available statistics, it is potential

<sup>1</sup> Cf. John Hery Maryman, Forward to J. David Murphy, *Plunder and Preservation: Cultural Property Law and Practice in the People's Republic of China*, 1995, p. xiii.

to outline three main waves of illegal removal of antiquities stemming from China: first, from the 1850s to the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century; second, between 1920s and 1949; and third, from the 1980s till today (Huo 2015: 151).<sup>2</sup>

Taking into account the cultural heritage protection system, it should be highlighted that the law is one and the most significant of the three factors creating such a system. Apart from law, there is also financing and the need to shape public awareness about the protection of cultural heritage. In fact, the law consists of norms making some obligations for both the state and the citizens. Furthermore, the law also grants competences and importantly introduces some restrictions and prohibitions in terms of cultural heritage, mainly concerning monuments. Therefore, the law is widely regarded as a basic tool for the protection of cultural heritage at the international and national level. In view of this article, two chief normative acts will be analysed, namely the Law on the Protection of Cultural Property of the People's Republic of China enacted on 19 November 1982 and the Intangible Cultural Heritage Law of the People's Republic of China adopted on 25 February 2011. The *ratio legis* for the latter is the need to implement the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, drawn up in Paris on 17 October 2003.

Given these characteristics, China owns a very rich cultural heritage and a number of cultural objects, inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List confirm this statement. The above-mentioned List is based on the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, signed on 12 November 1972 in Paris. There are in total 56 sites inscribed on the UNESCO List within the territory of the PRC, including 38 sites of cultural heritage, 14 sites of natural heritage and 4 mixed sites (Zeidler, Łagiewska 2020: 101).

The People's Republic of China ratified the 1972 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (aka World Heritage Convention) in 1989. Since then, China has implemented a common national strategy to build national identity through the designation of World Heritage sites. These actions were intended not only to enhance social solidarity, but also to control ethnicity and economic growth (Zhu 2019: 23). It is worth adding that China introduced the notion of "traditional culture" (传统文化) being a kind of a national or more broadly even a World Heritage. By way of explanation, according to the statement of the Chinese government, this notion should reveal that the nation belongs to a distinct group deserving to be recognized and respected worldwide. Taking into account the Chinese administration in charge of the protection of cultural heritage, it should be noted that China has a strong hierarchical and centralized administration. Along with the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Ministry of Culture (文化部) was competent to implement cultural policies in the country. Those actions concern the appropriate management of national museums and archives. Apart from the Ministry of Culture, there is another entity responsible for the

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Pan Chengliang, "Zhongguo Wenwu Liushi Jingli de Langchao" [The Waves of Illicit Export of Chinese Antiquities], 5 Kexue Zhiyou [Friend of Science] 2009, p. 51.

protection of cultural heritage, the so-called 'State Bureau of Cultural Relics' (国家文物局) founded in 1988. It has changed the name and nowadays is widely recognized as the State Administration of Cultural Heritage – SACH (Gruber 2013).

## **2. Protection of the Cultural Heritage in the People's Republic of China**

To start with, it is also worth highlighting that the protection of cultural heritage in China is guaranteed by the Constitution of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as "Constitution") of 4 December 1982. Pursuant to Article 22 of the Constitution, "The state shall protect places of scenic beauty and historical interest, valuable cultural relics and other forms of important historical and cultural heritage" (Constitution: Art. 22). Such constitutional guarantee of the protection of cultural heritage is very significant, most notably in view of its importance. Apart from the above-mentioned provision, Article 107 of the Constitution stipulates that "Local people's governments at and above the county level shall, according to the authority invested in them as prescribed by law, manage administrative work related to the economy, education, science, culture [...] (Constitution: Art. 107). Furthermore, it should be highlighted that under the Article 116 of the Constitution, "the people's congresses of ethnic autonomous areas shall have the power to formulate autonomous regulations and local-specific regulations in accordance with the political, economic and cultural characteristics of the ethnic groups in their areas". On the other hand, according to the Article 119 of the Constitution, "Autonomous organs of ethnic autonomous areas shall autonomously manage the educational, scientific, cultural, health and sports undertakings of their areas, protect and restore the cultural heritage of their ethnic groups, and promote the development and a thriving of ethnic cultures".

Furthermore, notwithstanding the ratification of the UNESCO Convention on 25 September 1989, it is worth adding that there are many references in the national regulations with regard to the 1970 UNESCO Convention. Therefore, it should be noted that the Law on the Protection of Cultural Property of the People's Republic of China was adopted on 19 November 1982 and then amended in 2002 and 2015. This normative act was enacted a short time after the fall of the Cultural Revolution in China. In the case of the Cultural Revolution, which took place from 1966 to 1976, numerous components of cultural heritage, including material and intangible elements, were annihilated. Nevertheless, bearing in mind both the substance of this normative act and the background of its enactment, it is visible that there was a "shift towards heritage" in the 1980s in China. This process of protecting cultural heritage began after the Cultural Revolution and lasts to this day. It is worth adding that the highest authorities of the People's Republic of China, led by the President Xi Jinping, also highlight the need to ensure better protection of cultural heritage. Therefore, many political, legislative and legal actions are taken simultaneously to guarantee the respect of Chinese culture (Zeidler, Łagiewska 2021).

Given the structure of this normative act, it comprises 80 articles divided into 8 chapters such as: 1. The Act is a medium-length act, consisting of 80 articles, arranged in 8 chapters: 1) general provision; 2) immovable cultural goods; 3) archaeological excavations; 4) cultural relics in the collection of cultural institutions; 5) cultural goods in private collections; 6) exit or enter of cultural relics out of or into China; 7) legal liabilities; 8) supplementary provisions (Law 2015).

Article 1 of this legal act states that, “this Law is formulated in accordance with the Constitution with a view to strengthening the protection of cultural relics, inheriting the splendid historical and cultural legacy of the Chinese Nation, promoting the scientific research, conducting education in patriotism and revolutionary tradition, and building the socialist spiritual and material civilization.”

Under Article 2, the catalogue of cultural relics protected by the law was defined. Nevertheless, this normative act introduces categories of protected cultural goods. It should be noted that this is a common solution around the world regarding the need to evaluate cultural property prior to its classification to a certain group. Furthermore, the State is not only the owner of a significant number of cultural goods within the People’s Republic of China, but simultaneously the State is also responsible to ensure the protection of those objects.

The PRC, similar to other states in the region (i.e. Japan and South Korea), introduced the cultural heritage protection system based on classification. Therefore, according to the binding regulations in China, it is possible to distinguish the following classes of cultural relics: valuable cultural relics of first-, second- and third-class as well as ordinary cultural relics. The entire process of classification is carried out in accordance with the Standards of Evaluation of Cultural Relics Collections. Given these regulations, the first-class cultural objects are of extraordinary historic, artistic or scientific value. In the case of second and third class objects, instead of “extraordinary” objects, they have a “great”, “relatively large” or “certain” historical, artistic or scientific value. By way of explanation, previous legal tenders belong to the first-class cultural objects because of their importance to the history of money (Smolarek 2020: 205–206).

Finally, it must be admitted that the Chinese legislation clarifies the obligations of the people’s governments at various levels to find the so-called “golden means” by “properly handling the relationship between economic construction, social development and cultural relics’ protection, and ensuring the safety of cultural relics” (Article 9).

Overall, this normative act comprises regulations not just specifying which cultural objects are prohibited to leave the Middle Kingdom but also stipulating about the competent government agencies to oversee the permission to leave, licencing procedures and associated legal liabilities. In addition, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China also enacted the Regulations in 2003 to implement the foregoing. In fact, those Regulations had to point to further specify the entire range of entry and exit of Chinese cultural goods, among other some provisions on review procedures, details that need to be gone over, exit licences,

legal effects of exit permits. Aside from these legal act, the Chinese authorities enacted as well the Review Standards on the Exit of Cultural Objects and the Administrative Rules on the Review of the Entry and Exit of Cultural Objects in 2007 (Report: 1). Compared to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, Chinese law includes a broader definition of “cultural relics” than “cultural objects”. Therefore, under Article 2 of the Law on the Protection of Cultural Property, “cultural relics” refer to both moveable objects and sites and monuments.

The People’s Republic of China also ratified the 2003 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Intangible Heritage in 2004 and thus introduced the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (there are already 42 manifestations of the Chinese intangible heritage inscribed on this List). The implementation of the above-mentioned Convention was carried out by a special legal act, namely the Intangible Cultural Heritage Law of the People’s Republic of China on 25 February 2011. This normative act comprises 45 articles organized in six chapters as follows: 1. general provisions; 2. investigation of intangible cultural heritage; 3. catalogue of representative items of intangible cultural heritage; 4. inheritance and spread of intangible cultural heritage; 5. legal liabilities; 6. supplementary provisions.

According to the statement of the Minister of Culture – Cai Wu, it is noteworthy to bring attention to the following features of the normative act on intangible cultural heritage (ICH) in China. Firstly, this legal act has the “one chief aim” that could be defined as “inheriting and carrying forward the brilliant traditional culture of the Chinese nation by promoting the construction of socialist spiritual civilization and strengthening the protection and preservation of ICH” (Law 2003). Secondly, it sets out two main principles regarding the protection of the ICH. The first one concerns the “authenticity, completeness and inheritance” of the ICH and the latter refers, on the one hand, to the need of beefing up the identification of Chinese cultures, and on the other hand, to uphold the unification and ethnic unity by simultaneously promoting both social harmony and sustainable development. Finally, one must note the “three systems” in the Chinese ICH Law such as the investigation system, representative projects list system and inheritance and dissemination system. In the case of an investigation system, people’s governments above the county level are competent to investigate services, citizens, legal persons, other organizations and foreign organizations or individuals. Taking into account the list of representative projects, the aim is to link limited resources and thereby ensure the protection of the ICH. It is significant to point out that the ICH represents the traditional culture of the Chinese nation being of historical, literary, artistic and scientific value. As a result of this feature of the ICH, it is important to continually raise public awareness of its protection.

### **3. Restitution of Chinese Cultural Goods: Case Studies**

There are many cases concerning the restitution of Chinese cultural artefacts worldwide. The first case analyzed concerns the two bronze fountains from the eighteenth

century, namely a rabbit and a rat belonging to Yves Saint-Laurent and Pierre Bergé. This restitution case involves Chinese cultural objects stolen from the Ancient Summer Palace in Beijing during the Second Opium War in 1860. The art world recovered these items at the auction organized by Christie's in February 2009. SACH expressed disappointment about the auction of two bronze fountains. Notwithstanding the objections raised by the Chinese officials and already taken legal measures, the Christie's auction house sustained the ongoing auction and finalized it by selling the aforementioned fountainheads to the Chinese antique collector – Cai Mingchao for the total amount of 28 million euros. In addition, the winner simply sabotaged the auction and refused to pay the amount offered. Consequently, he disclosed “a patriotic act of dissent” against the Christie's auction (Gruber 2013: 3). As a result, the auction house also revealed its standpoint by saying that “Christie's supports repatriation of cultural relics to their home country and aids in the process where possible by sourcing and bringing works of art to the auction platform to give buyers a chance to bid for them” (Wallace, Bandle, Renold 2013: 4). Finally, François-Henri Pinault revealed the donation of this Chinese bronze artefacts to the Poly Art Museum. On 28 June 2013, the People's Republic of China held a ceremony dedicated to the reappearance of the 18th-century cultural artefacts that took office in Beijing (Wallace, bundle, Renold 2013: 5).

The second case concerns Sino-Italian relations. China and Italy have joined forces to combat illegal trafficking in cultural goods. As a result, the Italian government made the decision to return 796 cultural objects to China, among them a red clay pot from the Majiayao culture (third millennium BC). In the case of this artefact, the Italian court issued a judgement confirming that this cultural object should be returned to the State of origin. It should be noted that those artefacts have been initially identified by the Italian art police in 2007 (Harris 2019).

Finally, it is worth analysing the restitution of Chinese cultural property linked to the UK. According to the Guan Qiang, serving as a deputy director of the China's National Cultural Heritage Administration (aka NCHA), “the recovered 68 smuggled cultural relics lost in the UK have reached an ideal end due to the Chinese government's efforts in transnational cultural relic repatriation over the past 25 years. This is a significant landmark for the spirit of international conventions” (Chen 2020). Therefore, amid the 68 Chinese cultural goods being the object of restitution, 13 belonged to the second-level cultural relics, while 30 were indicated as third-level cultural goods and finally 25 were recognized as general cultural relics. This restitution primarily concerned works of art, including not only porcelains, pottery but also bronzes. These objects had their origins from the Spring and Autumn period in ancient Chinese history until the Qing dynasty (Chen 2020).

Given the legal background of the return of the above-mentioned cultural goods, this achievement confirms a satisfactory cooperation on combatting the illicit trafficking of cultural relics under the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Pre-

venting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (People's Daily).

#### 4. Concluding Remarks

The People's Republic of China is one the country with the longest history and many cultural objects inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Nowadays, there are two chief legal acts ensuring the protection of cultural relics in China, namely the Law on the Protection of Cultural Property of the People's Republic of China and the Intangible Cultural Heritage Law of the People's Republic of China. Notwithstanding the ratification of international conventions related to the protection of cultural goods, China still faces many challenges concerning the restitution of cultural relics. Fortunately, a fruitful cooperation between the states and a good will of both parties guarantee that the Chinese cultural goods come back to the country of their origin.

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## За някои паралели между съвременен Иран и Сасанидски Иран от VII в. – проекция на сила по Пътя на коприната

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## Parallels Between Present-Day Iran and Sasanian Iran From the 7th century – Power Projection on the Silk Road

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### Abstract

The purpose of this article is to draw some self-imposed parallels between Present-Day Iran and the 7th century Sasanian Iran on the Silk Road. As a result of the war with Byzantium that broke out in 602, Iran conquered a significant part of Anatolia, as well as Syria, Palestine, and even the granary of the Byzantine Empire, Egypt. By 620, Sasanian Iran ruled the shores of the Persian Gulf as well as Yemen. There is an interesting parallel with the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the first decades of the 21st century. Iran is again spreading its influence across the whole region – in Iraq, where it supports the Shiite majority, in Lebanon, in Syria with nearly 80,000 troops and advisers, supporting Alawite-backed regime of Bashar al-Assad, and in Yemen, where it supports Yemeni Hussite rebels.

The power projection is in a westerly direction along the axis of the Silk Road, and the acquisition of resources, political and military support – in Central Asia and China. In 651, twenty years after the end of the 602–628 war, Yezdigerd III was assassinated and his son Peroz fled to China seeking help from the Tang dynasty – Iran fell to the Arabs.


Today, Iran, under strong American pressure, oil and arms embargo, seeks and finds support in the People’s Republic of China. The press recently announced the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, including the military sphere, between Iran and China in the amount of over 400 billion dollars.

Iran is once again seeking political, military and financial resources from the eastern end of the New Silk Road (PRC and North Korea, whose technologies are the basis for success in Iran’s ballistic missile program) as opposed to the West.

**Keywords:** Silk Road, Sasanian, Yemeni Hussite, Syria, power projection, Iran, Shiite, 7<sup>th</sup> century

Целта на тази статия е да даде кратък обзор на повтарящите се във времето от страна на Иран (в различните му ипостаси като Ахеменидска империя, Партско царство, Сасанидска империя, Сефевидската държава, Ислямска република) опити за проекция на сила в западно направление по Пътя на коприната.

Когато някой започне да се интересува от историята на Иран, Близкия изток и Пътя на коприната, той попада на някои, без оглед на държавния строй и господстващата религия, прилики във външната политика на Иран от VII в. и тази на съвременен Иран. Още от самото си създаване Сасанидската държава определя като свой главен съперник Римската империя (Frye 2006: 124) и насочва своята основна експанзия на запад по протежение на Пътя на коприната.



Фиг. 1. Основен маршрут на Пътя на коприната<sup>1</sup>


Всичко това би могло да се обясни с т.нар. географски детерминизъм, т.е. географското положение е решаващо не само за селското стопанство, икономиката, благосъстоянието на населението на дадена страна, но и предопределя дори насоката на военно-политическите решения на нейните владетели и управници.

## Географско положение на Иран

Първите сведения за заселването от иранските племена на платото, получило по-късно наименованието Иранско, датират от X в. пр. н.е. Иранското плато обхваща територия от ок. 2,7 млн. км<sup>2</sup> и се простира от юг на север на 1500 км и от запад на изток на 2500 км (от Месопотамия до долината на река Инд)<sup>2</sup>. Около 1,7 млн. км<sup>2</sup> от Иранското плато заема територията на съвременен Иран.

<sup>1</sup> [https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seidenstra%C3%9F#media/Datei:Seidenstrasse\\_GMT.jpg](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seidenstra%C3%9F#media/Datei:Seidenstrasse_GMT.jpg).

<sup>2</sup> Большая Советская Энциклопедия, т. 18, с. 435.



Фиг. 2. Топография на Иран<sup>3</sup>

Разглеждайки политическите карти, показващи територията на Иран през различни епохи, лесно може да се забележи, че на Изток границата е относително постоянна – тя се опира в планинската верига Хиндукуш, Памир и р. Инд. В някои исторически епохи обаче границата е изнесена далеч на Запад, където като естествен природен ограничител служи Средиземно море. Например по времето на Дарий I империята обхваща цяла Анатолия, Египет, Киренайка (съвр. Либия), части от съвременна Гърция и България.


<sup>3</sup> [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iran-geographic\\_map.svg](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iran-geographic_map.svg).

## Ахеменидска империя (550–330 г. пр.Хр.)



Фиг. 3. Карта на Ахеменидската империя<sup>4</sup>

Партската държава (247 г. пр.Хр. – 224 г. сл.Хр.) на Запад включва Месопотамия и Армения и има през цялото свое съществуване като основен противник Римската империя.



Фиг. 4. Партия<sup>5</sup>

## Сасанидски Иран (224–651 г.)


Хосроу (Хусрау) II се възкачва повторно на престола през 591 г. с помощта на дадена му от император Мавриций армия под командването на византийския генерал Нарсес<sup>6</sup>. Сключен е мирен договор между двете държави, по който Хосроу II отстъпва Кавказка Иберия, западна Армения, както и стратегическия град-крепост Дара в северна Месопотамия. Мирът трае до свалянето от трона на император Мавриций през 602 г. и последвалото убийство на него и цялото му семейство от узурпатора Фока. Хосроу II из-

<sup>4</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Achaemenid\\_Empire\\_\(flat\\_map\).svg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Achaemenid_Empire_(flat_map).svg).

<sup>5</sup> [https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:Map\\_Parthian\\_Empire-bg.png](https://bg.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:Map_Parthian_Empire-bg.png)

<sup>6</sup> Да не се бърка с известния пълководец Нарсес (ок. 490–573) от времето на имп. Юстиниан I.

ползва това като *casus belli* и започва война, която трае с променлив успех почти четвърт век чак до 628 г. През 614 г. е завладян Йерусалим, през 619 г. пада Египет, житницата на Източната римска империя. В Йемен още от 70-те години на VI в. се намира сасанидски военен гарнизон, който по-късно (след 622 г.) преминава на страната на Пророка.



Фиг. 5. Сасанидската империя през 621 г.<sup>7</sup>

Както може да се види от картата Хосроу II Парвиз почти възстановява териториално Ахеменидска Персия, но не успява да унищожи своя противник (Frye 2006: 169). Сасанидите губят войната с имп. Ираклий и към 630 г. Иран се връща в своите стари граници. Тази война, довела до икономически упадък и по-нататъшна политическа децентрализация на сасанидската държава, се смята като основна причина за падането на Сасанидски Иран (651 г.) и постепенното му завладяване от арабите, което може да се смята за завършено едва след битката при Талас (751 г.), където араби и хорасанци заедно с тюркското племе карлуци успяват да спрат инвазията на запад по Пътя на коприната на войските на династия Тан.

<sup>7</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sasanian\\_conquest\\_of\\_Egypt#/media/File:Sasanian\\_Empire\\_621\\_A.D.jpg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sasanian_conquest_of_Egypt#/media/File:Sasanian_Empire_621_A.D.jpg) (GNU Free Documentation License).

## Сефевидски Иран (1501–1722)



Фиг. 6. Сефевидски Иран<sup>8</sup>

На всички карти дотук се вижда, че Ирак е интегрална част от Иран (Партия, Сасанидската империя, Сефевидски Иран – за ок. 50-тина години при шах Исмаил и столицата Ктесифон, както и основаният през 762 г. гр. Багдад. В своята проекция на сила на Запад по Пътя на коприната Сефевидски Иран се сблъсква с по-силната в икономическо и военно отношение Османска империя, която *de facto* заема геополитическото място на Византийската империя и търпи поражение, отстъпвайки Ирак на Турция.

### Ислямска република Иран (от 1979) на картата на света

Съвременен Иран заема централната част на Иранското плато и обхваща 1 648 000 км<sup>2</sup> при население от ок. 85 млн. души. По оценка от 2021 г. по размера на своя БВП от ок. 600 млрд. \$ Иран е на 26-то място<sup>9</sup> в света (за сравнение 85-милионна Турция е на 20-то с почти 800 млрд. \$, а Русия е на 11-то с 1700 млрд. \$ при 145 млн. население, докато Полша е на 22-ро с ок 650 млрд. \$ БВП при население от 38 млн. души).


<sup>8</sup> [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Safavid\\_Empire\\_1501\\_1722\\_AD.png](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Safavid_Empire_1501_1722_AD.png).

<sup>9</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_GDP\\_\(nominal\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)).



**Фиг. 7.** Съвременен Иран<sup>10</sup>

През 2021 г. се навършват 10 години от пряката намеса на Иран в Сирийския конфликт. Понастоящем се говори за присъствието на ок. 4 000 иранци (войници, военни и граждански съветници и т.н.) и за годишни разходи, свързани с издръжката на този контингент, пряка и косвена помощ, оказвана на Башар Асад, които варират от 5 до 20 млрд. долара. Черпейки финансови и военни сили на Изток, Иран подобно на Сасанидски Иран в началото на VII в. е насочил своята военнополитическа и идеологическа експанзия на Запад, създавайки т.н.. шиитски пояс – Ирак, Сирия, Ливан, Палестина.



**Фиг. 8.** Прокси конфликти между Иран и Саудитска Арабия

<sup>10</sup> [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Iran\\_\(orthographic\\_projection\).svg](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Iran_(orthographic_projection).svg).


## Заклучение

В заключение бих добавил, че по моето скромно мнение, историята се повтаря. Да, вярно е, че Иран никога не е бил по-силен в икономическо и военно отношение – огромни запаси от нефт и газ, развита промишленост, включително военна, успешна ракетна програма, многобройни добре снабдени и обучени въоръжени сили, но и някои от неговите противници са с далеч по-големи възможности от Византийската империя, тогавашната регионална суперсила – визирам САЩ, единствената засега световна суперсила. Основен геополитически противник на Иран обаче не са САЩ, а други две регионални сили – Саудитска Арабия и Израел. Намирайки се под нефтено и оръжейно ембарго, Иран, подобно на последния Сасанидски монарх Йездигерд III и неговия син Пероз, търси опора в източната част на Пътя на коприната – в Китай. По съобщения на свободната преса между Ислямска република Иран и КНР е сключен многообхватен дългогодишен договор за над 400 млрд. \$. Говори се, че в своята военнотехническа част той включва дори клаузи за разполагането на китайски военновъздушни и военноморски бази. При създаването на собствено ядрено оръжие обаче би последвал неотвратим удар от страна на Израел и Саудитска Арабия, които едва ли ще се ограничат само с военни обекти – ще бъде срината цялата икономическа структура на страната. Иран надценява своите сили и ще плати съответната за това цена.

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PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION



ФИЛОСОФИЯ И РЕЛИГИЯ

# Christian Artifacts and Images from Tang to Yuan Dynasty A Brief Account on Practicing Christianity along the Silk Roads from the 7<sup>th</sup> to the 15<sup>th</sup> Century

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## Abstract

Syriac Christian communities reached China starting from the seventh century and their presence has been widely debated by recent scholarship. Their cross-cultural interactions with Chinese elites and the presence of monasteries and Christian objects in the Tang empire attracted the attention of scholars as early as the 17<sup>th</sup> century, when the Xi'an stele was unearthed. This paper aims to provide a concise account of the objects, images and artifacts produced, or discovered, since the 7<sup>th</sup> century to the 15<sup>th</sup> century in China showing the cross-cultural and interreligious interactions between Christianity and Chinese culture along the Silk Roads. Given the substantial scholarship on the topic, this paper will take into consideration especially objects and images that are particularly relevant in reconstructing the daily life of Christians in China and their liturgical and religious innovations showing the active role of inculturation between Christianity and Chinese culture.

**Keywords:** Jingjiao, Church of the East, Christianity in China, Silk Road, Medieval China

## Prologue: the Church of the East and the diffusion of Christianity in China (7<sup>th</sup> to 9<sup>th</sup> century)

The Church of the East, that was a distinctive denomination of Christianity adopting mainly Syriac as a common language and spreading in Persia, Syria, and Sogdiana, among other regions, had a crucial role in the diffusion of Christianity in China and in Central Asia through both textual sources and material culture (Baumer 2016; Malek and Hofrichter 2021; Lieu and Glen 2021). In 635, after a long and exhausting journey along the commercial routes that were linking Persia, Syria, Sogdiana and China, a “foreign” monk belonging to this order reached the city of Chang’an, now Xi’an, the capital of the Tang empire. He was Alopen, one of the first Syriac Christian (known controversially also as “Nestorian”) monks to reach the court of the emperor Taizong of Tang (唐太宗, 598–649, r. 626–649). After Alopen’s arrival, Syriac Christianity, known as Jingjiao 景教 among its believers in China, became widespread in the whole region. Conversely, starting from

the 9<sup>th</sup> century a persecution that was initiated by the emperor Wuzong of Tang (唐武宗, 814–846) and that had its apex in 845 prohibited for a short period of time the proselytization of “foreign” religions, including, among others, Christianity, Nestorianism and Buddhism. This marked the end of the lasting diffusion of Christianity in the region and it eventually led to the disappearance of Christian communities in the major cities of the Tang empire, Chang’an and Luoyang. The period between the arrival of Alopen and the persecutions in the 9<sup>th</sup> century was a crucial moment in which Christian artifacts, objects and texts were transmitted and exchanged between the Christian communities and the indigenous ones.

In fact, according to the Xi’an stele, a monument erected in 781 and celebrating the history of Jingjiao, when Alopen reached the imperial court, he brought books and images that were offered directly to the emperor Taizong:

“A-lo-pen of the Kingdom of Ta-ch’in, bringing the Sutras and Images, has come from afar and presented them at our Capital.” (Saeki 1916, 166)

The term used in Chinese to denote those images is *xiang* 像 that can categorize, generally, both statues or paintings, and it is quite vague. As a result, it is difficult to imagine, or to even surmise, what kind of “images” reached the Tang court. Conversely, we are aware, once Christians were allowed to establish their monasteries in the city of Chang’an, that in 742 the emperor donated them five paintings portraying different Tang emperors, including Taizong, that were sent to the Christian communities and they were hung on the Christian monasteries (Saeki 1916, 168). By venerating the portraits of the emperors, Christian monks were part of the religious-political landscape of the Tang society. In this sense, Christian devotional images reached China in the same moment in which Christianity itself arrived.

### **Christian devotional images and other artifacts in Tang dynasty China**

Similarly to Buddhism, also Christianity rooted its own proselytization to new images and texts that started to be rendered into Chinese by the monks. In the traditional account of the arrival of Buddhism in China in the 1<sup>st</sup> century, the emperor Ming of Han (*Han Ming Di* 汉明帝, 28–75) had a dream in which he saw a golden man flying about the palace. Once he asked about the meaning of this omen, his Grand Astrologer told him that he dreamt about the famous Buddha coming from India. As a result, he dispatched his envoys to India in order to receive more information about the Buddha. Hence, “[There] they made requests, and the Buddhist image they obtained was a statue of a bodhisattva, the scripture they obtained was the Scripture in Forty-two Sections [*sishi er zhangjing* 四十二章经] and the two Dharma masters they obtained were Kāśyapamātanga and Dharmaratna. [When they arrived,] Emperor Ming invited them to ascend to the audience hall

and made offerings to them” (Adamek 2006, 302–303; for a more comprehensive account, consult: Zürcher 2007, 11–17; 18–42). The usage of images of the Buddha, similarly to the ones used by Christians, will be a crucial element of proselytization of those “foreign” religions in China and their enrootment.

Moreover, since its arrival in China, Syriac Christianity adopted Buddhism as a religious *lingua franca* borrowing its terminology, its practices and its iconography. At the same time, Christianity kept its own unique features and it was clearly distinguished by the imperial authorities from other religions. In fact, by imperial decree in 745, under the emperor Xuanzong of Tang 唐玄宗 (685–762), Jingjiao changed its official name to *Daqin jiao* 大秦教 being definitely identified with a religion coming from the region/reign of Daqin (controversially identified with the Eastern Roman Empire) (Nicolini-Zani 2006, 82–83).

The Xi’an stele, that was itself not only a textual source but also a visual one, fascinated Chinese and European scholars alike since its discovery in the 17<sup>th</sup> century (for a more comprehensive account, consult: Keevak 2018). The unique presence of the term of a new religion, *Jingjiao*, and the symbol of the cross on top of the monument, generated a sense of wonder especially in the European audience who was not able to understand the content of it but immediately recognized the symbol of the cross as properly Christian. Interestingly, a very similar cross that is present in the top of the Xi’an stele and that is located on a lotus flower flanked by clouds has been found also in the Syriac Christian manuscripts in the oasis of Turfan (Dickens 2013, 15). Similarly, the Chinese audience believed to have discovered a monument that was strictly related to the teaching of Heaven (*Tianxue* 天学) preached by the Jesuit missionaries in that time, starting from the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. The Jesuit missionaries, since their first arrival in China, were in fact convinced that Christianity reached China before them but, somehow, they could not explain the precise context of the transmission from Middle East to China. Between 1605 and 1608, Matteo Ricci, the famous Italian pioneer Jesuit missionary, asked to a Chinese Christian to inquire about the presence of Christians in Kaifeng. One of the first things he inquired about was if they venerated the cross. In the same period, he met also some Hebrews from the city of Kaifeng who told him that they did not see old Christian communities venerating the cross directly. However, before eating or drinking anything they did the sign of the cross on the food or drinks, without recalling its original meaning (D’Elia 1942–1949, v. 2, 320).

Apart from those “popular” traditions on Nestorians in China that reached Ricci, the Xi’an stele is suggesting other practices adopted by Christian monks during the Tang dynasty. For example, they were “striking the woods” in order to produce a joyful music leading to Love and Charity (Saeki 1916,164), that means likely that they were using music for liturgic purposes. In addition, as translated by Daniel H.N. Yeung, “By the rule for admission, it is the custom to apply the water of baptism, to wash away all superficial show and to cleanse and purify the neophytes” (Yeung 2018, 38). Yoshio Saeki translated slightly differently the same passage stating that “His Law is to bathe with water and with the

Spirit, and thus to cleanse from all vain delusions and to purify men until they regain the whiteness of their nature.” (Saeki 1916, 164). The Xi’an stele is also providing other information concerning their liturgical practices, even though they are not sufficient to fully reconstruct the religious activities of the monks. According to the stele, in their ceremonies they turned to the East (Saeki 1916, 164) and they let the beard grow, did fasting, and did not accumulate wealth. Interestingly, the holy communion has been described as a “bloodless” sacrifice that all the Christian believers did every seven days (Saeki 1916, 165). This bloodless sacrifice, it is explained, led the believers to regain their purity. Moreover, the symbol of the cross was clearly identified as a Jingjiao sign. The Chinese term that has been used in the Chinese text is *yin* 印 that can be literally translated also as seal (like in the case of *yinxin* 印信). Interestingly, there are scattered evidence of casting forms in Dunhuang that were used for the production of crosses (Tang and Wincler 2020, 253). Moreover, from the establishment of the Yuan dynasty there is a vast presence of so-called “Nestorian crosses” that were probably used also as “seals” (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2).



Fig. 1. Bronze “Nestorian” Cross, circa 14<sup>th</sup> century, Philadelphia Museum of Art



Fig. 2. Bronze “Nestorian” Cross, circa 14<sup>th</sup> century, Philadelphia Museum of Art

Another important visual element, that is also a textual one, is the Pillar of Luoyang dated around 815 and discovered, controversially, in 2006 or probably even in 1976, In


fact, according to Nicolini-Zani, the pillar was discovered by local farmers already in 1976, then hidden and moved to several locations, and then it was re-discovered in 2006 (consult: Nicolini-Zani 2009, 103–104). This monument was a Buddhist-like mortuary pillar that was erected for the commemoration of the dead and the ancestors, and this was already a practice that was in use by merchants travelling along the commercial routes from Sogdiana to the Tang empire since the end of the 7<sup>th</sup> century and that continued until the religious persecutions in the 9<sup>th</sup> century (Nicolini-Zani 2009, 105). This pillar is particularly important because it shows, in a different way, the cross-cultural interaction between Buddhism and Syriac Christianity in the given period and in a funerary context.



**Fig. 3.** Pillar of Luoyang, circa 815, Luoyang Museum of Material Culture and Treasures (洛阳博物馆文物珍品)

Syriac Christians left also other fascinating artworks that were related to their beliefs and their practices. A famous example is the fragmentary painting of standing figure (probably a depiction of Christ or a Christian saint as a Bodhisattva), ink and color on silk discovered in the Mogao Caves (Mogao ku 莫高窟) of Dunhuang 敦煌 within Manuscript Cave n. 17, dated around the 9<sup>th</sup> century and currently preserved at the British Museum (Fig. 3). In this silk painting traditional Buddhist elements like the lotus flowers are combined with two crosses, one on the forehead of the figure and the other one on his necklace. Since its discovery by the archeologist Aurel Stein in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, the picture has gained a lot of interest among scholars of Christianity in China. Recently, Li Tang clearly points out that “the cross is the ultimate symbol in this painting that points to a Christian origin” (Tang 2020, 239). In fact, if other elements are a syncretic effort to combine a Buddhist iconography with a Christian one, the cross is clearly distinguishing it from other depictions of the Bodhisattva of Mercy, taking later the female resemblance of the Bodhisattva Guanyin in China. The use of the picture is still uncertain. According

to Li Tang, similar pictures were used not only for personal liturgical purposes as devotional images but also as part of the divine liturgy of the *Jingjiao*.



**Fig. 4.** Fragmentary painting of a standing figure (probably a depiction of Christ or a Christian saint as a Bodhisattva), ink and color on silk, 9<sup>th</sup> century, British Museum, Asia Department

### **Epilogue: Christian artifacts during the Yuan dynasty (from the 13<sup>th</sup> century to 15<sup>th</sup> century)**

After the religious persecutions in 845 by Emperor Wuzong, Christian communities started to disappear from the Tang empire. According to David Wilmshurst, in 987 (Hegira 377), the Christian author and polymath Abū al-Faraj ‘Abd Allāh ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. 1043) in Baghdad commented the encounter that he had with a Syriac Christian monk coming from China:

“I asked him for some information about his journey, and he told me that Christianity was just extinct in China; the native Christians had perished in one way or another; the church which they had used had been destroyed; and there was only one Christian left in the land. The monk, having found no one remaining to whom his ministry could be of any use, returned more quickly than he went.” (Wilmshurst 1990, 46)

Starting from the 13<sup>th</sup> century, Syriac Christianity became once again part of the Chinese religious landscape, especially during the Yuan dynasty. For example, in the area around the city of Beijing, the remains of the Fangshan Cross Temple (*fangshan shizisi* 房山

十字寺), controversially identified as a Syriac Christian temple, are an important evidence of the presence of Christianity in the imperial capital of the Yuan dynasty (consult: Tang and Zhang 2018).

In this time, Franciscan missionaries started also to reach China from Europe and they were stupefied by the presence of Syriac Christians. More controversially, Giovanni da Montecorvino (1247–1328) saw them directly as a rival Christian group in the region stating that “have grown so powerful in those parts that they will not allow a Christian of another ritual to have ever so small a chapel, or to publish any doctrine different from their own.” (Yule 2010, v. 1, 197). Together with religious buildings, Syriac Christians produced also daily objects. Pier Giorgio Borbone (Borbone 2019) studied the importance of a Yuan dynasty mirror coming from Inner Mongolia, which has been produced by an unknown artist. The mirror, according to Borbone, was used both in daily life but also for funerary services even though there is no direct evidence for the latter usage. The mirror, in Syriac literature, represented an important component of Christian spirituality like an object that can reflect divine reality (Brock 2009) and its usage for funerary purposes could be a plausible explanation of the presence of several mortuary mirrors in China since the 12<sup>th</sup> century. In addition, already in Liao China around 1105 a series of small bronze mirrors was placed on the exterior wall of the Bai ta 白塔 pagoda showing, once again, the complex usage of mirrors in China for religious purposes (Ho 2005, 95). Moreover, another important discovery in Inner Mongolia, specifically in Shizhuziliang 石柱子梁, testified the presence in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century of the figure of a Madonna with Child inscribed on a mirror (Halbertsma 2008, 77) dated around the 11<sup>th</sup> century. This discovery is problematic, and it has been challenged as a possible archeological misunderstanding. In fact, according to Tjalling Halbertsma this might have been also a depiction of Guan-yin, a Buddhist bodhisattva (Halbertsma 2008, 210; for a more recent work on the Shizhuziliang crosses, consult: Halbertsma 2021).

As mentioned previously, “Nestorian” crosses represent another important evidence of the transmission of Syriac Christianity through material culture and they shed light on the practices of Christians during the Yuan dynasty. Their usage has been disputed. For example, Samuel Lieu suggests that they were mainly used for funerary decorations and similar crosses have been also inscribed in several tombstones, especially in the area of Quanzhou 泉州 (Lieu 1980, 72–73). Still, the famous 19<sup>th</sup> century sinologist Arthur Christopher Moule suggested that, according to an inscription dated around 1281 in Zhenjiang, the crosses were also used as amulets or charms and it was connected to the four cardinal points comparing them with the human body (Moule 1931, 80–81).

Travelling across the Silk Roads, Syriac Christian material culture went through constant changes and transformation. Their change, from the Tang to the Yuan dynasty, is showing the unicity of the earlier interactions between Christianity and Chinese culture that will reach their apex in the 16<sup>th</sup> century when Jesuit missionaries, telling to the Chinese elites to have come from the marvelous and imaginary land of Tianzhu 天竺国, will

once again use maritime and terrestrial routes donating “books and images” to the Ming court.

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## On the Personal Experience of Momentariness in Buddhism

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### Abstract

*"You are dying from moment to moment and living from moment to moment and you're different each time... I am undergoing a transformation and myself is beginning to disappear." This contemporary account of a person diagnosed as a schizophrenic is a description of experience, very similar to the experience, depicted in some of the ancient texts of the Buddhist Yogācāra teaching of momentariness. The view that some of the basic ideas in the various Indian teachings, and in Buddhism in particular, are based on a personal experience, is not new. The question to what extent certain ideas used as an object of contemplation, such as that of momentariness, determine the experiences of neophytes remains open. Here we will discuss the mutual relationship between the meditation practices, experience, the teaching (dharma), and the metaphysics of the Yogācāra teaching of momentariness. The practices, especially invented to view, to realize, even probably to create momentariness, are aimed at destroying the attachment to the world and even to the sense of self. The meditative techniques themselves manipulate the temporal processing of information and thus shake the foundations of a stable view of the world as consisting of objects and relationships between them. The deep knowledge of the central Buddhist teaching dharma is a precondition for providing the mental health of the practitioners.*

**Keywords:** momentariness, Buddhism, Yogācāra, meditation, dharma, microgenesis, time experience

At the beginning we will focus on the Yogācāra doctrine of momentariness. Then we will examine some accounts of contemporary experience that is in close connection with the momentariness doctrine and *anātman* doctrine. Afterwards, we will pay more attention to some Buddhist practices of meditation which on the basis of contemplation of the impermanence – *anityatā*, produce the experience of momentariness *kṣaṇikatā* and of no-self *anātman*. Next, we will sketch out one akin to the Momentariness doctrine modern neuropsychological theory, created on the basis of the accounts of people with psychic problems. In the short final discussion, we will consider briefly also the role of the teaching (*dharma*) in the mental health of the practitioners.

## Momentariness – a brief introduction

According to the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness not time, but existence and the phenomena are atomized temporally. They are dissected into a succession of discrete momentary entities of experience, *dharmas*. So, everything passes out of existence as soon as it has originated and, in this sense, everything is momentary. As an entity vanishes, it gives rise to a new entity of almost the same nature. Thus, there is an incessant flow of causally connected momentary entities of almost the same nature, that form something like continuum (*santāna*). These entities succeed each other so fast that the process cannot be discerned by ordinary perception.<sup>1</sup> Because of the similarity of earlier and later entities within one continuum, we conceive that there is only one temporally extended entity, not a series of causally connected momentary entities.<sup>2</sup> According to the Momentariness doctrine, the world is a different entity at every moment, linked to the past world and to the future world by the law of causality (*pratītyasamutpāda* ‘dependent origination’).<sup>3</sup> This doctrine can be illustrated by analogy with the cinematography.<sup>4</sup>

The Buddhist denial of a permanent self had led to the conception of the mind as a flow of mental events, entities that are fundamental units of experience – *dharmas*. Their momentariness was deduced probably from the speed with which mental events follow each other.<sup>5</sup> On this basis and probably also from the testimony of *yogins* who had claimed that they have experienced the incessant rise and fall of the phenomena at every moment the doctrine of momentariness had emerged.

## Contemporary accounts of experiences of momentariness and of the lack of self

“You are dying from moment to moment and living from moment to moment and you’re different each time... I am undergoing a transformation and myself is beginning to disappear.”<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Rospatt 1995: 1.

<sup>2</sup> See Rospatt 1995: 1–12; Rospatt 1998; Rospatt 2004; Stcherbatsky 1993: 79–118; Harris 1991: 108, 157–172; Li 2016; Tola, Dragonetti 2004: xxxvii, 111–113.

<sup>3</sup> Rospatt 1995: 1–2. The idea of momentariness of the world is not looking so strange if we have in mind some of the contemporary theories of perception and cognition, and the Yogācāra doctrine of the world as *vijñāptimātra* or “[reduced to] cognition only”.

<sup>4</sup> The best description of this analogy I have met in the literature is given in Rospatt 1995: 1–2: “Just as the rapid projection of distinct pictures evokes the illusion of continuous action on the screen, so the fast succession of distinct momentary entities gives rise to the impression that the world around us (and also we ourselves) exist continuously without undergoing destruction and being recreated anew at every moment. And just as the change of events on the screen is caused by the qualitative difference between earlier and later pictures on the film reel, so the change in the world – this includes the change in spatial location, i.e. movement – is brought about by the qualitative difference between earlier and later entities. Moreover, just as each projected picture only consists of differently shaded points which by their specific arrangement give rise to the perception of composite shapes, so the world around us consists of without undergoing destruction and being recreated nothing but distinct atoms which are arranged in such a way that they convey the impression of compact bodies.” See also Rospatt 1998: 470.

<sup>5</sup> Rospatt 1998: 471.

<sup>6</sup> This experience is cited in Chapman (1966): 232. The whole extract of the account of the patient (duration of illness

This account of an experience of the patient in the relatively early stage of schizophrenia is very similar to the Buddhist adepts' descriptions<sup>7</sup> of momentariness experience. From such accounts it is seen that an experience of momentariness and/or of fragmentarity of the world can emerge spontaneously under specific conditions. This fact may lead us to different conclusions about the practice-experience-meditation-teaching-metaphysics mutual relationships as factors with different weight working together towards the goal – emancipation, omniscience, enlightenment.<sup>8</sup> The idea that one of the factors is with greater or less importance than the others will always be fragmentary – in the holistic process of human cognition different functions and modes of consciousness is not so precisely differentiated.

But such ideas do occur and even is very popular. According to Sharf and his profound study (Sharf 2005 [1995]: 255) “the role of experience in the history of Buddhism has been greatly exaggerated in contemporary scholarship.” The “phenomenological approach” to Buddhism, as Sharf (2005 [1995]: 258) points out may be misleading and “it may reveal more about the dangers of projection and transference in the study of Buddhism than it tells us about Buddhism itself”.<sup>9</sup>

Schmithausen (2014: 630, 635–636; 2005 [1973]) have stated that the theory of momentariness is “predominantly, rooted in spiritual practice.”<sup>10</sup> This idea has been critiqued in Franco 2009a, 2009b, 2018. Rospatt (1995: 209) suggested that the notion of momentariness could be incorporated in *smṛtyupasthāna* practice “as the adequate understanding of impermanence”. I want to emphasize here that both levels of experience – that of metaphysical understanding, and that of personal practice and meditation, were actively and simultaneously used for attaining the state “without becoming” – *nirvāṇa*.<sup>11</sup>

What may we conclude from the above-mentioned experience? It is possible that an experience of this kind has triggered the whole notion about momentarity, or probably, some of the especially acute practices as *maraṇasmṛti* (see below) have provoked an experience of momentariness before the *kṣaṇikatā* doctrine had emerged. Or, on the basis

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6 months, at the time of interview – a 20-year-old student of arts) is: “When you feel in a trance, you tend to identify yourself with the other person, but that does not matter for if he moves you go back into a trance. You are dying from moment to moment and living from moment to moment and you’re different each time. You don’t know you’re in it. When I look at somebody my own personality is in danger. I am undergoing a transformation and myself is beginning to disappear”. Another example is: “When I start walking I get a fast series of pictures in front of me. Everything seems to change and revolve around me. Something goes wrong with my eyes and I’ve got to stop and stand still,” Chapman (1966): 243. The idea in citing these experiences here is not to diminish the yogic feats into investigation of the nature of cognition and reality, but to emphasize the common base of experience, and eventually to point out some possible Buddhist strategies to understand the cognition processes deeply. See some other deficits in visual movement perception that are briefly discussed below and also see Kelly 2005; Wandell 1995: Chapter 11: Miracle cures.

<sup>7</sup> Although there are voluminous Buddhist *mārga* treatises, delineating the stages on the Buddhist path, they have never been depicted from the first-person point of view. See Sharf 2005 [1995], Franco 2009a.

<sup>8</sup> There are many investigations dealing with this theme. See Schmithausen 2014: 630, 635–636; Schmithausen 2005 [1973]; Franco 2009a, Franco 2009b, Franco 2018; Eltschinger (2009); Sharf 2005 [1995].

<sup>9</sup> For a broader Indian context see Ruseva-Sokolova 2011.

<sup>10</sup> Schmithausen 2014: 630. But he points out in Schmithausen 2005 (1973): 243 that “Of course, spiritual practice seems hardly possible without any theoretical presupposition.”

<sup>11</sup> See also Deleanu 2013.

of the *anityatā* doctrine Buddhists may have developed meditative practices, that induce such an acute experience, or that some of their practices lead as a byproduct to the experience of momentariness. And so on. The more interesting question is about the goal of such an experience of momentariness. From one hand, probably to apprehend the ‘quantum’ of experience (*dharmā*), from the other, to have a *nirvikalpa* (non-conceptual, see below) perception<sup>12</sup> and experience, and from the other, to experience fully the *anityatā* – non-eternity.

Can meditation give a new suitable knowledge, not attainable otherwise? According to Franco (2009a: 9) for the Buddhists the goal of meditation is “to gain deeper understanding of the truths handed down by the tradition”. As Eltschinger (2009) points out, for Dharmakīrti the sequence of deeds for the Buddhist practitioners is study, reflection and meditation, and the interpretation of experiences in meditation is based on the teachings (which are especially abundant in this area).<sup>13</sup> One is not expected to have a radical new experience that does not accord with the teachings.<sup>14</sup>

Here, in connection with another Buddhist doctrine – that of non-self, I will cite also the conclusion of the investigation made by Ataria and Neria (2013: 18–19) of accounts of the extreme human experience – that of a war captive:

During captivity, captives who suffer from extreme sensory deprivation frequently lose their sense of body... The loss of the sense of body results in the loss of one’s sense of objectivity because the body is not only an object of consciousness but also of time as an objective dimension. The arrow of time, a primary condition for rational and logical thought, ceases to exist/function. Similarly, the sense of oneness and the sense of duration collapse... In other words, time as a Newtonian/objective dimension is merely an illusion... The sense of time lies at the heart of the structure of the human subject as Being-in-the-World. Since the sense of time mirrors the current state of relations between thought, body, and the world it constitutes the first indicator of a disintegration of the relationship between the subject and the world. Lacking a sense of body is intimately linked with the collapse of the sense of time, and in extreme situations this may result in a collapse of the sense of self.

Being closed in a cave for a long time is a well-known practice among the Buddhists, and the non-self (*anātman*)<sup>15</sup> experience is central in Buddhism.

<sup>12</sup> Bronkhorst 2011.

<sup>13</sup> See also Deleanu 2013.

<sup>14</sup> Although, the Buddha’s own experience in meditation had given new knowledge, that is not based on any tradition. If we can reach such a knowledge in meditation independently of any teaching, as Buddha did, the teachings are not needed, and if we can not reach such a knowledge as a personal experience of reality, it is redundant. See Taber 2009. See also McCrea 2009.

<sup>15</sup> For the use of some metaphoric words and expression in Yogācāra see Tzohar 2018 and especially for the metaphor of *self* see Tzohar 2018: 158–161.

### Some Buddhist practices for realizing the *anityatā*

The realization of the impermanent nature of existence *anityatā* ('noneternity') is the first step on the Buddhist path of enlightenment,<sup>16</sup> and early Buddhism emphasizes brevity of life and mortality of all living beings.<sup>17</sup>

*"Seyyathāpi brāhmaṇā, thullaphusitake deve vassante udakabubbūlaṃ khippameva paṭivigacchati na ciraṭṭhītikam hoti, evameva kho brāhmaṇā, udakabubbūḷupamaṃ jīvitam manussānam parittam lahukam bahudukkham bahūpāyāsam, mantāya boddhabbam. Kattabbam kusalam caritabbam brahmacariyam. Natthi jātassa amaraṇam."* (Anguttaranikaya IV. 137.) (7.2.2.10.3 Arakasuttam)<sup>18</sup>

"Just as a line drawn on water with a stick will quickly vanish and will not last long, so too, brahmins, human life is like a line drawn on water with a stick. It is limited and fleeting; it has much suffering, much misery. One should wisely understand this. One should do what is wholesome and lead the spiritual life; for none who are born can escape death." (Aṅguttara Nikāya)<sup>19</sup>

In the Pāli canon many different practices for comprehension of the transience of life are depicted, most of them based on the manipulation of the time sense/perception.<sup>20</sup> These include contemplation of death in the charnel fields, with the awareness that the decaying corpse is one's own body, or at least, that one's own body will end in the same manner; gradually reducing in the mind the time that is left to live to a single breath (*smṛtyupasthāna*) in order not to waste time and to be mindful of the present;<sup>21</sup> concentrating on the impermanent nature of existence.

One technique to achieve the profound realization of *anityatā* was the contemplation of death in the charnel fields. The Buddhist practitioner observes the various states of decomposition of the human corpses, aware that his own body will end up in the same way. So, he begins to see directly the impermanent nature of his body.<sup>22</sup> A less dangerous is the practice of recollecting death (*maraṇasmṛti*). Here the stretch of time that a monk should expect to live gradually is reduced to the time taken for a single breath, so he should become mindful of the present.

When *anityatā* is dealt within the terms of momentariness the adept reduces the existence of entities to infinitesimal instants without any temporal extension. By contemplating *anityatā* in terms of momentariness, the impermanence can be understood as destruction and annihilation in every moment of existence.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>16</sup> See Rospatt 2004.

<sup>17</sup> Coomaraswamy 1947: 30–33.

<sup>18</sup> GRETIL.

<sup>19</sup> The translation is of Bhikkhu Bodhi (2012: 1096).

<sup>20</sup> Here I will mention only some of them as depicted by Rospatt (2004) who made a profound and detailed study on the subject. See also Ruseva 2018; Ruseva 2021.

<sup>21</sup> See Rospatt 1995: 210–212.

<sup>22</sup> Some Pāli texts note that this practice led to waves of suicides among the monks. Rospatt 1995: 210–212; Rospatt 2004.

<sup>23</sup> Rospatt 2004.

So, what is the goal of such practices – probably to bug the so-called normal activity of the brain in order to destroy the existing schema or matrix of the world view, of the normal thinking and cognition, in order to see the big picture, how the mind works, how the thought process is structured, what is cognition.

### A contemporary neuro-psychological theory

When something goes wrong in the psyche, the very mechanism of the work of the psyche can become clear. Based on this observation and on empirical experience, a neuro-psychological theory – so called microgenesis<sup>24</sup>, quite reminiscent of the doctrine of momentariness<sup>25</sup> was built. For our further analysis, let us cite an extract from Samyuttanikaya:

*“Aññatreva āvuso saviṭṭha, saddhāya aññatra ruciyā aññatra anussavā aññatra ākāraparivittakkā aññatra diṭṭhinijjhānakkhantiyā ahametaṃ jānāmi, ahametaṃ passāmi bhavanirodho nibbānanti.”* (Samyuttanikāyo II. 117)<sup>26</sup>

“Friend Savittha, apart from faith, apart from personal reference, apart from oral tradition, apart from reasoned reflection, apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, I know this, I see this: ‘Nibbana is the cessation of becoming.’<sup>27</sup>” Samyutta Nikāya (Kosambi 68.8, II. 117)<sup>28</sup>

But what is ‘becoming’? Time is judged with the rise and maintenance of the self, its creation at all times is closely linked to the creation of time. Time is created simultaneously<sup>29</sup> with the becoming and with the creation of self (or self-extension – identity). “... the time of a becoming is the time the becoming creates.”<sup>30</sup>

The scheme of the phases of descent in the mental state proposed by Brown (2008: 371) and given also here (Scheme 1) is up to some degree consistent with the Buddhist ideas concerning the process of becoming if we don’t pay attention to the notion ‘core self’ – in Buddhism there is no such things as core, or as self. Buddhists are quite aware that this core and this self are created in the process.

<sup>24</sup> See Brown 1996, 1999, 2000, 2008.

<sup>25</sup> Brown 1999.

<sup>26</sup> GRETIL.


<sup>27</sup> Here I prefer the variant ‘becoming’ instead of Bhikkhu Bodhi’s ‘existence’. The word *bhava* from the verb root  $\sqrt{bhū}$  – ‘to become’, ‘to exist’, ‘to be’, can mean both. Coomaraswami (1947: 33) also prefers ‘becoming’.

<sup>28</sup> The translation is of Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000: 610).

<sup>29</sup> We should keep in mind that simultaneity can be judged only retrospectively. See Zhou, Pöppel, Bao 2014.

<sup>30</sup> Brown (1996: 3).

SCHEME 1  
THE PHASES OF DESCENT IN THE MENTAL STATE PROPOSED BY JASON BROWN (2008: 371)



In the microgenesis theory “each mental state is a recurrent transition from core to empirical self to external world.”<sup>31</sup> “... The complete sequence from depth to surface constitutes the mind/brain state. In this theory, reality is not the starting point but the goal of an act of knowledge.”<sup>32</sup>

In Buddhism all these processes and phases are objectified, and consequently transcended. The Buddhist tries to withdraw beyond the initial phase in the mental state beyond the creation of time, beyond self and objects, beyond becoming.<sup>33</sup>

### Time experience

There are some special deficits in seeing and experiencing movement that throw some light on the question of how man creates time.<sup>34</sup> According to Wandell (1995: Chapter 11, Miracle cures, 5) the ability to integrate images acquired from different positions at different times is crucial for seeing motion. The ability to see a single object out of many images has to be learned for people blind as infants and then cured. In order to see a moving object, one must be able to integrate different images of the object over time. “To perform this integration, then, requires a means of short-term visual storage that can be used to represent recent information and visual inferences.”<sup>35</sup> The patients suffering from akinetopsia, or motion blindness, can perceive only stationary objects: the coming car is first very far away, then very near, without any experience of moving between, but they don’t have problems cognize different objects.<sup>36</sup>

To see momentary scenes in which there is no movement corresponds to the primary

<sup>31</sup> Brown 2008: 371.

<sup>32</sup> Brown 1999: 261.

<sup>33</sup> See also Ruseva 2018; Ruseva 2021.

<sup>34</sup> See Kelly 2005, Wandell 1995: Chapter 11: 1. Miracle cures.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 8.

<sup>36</sup> Kelly 2005.

perception in the moment (lasting no more than 40 ms [=0,04 s]), in this ‘functional moment’ the difference between an earlier and a later event is not felt, and events in this range are considered simultaneous. In the range of up to 3 seconds, the independent images are integrated into an object that can move – i.e., in order to perceive movement, it is necessary to create the object and realize this object as the same, but moved over time. Visible movement is created through this integration of the independent images obtained in the ‘functional moments’. Short-term memory is also involved in this process.<sup>37</sup>

According to Vasubandhu at the moment of perception there is only the so-called *nirvikalpa*<sup>38</sup> or non-conceptual ‘momentary’ perception, typical for very young children and highly trained *yogins*. Subsequently, the so-called *savikalpa* perception or reasoning by the mind is fulfilled without the presence of the already perceived object.<sup>39</sup>

## Discussion

In the framework of the Yogācāra tradition, that sees the whole world as being cognition-only (*vijnāptimātra*), or being mind-only or consciousness-only (*cittamātra*, *cittaiva*), the manner in which the world operates is the same as the manner in which the mind operates. The meditative practice is probably not structured specially to catalyze or provoke beforehand determined state of consciousness, but to bug the scheme / the matrix of everyday cognition, thought, and reason, to decompose the experience.

Through observations of experience from different points of view – from the outsider that has assembled many accounts of personal experience of his patients and from the point of view of the experiencer, and from the point of view of the Yogācāra traditional accounts, and then analyzing this experience according to the dogmas of different frames of investigation, one can make some conclusions about the way the mind and psyche operate.

The experience of momentariness is not the goal, it is just a step on the way to profoundly realize the impermanent nature of all the existence. The deep knowledge of the central Buddhist teaching *dharma*<sup>40</sup> is a precondition for providing the mental health of the practitioners.

This experience of time on different scales – the ‘functional moment’ lasting a few mini seconds, the ‘experienced moment’ lasting up to 3 seconds, and the ‘mental pres-

<sup>37</sup> For more detail of different temporal scales of integration of experience see Wittmann 2011. See also Kent, Wittmann 2021; Dorato, Wittmann 2015. On the notions of memory in Buddhism see Lopez 1992, Ruseva 2015a.

<sup>38</sup> For *nirvikalpa* and *savikalpa* perception see Bronkhorst 2011.

<sup>39</sup> See for example Tola, Dragonetti 2004: 111–113. For the comparison of the notions of the sense of time and temporality in Buddhism and in Yogasūtra of Patañjali see Ruseva 2015b, Ruseva 2018.

<sup>40</sup> The central for Buddhism word *dharma* (from the verb root *dhṛ*) has the whole list of connotations, ‘to support’ – ‘the order, that supports everything’, ‘The Order’; ‘The Teaching [of the Buddha]’; ‘religion’; ‘the Buddhist path’; ‘the momentary entities of cognition’, etc. See for example Kamburov 2015. On the Buddhist notions of ‘order’ and ethics see Bratoeva 1997a, 1997 b, 2002, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2020; and on the pan-Indian notions of [social] ‘order’ see Kamova 1995a, 1995b, 1997, 2009, 2017a, 2017b, 2019a, 2019b. It was very interesting for me to see, that the notions of ‘religion’ in Islam is quite different than those in Buddhism, see for example Dyulgerov 2008, 2012, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018: 47–90.

ence' lasting up to 100 seconds<sup>41</sup> is reduced in the Yogācāra meditation to the suspension of the integration of 'functional moments'. With this suspension, further functions of consciousness such as time-creation and world-creation cease, and also the more time-consuming self-creation.

In such a manner the experience is atomized and only the instantaneous experience-atom, or *dharmā*, is considered real, but not the integrative function that sews these instantaneous experiences into ideas, objects and the world, and for longer durations (up to 100 seconds) – into an experiencing subject. This integrative function ceases in the practices of Buddhism as a conceptual appendage, a concrete stitching that, though useful in everyday life, obscures the reality of momentariness, as well as the deepest suffering, that perhaps there is no such thing as a primordial not-composed<sup>42</sup> self or world.

One of the things that can be concluded from this consideration is that the meditative techniques themselves manipulate the temporal processing of information and thus shake the foundations of a stable view of the world as consisting of objects and relationships between them. A picture that subsequently becomes an idealistic conception of existence as awareness-only or as reduced only to awareness *vijnaptimātra*.

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<sup>41</sup> Wittmann 2011.

<sup>42</sup> For this deepest level of suffering, see Purser 2015.

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## Доктрината за алаявиджняна в ранните будистки текстове

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### The Doctrine of *Ālayavijñāna* in Early Buddhist Texts

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#### Abstract

This paper deals with the idea of *ālayavijñāna* as it is presented in the early Buddhist texts. The aim of the study is to establish the meanings and different connotations of the term *ālayavijñāna*. *Ālayavijñāna* is an invention of the Yogācāra Buddhist school, one of the most important schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Consciousness is divided into two main entities: *pravṛttivijñāna* – the functioning consciousness, and *ālayavijñāna* – the store (or storehouse) consciousness, the eighth consciousness. *Ālayavijñāna* performs two main functions – it is the „place“ where the impressions of previous knowledge are stored and in turn, when the „maturation“ of these impressions occurs, gives as a result a new knowledge. *Ālayavijñāna* is momentary, arising from moment to moment. It is based on the cognitive input, on the information from the functioning consciousness, on the *saṃskārā* (impressions) and *bīja* (seeds). It forms the memories, which in turn become new seeds for the next cognitive experiences.

**Keywords:** ālaya-vijñāna, Buddhism, early Buddhism, early Buddhist texts, yogācāra, consciousness, store consciousness

Ученията на Буда са задълбочени и обхващат философски, психологически и етични принципи, като също така преди всичко се занимават с целта на този живот – нирвана.

Школата йогачара (*yogācāra*, възникнала около IV в.) има различни имена – „само разум/съзнание“ (*cittamātra*), „само (раз)познаване“ (*vijñaptimātra*), „учение за познаването“ (*vijñānavāda*) – като всички те носят приблизително еднаква конотация. За основатели на школата йогачара се считат двама братя<sup>1</sup> – Васубандху и Асанга, живели през IV–V в., но най-вероятно теориите, развити в йогачара, са съществували около век преди това. Идеи, които могат да бъдат наречени прото-йогачара,

<sup>1</sup> Според тибетските източници, от една майка и различни бащи.

може да бъдат намерени в различни текстове, най-вече в Самдхинирмочанасутра (Samdhinirmocanasūtra). Школата йогачара се разпростира в Източна и Централна Азия и преживява най-голям разцвет през VI в., като много от творбите се пишат в будисткия университет в Наланда.

Йогачара отстоява практическата страна на философията и се смята за една от най-важните будистки школи. Йогачара се занимава предимно с доктрината за съзнанието, като се стреми да трансформира съзнанието и изследва критично както обикновения, така и просветления ум.

В Самдхинирмочанасутра се срещат пет от ключовите концепции на йогачара – трите отличителни нови доктрини на школата: за виджнаптиматра<sup>2</sup>, трисвабхава<sup>3</sup> (*trisvabhāva*) и осем степени съзнание, както и третото завъртане на колелото на дхарма<sup>4</sup> и преобръщане на основите (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*)<sup>5</sup>.

За да преминем към изследването на термина алаявиджнана (*ālayavijñāna*), е добре първо да разберем идеята на йогачара за съзнанието, което е изключително важен фактор във всеки аспект на съществуването. Нищо от това, което преживяваме, не се случва без посредничеството на ума и съзнанието, всичко пречупваме през собствената сфера на опитност и така до голяма степен преживяванията са субективни. Затова ще обясним по-подробно теорията за осемте вида съзнание (виджнана)<sup>6</sup>. Йогачара добавя още два вида към стандартното разбиране на будизма за шест категории съзнание, а именно ума (манас) и алаявиджнана. В йогачара съзнанието се разделя на две основни групи: правриттивиджнана (съзнание в действие) и алаявиджнана. Правриттивиджнана включва първите седем вида съзнание: на виждането, чуването, помирисването, вкусването, докосването, менталните възприятия (мановиджнана) и това на манас.

Опитът от първите седем вида съзнание е складиран в алаявиджнана и затова може да се твърди, че алаявиджнана е с много голяма важност, тъй като съдържа всички семена (биджа) и отпечатъци (васана). Всички минали идеи и преживявания оставят своите отпечатъци в алаявиджнана и така там се „складират“ различни семена. Затова може да се каже, че алаявиджнана е първопричина за правриттивиджнана, като правриттивиджнана е проява на алаявиджнана и двете не са нито идентични, нито различни. Алаявиджнана съхранява информацията, която идва от активния ум

<sup>2</sup> Виджнаптиматра – „само (раз)познаване“ или „свеждащо се единствено до разпознаването“.

<sup>3</sup> Възприетата собствена природа (*parikalpita-svabhāva*); зависимата собствена природа (*paratantra-svabhāva*); реално съществуващата собствена природа (*pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*).

<sup>4</sup> Самдхинирмочанасутра прокламира, че учението, което съдържа, е третото завъртане на колелото на дхарма.

<sup>5</sup> Йогачара описва просветлението като резултат от преобръщането на когнитивната основа (*āśraya-parāvṛtti*), т.е. преобръщане на концептуалните проекции и илюзии, които действат като основа на познавателните ни действия. Това преобръщане превръща основния метод на познание от разпознаване (виджнана) в пряко знание (джнана) – вж. Лустхаус (Lusthaus 2014: 7).

<sup>6</sup> Терминът виджнана може да се преведе и се превежда по много начини. Често срещан превод е съзнание, но е по-уместно да се преведе като познаване или разпознаване. Тук ще оставя превода съзнание, но нека се има предвид и конотацията процес на осъзнаване. Виджнана се състои от представката ви- (раз-) и джнана (знание; процеса на познанието) – вж. Monnier-Williams 1992.

като мисли и преживявания, като натрупано познание. Обектът и формата на *осмия вид съзнание* са недоловими.

Алаявиджнана изпълнява две основни функции – тя е „мястото“, където се съхраняват впечатленията от предходни знания и, от своя страна, при „узряването“ на тези впечатления дава като плод нови познания. Новите знания дават нови семена, които остават на съхранение, и така се завърта кръгът – това взаимно поражда не е циклично. Алаявиджнана отразява чувствата – страдание, удоволствие и нито страдание, нито удоволствие, защото е зависима от тях, но тя самата е недоловима, трудна за възприемане. Всеки човек има своя алаявиджнана, която е неразривно свързана и с дхарма.<sup>7</sup> Моментните състояния на съзнанието дхарма са винаги прилепени към алаявиджнана, а и тя към тях – процесът е взаимен и те се явяват причина и следствие съответно. Когато алаявиджнана е причина, дхарма са следствие, и обратно.

Думата *алаявиджнана* е сложна дума (композит), която се състои от думите *алая* и *виджнана*. Ālaya е съставена от префикса ā- (близо до, към (говорещия)) и глаголният корен lī (придържам се; притискам се плътно; залепвам, прилепвам се, разтопявам се, разтварям се; лягам; отпускам се; изчезвам). Така ālaya означава „онова, към което се прилепваме, което бива обитавано“, „дом, жилище, съд, убежище“, „прилепване, привързване, хващане“ (Monnier-Williams 1992).

Концепцията за *алаявиджнана* се развива от последователите на йогачара във времето (вж. Schmithausen 1987, Waldron 1994). За първи основен текст на йогачара те посочват Самдхинирмочанасутра, но терминът алаявиджнана се открива още в обемния труд на Асанга – Йогачарабхуми (Yogācārabhūmi), в частите Панчавиджнанакаясампраюкта бхуми (Pañcaviṅśānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmi), Манобхуми (Manobhūmi), Сачиттикачиттикабхуми (Sacittikā Acittikā Bhūmi), Чинтамаибхуми (Cintāmayī Bhūmi) и най-вече във Винишчаясамграхани (Viniścayasamgrahaṇī) (в разделите Правритти (Pravṛtti) и Нивритти (Nivṛtti)). Макар в частта Ālaya Treatise на Йогачарабхуми *алаявиджнана* да не се обсъжда толкова подробно, колкото в по-късните раздели на трактата, все пак показва забележимо развитие в сравнение с Proof Portion и със Самдхинирмочанасутра (по-подробно вж. Waldron 1994: 22–3).

Терминът *алаявиджнана* се среща и в други по-ранни текстове като Ланкаватарасутра (Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra), Махаянасамграха (Mahāyānasamgraha), но основно бива обяснен във Вимшатика и Тримшика (Viṃśatika, Trīṃśikā), които ще разгледаме в следваща публикация. В Ланкаватарасутра се споменават *алаявиджнана*, мановиджнана и десетте бхуми. Идеите на йогачара в зародиш се съдържат и в Дашабхумикасутра (Daśabhūmikasūtra), Шрималадевисимханадасутра (Śrīmālādevīsimhanādasūtra), Гандавюхасутра (Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra), и в Бхадрапаласутра (Bhadrapālasūtra).

<sup>7</sup> Думата дхарма също има много значения. В будизма едно от водещите значения е самото учение на Буда. Друго важно значение е съвкупността от етически принципи. Тук става въпрос за моментните състояния на съзнанието, елементарните когнитивни актове, които единствено се считат за реални от школата йогачара.

Алаявиджнана е в основата на индивидуалния опит и в текстовете бива определен посредством различни епитети и синоними, като тук ще изброим само някои от тях:

- „базово познание“ (мулавиджнана), защото съдържа кармичните семена, които повлияват и са повлияни от другите седем вида съзнание – базовото познание подпомага сетивата в тяхната дейност, те получават информация за нещата, които периодично възникват и се случват, докато алаявиджнана се характеризира със стабилност, трайност, непрекъснатост;
- „„съзнанието, съдържащо всички семена“ (сарвабиджакавиджнана, сарвабиджакачиттам), в аспекта хранител на семената – напр. в Махаянасамграха I.2: „Съзнанието (виджнана), съдържащо всички семена, е съдът (алая) на всички дхарми. Следователно се нарича алаявиджнана.“ (също и в Абхидхармасамучаябхашя 11);
- „татхагатагарбха<sup>8</sup> в Ланкаватарасутра – идея, която не се среща в трудовете на Асанга и Васубандху. (Татхагатагарбха според Сютън (Sutton 1991: 55) е утробата на абсолюта и есенцията на учението на Буда).

В Ланкаватарасутра срещаме и следното сравнение: „...тялото, насладата [от призежание и храна], и жилището (са) като алаявиджнана, т.е. над дуализма (дихотомията) на субекта [букв. мислещия] и обекта [букв. сферата на сетивното възприятие и на мисленето]: (и) състоянието на отсъствие на образ [букв. липса на светлина, отражение], което е следствие от пробуждането на самия ум и не се влияе от промени на съзнанието като пораждане, престой (и) изчезване [на ментални явления]“ (Lanka II: 42; II. 4–7, цит. по Sutton 1991: 218–9).

Според Самдхинирмочанасутра алаявиджнана влиза в тялото още в утробата на майката и се развива през самсаричното ни съществуване. Уолдрън цитира същата сутра: „Съзнанието се нарича още алаявиджнана, защото обитава тялото и се прикрепва към него чрез обща съдба“ (Waldron 1994: 20–1). В Нивритти четем: „Човек трябва да разбере, че алаявиджнана, която е коренът на злочестието, се преустановява чрез култивиране на полезни дхарми като тази“ (Nivṛtti 5.b)B.1). Така алаявиджнана е отговорна както за соматичните, така и за метафизичните преживявания.

Уолдрън споменава, че алаявиджнана действа на две нива: във връзка с познавателните обекти и свързаните с тях психични фактори (виджнана в традиционния епистемологичен смисъл); както и във връзка с процесите на ума, с които протича едновременно. Алаявиджнана и процесите на ума са и взаимно обуславящи се (Waldron 1994: 25). Той прави извода, че съзнанието алаявиджнана има три специфични типа възприемащи обекта: (1) като базово съзнание е дълбоко свързано с физическите усещания; (2) като развиващ се ум, който расте и се изгражда върху миналия опит, алаявиджнана съхранява различни чувствени и познавателни впечатления; (3) въз основа на тези две, алаявиджнана слабо възприема външния свят (Waldron 1994: 26).

<sup>8</sup> Букв. татха е „така“; гага е „отишгъл“; гарбха е „утроба“

В Абхидхармасамучаябхашя (Abhidharmasamuccaya Bhāṣya, ASBh 11.18–13.20) присъства и осемстепенното доказателство за съществуването на алаявиджнана, като тук ще го представим в превод на Грифитс (Griffiths 1986: 130–138):

Съществуването на алаявиджнана може да бъде показано по осем начина, а именно, без алаявиджнана:

- (1) Няма присвояване на [физическа] основа – не може да се придобие ново тяло.
- (2) Няма първоначално функциониране [на съзнанието] – не е възможно едновременното функциониране на сетивата, те действат едно след друго.
- (3) Няма проявено функциониране – няма ясна проява на манас.
- (4) Няма условие да има „семе“.
- (5) Няма действие.
- (6) Няма физическа опитност.
- (7) Няма медитативни постижения.
- (8) Няма „пропадане“ на съзнанието – не е възможно да настъпи смъртта.

Обемът на тази статия не позволява да разгледаме в детайли други важни за будизма концепции и връзката на алаявиджнана с тях, напр. с доктрините за анатман, карман, самсара, непостоянството, приемствеността и промяната, паметта, мигновестността и непрекъснатостта, живота и смъртта, но се надявам, че в общи линии успяхме да очертаем основните идеи, които стоят зад термина алаявиджнана. В заключение можем да кажем, че в съвременния динамичен свят будизмът, неговите медитативни практики и неговото разбиране за ум, разум, съзнание и връзката им с пълноценен и хармоничен начин на живот са много ценни и тяхното изучаване и разбиране е все по-необходимо.

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# The Underlying Principles of the Aristocratic Worldview in the Foreword of Shin Kokin Wakashū Composed in Classical Chinese

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## Abstract

This article aims at clarifying the nature of the Chinese influence and its interaction with the indigenous Japanese mindset in the Foreword to the “New Imperial Compilation of ancient and modern songs”, commissioned on the 300th anniversary (1205) of the completion of the Kokinshū (905). This foreword stays together with its Japanese counterpart in certain conceptual relationship as well as they both present a variety of key metaphors and principles that are not always adequately transmittable or obvious at their true functional scale. In spite of their elusiveness they have been a milestone of refined expression of an ancient and flourishing cultural tradition.

**Keywords:** Classical Chinese, Classical Japanese, Shin Kokin Wakashū, Japanese poetry, Eastern Philosophy and culture

In order to enable the reader to get a quick grasp of the problem raised in the title, we are offering a full translation of the Chinese Preface with some minimal footnotes. Afterwards we make a sufficient review of the main points of the text.

## 1. Translation of the Chinese Preface to the New compilation of Japanese songs – ancient and modern

[It must not be forgotten that]<sup>1</sup> the Japanese song is the predecessor<sup>2</sup> of all virtues,

<sup>1</sup> 夫 – initial particle which abolishes a presupposed profane view or raises attention to matters of high importance.

<sup>2</sup> 祖 – not only an esthetical praise but rather a metaphysical term. 1) Refers to a predecessor, but skipping at least one generation back (in some sense as near as only one jump away, but still unfathomable before facing it directly). 2) Signifies a true initiator. A true initiator in this case, radically speaking, may be the unborn and hence, an immortal one, not burdened by any definite properties. The origin of writing Japanese songs may be a state of consciousness, where their perfect author is a true witness, without any attachments and without any self-identifications, as the Buddhist ideology of the compilers imply. 3) The ideal author has been all along mysterious, and this beginning of his, respectively, of the Japanese song, is infinite in potential. The one, who has embodied mystery, knows the constant refining of the beginning, while facing no end. His pure consciousness is the only fresh self – it is an immediate adjustment to reality without any self-analysis. His empirical self has lost ground in the sense that the notorious samsara wheel virtually runs no more. This is also the definition of grace, a natural extension of a bliss, wondrously spread by the ideal emperor to the people. He, by means of his insight, happens to enable the Japanese song to become clearer at its very roots.

that always naturally go together like a flock of sheep<sup>3</sup>. It is also the essence of all various happy features displayed on the body of the awakened.

When the celestial bodies<sup>4</sup> haven't still manifest their properties, before the formation of Heaven, and before the appearance of a sense for the Five boundaries<sup>5</sup> and Six emotions<sup>6</sup>, when the abode in Soga was silent<sup>7</sup>, that namely was the time when the creation of masterpieces of 31 characters began to flourish.

And really there has been an all pervasive integrity within the songs, although you can say that some authors have just reached up to the emperor, simply exposing their minds in front of him, or that some others were just too articulate about the perceived unsurpassable virtues, meticulously aiming at transforming people. Or that, joining our well hosted drinking assemblies, some dare reveal their utmost intimate sentiments. Or that some only send off in words what they accept as beautiful and graceful. Really, there is a huge sign of true benevolence in these songs, when one is seeing the minute veins of the world and manifests an ability to lead it to ultimate peace, caressing the people. And precisely in accordance with these works, being a mirror of heavenly and earthly things, there are hearts which enjoy sights with truly opened eyes or are intrigued by all overwhelming things. Due to this we, in the illuminated age of sacred ruling, have ordered the compilation. We examined the songs properly and in detail – how can in this case something go underhand? And in spite of this, although one can collect jewels from the Kunlun mountain<sup>8</sup>, there are still many other poems left. And although one can take all the trees of the Wondrous forest Denglin born by the Giant Kuafu<sup>9</sup>, they will be still inexhaustible. The Japanese songs cannot be different to that.

So, we ordered the Appointed State Counselor and Commander of the Right Gate Guard Minamoto-no Michitomo, the Minister of Treasury Fujiwara-no Ariie, the Middle

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<sup>3</sup> Alluded by the sheep element of the character.

<sup>4</sup> 玄象 (“mysterious signs”) is also a name of a famous Japanese lute. There is a story behind it. A Japanese aristocrat wanted to learn the secrets of biwa in China but was stopped by the ghost of emperor Murakami, who appeared in his dream, and entrusted him a famous instrument from the Dragon Palace. This may be a metaphor for the belief that if somebody wants to acquire formidable skills in a deep art and by it even to know himself, he can do it without a step further from his house. Furthermore, analogous stories about ancient musicians from China suggest that biwa is a fruitful media of a mutual understanding. “Knowing the sound”, while attending someone's performance, is another word for a lifelong friendship (知音).

<sup>5</sup> The five inevitable kinds of relationship according to Confucianism: with the monarch, with the father, with the older brother, with the partner and with the friends.

<sup>6</sup> The Six emotions: pleasure, anger, sorrow, joy, love and hatred.

<sup>7</sup> When Susanoo-no mikoto established his dwelling in Soga with a “refreshed heart”, he wrote a song that depicted his many-fenced home, built out of the rising clouds. The epithet is opposed to the Five boundaries, settling the relationships. Before having the song, being focused on the conditions, one is bound to explore what is hidden in the clouds – the struggles with the ongoing relationships as well as the readiness to celebrate the natural beginnings of every spring (or divine creation).

<sup>8</sup> The structures inside the stones cannot be separated from them, so we can pick several others, but not extract one from another at will. We can polish them separately.

<sup>9</sup> The forest grew out of the stick and the body of the dead Kuafu, who chased after the sun, intrigued by its position. He helped himself with the stick to approach the sun, but didn't endure to the end because of the heat, drinking all of the water along the way. The Japanese songs are compared to the sticks from that forest that never cease to appear when witnessing, but never bring us to an end goal, if we are the explorers.

Captain of the Left Imperial Guards' Division Fujiwara-no Sadaie, the Former Deputy Prefect of Kazusa Fujiwara-no Ietaka, and the Junior Captain of the Left Guards Fujiwara-no Masatsune to collect many brocade lines and nephrite words, while deliberately ignoring the origin and social status of their authors. A widely understandable and unpretentious script was used to present words dedicated to the gods, to the awakened or to the common obscure matters – so maintaining the equality of representation.<sup>10</sup> Beginning with the past, which inevitably bears things we are still looking up to even in the present times, we compiled various pieces of work. In the morning, where the fragrance of the secret gardens flow, amidst the yards covered with jewels, where the cool winds blow, sipping from the venerable streams of Naniwa<sup>11</sup>, the splendid turmoil of currents, catching up to the fragrant traces of Asakayama, unwilling to judge about things shallowly, reciting or composing, digging up some outstanding works like teeth of rhinoceros and elephants, without taking sides of any faction<sup>12</sup>, we snatched the jadeite-colored cicadas<sup>13</sup> wings as something so precious as it is not worth to be valued by many. Arranging all songs according to their form, it gave us around 2000 items<sup>14</sup>, which we distributed in 20 fascicles sorting them out per similarity. The whole compilation will be from now on known as a New Collection of indigenous poems, ancient and modern. We put them in strings as if they were stars, with every piece belonging to its topic of any of the Four Seasons. They will spread like clouds, authored by many from the crowd, sung by many. As a result, all of these marvelous pieces are neatly harbored here.

If I respectfully reflect to the matters, I followed the ancient example of finally ascending to Fenyang, refusing to dwell in the Palace for long, although being of imperial blood. Instead I remained a demanding father of the current ruler and although not really having time to discuss the matters of the ruler's way, I am still the older among those of the same line, so, how could I desist from my care to enjoy and preserve our traditions? Hence we have been bound to merge into one body and are going to praise the virtues of the proper rule from our classics and from those of the achievers from afar. I will enjoy the unceasing spring of their benevolent influence, will let them all to peacefully recreate the ultimate virtue for life, as over the bending grass of Kasuga which subdues to the wind, will promise an eternal autumn to all the enjoyers of the moon-viewing feasts, so that the Realm of the Fall Margins<sup>15</sup> would become utterly silent. For sure I am eager to dip my brush and to rule out the matters with the blank paper, since the proper time has

<sup>10</sup> 希夷 – a pair found in Daodejing, in the 14-th chapter, referring to the unseen, rare, microscopic and elusive matters. They represent the wrongly obvious and the all-pervading property of the universe.

<sup>11</sup> The Osaka Bay (“The stormy waves”). The emperor refers to the famous poem of Wani, who praised the grace of emperor Jintoku, who found his capital there and released the common people from taxes.

<sup>12</sup> A motive found in the first Japanese constitution written by Shotoku Taishi.

<sup>13</sup> 川蝉 or 翡翠 – Kawasemi (see 蝉 which represents the unceasing song of the water, as well as the sound of the words. The song of the cicada is too noisy for the tiny body of the insect and is somehow extraordinarily appealing. Written the other way with 翡翠 it alludes to the nephrite light green color, but more transparent, as well as to the male and female side of the living things.

<sup>14</sup> Actually 1979.

<sup>15</sup> Another name of Japan.

come to manifest an overflowing action born at the bosom of non-action. Because of this I initiated this compilation, ready to convey it forever to another hundred kings.

Our old Manyoshu<sup>16</sup> is really the ancestor of all Japanese songs. The justification of the songs' choice, the compass of the sources: all of this is distant as the stars are and is difficult to reveal as if we are dabbling across a smoke. During the Engi Era<sup>17</sup> they edited the Kokinshu<sup>18</sup> – it was ordered to four people to compile it. In the Tenryaku era<sup>19</sup> there was the Gosenshu<sup>20</sup>, redacted by five men. After that come Shuiwakashu<sup>21</sup>, Goshuiwakashu<sup>22</sup>, Kinyowakashu<sup>23</sup>, Shikawakashu<sup>24</sup> and Senzaiwakashu<sup>25</sup>. Although the last five are ordered by several sacred emperors, they are, unfortunately reviewed only by one man each. Because of this I rather chose to follow the wise approach of the above mentioned Engi and Tenryaku eras and selected five best noblemen to engage in editing and compilation. Therefore, at first we took some songs from Manyoshu and after that we chose some of the songs outside the Seven anthologies, cited above. We dug deeply in order not to miss even a slightly valuable song and searched widely not to miss even a partially virtuous poem. But even if we stretch our nets in fields and mountains, tiny birds manage to escape; and though we unfold our webs in rivers and lakes, little fish can sneakily avoid them. Being in a state where not everything is seen or heard, there are probably more songs left outside our reach. And for now we are satisfied with the poems, we managed to save from forgetfulness.

In Kokinwakashu, actually, there was no poem, authored by a contemporary emperor. Since Gosenwakashu an emperor's work was included for the first time. If we examine every of this compilations, such works don't exceed ten. This time my own works here are more than thirty. Although some of them possess the formal features of style, and are worth the lowest evaluation, namely because of technical imperfections, there will be many which cannot prevail the judgment of time, being as impermanent as dew. While my thoughts were a captive of the ways of poetry, I have ignored the possibility of critical remarks from many eyes. When this compilation was at stake, I contemplated on the works deeply but without being involved too much in any of them. There have been 400 thousand years since Fuxi established the basis of virtue, and although there were rare examples of other emperors to participate in compilation and recording, there is hardly a precedent here to see an emperor taking the brush of editing himself. It must be known that I joyfully praise the possibility for the people under Heaven to meet, when the way

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<sup>16</sup> Compiled in 759.

<sup>17</sup> Daigo Tenno (901–923).

<sup>18</sup> Edited in 905.

<sup>19</sup> Murakami Tenno (947–57).

<sup>20</sup> Edited in 951.

<sup>21</sup> Compiled in 1007.

<sup>22</sup> Compiled in 1086.

<sup>23</sup> Compiled in 1127.

<sup>24</sup> Compiled 1144.

<sup>25</sup> Compiled in 1183.

of the songs flourishes. I abide alone in the marvelous cave of the saints, which is situated nowhere, and I don't only participate in assemblies, fixing the wind and catching up to the moon. And furthermore, in these days of the Genkyu era, I wished to expose my heart willing to befriend with the new, while freshly visiting the resourceful old. How can that intention for a precise work lack here? In the month of March, in the year of the wooden ox and in the spring when the Under Heaven is united, [I, the emperor confirm that] all the things written here are truly so as depicted above.

## 2. The aristocratic worldview

It can be assumed that the true intention of the emperor is an implementation of a unique religious view without any dogmas. He is promoting a method of engaging in poetry while being free of any method, urging only sincerity and attentiveness. This is confirmed not only by the text, but also by the typology of the traditional Japanese background in the matters of government. According to the Japanese thought the goal of life cannot be degraded or pushed back by the separate acts of governing or guiding for long. Only the provocation of the sensitiveness can be worth doing. Self-realization is not reducible to something pre-established on a social basis, but concerns the individual consciousness of everybody, so it can be a real object solely of an individual. This goal is the constant attainment of the essence of existence by everyone, given that its exploration cannot be terminated or conditioned by definitely stopping anywhere. So, the emperor appeals to the masses, but not to masses of heterogeneous kind, since this would be relaying on the conditioning of every mind, rooted in its personal background. The homogeneity of the masses, in the Japanese sense, consists in the abolishment of this conditioning. The masses are homogenized for the starting point of self-discovery. The emperor accommodates exactly this homogeneity, constituted at first by the equal veneration of emotions. The simple demands of the common people and the guidance by the educated – every side is indistinctively represented in the compilations of songs.

Purely theoretically the effective discarding of all dogmas is allowed in two directions – by means of one-way choice of an accommodating religious view and via a certain philosophy of language.

It is worth to comment the religious part in terms of only-behavior and conscious penetration in the nature of things. It is meant to have no alternatives after a certain choice in a strict logical sense, e.g., after choosing the no-dogmas stance, which is in fact the core Buddhist stance, but without the trappings, one automatically discards all the confinements of any views and dogmas. This stance only makes the discarding of the whole religion possible. After this one-time choice, everything else belongs to the exploration. This outcome is brilliantly confirmed by the historical ability of the Japanese to embrace the methodless method of Zen, which method is the most radical deconstruction of Buddhism ever (visible from the “Kill Buddha” slogan). It is also confirmed by any lack of

consistency in the Japanese religious denominations; they are mercilessly hybridized and the religious rigor is accused to be a faction activity, so it is decisively made unserious, i.e. is weakened in the eyes of the Japanese.

That's why a certain approach to language on Japanese ground is furthermore possible and this is quite widespread. The Japanese tend to bravely place themselves in the course of the "common" everyday routine or of a thought experiment successfully, being able to put themselves in the shoes of others, sealing the moment as "empty", without imposing their background to the new frame. They are able to cross the line of others leaving themselves behind. Because the present moment can be emptied, this means, that the future can become a new reason for the so-called past, illuminating the past. Respectively they can discern the plan of expression from the plan of content without training, up to bizarre boundary values of this ability. They understand the voluntary nature of denoting things instinctively, almost like mathematicians. Hence they can find amusement in opening themselves to the world through poetry, which, for us Europeans may be rather a distant, analytical experience.

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## Natural Philosophy in Daoism

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### Abstract

In the *Daodejing* and the *Zhuangzi* both nature and the Dao have the characteristics and virtues of spontaneity, naturalness and self-sufficiency which can be reflected in the Chinese word *ziran* (自然), which connects exactly these three meanings. This linguistic phenomenon, that the term *ziran* is used for describing the Dao and the nature could be a sign for Daoism's closeness to nature. Also, the *Daodejing* states that a natural state can be achieved through 'action as nonaction,' described by the Chinese word *wuwei* (无为). It encourages the self-cultivation of humans themselves and the nature around them with the help of spiritual techniques which they apply to nature while being in nature.

**Keywords:** naturalness, Dao, spontaneity, non-action, environmental sustainability

Recent years have seen an increased turning to the "Daoist wisdom" when addressing issues on the environment. Natural philosophy in Daoism implies admiring the perfection of nature and indulging in the spontaneous cycle of transformations. Naturalness is the main feature of Chinese poetry, painting, crafts, gardens, architecture, literature, and so on, including all general art forms. The arts through which people express their meditative understanding are also known as the Ways: flower arranging, archery, tea ceremony, acting and dancing are among them. This does not only apply to aesthetic culture. It is to this extent that with the word "Dao" at the beginning, the scope can become so wide that it includes everything. This might even create a sense as if "Dao" holds a concrete position in civilization and general culture – the manifestation of mankind's spiritual activity.

The poems of water and mountains are rooted in Daoism and its exquisite purity and clarity. Different Daoist masters express life in the mountains with graceful, elegant words and furthermore set out precisely the basic principles of Dao. It even seems as if poetry and Daoist mind have become one. It poetically expresses the principle of "the real nature of all things;" in other words that all things including natural phenomena present the Truth as-it-is. The symbolic dimension is an echo of the primary meaning, uniting the particular detail which is being noticed – often natural – with a human significance. The Way is revealed in the universal vitality and the Dao involves the spontaneous transformation of nature and the flourishing of the human world. The Daoist thinkers

considered the realization of Oneness with the Universe as not a thing that can be put into words, it could not be expressed verbally: “The Dao which can be spoken is not eternal Dao.” (Laozi, Daodejing).

Although the Way is inexplicable in words, human life takes part in it – only a small part of the larger process of nature. Accordingly, all human actions must be in accord with the flow of nature: the Dao or the Way (the unity and relationship of all dimensions of life). On the other hand, we find that many of the Daoist teachings are difficult to grasp not because they are complex, but because they are simple. The great sages would try to show a source that cannot be defined or located: emptiness, the stemming wisdom of Dao. Everything is emerging and co-operating together out of the mysterious Unnamable, that no words or concept can ever embrace. Our own awareness springs and is directly and forever a part of that. The substance of such spirit could be identified as “Dwelling nowhere and fostering Dao mind,” the free activity of the spiritual function. To put it simply, it is to live your life engendering a mind that is not constrained and working diligently at this within all activities. In actual terms, the easiest way to live this life is in a mountain hut because the life there is set up to live this way. The special characteristics of that way of life can be summed up in three points: (1) simplicity, (2) directness, and (3) depth.

Laozi was the original archetype of the Sage and references to paths, roads, ways and so on are always resonant. Nevertheless, it is not the case that Dao culture is the exclusive monopoly of Daoist sages who live “high above the clouds” in the mountains. The essence of Dao extends its influence across all of what people refer to as “Daoist culture”. The common characteristics of that mode, style or form are: 1) asymmetry, 2) simplicity, 3) nature, 4) the subtle and profound, 5) freedom from the everyday world, and 6) tranquility. The characteristics of Dao culture are to always break out by oneself from within, to deny perfection, and to have a structure that is based on the idea that the form of present life is perfect. The flexibility, toughness, purity and depth of human existence is provided in “the cultural creativity” that comes from the spiritual activity based on Dao essence. Daoist poets are struggling to convey the inexpressible, to find images for the ‘miraculous sound’ in the heart of the silence.

The nature’s creative power is represented in the spontaneous arising and decaying of things. This is the ceaseless flow of activity (阳 – yang) and receptivity (阴 – yin) within the energetic field (气 – qi) of the universe. Two ways of interacting with the world: wu wei (无为 – effortless action) and wuxin (无心), which literally means no-mind (empty heart), were a typical mode of response of the Daoist sage to the call of the universe. Through such an attitude and practice he achieved a natural state, which was in total accord with the way or the Dao. Wu wei is what occurs without being produced by a definite intention – the way one acts without trying to do the things that he does, without conscious motive, without a plan; what is happening without noticing it. Daoism says “wu wei er wu bu wei” (无为而无不为): by non-doing, nothing is left undone. Human avarice leads to over-exploitation of natural resources; but when everything in the universe grows natu-

rally, we have a community of affluence. If the pursuit of development ruins the harmony and balance of nature, the followers of Dao restrain themselves from it.

Let's take a look at the natural philosophy of Daoism in the context of Zhuangzi and its environmental implications. Zhuangzi, actually named Zhuang Zhou, is one of the most influential philosophers of Daoism who lived during the Warring States period. He showed us the fundamental secret of all the issues involved in the creativity of Dao culture. What is known about him is mostly extracted from his book by the same name, *Zhuangzi*, also known as the "True Scripture of the Southern Florescence." The life of Zhuangzi is recounted in Si Ma Qian's Record of the Grand Historian, chapter 63, entitled 'The Biographies of Laozi and Han Fei'. His written books of ten thousand odd words, for the most part, are amazing fables. "He was adept at composing writings and analysing expressions, pointing to the facts and inducing the situations by analogy, which he employed to attack and rip apart the Confucians and Mohists"<sup>1</sup>

When the King Wei of Chu heard about the worthiness of Zhuang Zhou, he dispatched an envoy with generous coins to invite him to court, promising him with the post of the chief minister. Zhuang Zhou laughed and addressed the envoy from Chu: "Ten Thousand pieces of gold, what a huge gain! The high rank of the chief minister, what an honoured position! Have you, sir, not seen the ceremony where the ox is sacrificed in the outskirts? It is fed with fodder for several years and it is then covered with an embroidered fabric, so that it can enter the great temple. At that time, even if it wishes to be a suckling pig that no one notices, how could it fulfil that wish? Sir, you must leave immediately; do not defile/taint me. I rather have the delight to play in the dirty ditch, and I will not be restrained by a person who possesses a kingdom. Till the demise of my body, I will not serve as an official, so that I can take delights in my own volitions." (Chapter 32)<sup>2</sup>

Let us now go into the liberation as seen in the eyes of Zhuangzi:

"I received life because the time had come; I will lose it because the order of things passes on. Be content with this time and dwell in this order and then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you. In ancient times this was called the 'freeing of the bound.' There are those who cannot free themselves because they are bound by things. But nothing can ever win against Heaven – that is the way it has always been. What would I have to resent." (Wu 2008: 248)

All definite things, everything we may name and identify, including our own lives, emerge from something formless and are rooted in the indefinite. Forms emerge from formlessness, the divided from the undivided, the named from the unnamed, concrete things from vaporous energies, even "beings" from what we would call "nothing" (无 – wu). In all forms of Daoism we are invited to "return to the source", focusing on the reversal of the usual values and union of apparent opposites. In the "Zhuangzi" the scope of

<sup>1</sup> <https://purplecloudinstitute.com/daoism-series-23-%E8%8D%98%E5%AD%90-zhuang-zi/>, 12.05.2021.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

universal reversal is manifested as the transformation of all things into each other, which requires openness to the universal process of change.

In general, in Daoist literature themes which are relating the human to the nature around him/her and natural symbolisms can be often found. The place of the human in Daoism is found somewhere between heaven and earth where sages wander around influenced by opposite energies seeking balance. The human is part of the nature and the universe around it. Most Daoist philosophers do not draw the distinction between human and nature as Western philosophers did (Nelson 2004; Alexander 2008). Also, in Daoism the nature is often valued as a sacred space, a space where humans can flee from the human world and self-cultivate their own nature (Miller 2008). I am going to present some of the developments regarding the nature-human relation in Daoism with a special focus on the relationship depicted in the Daodejing.

During the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BCE), it was believed that nature's benevolence depended on the citizens or ruler's moral rightness (Jackson, 2013). During the Warring States period (475–221 BCE) there was a shift in the perception of the Dao, written down in the famous texts of Zhuangzi and Daodejing (the Book of the Way and Virtue), which are gaining most attention and are seen as the core of Daoism by most interpreters. In this view, which I am going to explore further, the Dao is beyond conceptualization, is the mother of everything, is like a sage ruler given its right by Heaven to influence the cosmos. The lifestyle resulting from this worldview is a self-sufficient one with little impact of the human on its environment. The Book of the Way and Virtue favours a peaceful life in a village without much luxury or great aspirations. Similarly, the Zhuangzi pictures a lifestyle as ideal which avoids artificial human activities like "thought, goal-oriented planning, and unnatural striving" (Jackson 2013: 47) and rather focusing on spontaneous satisfaction.

In the Daodejing both nature and the Dao have the characteristics and virtues of spontaneity, naturalness and self-sufficiency which can be reflected in the Chinese term 'ziran' (自然) which connects exactly these three meanings. This linguistic phenomenon, that the term ziran is used for describing the Dao and the nature could be another sign for Daoism's closeness to nature (Miller 2008: 171). Also, in the Daodejing it is stated that a natural state can be achieved through 'action as non-action' which is described by the Chinese word 'wu wei'. It encourages the self-cultivation of the humans themselves and the nature around them with the help of spiritual techniques which they apply to nature while being in nature. The passage in the Daodejing describing the wu wei states that:

"The softest thing in the world dashes against and overcomes the hardest; that which has no (substantial) existence enters where there is no crevice. I know hereby what advantage belongs to doing nothing (with a purpose). There are few in the world who attain to the teaching without words, and the advantage arising from non-action."<sup>3</sup> (Daodejing, Chapter 43. Translated by Chinese Text Project)

<sup>3</sup> <https://ccontext.org/dao-de-jing>, 21.04.2021.

A similar idea can be found in the Zhuangzi: the lesson, that humans are not capable of applying human concepts on the world and should therefore simply give in to the world and not even try – instead meditate and wander freely through their fates. Natural phenomena or patterns found in nature were believed to be revelations and proof of the existence of the Dao, which could be for example seen through the special energetic activity of the 'qi'. It was believed to be found in natural peculiarities, generally the process of plant growth, or for example the human organism but it also represents the cosmic breath.

One symbol in which the Daoist stance towards nature is reflected is the yin and yang. The yin – yang symbolizes the balance of two contrary forces, which are described as the Obscure and the Brightness. There is constant change as the yin and the yang are constantly seeking balance whilst the decrease of one side goes hand in hand with the increase of the other side. The yin – yang is therefore a symbol of natural processes as it shows that everything exists in response to each other and everything is interconnected. It also suggests that being only one side of the yin – yang is not favourable, but that a combination of both is natural.

After looking at these different Daoist views on the concept of nature and the human-nature relationship, the question remains whether Daoist thought could be applied as a vehicle for societal change towards a more sustainable society? Are the lessons of Daoism applicable in the quest for achieving a more sustainable future? According to the Cambridge dictionary environmental sustainability can be defined as “the quality of causing little or no damage to the environment and therefore [being] able to continue for a long time”<sup>4</sup>.

When it comes to the question whether Daoist thought could encourage environmental activism, there are two different conclusions one might arrive at, depending on how one interprets the passages about wu wei. As wu wei is describing the 'non-action', one could claim that Daoism, as it is not encouraging the taking of action against environmental problems would not be the solution for an environmentally healthy future. This would be the case if one would understand wu wei as indifference to the world and for being passive. However, wu wei could be understood simply as 'noncoercive receptive activity', as a tolerance for the happening things and a reserved way to deal with them, which is not only fixed on the action, but also sensitive on the reaction while assuming that every knowledge is equally to be respected (Nelson 2004). So the way in which Daoists would call for change might be more calm and sensitive and less violent and radical.

Still, Daoism could have been the solution for a pre-industrial society in which the nature was still healthy and well-balanced, but at the common state of the world, slow and gentle changes might not help anymore to reach the goal of environmental sustainability. If one regards the virtues of Daoism and its promotion of a low-impact lifestyle

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<sup>4</sup> Sustainability. (n.d.). <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/sustainability>. 20.04.2021

which is close to nature, one might say, that Daoism could have prevented environmental destruction. But this could only happen if it would have persisted and the humans would have not started the industrial revolution but would have stayed being self-subsistent, in agricultural societies.

The Daoist worldview, which is not human-centered, differs from the common Western anthropocentric worldview which is giving the human the role of the conqueror on which capitalism and industrialization were founded. The Daoist worldview is much more cautious and sensitive to the environment and worships natural processes, whilst not trying forcefully to fully understand and alter them. Much more focus is posed on balance and being in peace and harmony with oneself and the environment. It promotes a lifestyle which does not need so many material goods and is not striving for becoming the centre of the world but respects nature in a way that one can never overrule the divine or the universe.

However, Daoists still alter nature as well to their needs but this happens in a very conscious way. For example, as Chinese culture is full of mysticism and fantastic imagery, the altering or destruction of nature (for example a hill) is treated with much consideration and caution, because then something terrible could happen if the mystical creature, like a dragon, could be angry. Another passage which can be found in the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi states that the sage should not be egoist and save things for themselves, but instead must be helping and giving to others and by that gaining the most for themselves. Therefore, the usage of nature for their own purposes, as long as it is based on compassion and no greed, does not go against a sustainable lifestyle.

If everyone would only take as much as one needs, we probably would not have such a problem with the natural destruction of the planet. Daoism offers a philosophy which could leave humans more grounded in themselves and within non-artificially created environments. This could lead to happiness based not on material goods and splendid lifestyles, which are responsible for many environmental problems. Daoism teaches a person to flow with life. The truth taught in it is to embrace life in actions that support you as a person in a universal whole that is nature. The term Taiyi (太一) variously translated as The Great One, The Great Unity (monad), stands for the cosmic oneness at the base of the universe, as well as the experience of this unity. Taiyi represents the immortal identity or true self of a person: if you obtain the Great One, the ten thousand pursuits are completed. A chance which Daoism holds further, is an awe for nature and seeing oneself not apart from it, but within it.

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# Taoist Palace TAIQING In The Context Of The History Of The City Of Shenyang (Based On Fieldwork)

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## Abstract

The aim of this work is to study the Taoist palace Taiqing, which has not been researched previously in domestic and foreign works. In order to explore this architectural object, the author made a trip to the city of Shenyang in China. The method of field research has been used for the study, describing the history, structure and decorative features of the temple complexes of the palace. With the aim of expanding knowledge in the field of religious architecture, the palace is analyzed in its cultural and historical context, and special focus is laid on the symbolism of the architectural space of temples.

On the basis of sociological survey of residents of the city of Shenyang, I found that the ritual practice remains relevant in the 21 century, and therefore the Taoist temple complexes perform a bridging role in Chinese life. The study showed that the Taoist palace Taiqing is the center of Taoism in Liaoning province.

Currently, China has preserved a small part of the temple architectural heritage. Proceeding from this thesis, it is hoped that the results received by the author during the research of the Taoist palace Taiqing will help to introduce new data on cult objects in China.

**Keywords:** China, Taoist palace Taiqing, Taoism, religious architecture, cultural heritage, human being, nature.

The Chinese civilization is considered one of the oldest in the world.<sup>1</sup> As it developed, it accumulated a unique cultural experience over the millennia, which had a huge impact not only on the nearest Asian countries, but also on some Western countries. Currently, the architectural heritage of China has not yet been fully studied, which determines the relevance of this research work.

The temple, being a cult object, in the philosophy and culture of China was originally considered as a kind of heavenly world on earth. Under the dome of the temple, the laity found “shelter” and “stage” for their prayers and requests. This has been the case several millennia ago, and still is in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Taoist and Buddhist temples gather thousands of believers, and not only Chinese people. The faith of the Chinese in the help

<sup>1</sup> Stilisticheskie osobennosti arkhitekturnykh pamyatnikov Drevnego Kitaya [Stylistic Features of Architectural Monuments of Ancient China] [Electronic resource]. Available from: <http://bibliofond.ru/view.aspx?id=813381> (accessed: 21.04.2016).

of the deities is great even today, since often, according to their convictions, requests and prayers are heard, and therefore fulfilled by the gods of the heavenly world.

In art history, there are no descriptions of the Taoist palace Taiqing (located in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, China), as a result of which we undertook an expedition trip to China.

During the field research in July-August 2015, we studied the Taoist palace Taiqing in the city of Shenyang, as well as analyzed the temples that are part of it, identified the structural elements inherent to individual temples, studied their history and identified the role of the Taoist palace in modern times.

The direct entrance to the monastery complex is the Shanmen (山门) Gate. Behind it are the Huabiao memorial columns, a characteristic element of traditional Chinese architecture, marking the boundary between the space inhabited by the Xiang celestial beings and the profane world. The main part of the Taoist monastery is called the Middle Courtyard (Zhong Yuan). Usually on both sides of the Middle Courtyard there are two alleys, called the Western and Eastern courtyards, which are most often symmetrical with respect to the Middle One and are isolated from it in a certain way. The halls of the side alleys are dedicated to deities (Xian) of different level than the chambers of the Middle Courtyard, and the refectory, living and service rooms of the monastery are located here. Typically, the temple complex comprises the so called Back Courtyard – a small natural landscape formed in the traditional Chinese style of park art with a natural layout, artificial mountains, reservoirs and decorative stones. The temple complex, like any architectural ensemble, has its own “language”. It “speaks” in chambers, arches, and monuments, and can be understood as a heterogeneous text that implements a certain system of signs.<sup>2</sup>

To confirm this thesis, we look at the Taoist palace 太清宫 – Taiqing. It consists of eight temples, the main temples Laojun 老君殿 and Qian kun zheng qi 乾坤正气 occupy the central part of the complex, the rest are located on the northern, southern, western and eastern parts of it.

In the space of the temple there are lateral compositional axes, represented by secondary altars. In front of the entrance there is a large incense burner, on both sides of the central path – steles with commemorative inscriptions, stone or iron statues of temple servants, figures of mythical animals.<sup>3</sup>

The temple complexes of the Taoist palace Taiqing have the same structure, but differ only in the deities represented in them. It was founded by Guo Shouzen in 1663, during the second year of the reign of Emperor Kangxi (康熙) of the Qing Dynasty. In 1665, in the fourth year of the Emperor Kangxi's reign, the palace was completed. The original name of the Temple is 三教堂 – “Temple of the Three Teachings” (Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism). In 1779, the palace was reconstructed and renamed 太清宫. Taiqing palace is the

<sup>2</sup> Filonov S. Vvedenie v daologiyu [Introduction to Taoism]. Blagoveshchensk: Amur State University. (2010): 161–162.

<sup>3</sup> Maliavin V. Kitayskaya tsivilizatsiya [Chinese Civilization]. Moscow: AST. (2001): 452.

center of Taoism in northeast China. It consists of eight temples: Lin Guan, Guan Di, Lao Juan, Yu Huang, San Guan, Liu Zu, Qiu Zu, Guo Zu.<sup>4</sup>

At the entrance to the Taoist temple Taiqing, there are trigrams stone lions. Taoism, preached in the temple, belongs to the Longmen direction. Above the entrance there is an inscription: 紫气东东 – “Came from the East on purple clouds”. This phrase is a kind of a Shenyang slogan. Initially, it referred to the appearance of the Taoist patriarch Lao Tzu, but in the 18th century, the Qing emperors began to refer to it, since they also came to China from the East.<sup>5</sup>

### **Taiqing palace temples:**

1. Ling Guan: it deifies Wang Linguan (in the people of Wang Shan) and Zhao Linguan (sitting on a tiger). The teacher of the first was the famous Taoist Shoujian. Zhao Linguan (also known as Zhao Gongming) is the god of wealth.

2. Guan Di: Deifies Guan Yu. Next to him is Guan Ping (his son) and Zhou Chang. Guan Yu was born in Shanxi Province, and is widely regarded as a great hero. His lunar birthday is June 24.

3. Lao Jun: in the temple, Lao Tzu, who was a great Chinese thinker and founder of the Taoist school, is deified. His lunar birthday is February 15.

4. Yu Huang: the Supreme lord of the “Jade Sovereign” is deified. In addition, the temple has Wang Lin on the left, the earth deity on the right.

5. San Guan: three emperors are deified – Yao, Shun, and Yu.

6. Lu Zu: the temple deifies Lu Zu (in the people of Lu Dongbin), his image in the temple is on the left, and on the right – Ji Zu. Lu Zu loved fencing and poetry. His lunar birthday is April 14.

7. Qiu Zu temple: The temple deifies Qiu Zu (Qiu Chuji). He was born in Shandong Province, and became a Taoist at the age of 14. His teacher was Wang Congyang.

8. Guo Zu temple: Guo Shou Tsen is deified in this temple. For 30 years, he was a student of the teacher Li Changmin. Is a revered god in northeast China.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to the 8 temples on the territory of the Taoist palace Taiqing, there is an active Taoist monastery. During the conversation with the monks, it was found out that the state of religious architecture in modern conditions is experiencing difficulties in the preservation of objects and the study of the concept of the unity of man and nature due to the rapid development of the nearby territory of the palace (because of which the main pillars of the traditional philosophical concept are violated).<sup>7</sup>

Thus, we can conclude that the Taiqing palace corresponds to the decorative and applied features of the Taoist temple architecture of the Qing Dynasty. The structure of the

<sup>4</sup> Field materials of the author (FMA). 2015. Shenyang, People’s Republic of China.

<sup>5</sup> Vostochnoe polusharie [East Hemisphere] [Electronic resource]. Available from: <http://polusharie.com/index.php?topic=28848.25> (accessed: 28.10.2015).

<sup>6</sup> Field materials of the author (FMA). 2015. Shenyang, People’s Republic of China.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

palace is made in accordance with the philosophical views of ancient architects on the surrounding world. At the entrance to the palace there are gates separating the world of earth and heaven, as well as two stone lions, which, according to the ancient Chinese, protect from evil spirits. In the central part of the complex are the main temples, and in the northern, southern, western and eastern parts – the less significant ones.

Currently, Taiqing palace is the center of Taoism in northeast China. Despite the current urban planning situation in Shenyang, it still attracts thousands of believers and parishioners. Taoist monks, in turn, try to adapt to the modern conditions of rapidly developing China and to maintain a balance between the divine (heavenly) world and the real world in order to preach the truths of Taoism.

This architectural object is the only major Taoist temple complex in Liaoning Province, so it provides an opportunity to collect unique information about the construction of such buildings in the Qing Dynasty. Currently, the research of Taoist temples in China is significant and relevant for the theory and history of culture, religion, architecture, tourism, etc. In this regard, we think that the material will receive further scientific development to identify the connection of the Taoist palace of Great Purity with the development of the city of Shenyang, as well as the geocultural location of the palace complex in the historical context.



*Taoist temple Qian kun zheng qi 乾坤正气*



*Taoist Temple Lao Jun 老君殿*

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TOURISM, SPIRITUAL  
AND PHYSICAL CULTURE



ТУРИЗЪМ, ДУХОВНА  
И ФИЗИЧЕСКА КУЛТУРА

# Promoting Chinese Cultural Tourism Through Events and Exhibitions in Sofia Between 2017 and 2021

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## Abstract

Presenting various Chinese cultural events and exhibitions in Sofia is a long-standing and rich tradition. The promotion of China's history, nature, art, and handicrafts enables Bulgarians to acquire new knowledge and ideas about various types of cultural tourism. This paper offers an analysis of some interesting events and exhibitions in Sofia, held at the National Palace of Culture, the Chinese Cultural Centre, the Confucius Institute and the City Library in the 5-year period briefly described here.

**Keywords:** cultural tourism, art, traditions, events, tourism resources, communication, messages

## Introduction

Cultural tourism with its subtypes is what is attractive to the tourists because they incorporate visits of cultural and historic sites and participation in festivals and modern cultural events; they become introduced to the local lifestyle and traditions, the folk cuisine, they include visits to museums, galleries and attractions, etc.

Cultural tourism is an example of "becoming familiar with the historical development of the various civilizations during the centuries and with their achievements in the different areas of human activity. The tourist travel with a cultural motive activates cognitive, informative, communication and evaluation functions needed to perceive the reality in the visited destination" (Marinov 2011: 136). According to the International Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the definition of cultural heritage includes "monuments, groups of buildings and sites, while natural heritage – natural features, certain natural sites or zones of exceptional universal value"<sup>1</sup>.

In a way, this diversity positioned cultural tourism as a "brand" in the strongly competitive environment of the world tourism marketplace even before the pandemic lock-

<sup>1</sup> See more at: Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Definition of the Cultural and Natural Heritage (Article 1) – <http://whc.unesco.org/en/conventiontext/> – (Read 30.06.2021).

down in 2020. Countries with rich heritage and time-honoured traditions rely on recognizability to attract tourists who consider cultural tourism as an attraction but also as “a movement of people towards cultural attractions”. The dynamics of world tourism is changing not only customer priorities in terms of types of travel and destinations but also in terms of preferences in the era of modern technology and innovation.

### **Events as increasingly attractive communication instruments in tourism**

In the post-pandemic period, but also before the lockdown, tourists manifested an increasing interest for more attractive and personalized travel. Their attention was more focussed on off-the-beaten-path tourism product and the opportunity to participate in a growing number of events based on professional, cultural, or hobby interests. The reason is the need to seek new positive emotions in less known destinations on the one hand and the “digitalization” of experiences through a more active communication and the creation of shared contents on the Internet, on the other hand. „In the era of new technologies, the use of the growing diversity of opportunities that the Internet offers as a travel and entertainment environment makes out of events increasingly attractive communication instruments in tourism” (Alexieva 2019: 248).

The various types of cultural tourism unveil the past through knowledge, experiences, and the magic of art. Presenting various Chinese cultural events and exhibitions in Sofia is a long-standing and rich tradition. It features music concerts, theatre performances, and novel exhibitions attracting local audiences on various Chinese anniversaries and celebrations held in Bulgaria. Their concept and implementation are an example of an extraordinary way to promote Chinese cultural tourism in Bulgaria’s capital city.

According to Dr. Joe Goldblatt, a renowned researcher in event management, this is a key profession related to “public assembly for the purpose of celebration, education, marketing or reunion”. Although there are arguments in support of the thesis that, similarly to tourism, event management actually consists of many industries, it is a unique field of knowledge (Goldblatt 2006: 8). Emphasizing that event tourism becomes an important phenomenon allowing to make earnings and celebrate more than ever, Goldblatt points out that its scope is constantly widening to include “performances or handicraft exhibitions, historical commemorations, music festivals or other types of events” (Goldblatt 2006: 15).

The growing number of world and national online events, such as round tables, competitions, presentations, exhibitions, lectures, etc. in the times of ‘lockdown tourism’ and post-pandemic crisis, are an evidence of it. They create or fill the gap of lacking emotions and communication between users with new experiences to complete their memories as tourists and increase their expectations of future itineraries. Experts underline the importance of the huge worldwide demand for cultural and tourist experiences from home.

“Culture has proven indispensable during this period, and the demand for virtual access to museums, heritage sites, theatres, and performances has reached unprecedented levels”<sup>2</sup>.

The growing interest for virtual or hybrid events cannot replace traditional dynamic travel and in-person meetings, but they are a way to successfully communicate messages between travellers. Recent similar events presenting the wealth of Chinese cultural tourism to the Bulgarian audiences are an evidence of it.

### **Experience is at the basis of knowledge**

There was a huge variety of attractive initiatives and occasions to promote Chinese cultural tourism through a multitude of events and exhibitions in Sofia between 2017 and 2021. Only a few of them, focussed on the development of Chinese cultural tourism and its role in positioning the country as an attractive world destination, will be discussed in the narrow scope of this paper. Presentations took place in key cultural venues in Sofia, such as the National Palace of Culture, the Chinese Cultural Centre, the Confucius Institute, Sofia Library, and others.

Dozens of different events: performances, concerts, exhibitions, theme celebrations, demonstrations, etc. were staged over the years to make the Bulgarians acquainted with China’s heritage, art, handicrafts, and cultural tourism. They all brought new information and sharpened the Bulgarians’ curiosity for the tangible and intangible heritage of the ancient Chinese civilization. A widely known Chinese dictum says: „Listen and you will forget, see and you will remember, but, do and you will learn”. Doing or experiencing is at the basis of knowledge. Many of the unique events held in Sofia to present the country as a cultural tourism destination as well opened the door to knowledge.

How did some exhibitions held in Sofia between 2017 and 2021 promote the wealth and specifics of Chinese cultural tourism?

*Bulgaria and Shanxi (China): Two Worlds on the Silk Road*, a forum which took place in Sofia on 10 October 2017 as part of the *Journey Along the Silk Road* international event is one of the answers. The forum was organized by the International Relations Department of the Shaanxi Province in partnership with the Embassy of China in Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian Ministries of Tourism and Culture (**Photo 1**).

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<sup>2</sup> See more at: Cultural Tourism & COVID 19 – <https://www.unwto.org/cultural-tourism-covid-19> (Read 30.06.2021).



**Photo 1.** *Bulgaria and Shaanxi (China): Two Worlds on the Silk Road, 2017*

This international event involved a multitude of participants who embarked on a 52 day-journey along a 15,000 km route across 16 countries. It began on 28 August from Xian, China's old capital city, the starting point of the ancient Silk Road, and ended in Budapest, Hungary, on 18 October. More than 50 cars with 50 cultural experts, artists, and business people on board, in addition to journalists from six Chinese satellite channels<sup>3</sup>, took part in this extraordinary journey. The forum gathered in Sofia a large number of state officials, business leaders, representatives of the tourist industry, and journalists. Shaanxi's historical and cultural tradition and trade opportunities between Bulgaria and this famed Chinese province were advertised through presentations, documentaries, and lectures. The Ministry of Tourism focused on the importance of cultural tourism and announced the big news for Bulgarian tourism: the opening of a tourism information centre on Bulgaria in Shanghai only a few days earlier.

### **In the exhibition halls: gazing at 5 000 years of history and culture**

At its official opening in November 2017, the Chinese Cultural Centre presented an exhibition of intangible cultural heritage: the many guests had the opportunity to see UNESCO-listed traditional Chinese paintings and calligraphy (since 2009), in addition to two exhibitions and a tea ceremony.

<sup>3</sup> Bulgaria and Shanxi (China): Two Worlds on the Silk Road – TV/Media partners of 2017 Journey Along the Silk Road are Shaanxi Satellite TV, Gansu Satellite TV, Ningxia, Satellite TV, Qinghai Satellite TV, Dongnan Satellite TV, Guangxi Satellite TV and Xinjiang Satellite TV – <http://www.read-travel.eu/?page=novina&lang=bg&novina=533> (Read 28.06.2021).

The traditional culture and art of Qinghai, a Northwest Chinese province, as well as the Roof of the World's beautiful nature and itineraries were presented in Sofia in May 2019. The event, which featured exhibitions, documentaries, and presentations of traditional handicrafts, was held at the Confucius Institute in Bulgaria's capital city. Many guests, friends of China, and students attended the *Magnificent Beauty of Qinghai*, a photo exhibition, and the *Tibetan Art Masterpieces* exhibition on 14 May 2019. The unique photos showed the many natural and cultural landmarks of Qinghai and told the history of the Tibetan culture. This beautiful tourist destination attracts visitors with China's largest lake, known as Qinghai Lake or the Green Lake, with a more than 40 percent green area. Often named the country's "most beautiful lake", this is the saltiest landlocked lake also known as "the coloured lake", due to its colours that change from dawn to dusk in front of travellers' eyes.

This famed province's history, traditional handicrafts, and breath-taking landscapes and mountain peaks brought additional value to the event. As a "journey" to Qinghai's cultural tourism, exhibitions and documentaries offered an insight into local historical monuments, temples, art, and handicrafts. By visiting the event at the Confucius Institute, the Bulgarians acquired new knowledge and information about this tourist destination welcoming millions of visitors every year. For instance, they came to know about a Guinness-certificated Tibetan thangka painting (618 m)<sup>4</sup> created in the Ri Gong autonomous area which was the world's longest by that time (**Photos 2–3**).



**Photos 2–3.** *Magnificent Beauty of Qinghai*, 2019

Tourism landmarks and the potential for cultural tourism of the Zhejiang Province were presented through *The Beauty of the Orient* exhibition as part of the Days of Chinese Culture organized in the Chinese Cultural Centre in Sofia on 24 June 2019 under the moto *Beautiful China, Picturesque Zhejiang*<sup>5</sup>. Chinese lecturers in a variety of fields (calligra-

<sup>4</sup> The Longest Scroll Painting is on display at the Chinese Museum of Tibetan Culture and Medicine in Xining, the capital city of Qinghai Province and a famous trade centre on the northern part of the Silk Road.

<sup>5</sup> The Days of Chinese culture were organized in cooperation with the Zhejiang Department of Culture and

phy, Chinese painting, music, dancing, handicrafts, ceramics, Chinese medicine, martial arts, a Chinese cuisine) gave courses within the *Journey through the China's Culture and Art* event. Within half a month, Bulgarian audiences got acquainted with the millennial Chinese culture through an exhibition featuring artefacts from Liang Zhu, a culture dating back to the dawn of civilization, visual art and calligraphy, replicas of cultural relics, silk art, porcelain and ceramic, and various types of jade and tea (**Photos 4–5**).



**Photos 4–5.** *The Beauty of the Orient and Life with the Soul of Dance*, 2019

The event included also *Life with the Soul of Dance*, a dance performance at the Azaryan Theater (National Palace of Culture) and a photo exhibition. This famous province also named ‘The Land of Fish and Rice’, made a presentation of its administrative centre, Hangzhou, one of the most beautiful Chinese cities. Its centuries-old history, unique nature and remarkable architecture attract annually millions of tourists from all over the world through the development of cultural tourism. Hangzhou, one of China’s eight ancient capitals, tops the country’s national list of cultural and historical centres. “The City of Tea” is also known to tourists with the National Silk Museum, the Lantern Museum, the Fan Museum, West Lake (Xi Hu), and evening outdoor performances, as well as with its famous tea plantations outside Hangzhou. There is also the Ecological Tea Museum, which displays over 200 most famous varieties growing in the homeland of tea and attracts over 500,000 visitors each year.

A non-standard exhibition opened at Sofia Metropolitan Library in September 2019, drawing the attention with its great historical value: *The Blooming Flowers of Shanghai*. It was designed especially for the library and all photos were displayed for the first time in public. The visiting exhibition of the Shanghai Library featured old photos from the library’s contemporary collection, a testimony of the last 200 years of history of China. These

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Tourism and Zhejiang Museum, co-organizer of the Beauty of the Orient exhibition.



**Photo 6.** *The Blooming Flowers of Shanghai, 2019*



**Photo 7.** *A Trip to China, 2020*

valuable pieces of history opened a “window” to the past, without which it would be difficult to get to know and understand modern China.

From 19 to 24 September, visitors had the unique opportunity to see a selected series of the most representative photos reproducing different features and aspects of life in modern Shanghai from 1840 to 1949. The presentation of the event on the official website of the Sofia Metropolitan Library put the emphasis on the fact that the photos focused visitor interest on Shanghai as a city that has witnessed Chinese and Western cultural trends over the past 200 years. “[The photos] reveal a multifaceted reality, ranging from architecture and landscapes to advertising and fashion, as well as many others, including the classic buildings along the Bund Promenade...”<sup>6</sup> (Photo 6).

The exhibition was a continuation of the successful cooperation between the two libraries, which started with the presentation in Sofia of *the Shanghai Window* project (2011). Along with *The Blooming Flowers of Shanghai* exhibition, a collection of valuable Chinese books was displayed in the lobby in front of the hall. Most of the books were received as a donation from China, with some of the famous titles about China translated into Bulgarian.

The first 2020 exhibition at the Dechko Uzunov Gallery, a filial of the Sofia City Art Gallery, was *A Trip to China*, opened for visitors from February through July. The exhibition was the result of a journey to China that the famous Bulgarian artist D. Uzunov (1899-1986) made in 1958 within the framework of a bilateral cultural exchange program. Together with Veselin Staykov, a graphist, D. Uzunov

<sup>6</sup> See more on: The Blooming Flowers of Shanghai Exhibition – official website of Sofia Metropolitan Library – <https://www.libsofia.bg/page/posts/izlozhba-bdquorazcfnalite-cvetja-na-shanxajldquo-8876.php> (Read 21.06.2021)

spent three months in China visiting different cities and their landmarks. The 2020 exhibition contained over 20 historical and urban themed graphics and paintings and telling the great Bulgarian artist's own story of what he saw in Beijing, Shanghai, Canton, Suzhou, and elsewhere in China (Photo 7).

The beginning of Chinese New Year 2021, which is the Year of the White Metal Ox, was marked by *Lights over the City*, a Bulgarian-Chinese exhibition staged in an urban environment from 12 February till 14 March 2021. Slaveykov Square, a top place in downtown Sofia, was illuminated by a combination of elements of traditional Chinese lanterns, innovative lighting techniques, and modern art forms. This project was the result of the joint creative effort of 18 artists and students from Hangzhou and Sofia. The event was initiated and coordinated by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Bulgaria and organized by the Chinese Cultural Centre and Sofia Municipality, in cooperation with the Chinese Academy of Arts, Hangzhou and the National Academy of Sciences, Sofia<sup>7</sup> (Photo 8).



Photo 8. Lights over the City, 2021

This first outdoor art event was based on the concept of lanterns and light in the context of the famous art of creating handmade lanterns, a centuries-old Chinese traditional handicraft. "In Buddhism, the flame of the lanterns symbolizes enlightenment and knowledge. Lanterns serve as a guide to the guests expected to come and also to the souls of the dead. During the Lantern Festival celebrated in the first month of the traditional Chinese calendar, lanterns carry a special meaning" (Eberhard 2005: 466). The extraordinary exhibition offered passers-by a synergy of sculptural forms and light objects combining the ancient mastery of lanterns and the modern ideas of young artists for more light and hope on the eve of a new year.

<sup>7</sup> Art directors and curators were Asadur Markarov and Zheng Jing; Chief Curator Assistant: Ren Jae; curator team in Bulgaria included: Prof. Desislava Mincheva, Dr. Maria Ganeva, and Dr. Michaela Kamenova; sponsor was Huawei Technologies Bulgaria EOOD.

## Conclusion

The focus on knowledge and information about history, culture, and art through the prism of Chinese cultural tourism is among the positive results yielded by the events staged in the 5-year period briefly described here. Successful communication of the messages that these events convey to the public is an evidence of a long-standing creative partnership between the two countries. Although selective, this glance at their importance in promoting China as a cultural tourism destination is part of its successful promotion in Bulgaria. Both the upsurge of virtual or hybrid events in a time of “lockdown” tourism and the combination of traditional and online initiatives in Bulgaria are a testimony to the desire and curiosity of modern people to discover the vast world of cultural tourism.

The initiative and creativity of the cultural institutions mentioned above are part of the dynamic development of Bulgarian-Chinese cultural relations. They are not only a way to make people discover the rich heritage, nature, landmarks, and artifacts of China, but also a proof of the bright perspectives of cultural tourism as one of the most preferred types of tourism in the world.

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# The Dawn of Heaven: An Intercultural Approach on the Mythical Founder through René Girard's Scapegoat Mechanism

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## Abstract

This paper discusses how Pangu's story hypothesizes the world as being the ultimate creation of a sole character, considering that its study should also be addressed as an intercultural link, for it is probably the result of intense cultural exchanges among different people along the Ancient Silk Road. Pangu seems to hold an unprecedented importance to the field of comparative mythology as it can also be analyzed through Girard's mimetic theory and scapegoat mechanism. It is this paper's main goal to demonstrate that Pangu is not only the father of the Chinese universe, but he can be considered as a mirrored figure, and the victim, of a previous mimetic triangulation as well.

**Keywords:** Chinese creation myth, Mimetic theory, Pangu, Scapegoat mechanism

## 1. Thoughts on Chinese Origin Mythology

Transmitted orally among generations before any type of written record, origin myths provide a set of clues concerning the line of thought of the people who developed them. As society grows and changes, these same myths undergo similar transformations. In some of them, there is no genesis for the characters who are involved in the narratives, since they simply exist. Others, by contrast, provide this explanation. The presence of these gods or heroes does not, however, preclude the emergence of the world, the birth of humanity or the creation of culture. This appearance is often made from a cosmos that already has some existing matter.

Thus, it is not feasible to carry out an analysis that proves to be restrictive in one's research, as it is impossible to reduce it to just a foundational myth. The world's origin has always been part of the most intimate worries of any community. Consequently, these same ideas often come together in one, transforming their plot into something more detailed. In this sense, assumptions concerning the origin and formation of the world, in a community that reveals itself to be truly diverse on an ethnic plane, take on multiple forms, which results in a remarkable divergence when compared, for example, to Jewish

and Christian mythic narratives. There is not only one myth that may be considered as the one that narrates the true origin of the world and/or man. On the contrary, there are different myths, often oxymoronic versions, on this matter. Therefore, it is more rigorous to reflect on a pluralism of Chinese cosmogonic conceptions.

Describing the way how the world became organized out of chaos, origin myths unveil man's increasingly entrenched interest in identifying the moment in which the universe he lives in came to existence. It is entirely natural to search for answers for this supposedly unsolvable ignorance. All the conclusions that came from it date back to the exceptional time when, breaking the darkness, a primitive element originated all the components that would end up building that same environment. In Chinese mythology,

The act of creation was understood as a matter not of bringing something out of nothing, but of turning formlessness into an ordered pattern. The universe came into being when existing elements, previously mingled in chaos, were set apart in an arranged fashion. The ancient Chinese imagined the primeval chaos as a cloud of moist vapor, suspended in darkness. (Allan & Phillips 2012: 30)

Although countless geographical barriers separate them, many cultures have conceived origin myths containing the very same basic basis. Birrell (1993) believes that, contrary to the ancient Greek, Egyptian or Mesopotamian cosmogonies, whose origins go back to primordial water, the Chinese cosmogony presents vapor (气, *qi*) as the basic element that embodies cosmic energy responsible for the organization of matter, time and space. As the author states (1993: 23), "this energy, according to Chinese mythic narratives, undergoes a transformation at the moment of creation, so that the nebulous element of vapor becomes differentiated into dual elements of male and female, Yin and Yang, hard and soft matter, and other binary elements". This allusion to the common birth of Yin and Yang (阴阳, *Yīnyáng*), constituent parts of the vapor, is immediately detected. It was from the interactions established between these two forces that the world gradually began to take shape.

*The Book of Master Zhuang* (庄子, *Zhuāngzǐ*) adds another narrative that seeks to clarify how the world's origin happened, by introducing three gods: Shu (倏, *Shū*), Lord of the South Sea, Hu (忽, *Hū*), Lord of the Northern Sea, and Hundun (混沌, *Hùndùn*), Lord of the Centre. Shu and Hu lived in kingdoms located in opposite geographies, however, as good friends, they would often meet in order to talk and compare their kingdoms. During these meetings, each one travelled halfway, eventually joining together in Hundun's kingdom. The Lord of the Centre, who was a kind being, tried to make the other two gods feel as comfortable as possible, although he himself felt very unhappy, since he did not breathe, did not see, did not hear, nor did he eat. One day, Shu and Hu, wanting to thank all the kindness shown by Hundun, decided to assign him the seven orifices (七窍, *qīqiào*)<sup>1</sup>, very much in their own image. Hundun immediately accepted their gift, and

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<sup>1</sup> It refers to the seven orifices of the human head (mouth, ears, nostrils and eyes).

the two other gods used an axe to open the first orifice. In each of the following six days, both Shu and Hu opened a total of seven orifices in Hundun's face. However, on the last day, when the final one was opened, Hundun died, releasing a final breath. For Yuan (2006: 19), "this parable, despite being comic, contains itself the concept of an origin myth. Although Hundun (...) dies, the whole universe, or the world that followed it, was born from that moment on". Hundun's theme of primordial unity and pre-civilizational innocence is, therefore, prominently highlighted in Taoist texts, functioning as a metaphor for chaotic order, unlimited freedom and the totality of human nature and primitive society. In contrast, in Confucian works, Hundun is not introduced in a context of dialogue about cosmogony. He is often described as a barbarian who challenged the ritual and appropriate order of civilizational life.

From the perspective of comparative mythology, it is possible to relate this myth to the one conveyed by the Judeo-Christian tradition through the *Book of Genesis*. According to it, God created the world in six days, resting on the seventh. Initially, he created Heaven and Earth. Then, separating day and night, he also conceived the stars, the air, the plants, the animals and, finally, the human being. In both myths, the chaos in which the cosmos was diluted is nullified, disappearing after seven days. On the one hand, in the Chinese proposal, the modification of the original state of chaos, with the effective opening of the seven offered orifices, forced it to develop a shape (that is, eyes to see, ears to hear, nose to inhale and mouth to taste) and to stop being what he previously was. On the other hand, God, after separating Heaven from Earth, ordered chaos and transformed it into cosmos. And it all takes place in seven days.

## 2. Pangu's Myth

However, the most frequently conveyed narrative regarding this theme is the one that involves the giant Pangu (盘古, *Pángǔ*). According to Yuan (2006), the collection and identification of its fragments allowed to date its origin to the 3rd century. Pangu's myth proves to be important for the present analysis, since it has probably been propagated by people who were foreign to the original Chinese culture. In other words, this giant is believed to have been a creation not only of the constant cultural exchanges that have been established and promoted by the largest commercial network in the ancient world, the famous Silk Road (丝绸之路, *sīchóu zhī lù*), but also of the descriptive contributions that, in the context of opening and fixing commercial relations, were made by multiple traders. In this aspect, Birrell (1993: 31) considers that "the myth shares so many features with the Indo-European mythologem of the cosmological human body that it seems likely that it was borrowed at a late date (...) from Central Asian sources reaching China".

Wu (2001) explains that there are several theories concerning this myth's origin. In the author's opinion, there are three most plausible regions for its genesis: the western part

of India, the Chinese Central Plains (中原, *Zhōngyuán*) or southern China. Wu's work is also quite complete, and, unlike Birrell, this author defends a Chinese origin for the myth, stating that the Central Plains would have most likely been its birthplace. However, even though they do not agree, Wu recognizes that there is a difference regarding written literature and oral tradition, stressing the existence of multiple versions. It should be noted, therefore, that Pangu's achievements are widely recognized not only by the Han ethnicity, but also by other ethnicities such as Zhuang (壮族, *Zhuàngzú*) or Bai (白族, *Báizú*), which, therefore, gives them a certain specificity.

Another reason why this myth is so important has to do with the duality transmitted by it. Pangu, when he strives for the separation of Heaven and Earth, sacrificing his own life, recovers the immemorial concepts of Yin and Yang. As previously inferred, "the constitution of the universe is made through the antithesis of the two realities, opposing forces, which do not exist without one another" (Martins, 2018: 3).

Like Hundun's narrative, the story of Pangu presents a series of aspects common to other myths. For example, referring to the foundational sacrifice, it is feasible to draw a small comparison between Pangu and the biblical proposal. In the first narrative, Pangu not only renounces his own life to preserve the state of separation between Heaven and Earth, but also offers his physical body in order to propel the transformation of the world, which, consequently, loses its status as a desolate place and gains (even more) life. There is here a clear link between Pangu and the Heaven / Earth duality, since the former, holding the cosmic powers of the latter, is metamorphosed and creates all the worldly elements.

In the second proposal, following a sacrificial interpretation of the crucifixion, Jesus Christ allows himself to be sacrificed on the cross in order to become the atonement that makes possible the salvation of mankind. It is, like Pangu, a conscious and selfless sacrifice. Jesus does not defend himself from the incriminations attributed to him, since he was himself the agent sent by God who sought to succeed in the mission of, by redeeming humanity from its sinful attitudes, making salvation possible. In both examples, they sacrifice themselves in a conduct whose purpose is to prevent chaotic recidivism.

As such, it is possible to consider that, regardless of culture, human beings will constantly question themselves about the formation of the cosmos. Whether or not there is a correlation or disparity among the mythical narratives that erupt from there, myths reflect the cultural exclusivity of the people who created them. Consequently, there is not only one unique origin myth. On the contrary, several myths will set out to search for that answer.

### **3. Interpreting Pangu's story through Girard's Scapegoat Mechanism**

Although René Girard did not make this Chinese narrative a direct and unequivocal object of his theory, it is feasible to try some approximations between these same elements. In this sense, first, it is necessary to clarify that, in Pangu's myth, the mimetic triangle has no notorious presence. Pangu's birth occurs in a world characterized by com-

plete and total disorganization (chaos) which can be understood as the result of a previous triangulation. Although it is not important to determine who imitated, was imitated or who desired what, it is perhaps necessary to underline that, in a certain chronological period, a given subject desired exactly the object already desired by a certain model. This created a generalized rivalry, because the subject who copies the model is also the model copied by another subject. Thus, the repercussion of a correlated chain of subjects and mediators, that is, an increasingly universal violence, erased the original desired object from the minds of the conflicting parties, grew and amplified its influence in society. Then, a state of violence against all was formed.

According to Girard, it is essential that, in order to temporarily abolish total violence, the so-called scapegoat must be sacrificed. However, considering Pangu's narrative, it is assumed that there was no such figure who, by being chosen by the community as a specific target of the same violence, effectively managed to avoid the chaotic social state. Before Pangu's birth, society succumbed to universal violence, moving from an organized cosmos to an indefinite chaos. Therefore, the blackness identified by Pangu, as soon as he was born, is an allegorical effigy for social anarchy that, during a given period, had shaken society. Another plausible interpretation is associated with the fact that, although this society has successfully selected and sacrificed a victim to appease widespread violence, they were unable, for a certain reason, to proceed with the subsequent renewal of this sacrifice through the rite. Consequently, the previously extinct mimetic rivalries re-emerged, transporting the community back to the state from which it was trying to escape.

In the face of the chaotic state of society, represented by the immense blackness that emerged from a violence prior to his birth, Pangu decided to sacrifice himself in order to allow society to recover its cosmic state of peace. He became the victim who gave new origin to the community. In fact, he was chosen as such, because, as Girard argues, the more isolated the victim is (this is, regarding to the social group), the more perfect it will become for the fulfilment of the sacrificial act. Hence, foreigners, war prisoners and children are the preferred elements for this. Pangu was born, and it was precisely his birth that placed him in a prominent position in the list of sacrificial choices, since his attachment to society prior to all this generalization of violence was, in fact, quite weak.

It is assumed that, originally, Pangu's sacrifice was not mortal, since, between the time of his birth and his death, a period of eighteen thousand years elapses. In today's Chinese culture, this expression only indicates that a long period of time has passed. However, sources linked to the Chinese myth are not always clear, which, in this case, may mean that Pangu, during a certain stage of his life, was a constant victim of a drawn-out sacrifice. In other words, Pangu fulfilled his mission for eighteen thousand years, which demonstrates the time gap between the moment of the first sacrifice and its conclusion. Society was so caught up in a chaotic state that the scapegoat's immediate death would not have the desired effect (returning the former peace to its full extent). The separation of Heaven and Earth is thus affirmed as a scene of rite which, incessantly performed

by Pangu, renewed his position as a sacrificial victim. Crucial to society was, then, the successive renewal of the rite and not its full execution. Pangu's sacrifice became sacred, as, in effect, it continually reorganized and nullified chaos. In this context, it is perhaps interesting to think about Christian theology of salvation through death and resurrection, since it also warns that the restoration and maintenance of order is not a momentary work, but a continuous one.

Pangu's death portrays the moment when, once the mimetic rivalry was resolved, the cosmos was finally able to assume its full form. The dismemberment of his body, thus, symbolizes Pangu's absolute integration into the society he rescued. From a victim to blame for the chaotic state of society, this giant started to assume a new role, the one of a saviour who is worthy of the devotion of the saved society.

Regarding Pangu's sacrifice, it is equally plausible to conjecture that, as originally suggested, the rite that commemorates and remembers it was, at some point, forgotten and prevented from fulfilling its purpose. This is equivalent to declaring that, at a certain point in the future, the same crisis may reoccur, in what would be called cyclical crises. In fact, a quick reading of the annals of Chinese history will allow the realization that several dynasties were successively established and removed in a process in which the exonerated emperors were guilty of all evils. Thus, the hypothesis of the existence of a constant search for the renewal of the methods used to solve the mimetic rivalry(-ies) and the crisis that follows. Burkert (1996: 73–4) recalls this principle of the victimless victim, which is also present in Christian theology, stressing that

The *pars pro toto* principle, accepting a small loss in order to save the whole, is even more effective in group dynamics. "It is preferable for a single man to die than for all the people to be destroyed" – this is what the Caiaphas priest says in the St. John's Gospel. The evangelist is anxious to add that Caiaphas had said this "not because of his self-recreation, acting like a prophet". This strange harmony (salvation of all by the death of one) has become one of the main tenets of Christian theology. Caiaphas' prophecy, however, was reaffirming a much older principle, widely understood, accepted and practiced. It is already presupposed in the Babylonian creation epic *Enuma elish*, when a sentence is pronounced about a guilty god: "Only he must perish for humanity to be moulded".

In short, as Martins (2017) describes, Pangu myth is distinctly allegorical and changeable. In the present analysis, it is assumed that there was a social group prior to the appearance of Pangu that, for a certain reason, was involved in a period of great adversity. Pangu, in this sense, may have been a king, a state official, or any other figure of importance to society at the time. It is known, however, that he was a character who helped to solve the societal problems of that time, conquering his place as an essential element of the community: the eternal saviour who regenerated the world.

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**Китайският традиционен празник Цинмин  
(Ден за почистване на гробовете) като колективен  
ресурс за справяне с екзистенциалната криза на  
прехода между живота и смъртта в нетрадиционните  
условия на пандемията от КОВИД-19\***

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**Traditional Chinese Festival Qingming (Tomb Sweeping)  
As a Resource for Dealing With the Existential Crisis  
Between Life and Death Under the Non-Traditional  
Conditions of the COVID Pandemic\***

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**Abstract**

The paper traces the roots of the Qingming festival in ancient Chinese culture, analyses the meaning of the festival ritual complex and presents its significance as a traditional community resource for dealing with the existential crisis arising from the psychological need to make death meaningful and accepted as an element of the natural cycle. The paper reviews some forms of the celebration during the COVID pandemic, based on materials from the Chinese language media from 2020 and 2021. The current situation is presented as a factor enhancing the traditional function of the Qingming festival as a key social practice for marking life and death a mutually defining dichotomy.

**Keywords:** Qingming festival, Chinese culture, COVID-19, tradition, rituals, death

Традиционният празник Цинмин<sup>1</sup>, познат също и като Ден за почистване на гробовете<sup>2</sup>, се чества ежегодно в началото на април в Китай и във всички китайски общности по света. В китайската култура се придава особено голямо значение на този празник, функционално съответстващ на чествания в християнството ден за почита-

\* The cited data are based on results obtained from a study within the project "Local festivals: A resource of local communities for coping with crises", funded by National Science Fund – Ministry of Education and Science (KP-06-H45 / 5 from 30.11.2020).

<sup>1</sup> 清明节 – букв. Празник на ясното и светлото (време).

<sup>2</sup> 墓节.

не на мъртвите, наричан Задушница. Това значение на Цинмин се дължи на ролята му като ресурс на традиционната общност за справяне с екзистенциалната криза, произтичаща от психологическата необходимост да се придаде смисъл на смъртта и тя да бъде възприета като елемент от естествения природен цикъл. Съществуват разнообразни локални форми на празничната обредност, посветена на Цинмин и на неговата връзка с календарната дейност в различни региони на Китай<sup>3</sup>, но във всички тях е налице един фундаментален акт – почистването на гробното място (Wu, Cesarino 2019). Друга традиционна дейност е колективното поклонение пред гробовете на предците и полагането там на жертвени дарове, включващи благовония и ритуални копия на банкноти и монети, цветя, плодове, храни и хартиени макети на предмети, смятани за нужни на покойниците в Отвъдното. По правило централно място за изпълнение на тези ритуали са самите гробни места, въпреки че в дните около официалния празник Цинмин хората изгарят хартиените жертвени дарове и по улиците в населените места.

От казаното дотук става ясно, че правилата за социална дистанция, наложени заради КОВИД-19 пандемията, превръщат традиционното честване на празника в почти невъзможно начинание. В този контекст може да се твърди, че **настоящата крайно необичайна и напълно нетрадиционна ситуация, причинена от разпространението на КОВИД-19, действа като фактор, усилващ функциите и значението на празника Цинмин**. Аргументацията на това твърдение почива както върху проследяване на корените на празника Цинмин в древната китайска култура, така и върху анализ на смисловите пластове в празничния ритуален комплекс през различните исторически периоди от съществуването му. Такъв преглед на възникването и функциите на Цинмин полага в необходимия за разбирането им контекст някои актуални форми на този празник, честван от всички китайски общности по света.

В празника Цинмин се открояват **три основни компонента**, които са се напластявали един върху друг в историческа последователност и така постепенно са формирали съществуващия и в наши дни комплексен ритуал.

**Названието Цинмин** насочва вниманието към древната система от 24 „соларни периода“<sup>4</sup> – отрязъци от календарната година, определени в съответствие с целогодишното движение на Слънцето по еклиптиката (UNESCO 2016). Соларните периоди, всеки от които е съставен от три обикновено<sup>5</sup> петдневни подразделения,

<sup>3</sup> Изследвана е например връзката между поклонението към предците по време на Цинмин и цикличността при сеенето на ориза в Централен Китай (Aijmer 1978).

<sup>4</sup> Системата от 24-те соларни периода (节气) се заражда през епохата Пролети и есени (春秋时期) (771–476/403 г. пр. Хр.) от династия Източна Джоу (东周) (770–256 г. пр. Хр.) с първоначалното определяне на два и после на четири основни времеви сегмента. Всичките 24 периода са окончателно установени през династия Западна Хан (206 г. пр. Хр. – 24 г. сл. Хр.) (CSSN 2015).

<sup>5</sup> Тъй като скоростта, с която Слънцето се движи по еклиптиката, се променя в зависимост от разстоянието между него и Земята, броят на дните, нужни за придвижване на Слънцето от един до друг соларен период, също леко варира.

наречени *хоу*<sup>6</sup>, носят различни названия в зависимост от метеорологичните условия през тези 15 дни и свързаните с тях селскостопански дейности. Петият поред от 24-те соларни периода е наречен Цинмин, букв. „Ясен и светъл“, и началото му съответства на дните 3-ти, 4-ти или 5-ти април, тоест във времето от годината, когато природата се събужда за новия си жизнен цикъл. В първото писмено свидетелство за този соларен период в съчинението „История на династия Джоу“<sup>7</sup> от IV в. пр. Хр. се споменава: „В деня Цинмин дървото *утун* (пауловнията) започва да цъфти“<sup>8</sup> (Lu et al. 2019).

Вторият основен компонент при формирането на празничния комплекс Цинмин е **празникът на студената храна Ханшъ**<sup>9</sup>, свързан с легендата за предания сановник Дзие Дзътуей<sup>10</sup> (Lu et al. 2019). Всъщност в основата си този празник е проява на още по-древния култ към предците, за който се знае, че съществува още през династия Шан (ок. 1600 г. пр. Хр. – 1046 г. пр. Хр.) (Johnson 1989: 34–41) и векове наред заема ключово място в цялостната духовна култура на Китай. През VII в. празникът *Ханшъ* вече е разпространен в цяла Източна Азия като форма на поклонение към мъртвите предци, за които се приема, че закрилят от Отвъдното живота, здравето и благополучието на своите живи потомци. Потомците на свой ред са убедени в личната си отговорност за гарантиране на тази закрила посредством стриктно определена система от жертвоприношения и възпоменателни ритуали, с чиято помощ между поколенията се поддържа непрекъснатата комуникация отвъд живота и смъртта (Johnson 1989: 35–37).

Не е случайно, че честването на пролетта като начало на нов жизнен цикъл в природата съвпада в традиционния календар с поклонението пред мъртвите предци. Такава връзка съществува и при **третия компонент в празничния комплекс Цинмин**. Това е традиционен празник, отбелязван в древен Китай<sup>11</sup> на третия ден от третия лунен месец и известен като **празника Шансъ**<sup>12</sup> или просто като Третия ден

<sup>6</sup> 候.

<sup>7</sup> 《周书》 – Този текст е ядро на „Загубената история на династия Джоу“ (《逸周书》) – сборник от исторически документи относно епохата Западна Джоу (1046–771 г. пр. Хр.).

<sup>8</sup> 清明之日, 桐始华.

<sup>9</sup> 寒食节.

<sup>10</sup> 介子推 – Легендата разказва, че той бил предан служител на Чун Ар – престолонаследник на царство Дзин през VII в. пр. Хр. В един момент от дългогодишното изгнание на принца в чужди краища, Дзие Дзътуей го спасил от гладна смърт като отрязал къс месо от собствения си крак и сготвил от него ядене за господаря си. Чун Ар в крайна сметка успял да се качи на трона под името Уънгун, но забравил саможертвата на Дзие Дзътуей, който се оттегил в планината с майка си. Когато след време Уънгун си спомнил за него и го потърсил, Дзие Дзътуей отказал да се срещне с предишния си господар, затова владетелят подпалил гората, в която той живеел, за да го принуди да излезе. За нещастие Дзие Дзътуей и майка му изгорели в пожара и наскърбеният Уънгун заповядал да му въздадат почести в специално построен за това храм. Една от заповедите на владетеля била в деня на възпоменанието на Дзие Дзътуей хората в царството да не палат огън, така че трябвало да се хранят единствено със студени ястия, което обяснява името Празник на студената храна (Zhang 2002).

<sup>11</sup> Посочва се, че празникът съществува от края на периода Пролети и есени (Zhang 2011: 17).

<sup>12</sup> 上巳节 – 上巳 означава буквално „първият ден съ“, тоест денят, в чието название за първи път в месеца се появява знакът съ (巳) от цикъла от дванадесет знака, известен като „Земни върви“ (地支). Те са използвани в съчетание с други десет от цикъла „Небесни стволоче“ (天干) за отбелязване на времето в древен Китай (Yan 2021).

от третия месец<sup>13</sup>, и разбиран като време за ритуално очистиране<sup>14</sup>, с помощта на водата, от натрупаните през старата година вредни енергии и зли влияния. В китайските народни вярвания се приема, че на този ден порталите между световите на живите и мъртвите се отварят и душите на мъртвите могат да бъдат призовани – мотив, съдържащ се и в празника Цинмин. Според редица източници тъкмо този ден се смята за рожден ден на Жълтия император, всепризнат за общ прародител на китайците (Zhang 2011: 17–18; Li 2015: 3). Тук трябва да се посочи и поощряването от традицията<sup>15</sup> свободно общуване между млади мъже и жени<sup>16</sup> (Zhang 2011: 18) именно на този ден, с недвусмисления подтекст за необходимостта от възпроизводство на живота. Вероятно поради това в наши дни празникът *Шанс* е коментиран от някои изследователи и най-вече от китайските медии като древен и изконно китайски вариант на празника на влюбените (Tan 2020).

И в трите горепосочени компонента на празника Цинмин присъства **мотивът за взаимната обвързаност между живота и смъртта като елементи от един динамичен континуум**. Тази фундаментална идея за човешкото съществуване като неразделна част от променящата се, но вечна природа обяснява защо Цинмин се празнува като един от дните за поклонение към мъртвите предци<sup>17</sup> и заедно с това като символично начало на новия живот в природата. Празникът Цинмин е пресечна точка между календарния цикъл, съобразно който традиционната общност организира битието си, и жизнения цикъл на отделния човек, поради което функционира като психологически и социален механизъм за включване на човешкото съществуване (индивидуално и групово) в по-висшия порядък на универсалната цикличност във вселената.

На 4 април 2020 г. празникът Цинмин бе отбелязан в напълно нетрадиционните условия на пандемията от КОВИД-19. Това за нещастие се повтори и на 4 април 2021 г. поради продължаващата пандемия. Въпреки огромните предизвикателства, пред които пандемията изправи обществата и правителствата, навсякъде в Китай и в китайските общности по света празникът бе честван със смесица от традиционни и нетрадиционни средства. Това означаваше огромни усилия за държавната администрация и за обществото като цяло, за да се организират и проведат относително безпрепятствено ритуалите за почитане на мъртвите, като същевременно се гарантира безопасността на живите. В КНР държавата и обществото бяха съвсем наясно с

<sup>13</sup> 三月三.

<sup>14</sup> 祓禊.

<sup>15</sup> Още в най-древната антология на поезията в Китай „Книга на песните“ (《诗经》), за която се приема, че съдържа текстове от времето на династия Западна Джоу до средата на периода Пролети и есени от дин. Източна Джоу (XI в. пр.Хр. – V в. пр.Хр.) е включена народната песен „Реките Джън и Уей“ в царство Джън (《郑风·溱洧》), която пресъздава вълнението на младите влюбени, разменящи си знаци на привързаност в деня *Шанс* (Xiao 2012).

<sup>16</sup> 春嬉.

<sup>17</sup> Китайската традиция познава няколко празника, посветени на мъртвите предци. Такива са например Денят на Зимното слънцестоене (冬至), Празникът на двойната девятка (重阳节), Последният ден на старата година (除夕) и Празникът в средата на седмия лунен месец (七月半).

важността на този празник за нормалното функциониране на обществения живот и за съхраняването на социалната стабилност в кризисната ситуация на КОВИД-19. Ето защо не бяха пестени усилията да се осигури възможността хората да изпълнят поне базовите ритуални дейности, свързани с поклонението към мъртвите предци. Нещо повече, честването на Цинмин бе направлявано като канализиран начин както за изразяване на скръбта от загубите, дошли с неочакваната здравна криза, така и за укрепване на културата на синовната почителност<sup>18</sup>, възприемана като фундаментална за съществуването не само на семейството и рода, но и на държавата като естествено тяхно продължение<sup>19</sup>. Впрегнати бяха всички сили и ресурси, бяха поощрени бизнестът и рекламата в услуга на традицията да се чества Цинмин.



Постер от кампанията за поощряване на “облачното поклонение”

Източник: <https://www.tusij.com/picture/434046.html>

В резултат на това празникът прие нетрадиционни и в отделни случаи изненадващи за външните наблюдатели форми. Навсякъде бяха прилагани изключително стриктни мерки за социална дистанция и за предпазване от заразата с КОВИД-19 при посещенията на гробищните паркове. Бяха въведени предварителна регистрация и график за посещенията, а също и контрол на статуса на „здравния код“<sup>20</sup> на посетителите. Големите гробищни паркове в Пекин, Шанхай и на други места откриха горещи телефонни линии за нуждаещите се от техните услуги. Същевременно в медийното и в реалното комунално пространство, и в социалните мрежи се разгърна интензивна „идеологическа работа“<sup>21</sup> за убеждаване на населението да се въздържа от лични посещения на гробните места в дните около Цинмин с цел избягване на струпване на хора. Стана възможно близките на починалите да възложат почистването на гробовете и извършването на възпоменателните ритуали на служители на гробището, като клиентите лично наблюдават стрийминг в специален онлайн-канал в реално време или на видео-запис изпълнението на услугата, а след това

<sup>18</sup> 孝.

<sup>19</sup> В тази връзка е показателна китайската дума за държава (国家), записвана с йероглифите за държава (国) и за семейство (家) и би могло да се превежда буквално като „държава-семейство“.

<sup>20</sup> 防疫健康码 – „Здравен код за превенция на пандемията“ е система за електронно отчитане на здравния статус на хората в реално време чрез приложение в мобилните телефони. Системата е въведена за пръв път в употреба още на 9 фев. 2020 г. в гр. Шънджън от технологичния гигант Тенсент (Tencent 2020).

<sup>21</sup> 思想工作.


могат да получат фотографии. В условията на КОВИД-19 получиха сериозно развитие съществуващите и преди 2020 г. услуги за онлайн-честване на празника: създаването на персонализирани онлайн-олтари със снимки на починалите и на разнообразни дигитални дарове за тях (като изображения на любимото ястие на покойника, аудио-запис на любимата му песен или дигитален вариант на домашния му любимец<sup>22</sup>) в специални интернет-платформи (Tiantangwang 2021; Gurenju2021; Jibai



Постер от кампанията за поощряване на "облачното поклонение".

<http://xhv5.xhby.net/mp3/pc/c/202004/02/c760336.html>

Източник: ежедневникът "Синхуа жъбао" от 02.04.2020.



Служители на Революционното гробище Бабаошан в Пекин изгъляват ритуален поклон пред гроба на клиенти, поръчали услугата онлайн:

Източник: <https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202003/31/WS5e830d8ba3107bb6b57a9e86.html>



Постер от кампанията за поощряване на "облачното поклонение"

Източник: <https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/124680040>

<sup>22</sup> Неизбежно това събужда асоциации с електронното пиленце-тамагочи, което се превърна в световен хит в края на 90-те години на XX в. и продължи да изисква грижи от собствениците си и в началото на XXI в.



“Тайландски предприемач предлага защитни маски срещу КОВИД-19 за мъртвите предци”  
(泰业者推冥纸口罩 让先人一起防疫)

Източник: <https://weareunited.com.my/11544795/>



Постер от кампания в Малайзия за въздържане от посещение на гробищата.

“Тази година сами ще си поръчаме всичко отвън. Вие се пазете и не идвайте!”

Източник: China Press:

<https://www.chinapress.com.my/20200331/%E2%97%A4%E8%A1%8C%E5%8A%A8%E7%AE%A1%E5%88%B6%E2%97%A2%E6%B8%85%E6%98%8E%E7%A6%81%E6%AD%A2%E6%89%AB%E5%A2%93%E5%85%88%E4%BA%BA%E8%87%AA%E5%B7%B1%E5%8F%AB%E5%A4%96%E5%8D%96%EF%BC%81/>

<sup>23</sup> 线上祭祖.

2021). Появиха се дори игрови онлайн-указания за създаването на виртуалните олтари и за правилното изпълнение на ритуалите, свързани с поклонението на предците. (Renren jizuwang 2021)

Освен онлайн-поклонението към предците<sup>23</sup>, в условията на пандемията от КОВИД-19 някои от най-традиционните ритуали за поклонение на предците също бяха обогатени с ново съдържание. Така например в Хонконг, Тайван и Тайланд близките на починалите можеха да включат в ритуално изгаряните хартиени дарове защитни маски в различни цветове, както и макети на електронни термометри и на дезинфектанти (Oriental Daily 2021; Liberty Times Net 2020; Viralcham 2021). Това може и да изглежда абсурдно отстрани, но всъщност е трогателен израз на любов към починалите близки, за които се приема, че продължават да имат своите нужди и в Отвъдното. Вярата във връзката между живите и мъртвите предоставя психологическа обосновка и на призива за въздържане от посещения на гробовете, излизащ от устата на самите мъртви предци: „Деца, не се притеснявайте за нас, тази година сами ще си поръчаме навън нужните неща, а вие се пазете!“, както това е изобразено в един донякъде злокобен постер, публикуван в китайскоезичната интернет-медия „Чайна прес“ в Малайзия (China Press 2020).

Възможно е да се приведат още многобройни примери за формите, които поклонението към предците в КНР и в китайските етнически общности по света прие в последните две години. Всички тези конкретни случаи демонстрират, че **традицията, свързана с празника Цинмин е достатъчно устойчива, за да не бъде сериозно нарушена от каквото и да било, включително и от настоящата пандемия. Точно обратното, под нови и нетрадиционни форми тази древна традиция съумя да откликне на драстично усилилата се от пандемията психологическа нужда от адекватна индивидуална и колективна реакция на сблъсъка със смъртта. В настоящата ситуация споделянето от всички риск за живота, произтичащ от вероятно заразяване с КОВИД-19, актуализира функционирането на ритуалния комплекс Цинмин като дългосрочна и редовна психологическа помощ за членовете на общността, изправени пред смъртта на близките си.**

Разбира се, нововъведенията в празничната ритуалност предизвикват и **някои въпроси**. Така например за момента не е ясно дали **дигиталните форми за поклонение на предците ще се превърнат в траен елемент от традицията на Цинмин**. Още по-съществен е въпросът **какви са обществените оценки за това ново явление и доколко е допустимо държавата да се намесва активно в едно от най-интимните екзистенциални преживявания на личността и на общността, каквото е сблъсъкът със смъртта на член от семейството**. Тези и други свързани с практикуването на празника Цинмин въпроси с обществена значимост ще назряват тепърва и в бъдеще неминуемо ще изискват своето разглеждане както от академичен ракурс, така и от позициите на държавните и обществените институции в съответните региони на света.

За момента е очевидно само, че **многопластовият смисъл на празника Цинмин гарантира устойчивостта му в променящите се условия**. Може спокойно да се твърди, че **китайският култ към предците (семеен, родови, етнически и национални), чийто израз е празникът Цинмин, е доказано ефикасен механизъм и обществено приет модел за колективното преодоляване на екзистенциалната криза пред лицето на смъртта**. Той спомага за постепенното интегриране на индивида в семейната, локалната и етнокултурната общност посредством стройна система от ритуали и така усилюва съзнанието за идентичност и усещането за трайна връзка с нещо много по-значимо и устойчиво от съществуването на отделния смъртен човек. Опасността индивидуалният жизнен опит да бъде обезсмислен от настъпването на смъртта, а скръбта от загубата на близките да бъде преживявана като единствено възможната и всепоглъщаща реакция, бива неутрализирана с помощта на ритуалите. Те играят ролята на проверен през вековете механизъм за запълване на пустотата, появила се със смъртта, и за включване на единичната човешка съдба в колективната опитност на границата между природата и културата.

**Именно поради функционирането си като генератор на идентичност за индивида и общността и на усещане за принадлежност към своеобразното**

„колективно безсмъртие“, традицията на Цинмин запазва жизнеността си и проявява гъвкавост по отношение на необходимостта от приемане на нови форми. Бидейки социална практика за маркиране на живота и смъртта като взаимно определящи се състояния, традиционният празник отново и отново осъществява символичния преход между тях. Така, култът към мъртвите предци и отбелязването на новия жизнен цикъл в природата в деня, наречен Цинмин – Ясен и светъл, се сливат в спокойното и мъдро честване на динамичния континуум живот-смърт.

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## Ancient Wisdom in Chinese Traditional Medicine: The New Face from Modern Science

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### Abstract

Discovering the essence of Chinese Traditional Medicine shows how the richness of its methods of treatment reflects the millenniums experience in the traditional medical knowledge. This knowledge deserves attention and in-depth understanding. Hence the guidelines for studying the theoretical, philosophical and methodological principles of Chinese Traditional Medicine. Unfortunately, when it is accepted as a fact and as a practical knowledge, it comes to the formal recognition of its methods, so the experience of putting it into practice not only can not solve the curative process with great effect but in some cases also causes their elimination.

In order to master the theoretical knowledge, the direct consequence of which is the practical results, it is necessary to publish translations of original Chinese Traditional Medicine publications, accompanied by comprehensive scientific comments. This will ensure a correct understanding of its theoretical system and purposeful use of its methods in practice to achieve and maintain homeostasis in the body. In today's tendency to apply Chinese Traditional Medicine methods, especially acupuncture, massage and gymnastics, there is a growing perception of the acute need for such scientific literature in practice. This will not only be promoted and disseminated but will also fine-tune the level of their implementation according to the classical principles.

**Keywords:** Chinese traditional medicine, Chinese herbal medicine, qi gong, acupuncture, tui na massage

The development of Chinese traditional medicine dates back to ancient times, before the scientific traditions of the West, in a culture with a unique way of thinking where dissections were forbidden. The ancient Chinese doctors had to rely on the power of their observation and on the trial and error in order to develop their medical system and terminology. As a result of that, they developed perceptions and ideas of the body, its functions, and the related diseases, which were different from those developed in the West.

Chinese traditional medicine is characterized by a rich system of theoretical principles which can be hardly interpreted from the modern science of medicine. Its theoretical system was built on imaginary relations in the body and on the relationships between

nature and humans. This is one of the important sides of Chinese traditional medicine which, in a sense, has the characteristics of a natural science (Goranova 1999: 48).

A characteristic of the Chinese medical philosophy is that it attaches significance to unity, harmony and equilibrium of opposites unlike the European medical philosophy which pays attention mostly to fighting opposites. This peculiarity is related to the traditional medical principles which interpret health and diseases, identifying them with the terms for harmony and its disruption in the organism. In Chinese traditional medicine diseases are viewed as a disruption of the harmony in the whole organism, not in its different organs and systems. This perception is based on the Chinese philosophical understanding and the idea of unity, wholeness, and harmony.

### **Ancient views of man and nature in Chinese traditional medicine**

The ancient Chinese people perceived human beings as a microcosm in the Universe which surrounded them, and they were driven by the same primary powers which ruled the macrocosm. They were perceived as part of the inseparable whole, called Dao – a continuum of connections and relations inside and out of them. This way of thinking was the reason why they did not separate spirit from the body and man from nature. The nature was perceived to be built out of interweaving figures and forms of movement. These elements were found in the smallest systems. In order that the whole system was balanced, each subsystem had to be balanced too. The principle of harmony was the same for each level of difficulty. The harmony in one system simultaneously reflected and generated the harmony of the other systems regardless of their complexity. According to the theory of correspondence, all events were related to one another, they were subjected to common powers regardless of their position in time or space. The energy Qi was the link which united events, time, and space because the reason behind the events was external (Dong 2018: 1–10).

Chinese traditional medicine claims that if you change the existing disharmony in the system of harmonious links, the initial reason will disappear because the conditions in which it emerged will not exist anymore. Chinese medicine observes the conditions while Western medicine deals with the reasons. According to the former, health is the ability of an organism to react to the wide diversity of challenges in a way which ensures balance. The disease shows our inability to adapt to the challenges, a disruption in the overall balance, and a break into the structure of an organism (Meng 2014: 25–30).

The ancient Chinese people believed that the basis of everything was the dualistic cosmogonic concept about the existence of two opposing powers – Yin and Yang which emerged from the initial united energy Qi. This happened with the help of the initial matter Taiji (太極) – “The Great Bounds”. The light and weightless particles of Yang went up and formed the sky and the turbid and heavy particles of Yin went down and created the earth. The alteration of Yin – the passive power and Yang – the active power determines

the cyclic recurrence of all processes in nature: day and night, morning and evening, winter and summer, awake and asleep, cold and heat, breathing in and breathing out, etc. The interaction between Yin and Yang created the first five elements which are in the basis of all material things and natural phenomena. If we took away one beginning, life would be impossible. The ancient Chinese took these elements from nature and applied them in their life. These are water, wood, earth, and metal and they encompass a much wider idea of these particular things. The concept of channels and collaterals is closely related to the ancient philosophical theory about unity and fight between the two opposites – the positive Yang and the negative Yin. The ancient healers tried to explain all processes and phenomena undergoing in the organism and the surrounding nature with this theory (Goranova 1999: 35-42). There are four directions in Chinese traditional medicine for prophylactic and treatment of diseases: acupuncture and moxibustion; herbal treatment; massage and manual therapy; Qigong – a special kind of gymnastics for generating the energy Qi in the body and making it harmonious. Nowadays, they are preserved as independent treatment methods, but it has been proven that they were used in combination in ancient times. Together with the above-mentioned direction, two more developed: nutrition science and longevity science. In “Huangdi Neijing” – “The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Medicine – Essential Questions”, 475–221 BC, it is stated that stone pricking emerged in East China, herbal therapy – in West China, moxibustion – in North China, massage – in Central China, and metal needle treatment – in South China (Zhou 2009: 7–12).

Scientific research in the field of Chinese traditional medicine was provoked by its worldwide popularity, especially of acupuncture, moxibustion, massage, and the specialized gymnastics Qigong. Through them one achieves harmony between their physics and psyche with the aim of bodily and spiritual perfection, health prevention, and recreation – in case of a disease. Chinese traditional medicine is perceived as an independent system of scientific knowledge which supposes its studying in detail. It consists of philosophical concepts characterized with the use of specific means of influence – special needles, moxibustion, massage, natural products, Qigong gymnastics.

The concepts of the theoretical system of Chinese traditional medicine define it as a unique system for prophylactic and treatment. However, there are some components in it, which are contradictory because its theoretical concepts reflect the specifics of ancient Chinese philosophy which viewed nature and humans as associated ideas and empirical reasoning. It has been accepted until recently that Chinese traditional medicine has an empirical nature. The newest research in this area shows its efficacy. Under the influence of naive materialistic and atheistic views taken from the experience in treatment, some statements were summarized and presented in the medical treatise “Huangdi neijing” – “The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Medicine – Essential Questions”. It says that the spirit is the beginning of life which sets the Zang Fu organs in motion. It also says that psychic abilities are located in Zang organs: the spirit is in Zang heart, the soul is in Zang lung, the mind is in Zang liver, the will is in Zang kidney. In accordance with these statements,

in the further development of this philosophy, we observe an analogical materialistic approach to spiritual phenomena which can be found in the written manuscripts from ancient times – from the 3<sup>rd</sup> century BC until the 17<sup>th</sup> century AD (Yi et al. 2006: 219–236).

Traditional Chinese medicine believes that a disease occurs mainly due to disbalance in the condition of the human body. That is why a healer should not pay attention only to different local problems but should treat the body as a whole. So far, no side effects from the treatment with Chinese traditional methods have been recorded. Their application dates back to centuries ago and this is the main reason for their preservation until present times. In complicated cases this medicine often leads to good results which are preconditioned by specific diagnostics (according to the heart rate, tongue, the pitch of the voice, and the face color) and treatment, subjected to the whole condition of the organism, the influence of the environment, and nutrition. This success provokes certain interest in the world medical practice. There is a pronounced rise in the profound scientific research of methodology and phenomena of Chinese traditional medicine based on the advance in the development of modern scientific thought (Dong 2013: 153–148).

The ancient medical records describe different systems of treatment which include:

– Acupuncture and moxibustion. They can treat both chronic and acute diseases. Acupuncture leads to decreasing the high body temperature, improvement in the recovery of the organism, and increase of immunity. Modern surveys are aimed at building scientifically based physiological grounds for revealing the mechanisms of influence of these two methods. Acupuncture can stimulate the active points in the body through pricking with metal needles. Moxibustion uses warmth received from burning moxa cigars or moxa cones on active points or parts of channels.

Over the years, with the development of science and the implementation of the new technologies in medicine, a lot of research and scientific discoveries have been made in the field of acupuncture and moxibustion. The lack of understanding acupuncture and moxibustion on behalf of the representatives of modern scientific medicine is usually explained with the lack of statistical proof. The absence of good clinical check-up, the existence of placebo effect, and the lack of statistically reliable results for the successful cases, as well as information about the consequences of the treatment in modern China, are indeed an impediment to the accessibility of perception of this kind of treatment.

– Qigong is a special kind of gymnastics for generating the energy Qi in the body and making it harmonious. The system Qigong is a method for extending life's duration, prevention, and treatment. Qigong is a system for regulating the psycho-physical energy in the human body. Its influence is in two directions: psychic – the ability for immediate relaxation, “clearing” of the mind and concentration (There are different systems for psycho-physical training based on psycho training and psychic self-regulation); physical – a selection of exercises aiming at quick “setting into motion” of the Qi energy in compliance with breathing exercises. A massage, acupuncture and moxibustion are combined. According to Qigong, the cosmic order in the Universe is determined by our everyday

lives. That is why it is important that people stick to this order. The different systems of Qigong reflect the peculiar characteristics of different schools for martial arts and treatment, which were located in the monasteries of ancient China. Nowadays, a number of scientific surveys are dedicated to revealing the mechanisms of influence of this ancient kind of gymnastics aiming at developing and training of man's psycho-physical abilities.

– Herbal treatment or treatment with natural products. It has been established that over 1000 plants, animal products and minerals are used in China. Their influence on the human organism is determined by the traditional concepts of classical theory – the flow of the energy Qi, the condition of the liquid substance Xue, and the tissue liquids in the body. The healer Li Shizhen occupies an important place among the authors of herbal treatment treatises. He lived in the 15th century and became famous with his work *Ben Cao Gang Mu* 《本草纲目》 (Compendium of Materia Medica). In it, the medicines are classified according to their properties based on the principles of Chinese traditional medicine. Each medicine or herbal mixture in Chinese traditional medicine has a certain taste (sour, bitter, sweet, spicy, or salty) which corresponds to the disease. Each institute or hospital in traditional medicine in China has their own factory for making traditional medicines. Very often, some of the medicines are particular only to a certain hospital which shows that each school in Chinese traditional medicine interprets diseases in their own way and makes corresponding prescriptions for their treatment (Goranova, 1999: 46–52).

Pharmacology and nutrition have a common base for selection and combination. Both in medicines and in nutrients, their characteristics and taste are taken into account. Food's color and aroma are also paid attention to. Soup is most important in healing nutrition because it is easily absorbed in the digestive tract. It is believed that in the technology of making healing meals, the most important element is steam cooking and prolonged stewing at low temperature. In a diet, we should always observe some general rules valid for each disease.

### **Conclusion:**

The retrospection towards ancient times reveals the richness of the Chinese medical literature collected over the years and dedicated to the methods of traditional treatment. Today, with the means of modern technical advance, scientists look for explanation of the ways of influence of the ancient healing techniques. We cannot deny the great success achieved in this field, but the real exclusive value of Chinese traditional medicine is still to be acknowledged.

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## Цигун, даоски практики и тайчи – китайският подход към здравето в условията на Covid-19

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## Qigong, Tao Practices and Tai Chi – The Chinese Approach to Health in Conditions of Covid-19

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### Abstract

The main purpose of this article is to explore the real benefits of the “Eastern approach to health”, as well as the interplay between tradition and current challenges – especially in the context of Covid-19. The research focus is directed at clarifying the real value and benefits of practicing Qi Gong, Tao, Tai Chi and martial arts. We focus and analyze the testimonies given to us by our respondents related to the impact of practicing Chi Gong and other methods on their health. For the purpose of the article, a series of in-depth interviews were conducted with people practicing various Chinese techniques and methods for maintaining health, including martial arts, as well as in-depth interviews with instructors and teachers from different schools.

**Keywords:** Qigong, Tao practices, Tai Chi, Covid-19, health, benefits

Изправен пред предизвикателството на Ковид-19, съвременният човек от западния тип общества се оказва безпомощен, изплашен и уязвим. В условията на пандемия все повече хора търсят начини и методи да съхранят своя живот, здраве и психическо равновесие. Опитват се също така и да помогнат на своите близки да запазят душевния си баланс, самообладание и вяра в тези трудни времена на изолация, несигурност и надвиснала заплаха. Чести са случаите, в които хората не получават ефективна помощ от страна на съвременната медицина за техни хронични или новопоявили се оплаквания, или получават множество усложнения от страничните ефекти на препаратите, които са им предписани. Тази липса на помощ и ефективно решение на здравословните и психически проблеми, особено в ситуацията на Ковид-19, насочва част от хората към търсене на алтернативни методи. Наблюдава се един постоянно нарастващ интерес към „китайския подход към здравето“. На него се осланят както

зdrави хора за профилактика и поддържане на жизнения си тонус, така и хора, страдащи от определени заболявания – като рехабилитация след лечение или в състояния, в които традиционната медицина не може да помогне.

В този контекст, настоящата статия поставя въпроса за мястото на това културно и духовно наследство в съвременния свят – особено в предизвикателните условия на тотален психически, икономически и социален срив поради пандемията от Ковид-19. В търсене на доказателства за ефективността на методите на различни китайски здравословни практики, формулирахме и основната цел на настоящата статия: да изследваме реалната полза от Чи Гун, Даоски практики и Тай Чи, през погледа на самите практикуващи.

За целта на статията бяха проведени серия дълбочинни интервюта с хора, практикуващи различни китайски техники и методи за поддържане на здравето, включително и бойни изкуства, както и дълбочинни интервюта с инструктори и преподаватели от различни школи. Интервютата са проведени на два етапа – в периода април–май 2020 г. (при първия локдаун) и март–април 2021 г. (втория локдаун). Интервюирани са общо 40 лица. В настоящата статия са представени обобщените изводи от проведените интервюта, като имената на респондентите са отбелязани с инициали от съображения за конфиденциалност.

Универсалната ценност, която стои в основата на целия ни живот, безспорно е здравето. Пандемията от Ковид-19 категорично пренареди приоритетите ни в живота и показа с кристална яснота кое е най-важно за всички хора – животът и здравето на самите нас, на близките ни и на цялото общество.

Здравето като ценност, цел и предпоставка за всичко останало в живота ни, не е просто липса на болести. То няма само физически измерения – схващане, което дори съвременната медицина на Запад признава. Разбирането за хармонично и балансирано единство на цялото ни същество на всички нива – **физическо, ментално/умствено, емоционално и енергийно** – стои в основата на източното, китайско разбиране за доброто здраве, балансирания живот и дълголетието. Хармонизирането на тези четири нива ни дава неизмеримо друго, по-високо качество на живот. Тя се определя до голяма степен от адекватните грижи, които полагаме за себе си. Именно в избора на подход към собственото здраве се крие ключът към успешното преодоляване на съвременните предизвикателства и заплахи, свързани с пандемията от Ковид-19. Какво казват в тази връзка хората, които интервюирахме:

*„Имам хронично заболяване, свързано с дишането. Откакто настъпи тая пандемия, притесненията ми се увеличиха значително – нали Ковида засяга именно дихателната система. Забелязах, че дишането ми рязко се влоши – дишам още по-трудно, задъхвам се, вие ми се свят, а тестовете показаха, че нямам Ковид. Вече не спя почти никак и изобщо чувствам се много зле откакто се заговори за Ковид-19. Помолих лекуващия си лекар да ми предпише нещо за състоянието ми, но тя казва, че вече ми дава каквото трябва и няма какво друго да ми даде.“ (Р.К., от София)*

Друга респондентка споделя: „Аз по принцип страдам от панически пристъпи. Просто се притеснявам от определени неща – и то до степен на истинско, физическо страдание. Ръцете ми се потят, сърцето ми ще изскочи през гърлото, вцепенявам се, вдигам кръвно... Откакто излезе този Ковид и направо преперквам. Страх ме е да стоя сама, за да не ми стане нещо и изпитвам неописуем ужас, че ще се задуша, а няма кой да ми помогне, защото живея сама. Личната ми лекарка ми се смее. Вика ми: Е., нищо няма да ти стане, здрава си! Е, здрава, ама се поболявам от ужас и притеснение поради Ковида!“ (Е.Д., от Бургас)

Тези цитати са избрани неслучайно – те представят в обобщен вид есенцията от мненията и случаите на запитаните лица. Тези експлицитни мнения недвусмислено показват, че подходът на традиционната медицина често се изчерпва със съсредоточаването върху болния орган, игнорирайки комплексната природа не само на заболяването, но и на самия човек, който бива разглеждан просто като сбор от органи. Безсилието и прекалено специализирания, фрагментиран подход на съвременната медицина не успява да помогне на конкретните респонденти, като изказвания в този дух получихме и от други запитани лица, които имаха различни оплаквания и заболявания – психически, физически, хронични или травматични, отдавна или отскоро появили се.

Изводът, който можем да направим, е, че хората изпитват повишена тревожност поради постоянния новинарски поток от медиите и обострят състоянието и оплакванията си, като в същото време не намират решение на проблема си, тъй като той не е чисто физиологичен. В случаите, в които лекуващия лекар все пак приема някакви мерки, те са свързани с предписването на силни успокоителни медикаменти, които не решават проблема на пациента, но пък добавят нови, странични и неблагоприятни ефекти към състоянието му:

„Да, моята лекарка ми написа рецепта, защото не мога да спя и станах твърде напрегната. Сега съм малко по-добре, защото поне спя, обаче през деня съм замаяна и като в сън от хапчетата. Като дрогирана съм постоянно. А като ги спра пък, отново почват страховете, че даже и по-силни. А то с тия новини, които по цял ден слушам (на работа имаме радио и то свири цял ден), как да се успокоя?!“ (Е.Д., от Бургас)

Поставени в подобна ситуация, много хора започват да търсят алтернативни начини, за да се избавят от дискомфорта, болката или мъчителните преживявания. Виждайки възможност за подобряване на състоянието си или това на свои близки, те започват да проявяват интерес към източни практики – Йога, Чи Гун, Тай Чи, даоски практики, бойни изкуства<sup>1</sup>... Търсенето им не винаги е свързано с конкретно оплакване или стремеж да се избавят от болката. Понякога мотивът е просто желание да балансират

<sup>1</sup> Това са обикновено най-разпространените школи в България вътрешни стилове бойни изкуства, в които се набляга на вътрешната, енергийна работа – Ба Гуа Джан, Си Ни Цюан и др. (Александров 1994). Трябва да се отбележи специално, че те имат съвсем подчертани здравословни ползи за хората, които ги упражняват редовно.

психиката и живота си; да постигнат спокойствие, вътрешен мир и сила в тези времена на пандемия и всеобща заплаха, които напрягат психиката достатъчно:

*„Аз по принцип съм здрав. Нямам оплаквания, обаче бих искал да поработя над себе си, да съм по-спокоен, по-балансиран. Казаха ми, че тези практики (даоските практики и Тай Чи) ще ми се отразят много добре. Реших да пробвам, защото четох доста и вярвам, че наистина е така, но само с четене не става. Затова почнах да се занимавам.“* (К.П., от София)

В други случаи респондентите са вече запознати с някои от китайските здравословни практики и ги упражняват от години:

*„Да, занимавам се с Ушу и Тай Чи от години. Чувствам се здрав, зареден и силен. От години не съм боледувал и от грип, така че се надявам Ковида да ме пропусне (смее се). Опитвам се да успокоявам и родителите ми, защото те са много притеснени – гледат постоянно телевизия и според мен, поглъщайки всичко, което се излива оттам, лесно се поддават на страха.“* (П.С., от Русе)

А за хората с конкретни оплаквания тези методи се явяват „спасителна сламка“ за изход от страданието. Ето някои от най-емблематичните изказвания:

*„Имам проблеми със сърцето. То не е само това при мен, от доста неща се оплаквам, де. Сега, като излезе и Ковида, и много се страхувам, защото състоянието ми е доста крехко, преживяла съм и няколко сърдечни операции. Пробвам всякакви методи, защото искам да използвам всяко нещо, което би могло да ми помогне. А и от тези неща (китайските практики) вярвам, че има полза, но трябва да се полагат доста усилия. Пробвала съм какво ли не – Боуен терапия, Аюрведа, йога... Сега правя някои елементи от един Чи Гун комплекс и мога да кажа само, че се чувствам супер, а и няма странични ефекти – за разлика от хапчетата, които пиех. Сега вече сърцето ми почти не прескача, защото се научих да дишам правилно, по-спокойна съм, по-уверена. А и от едно специално упражнение, хемороидите ми почти изчезнаха.“* (И.Ч., от София)

Изоляцията по време на двата локдауна оказва също силно негативно влияние върху психиката и здравословното състояние на хората. Възможността да практикуват онлайн, от всяка локация, благодарение на съвременните технологии, е възможност, която някои от респондентите ни оценяват високо:

*„Още преди много години се бях заинтересувала от практиките Вътрешната усмивка, 6-те лечебни звука, Микрокосмическата орбита, Нефритеното яйце. Опитах се по материалите от книги и от Интернет да направя някаква практика, но разбира се, не успях. Понеже съм от едно малко градче, нямам възможност да посещавам занимания в София. Аз съм възхитена и от техниките, и от тези прекрасни учители. Усецала съм, че биха ми харесали тези техники, но се оказа, че е по-хубаво, отколкото съм си мислела. Може да се каже, че съм благодарна и на коронавируса, защото точно изоляцията заради него ми позволи да срещна възможността да правя наистина тези практики. Благодаря от сърце на целия екип!“* (М.С., от Долни Дъбник)

Друга респондентка казва:

*„Изключително съм благодарна за практиките, които организирахте чрез фейса и zoom<sup>2</sup>. Сбъднахте една моя мечта да започна да се занимавам с Тай Чи или Ци Гун, за което до този момент няха пространство в „реалния живот“, както и не бях сигурна за школа, място и учители, които да опитам. Сега имам тази възможност, благодарение на вас! Чувствам се, че светя!“ (М.П., от София)*

Много показателно е и едно друго изказване, от наша респондентка:

*„Искам да изкажа огромна Благодарност на целия екип<sup>3</sup> относно практиките, които провеждате по време на Карантината! В момента работя в Република Турция като здравен служител! В тази изключително тежка глобална пандемия, искам да Ви уверя, че благодарение на Вашите лекции съм на крак и пазя самообладание! Бъдете ми живи и здрави, мили душички! Особено съм благодарна на вашите инструктори – за проявената воля и решителност в тази трудна ситуация!“ (К.Й., от София)*

В хода на нашите интервюта попитахме и другата страна в процеса – инструкторите от различни школи – какви са техните впечатления за ефектите на практиките, които преподават върху хората, както и какво е мнението им за оздравителния потенциал на практиките – особено в контекста на Ковид-19. Ето какво казаха някои от запитаните:

*„Заниманията с Даоски практики, Чи Гун и Тай Чи дават възможност на човек, да се завърне в състояние на първоначална цялостност и енергийна пълнота, да усети хармонията на света и да придобие изначална сила. На това ниво човек може да овладее изкуството да се самолекува, истински да обича себе си и близките си. Без значение от вероизповедание и образование, човек, който поема по пътя на Дао, започва път на самоусъвършенстване и може да стане пълноправен собственик на съдбата си, да разкрие вътрешните си възможности.“ (А.Н., инструктор Даоски практики, Чи Гун)*

*„Занимавам се с Даоски практики и Чи Гун повече от 20 години. Смело мога да кажа, че въздействието на тези практики върху хората понякога е истинско чудо! Виждала съм един човек (мъж на около средна възраст) да преодолява последици от цироза и уголемяване на черния дроб. След около 2 години занимания се беше възстановил почти изцяло и сега се чувства добре. Една дама имаше оплаквания в коляното и кръста – трябваша ѝ около половин година редовни занимания, за да намалее болката значително, а с продължаването на практиката и да отшумят завинаги. Идвали са жени с оплаквания – кисти, нередовен цикъл, предоперационни състояния, свързани с образувания на гърдата, безплодие... На много от тях Даоските практики и енергийните занимания с Чи Гун оказаха благотворно въздействие. Много такива случаи има.“ (М.Т., инструктор Даоски практики)*

<sup>2</sup> Става въпрос за безплатните онлайн практики, които организира школата „Универсално лечебно Дао“ още през 2020 г., по време на първия локдаун.

<sup>3</sup> Отново става дума за практиките на „Универсално лечебно Дао“ – България.

И още една инструкторка, която споделя своя опит по отношение на практиките:  
*„Чи Гун или Тай Чи не са панацея. Не мога да кажа, че задължително ще излекуват всеки от всяко страдание. Но от личен опит, както и от дългогодишни наблюдения на учениците ми, мога да кажа, че тези методи и техники наистина действат! Аз преодолях дългогодишни оплаквания на нервно-вегетативна основа. В последствие станах инструктор, защото искам да споделям тези прекрасни методи за съхранение на здравето с хората. Сега нямам кризи от години и това се случи не изведнъж, а в течение на годините практика. И точно тук е ключът, за да действат тези практики – трябва постоянна и редовна работа, тренировки.“* (Р.Б., инструктор Даоски практики, Чи Гун, Тай Чи)

И така, категорично можем да заявим, че Чи Гун, Даоските практики, Тай Чи, както и дори някои традиционни китайски бойни изкуства имат ясно изразен здравословен ефект върху практикуващите. Въпреки лечебния ефект, който имат понякога бойните изкуства, това не е тяхната основна цел, която е преди всичко самозащитата: „Основната им цел и основание за съществуване са именно самозащита и предотвратяване на насилието“ (Яворов 2009). Изискването за редовни тренировки по естествен начин пресява само мотивираните адепти (ученици), така че в действителност практиките помагат на тези, които имат най-голяма нужда от тях (и имат най-голяма мотивация). „Ако човек иска да се отърве от болест или от болка – това е достатъчна мотивация, за да продължава. А резултатите идват задължително! Виждам как хората се променят пред очите ми и как някои техни състояния, които са ги мъчили от години изчезват или значително се подобряват“ (Я.Н., инструктор Тай Чи)

След анализ на изказванията на нашите респонденти – практикуващи, инструктори и майстори-учители – може да систематизираме някои от споделените ползи за здравето. Наблюдавани са следните промени и ефекти (без да сме съвсем изчерпателни), които протичат в различна степен у повечето от тях в резултат на тренировките:

- На физическо равнище:
  - Дишането става по-равномерно, дълбоко и пълноценно
  - Подобрява се състоянието на сухожилията (гъвкавост)
  - Балансира се и се подобрява работата на всички органи
  - Подобряват се стойката и баланса/равновесието
  - Съкращава се времето за възстановяване и излекуване
  - Увеличава се плътността на костите
  - Подобряват реакциите (ловкост, бързина на рефлексите)
  - Повишава се имунитетът, устойчивостта на стрес, бактерии и вируси
  - Кръвното налягане се нормализира
  - Теглото също се нормализира, а тялото се изчиства от токсините
  - Кожата става по-еластична и сияйна
  - Подобрява се кръвообращението
  - Подмладяват и защитават сърцето, намалява опасността от сърдечен удар

- На психическо и личностно равнище:
  - Развива се концентрацията, яснотата и остротата на ума
  - Развива паметта, интелекта, самоконтролът и осъзнатостта
  - Формира се по-спокойно отношение в критични ситуации и по-ведро – в ежедневието
  - Повишава се дисциплината, волята и отговорността
  - Повишава се работоспособността и производителността
  - Практикуващият става по-отговорен към здравето и живота си
  - Адаптиране към променящата се среда
  - Успокоява нервите
  - Балансира емоциите
  - Възстановяване и развитие на естествената връзка с Природата

Разбира се, тези ефекти и ползи от тренировките се явяват различно у практикуващите. Степента на проявлението на един или няколко от горните ефекти зависи от това дали заниманията са били достатъчно редовни, задълбочени и продължителни.

Не трябва да забравяме, че буквалният превод на термина „Чи Гун“ е „енергия и време“, а съдържането е: „Умение да се увеличава и прилага енергията, което се постига с течение на времето чрез трениране и постоянство“ (Циенцюн 2019). Също както и терминът „Кунг Фу“ в буквален превод означава: „Време, изразходвано за постигане на майсторство“ (Йорданая 2013). Един от основните постулати на китайският подход към здравето гласи, че за постигане на майсторство и напредък са необходими лични усилия и упорство в практиката, прилагани в продължение на години. В случая, най-важен е самият процес на ежедневната практика, както и специфичната нагласа на ума, която се формира вследствие на самите тренировки.

Всеки, който е практикувал някоя от тези практики – Чи Гун, Даоските практики, Тай Чи, както и някои традиционни китайски бойни изкуства – се е приобщил в известна степен към древните традиции. Независимо дали тренировките са станали неразделна част от живота, духа и ежедневието на трениращия или с времето той ги е преустановил, натрупаните качества на тялото и психиката остават за цял живот. Разбира се, степента, в която са постигнати позитивни здравословни ефекти, зависи от упоритостта, последователността и желанието на адепта да учи и тренира. Личното преживяване на учението и практиката е уникален начин на възприемане на знания, а и на реалността въобще. Както гласи и древната китайска поговорка: „Чуваш и забравяш. Гледаш и zapomняш. Правиш и разбираш“ (Уестбук 2011: 39).

Китайските бойни изкуства са тясно свързани със самоусъвършенстването на личността, тялото и духа на практикуващия. Редовната практика подобрява не само физическото, умственото и емоционалното състояние, но и представлява начин и изпитано средство за поддържане на здравето, добрата психическа кондиция и защитата от вируси (вкл. от Ковид-19).

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# Healthy China 2030: A Plan Towards Growth, Development and Innovation in Health Sector and Global Governance

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## Abstract

Health is a necessary condition for humankind development. People's Republic of China (PRC) has a huge responsibility towards global health. Indeed, PRC is committed to global health aligning its strategy with the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The plan adopted by the Chinese government for the health sector is 'Healthy China 2030', a medium to long-term initiative to promote health and well-being. Thus, this paper will be based on a theoretical framework, resulting from a literature review on these three main fields: (i) concept of innovation, (ii) Chinese capabilities of innovation and development; and (iii) 'Healthy China 2030' initiative and Chinese health policies. It will then analyse the way the strategic goals of 'Healthy China 2030' reflect Chinese broader purposes of 'health for all' and 'sustainable development based on innovative and scientific development'.

**Keywords:** Healthy China 2030, health policies, innovation

## Introduction

Health is a necessary condition for humankind development. People's Republic of China (PRC), as the world's second-largest economy and the most populated country in the world, has a huge responsibility towards global health. And PRC is, in fact, committed to global health and, at the same time, has its strategy aligned to achieve the 2030 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The plan adopted for the health sector is 'Healthy China 2030', which is a national initiative to promote health and well-being that traces the pathways to achieve these seven strategic goals (Zhuang 2016):

- Healthy living;
- Optimizing health services;
- Improving health security;
- Building healthy environment;
- Developing healthcare industry;
- Building supportive mechanisms;
- Strengthening organization and implementation;

Each of these goals embraces the concepts of innovation for growth and development. In the following sections this paper will focus on theoretical definitions of the concepts, as well as on how each goal is connected to them, all resulting from a literature review that was made on these three main fields: (i) concept of innovation, (ii) Chinese capabilities of innovation and development; and (iii) 'Healthy China 2030' initiative and Chinese health policies/reforms.

## 1. Conceptual framework

### Concept of innovation

The concept of innovation has been studied for decades and is marked by a variety of definitions according to the perspective of authors and their scope of studies. Thus, one can define the concept as per the following:

- “[...] innovation concerns the search for, and the discovery, experimentation, development, imitation and adoption of new products, new production processes and new organizational set-ups” (Dosi 2012: 222).
- “Innovations are new creations of economic significance of a material or intangible kind. They may be brand new but are more often new combinations of existing elements” (Edquist 2).

The Oslo Manual is the key reference for collection, formulation and implementation of innovation that defines it as: “a new or improved product or process (or combination thereof) that differs significantly from the unit’s previous products or processes and that has been made available to potential users (product) or brought into use by the unit (process)” (OECD/Eurostat 2).

As far as R&D is concerned, its aim is also to generate new knowledge, based on five main principles: (i) novelty; (ii) creativeness; (iii) uncertainty; (iv) systematic character; and (v) transferability or replication (OECD 2019).

Moving to innovation policy, as prescribed by Lundvall (2007), it is public action that leads to technical change or other types of change. It comprises elements of research and development (R&D), technology policy, infrastructures, regional policy and education policy. Thus, innovation policy goes further than only science and technology policy, from the side of supplying science as a public good. Innovation policy also comprises public action that causes impact on innovations from the demand side. So, innovations can be translated into different types of outcomes as summarized in Figure 1 below.




Fig. 1. Taxonomy of innovations (Edquist)

In the next section, we will focus on Chinese capabilities of innovation, namely on the path it has been following, and on the industrial and technological achievements.

### Chinese capabilities of innovation

When speaking about Chinese path to innovation, some questions arise instantly: How is China making the transition from a labor-intensive economy to a knowledge-based economy through innovation processes? What is driving its innovation strategy?

One of the main aspects pointed out in literature, for explaining Chinese transition into a knowledge-based economy is its exponential growth in technological area. According to Li et al. (2018), some key drivers enabled PRC to achieve such technological development. They are synthesized in Table 1 below.

**Table 1.** Five main drivers for China’s growth in technological innovation (Li et al. 2018)

1	National Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) policy and efficient implementation
2	Initiated by infrastructure and urbanization
3	Led by informationalization
4	Driven by globalization
5	Supported by Entrepreneurship

Recent guidelines have been issued by the government in order to define goals for innovation and to implement strategic plans of execution, namely: the ‘Made in China 2025’ and the Outline of the ‘National Strategy of Innovation-Driven Development’ issued in 2015 and 2016, respectively. ‘Made in China 2025’ is a plan inspired by German’s plan ‘Industry 4.0’ and focuses on promotion of Chinese manufacturing, aiming at the upgrade of manufacturing in line with the fast growth in science and technology. The year of 2025 only refers to the first phase of the strategic plan, in which upgrading parts of the economy and developing a number of world-class enterprises able to compete with international European and US companies are the main purposes (Li et al. 2018). As pointed out by Wübbecke et al. (2016: 4), “The strategy stresses terms like “indigenous innovations” and “self-sufficiency”. It intends to increase the domestic market share of Chinese suppliers for “basic core components and important basic materials” to 70 per cent by the year 2025.”

‘Made in China 2025’ formulation and implementation involves a large number of interdisciplinary working groups and is applied to several key sectors of Chinese economy, as listed below:

1. New information technology
2. High-end numerically controlled machine tools and robots
3. Aerospace equipment
4. Ocean engineering equipment and high-end vessels

5. High-end rail transportation equipment
6. Energy-saving cars and new energy cars
7. Electrical equipment
8. Farming machines
9. New materials, such as polymers.
10. Bio-medicine and high-end medical equipment.

The last topic is related to the health sector and to the areas in which Chinese government intends to invest within it, as will be shown in the Analysis section in regard to ‘Healthy China 2030’ plan of action.

As far as the Outline of the ‘National Strategy of Innovation-Driven Development’ is concerned, it is basically divided into three major steps: (i) first, PRC has to be an innovative country by 2020; (ii) PRC should be at the forefront of innovative countries by 2030; (iii) PRC should become a nation power in innovation field by 2050 to achieve its dream of national renewal and prosperous society for all.

Despite having already moved into the position of innovative countries and having improved its technological and scientific growth, translated in a better position of its overall production in global value chain, PRC still faces challenges that are summed up in Table 2, according to the perspective of Li et al. (2018):

**Table 2.** Five Major Challenges in Building a Most Innovative Nation (Li et al. 2018)

1	Encouraging world-changing basic research and original innovations
2	Attracting the best talent and resources from all over the world
3	Balancing the paradox of open innovation
4	Building a core competence-based innovation ecosystem
5	Achieving poverty reduction, sustainable development, and peace

In 2006, PRC declared indigenous innovation – that is, basic innovation from inside – as a strategic priority. This led to a change in its innovation focus, shifting from external knowledge usage to internal creation of this knowledge (Li et al. 2018).

Basically, the Outline of the ‘National Strategy of Innovation-Driven Development’ sets the tone, in diverse but solid ways, to encourage STI policy, by setting innovation as the main factor of driving development.

In the following section, we will develop an analysis based on the ‘Healthy China 2030’ program, to shed light on the ways it implements innovation guidelines towards a scientific-based knowledge and prosperous society.

## 2. Analysis of ‘Healthy China 2030’ plan

This section focuses on the ‘Healthy China 2030’ strategic plan for the health sector and analyses how it is marked by the national-level objective of a scientific, knowl-

edge-based economy. It also analyses how the combined elements relate to innovation, growth and development.

'Healthy China 2030' strategic plan was released in 2016. It traces a set of objectives to be accomplished so that Chinese society can be a prosperous society in all fields, including health and well-being, meaning that every citizen is able to access high-quality healthcare at affordable costs, has a health insurance and may be confident in safety of food and drugs in the market.

Strategic goals of the plan are (Zhuang 2016): (a) Healthy Living for all; (b) Optimizing health services; (c) Improving health security; (d) Building healthy environment; (e) Develop healthcare industry; (f) Build supportive mechanisms; (g) Strengthen organization and implementation.

#### (a) Healthy Living for all

This topic is largely related with the commitment of putting health in all policies, as it refers mainly to three core initiatives: (i) improving health literacy and promoting school health education; (ii) encouraging healthy habits in population and (iii) improving fitness services for all. The first initiative has been implemented through specific programmes (e.g. dental health, bone health and weight control) carried out on local levels reaching population households. The second initiative is related to campaigns of promotion of healthy habits, such as: tobacco and alcohol consumption control, divulgation of healthy diets to avoid specific kinds of diseases and prevention campaigns associated with drugs consumption or even sexual risky behaviors. The third one, linked to fitness for all, implies the development of a nationwide network of fitness services providers and campaigns encouraging physical exercise, combined with a healthy lifestyle to reduce need for medicines and medical invasive treatments (Zhuang 2016).

#### (b) Optimizing health services

The plan foresees a set of measures that includes: promoting universal access to public health services; delivery of high quality and efficient medical care; improving of Traditional Chinese Medicine; improving health services for priority groups. The promotion of universal access to public health was the motto of healthcare system reform initiated in 2009, aiming at an equitable distribution of health care services (Yip and Hsiao 2015). The need to improve quality of Traditional Chinese Medicine is in the sense that it will continue to be important in Chinese health sector (Tita 2019), so it has to be preserved but at the same time, updated according to innovating factors. As far as care towards priority groups is concerned, the plan foresees specific measures for improving maternal and child health, as well as for improving of care for healthy aging.

#### (c) Improving health security

This topic relates to two main domains: the health insurance coverage from one side, and the drugs sector regulation. Health insurance coverage means the set-up of a

multi-level health insurance system for basic needs, complemented by commercial and other forms of insurance, for both urban and rural areas (Hsiao et al. 2014). The regulation of drugs sector implies the establishment of profound reforms on drugs circulation and their traceability, as well as the tightening of legislation regarding the market prices for the same.

(d) Building healthy environment

This topic is based on several key actions: (i) deepening patriotic public health campaigns; (ii) strengthening the management of environmental problems affecting health; (iii) ensuring food and drug safety and; (iv) improving public safety systems (Zhuang 2016). Building a healthy environment is a goal that strongly appeals to vertical and horizontal cooperation.

(e) Developing healthcare industry

This topic is the one most directly related to innovation in terms of scientific and industrial based components of innovation. It embraces measures, such as: optimizing pluralistic structure of medical care services; developing new types of health services; promoting fitness, leisure and sports industry; and promoting development of medical industry (Zhuang 2016).

The emphasis on prevention and high-quality treatments will boost the whole health industry, changing the current paradigm, either in the players involved or in the design of delivered products and services. It involves, for example, the creation of fitness and leisure industry belts with regional characteristics, as well as the increasing development of medical innovation technology.

(f) Building supportive mechanisms

This topic is the most directly related to innovation in terms of scientific and industrial based components of innovation, as the previous one. It involves the following actions: deepening reforms in institutional arrangements; development of human resources for health care; promotion of science and technology innovation in health care; and development of digital health information services.

(g) Strengthening organization and implementation

This topic encompasses essentially mechanisms of monitoring of implementation, as well as evaluation mechanisms and the use of indicators to assess the merit of people involved in health policies and health care provision (Zhuang 2016).

In the discourse of the 19<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping made a sum up of the Chinese strategy for health:

“We will, with emphasis on prevention, carry out extensive patriotic health campaigns, promote healthy and positive lifestyles, and prevent and control major diseases. We will initiate a food safety strategy to ensure that people have peace of mind about what they are putting on their plates. We will support both traditional Chinese medicine and

Western medicine, and ensure the preservation and development of traditional Chinese medicine. We will support the development of private hospitals and health-related industries.”

From these strategic goals, several aspects stand out. We can observe that ‘Healthy China 2030’ plan is mobilizing and integrating diverse sectors of economy: public health services, environment management, medical industry, food and drug safety and big data. It signals the start of a more innovation-friendly environment (Kantel 2018).

## Outcomes and conclusions

The complexity of the theoretical concepts involved in this paper, as well as the complexity inherent to Chinese innovation capabilities and STI strategic policies tend to reduce the framework and analysis that can be developed in this kind of work. We are aware that an exhaustive revision of literature is still to be made and that an in-depth analysis can be carried out regarding the current challenges to become a top-leading country in scientific knowledge-based economy, especially in the health sector.

Nevertheless, from the analysis of the ‘Healthy China 2030’ plan and in sequence of previous literature review on concepts of growth and innovation applied to Chinese context, we can reach some interesting conclusions that might be used in future research jobs in this field.

First, government role in stimulating innovation in every sector, specifically in health, is crucial. In Chinese case, this occurs and there is a large appeal to “put health in all policies”: a large number of sectors – industry, environment, education, science – is already cooperating to deliver high quality healthcare, accessible to all citizens of PRC, and to develop healthcare industry so as to be in the ranking of high-tech industries by 2030.

Health from the cradle to the grave is at the center of current health reforms and policies. President Xi Jin Ping’s government is committed to lead China to the path of sustainable growth, stating that: “Scientific and technological innovation is not just the research in the laboratory, but rather the transformation of technological innovation into a realistic driving force for economic and social development.”

Therefore, the country is still facing some challenges in order to further develop and improve its STI policy, not only in the health sector. As a priority, it should overcome its lack of creativity, encouraging critical thinking within the education system, instead of only appealing to respect for existing knowledge (Fu et al. 2016). Then, it should also reduce and, if possible, eliminate inequality in access to innovation resources (Fu et al. 2016).

In order to overcome these challenges PRC should, amongst other aspects: optimize STI triple or even quadruple helix; better integrate science and technology with economy;

better integrate innovation into educational programmes; better integrate STI policy into Chinese renaissance in traditional culture (Li et al. 2018). Optimizing STI helix model means that, besides, universities, industries and the government, an efficient knowledge transfer system must exist.

Finally, we may conclude that the implementation of the Healthy China Initiative, through the whole set of guidelines, will lead to better national health awareness and to growth in market demand, as Li et al. (2018) defend: “Supply-side and demand-side reforms integrating individual, institutional and social factors will provide momentum to maintain and protect people’s health”.

‘Healthy China 2030’ can be considered an adaptation of ‘Made in China 2025’ applied to the health sector, with the goal of innovations in the health sector intending to make it further develop and grow, providing Chinese people with good healthcare, for a healthier and happier life, as an ultimate goal.

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## Дао – път на войната и мира

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## Tao – the Way of War and Peace

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### Abstract

Contemplating war has been an inevitable angle of every teaching and every wisdom tradition born in ancient times. It is unlikely that the essence of their expression has changed much in our current times. Maybe only the context has changed but once captured, the logic of the phenomenon remains – shaped, consciously or not, by our senses, thoughts, emotions, and vitality – and perceived, understood, accepted or not, put into practice or not, and used in the spiritual (virtual) or material (substantial) reality of our expression.

Similar to Yin and Yang, the civic and martial principle in governance can be distinguished from each other but also unified, regardless of the relationship to or from them, as well as regardless of the ability for their subjective perception or understanding. Ancient treatises are filled with openly declared postulates of truths which were the products of the experience and knowledge expressed in their wisdom. Strategic decisions of the martial (military) science and art since antiquity until today reveal their meaning and content for their correct application in the variety of everyday life dilemmas. Histories, full of examples of real people and events provide us with convincing pictures of reality.

Whether the possibly inevitable violence also holds the possibility to provoke spiritual catharsis and transformation is a question and maybe even a dream for most of humanity. The answer to this question is also an argument, possibly for or against violence, as it concerns development itself, as a basis for spiritual and/or material revolution or evolution

**Keywords:** tao, way, peace, war, ancient, essence, spirit, material, relation, martial, military, science, wisdom, reality, violence, governance, transformation

Съзерцаването на мира и войната в отношенията на присъствие на човека в този свят е неизбежен ъгъл за възприятие на всяко учение и на всяка мъдрост. Контекстът на тяхното взаимодействие сякаш непрекъснато се изменя, но въпреки това остава проследим във всяка епоха, във всяка история – социална, общностна или лична.

Затова и споделените мисли в тази връзка винаги изглеждат актуални, независимо от тяхната интерпретация. След като бъде уловен феномена, а логиката му оформена, той запазва своето присъствие в нашия свят, създаден съзнателно или не от нашите сетива, мисли, емоции и жизнена активност. Тази логика възприемана, разбрана, приета или не, намира място и практическо използване както в духовната (виртуална), тъй и в материалната (подлежаща на обсъждане) реалност на нашето изразяване. Подобно на Ин и Ян, гражданският и военен принцип в управлението могат да бъдат разграничени един от друг, но и унифицирани, независимо от връзката с тях или от тях, както и независимо от способността за тяхното субективно възприятие или разбиране.

Когато изследваме и изучаваме древните трактати, намираме редица открито декларирани постулати за истини и принципи, осъзнати като плод на опита и знанието, изразени в тяхната мъдрост. От своя страна, древните стратегически решения в прилагането на бойната (военна) наука и изкуство очертават значението и съдържанието на тези принципи в тяхното практическо използване за разрешаване на твърде голямото разнообразие от ежедневни дилеми. Разказвани в древността, но и днес истории са изпълнени с примери за реални хора и събития, които ни предоставят убедителни картини на реалността, в която вярваме, или не тези принципи са действащи и работят. Можем ли да допуснем дори неизбежното на пръв поглед насилие, с което ежедневно се сблъскваме, да крие в себе си възможността да провокира духовен катарзис и трансформация?! Човечеството продължава да задава този въпрос от древността до днес и той ни се струва все по-актуален. Отговорът изисква аргументи както за, така и срещу това насилие, което сякаш намира най-ярък израз във войната. В същото време този въпрос се отнася и до самото развитие на човека, като основа за неговата духовна и/или материална посока на революция или еволюция.

Войната и мирът присъстват неизбежно в историята на човешкия свят. Инстинктивно като че ли възприемаме всяко противопоставяне като покана за война и също така инстинктивно усещаме нейния разрушителен и поради това неблагоприятен характер както за другите, така и за самите нас. Този конфликт в отношенията се поставя от неизбежния въпрос за мястото на човека и на неговата „човечност“ в съществуването изобщо. Тази човечност е в състояние да определи дори връзката между Небето и Земята, която иначе си присъства по естествен начин дори и без нашето участие в нея. Какво означава да бъдеш „хуманен“ и може ли човек да запази това си качество? Доколко човекът може да бъде отделен и независим от това отношение, но и доколко може да участва в него, да го насочва съзнателно и да му влияе. Тази двойствена неопределеност дори на самия въпрос и неговото поставяне се проявява в представата за пътя Дао /начина/ на осъзнаването на човека /мъж или жена/ като „Дао жън“ – човек на Дао, в съответствие със средата, в която това негово качество се проявява. Използването на човечността и човеколюбието като морална и етична категория, зависеща от нейната социална оценка и в същото време нейната общова-

лидност дори и без присъствието на човека, е значителен обект на спорните моменти в дискусиата между последователите на ученията на Лао Дзъ и Конфуций.

„Онова, с което благородният човек се отличава от другите хора, е скрито в сърцето му. Защото в него се таят подбудите на човеколюбието и благочестието“ (Книга на философа Мъндзъ – Хинов 2020: 16).

Конкументните, но и допълващи се разбирания, представяни от Лао Дзъ и Конфуций, са част от много различия в методите и стратегическите похвати, които те защитават и се опитват да обосноват като работещи в реалността. Докато Конфуций изразява човеколюбието като активно и насочено възпитание и култивиране на човека, което би следвало да води социалния аспект на неговото поведение, то Лао Дзъ открива човеколюбието в самата естественост на човешката същност.

Дао дъ дзин, глава 38

„... Върховното човеколюбие действа без умисъл

Върховният дълг действа с умисъл.

Върховният ритуал действа, но никой не откликва,  
тогава се посяга към оръжие да се срази врага...“

(Куцарова 2019: 214)

Пътят на човека неизбежно е очертан като път на посредничеството между Небето и Земята, но може би и като такъв, който би могъл да оказва съществено влияние в тези отношения. Човекът като посредник може да бъде овластен и предопределен да управлява по волята на Небето и да прилага неговия свършен ред. От друга страна, това може да се случи само когато бъде допуснато и прието от страна на Земята, която може да ограничава това влияние. Така пътя на човека Дао е съответствието, с което той отговаря, и начинът, по който тези взаимоотношения се случват и допускат човешкото съществуване. Това съответствие следва да присъства както в условията на мир, така и в условията на война. То трябва да присъства в кръга на подкрепа и пораждаване на петте елемента във времена на мир и просперитет, където осигурява развитие, като морал, ред, възпитание и любов към хората, както е разкрито от Конфуций. Но също така трябва да присъства и по време на война и криза, конфронтация и конфликти, където пътят се проявява като управление, насочване и овладяване на силата на разрушението в кръга на петте елемента, така както сякаш предпочита да разглежда проблема Лао Дзъ.

По този начин Дао дъ дзин се разкрива като трактат, насочен към управлението в контакт с непостижимото, немислимото, непроявеното, променливото и непознаваемото неизвестно – Дао. Пътят не по време на установения ред и мирно спокойствие, а Пътят при докосването на риска от унищожението на войната. В същото време трактатът предполага необходимостта от намиране на вярно и работещо ефективно и ефикасно решение. Решение именно в условията на тази неуправляема хаотична

проява на неизвестна сила и то още на етапите, преди тя дори да е представлявала предизвикателство, опасност или заплахата от унищожение.

В особено популярните днес военни инструкции на генералите от същия исторически период можем да видим развити много от концепциите за управление по време на криза, хаос и война. В тях можем ясно и отчетливо да разпознаем принципи, които водят началото си от Дао дъ дзин и Лао Дзъ. Как да намерим пътя в криза и война – това е бил и това все още продължава да бъде съществения въпрос дори и в наше време. Така че военните пълководци говорят за същото това Дао, в което присъства опасността и риска от изчезване, прекратяване на съществуването.

„Сун дзъ каза: Войната – ...това е пътя на съществуването и гибелта“ (Конрад 1995: 23).

Днес тяхното разглеждане се радва на популярност не само в средите на изучаващите военните доктрини, стратегии и похвати, но и в средите, насочили своето внимание към управлението на бизнес в условията на конкуренция, криза или неизвестност, граничеща с хаоса. Непознатото и непознаваемото продължават да имат същите изненадващи и непредвидими характеристики, в условията на които бихме могли да разчитаме само на степента на адаптивна приспособимост, която можем да си позволим. По този начин основните принципи във воденето на война и битка, развити в древността, достигат своето широко гълкувание и доразвитие, наблюдавайки подобно на Лао Дзъ същите принципи в съвсем друг и на пръв поглед необичаен контекст.

В древно, но доста по-ново време можем да проследим приложението на същите тези основни принципи в конкретни тактически прийоми и похвати в други текстове за войната – 36 стратегеме, които са доста по-детайлизирани и подкрепени с примери от по-късни епохи. Както би могло да се очаква, въпреки конкретиката, изкуството и уменията за ползване на формулите в тези стратегеме не се съдържат в самите стратегеме. Те продължават да бъдат качество и свойство на откриването на пътя в тяхното прилагане в откриване на умения и изкусен начин /Дао/ за тяхната реализация. В тях също прозира присъствието на качеството на човека, на неговия път като еманация на естественото съотношение на всички явления между Небето и Земята. Човекът в неговия цялостен човешки потенциал и реализация на способности, възможности и умения в условията на тяхната градивна или разрушителна взаимосвързаност и взаимозависимост на мир или война.

„Изложени с думи, общите принципи стават ясно от само себе си. А [умелата] преценка е онова, което е недостъпно за словата на теорията.“ (Хинов 2013: 30).

Проследено по този начин, за целите на изследването можем да ползваме това разглеждане за класификация като направим следната подредба:

А. Философски концепции, понятия, принципи и тяхното разбиране в опозиция, представени от Лао Дзъ и Дао дъ дзин;

Б. Стратегически способности за прилагане на тези концепции и принципи във воденето на война, представени от Сун Дзъ и древните пълководци;

В. Тактически подходи за водене на битка в пряка опозиция и конфликт – 36 стратегемеи.

Тъй като достигаем до конкретното приложение и упражняването му в практиката, можем да кажем, че практикуването на т.нар. днес „бойни изкуства“ предоставя възможност за непосредствено вникване в разбирането и практическо упражняване на изложените военни постановки. Комплексността на реалната действителност, в която живеем в обективния свят, е съпоставима с комплексните характеристики в организацията и съществуването на нашия субективен вътрешен свят. Мирът или войната присъстват и в двата свята по сходен, ако не и еднакъв, но във всички случаи съпоставим начин. Тези светове се разделени единствено от граничното филтриране при нашето определяне в трансформацията на енергията, преминаваща през нас като:

- Сетивно-сензорно разграничаване и възприемане
- Мисловно-интелектуално изследване и свързване
- Емоционално-чувствено усвояване, приемане и допустимост
- Жизнено-активно усвояване и практическото прилагане
- Веществено-материално присъствие и реализация

Примери за конкретно приложение на даоистката философия често се наблюдават при изучаването и практикуването на традиционни бойни изкуства и тяхната философия, в препратките към Лао Дзъ и Дао дъ дзин, в трактатите на древните военни стратегии, както и в тълкуванията и примерите на 36-те стратегемеи. Макар че в ежедневието на практиката в бойните изкуства често се цитират тези принципи, ползването им често се наблюдава във вид на общоприети, „народни“ поговорки, максими и сентенции, правила и мъдрости, предавани устно като традиция от поколение на поколение, от учител на ученик. Своеобразно откритие при нашите изследвания се оказва факта, че повечето от тези сентенции стават популярни в западното общество едва при тяхното преразказване и тълкуване от станалия известен като американски актьор с китайски произход Брус Лий при интерпретацията им в неговите филми и непубликувани бележки, издадени след трагичната му смърт през 1973 г. Обикновено, когато напишете цитат от Дао дъ дзин в търсачката на Google, тя намира мислите и коментарите на Брус Лий. Цитиран от неговата дъщеря, той споделя:

„Искам да вдъхна духа на философията в бойните изкуства, затова настоявах да уча философия“ (Лий 2021: 101).

Въпреки или може би точно заради това, и до днес широката общност трудно възприема възможността за наличие на философия, дълбоко разбиране и осъзнаване в нанасянето на един прост удар или в повторението на множество странни на вид или видимо неизползваеми движения. Предаването на учението по този непосредствен и практически начин, който е характерен за подхода на Чан/Дзен будизма, е трудно да бъде възприето както от любителите на умозрителната философия, така и от привържениците на практическата полза и сработване в живота. Допълнително

усложнение в този смисъл е и невъзможността да бъде отделена философията и разбирането за света от религиозното му възприемане и стремежа към духовно отразяване на реалността.

Има мирни времена, когато човек може да покаже „човечност“ и да следва Дао, както това е разказано и виждано от Конфуций и неговите последователи. Това е Дао на реда с неговата подреденост като структура, възприятие, морал, правила и социални ритуали. Има и времена на война, когато човек е добре да следва Дао, както е разказано от Лао Дзъ. Дао, което се проявява в докосването с непознатото и непознаването, за да може да бъде овладяна разрушителната енергия на съществуването в неговата проявена или все още непроявена сила, форма и качество. Както може да обърнем внимание, промените в действителността водят и до промяна на формите. Това може да се види дори и в най-повърхностния преглед на И дзин – китайската „Книга на промените“. Промените на формите се реализира при преливането на енергията между тях. Това става в тяхното взаимодействие при съотношението на петте елемента в двата им начина на подреждане – като пораждаване и като разрушение. Но и в двата случая естественият начин да останете адекватни в този процес е да трансформирате качеството на енергията и силата при нейната насоченост. Това умение винаги е персонална и лична за всеки способност, както и подготвеност за ползване на възможностите за реализация на тази способност. Способността и уменията за нейното ползване са характерни за всеки човек – негово собствено същностно качество.

Пътят на придобиване на умения в бойните изкуства се свежда до усъвършенстване на личните способности за трансформация на енергия в качеството ѝ на:

- Ли – груба, разделна и локална, мускулна сила;
- Дзин – гъвкава сила на огъване и усукване в сухожилията;
- Ци – състоянието на сложно и едновременно взаимодействие навсякъде и във всичко, проявяващо се в целостта на костите;
- Шън – съзнателно разтваряне на енергията в състояние на адаптивно съответствие и неинтерпретираща адекватност – силата в костния мозък.

Това са и препоръките на даоския подход към света, независимо от неговата интерпретация на микро- или макро-квантово/космическо ниво, както разбира се и в по-непосредственото му присъствие в човешката реалност и ежедневие. Тези препоръки са като начин – път, как да се промени и трансформира енергията, а също и практически указания как да откриеш и култивираш уменията си в опита за съхраняване на естественото и природно съответствие с промените в енергията на каквото и да било.

„Една от целите на даоистката вътрешна алхимия и на даоистката медитация е обръщането на посоката на движение на петте сили“ (Бизио 2019: 292).

Животът и жизнеността на човека присъства както в подреждането на мира, така и в почти неуправляемия хаос на войната.

- При управлението на мира се налага управлението на гражданския живот от позицията на морала, закона, достойнството и честта /името/ на благородния /съвършения/ човек. Вниманието се фокусира върху ясно изразената структура и подреждане в обществото. Динамиката на живота естествено проследява градивния кръг на петте елемента като съотношения на всичко проявено – Ян – или също така свойствената им, но единна непроявена част от тях – Ин.
- Във войната водеща е заблудата, измамното представяне и манипулиране на човека в условия, които разрушават сигурността и спокойствието на неговия свят – физически, жизнен, емоционален, ментален и сетивен. Структурата на всичко проявено е крайно несигурна, а редът изглежда като напразна илюзия. Динамиката е различна, а промяната на елементите следва реда на тяхното разрушаване, отдръпване в страх.

В мира пораждането процъфтява, при войната разрушението е на всяка крачка.

В същото време, на което и да е място силата на конфронтацията и унищожението ни открива на всяко ниво – лично, семейство, корпоративно, социално... В овладяването и способността да трансформираме тази сила се крие нашият начин да подобрим собственото си умение за нейното превръщане в нещо полезно и градивно. Може би най-значимият извод се крие в това, че ако човекът не е различен, светът винаги е един и същ – във или извън неговите форми. Светът винаги отразява себе си, но човекът всъщност не го прави. Това го прави неадекватен и несъответен на естествената реалност. Той е неотговарящ на истинското Дао поради самото му присъствие, интерпретация и действие като човек. Разбира се, човекът може и почти е сигурно, че ще се опита да се справи, без да действа, но това изглежда не е толкова лесно. В процеса на трансформация на света, този човек се нуждае от трансформация на самия себе си.

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# The Bestiary's Code of Chinese Culture Through the Images of the Dragon, Tiger and Turtle

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## Abstract

In this article, several elements of the bestiary's code are analyzed: dragon, tiger, and turtle. The Dragon – one of the main symbols of China, is reflected in Chinese architecture and literature. Whereas the Tiger had the glory of a devourer of demons. The Turtle also had its origins in Chinese mythology, with a feature of legendary longevity.

**Keywords:** Bestiary's Code, Chinese culture, cultural code, animals.

The culture of each country is a reflection of the entire path of development of its people, and it possesses cultural codes characteristic only of it, under the influence of which the self-consciousness of each individual member of society is formed, as well as the national consciousness as a whole. Since modern humanitarian science shows a fairly wide interest in the study of the "picture of the world", the most in-demand knowledge now is to reflect the image of the world, the national mentality through language and linguistic means, which open up the opportunity for researchers to turn to the study of the "bestiary's code" of culture.

What does the phrase "bestiary's code" mean? Why is the bestiary's code so connected with our world culture, and at the same time we do not know about its existence? Bestiary is a medieval preachy book and a collection of illustrated articles describing and depicting animals mainly in an allegorical view: certain qualities and "character traits" are associated with each beast.

The Dragon is a generally recognized symbol of China. The first mention of it in China dates from about 2696–2598 BC. As the Chinese people say, the Dragon has deer horns, camel head, rabbit eyes, and bull ears, snake neck, carp scales, eagle claws and tiger paws. Dragon in Chinese culture means wisdom, life, light. In ancient times, this creature was the keeper of jewelry, later it was considered the patron saint of fertility [2]. The appearance of an animal is a joyous omen. Great and brilliant people are born on this day. There is a legend about Confucius: when he was born, two winged mythical beasts descended into his house – the harbingers of a joyful event. There is a popular belief that the creature is the personification of the masculine principle, strength, power. In addition, a long time ago, people believed about its connection with young girls. If a woman saw an entity in a

dream or in the sky above the house, then an outstanding sovereign, an emperor, would be born or appear in her family. All peoples speculated about how the various forms of relief were formed: rivers, mountains, lakes. Even the Chinese explained the appearance of rivers by the activity of dragons. Thus, the Chinese poet Qu Yuan wrote in his poem that the Dragon Ying Long traced the Yellow River, Yang Ze and other large rivers of China with his tail. The emperors of all Chinese dynasties considered themselves the direct descendants of dragons, since they believed that Lung was the progenitor of all beasts of birds. People believe in miraculous power, believe that a magical essence penetrates into any crevices, sinks to the depths of the seabed, and ascends to the very heavens [3]. This is why the expression “descendants of the dragon” arose.

The Tiger in mythological representations often acts as the king of animals and the owner of the forest. In China, the Tiger was revered not only as the king of beasts, but also as a thunderstorm of demons, in particular bringing diseases [4]. Special rituals were associated with the idea of the immense life force of the Tiger. The positive significance of tigers was determined by the fact that they drove out and devoured wild pigs that devastated the fields. The life force and energy of the Tiger made him a Yang (masculine) beast, while the white albino tiger was associated with Yin (feminine). When he has Yang symbolism, then, in accordance with Chinese symbolism, it takes the place of a lion in the West and personifies the masculine principle, the bodily strength that it needs as a protector. When the Tiger is depicted fighting the Yang symbol, the celestial dragon, he becomes the earthly personification of Yin. So, this strong living creature, depending on factors, is personified by courage, the power of a warrior and fury, and on the other hand, the Tiger is often depicted together with the Heavenly Dragon – the personification of female activity. Therefore, the Tiger is a symbol of the union of two forces – mental and material [1].

In Chinese art and mythology, the Tiger theme is one of the key ones. Talismans were made of various materials and used as a symbol of good luck [2]. Above the front door, people placed an image of the Tiger so that it would allow them to live in peace. Pictures depicting this animal are also popular in China. The white Tiger will give you protection and patronage, save you from robbery, troubles and collapse. However, the Tiger’s rage can also spill over into the inhabitants of the house, so the Dragon must control the Tiger [4]. In general, it is believed that the Tiger lives only where the Dragon is. That is, if you do not see the signs of the Dragon, then you will not see the White Tiger in this area either.

Since ancient times, Chinese culture has paid great attention to the Turtle – from the practice of divination on the shell to medical potions that were prepared from turtles. For the Chinese, the Turtle represents the Universe [1]. Its dome-shaped shell represents the vault of heaven, its belly represents the earth floating on water, and its famous longevity is equivalent to eternity. In ancient China, the Turtle and the serpent entwining it were considered spiritual beings, symbolizing longevity. The Turtle is called the Black Warrior; it embodies the vital principles of all things, namely: measured, consistent and calm prog-

ress along the path of life, the inviolability of human faith and knowledge, the same as the strength of the turtle shell and its healing properties. In Taoism, the Turtle symbolizes the Great Triad or the Universe in its entirety, with the dome of Heaven (domed upper carapace), with the Earth and a human mediator (tortoise body), and waters (lower carapace) [3]. The upper part of the carapace carries a positive charge (Yang), and on its lower carapace there are lines related to the ground, and this side is negative (Yin). Therefore, in Chinese philosophy, the turtle is a harmonious union of Yin and Yang energies as well.

In Feng Shui, Tiger, Dragon and Turtle represent the foundation of a happy and successful life. It was believed that the Tiger protects the western part of the house, the Turtle – the northern and the Dragon – the eastern one [2]. The image of the Chinese dragon is one of the most versatile and popular Feng Shui talismans and amulets. The Dragon attracts almost all types of luck and protects from all misfortunes, it is successfully used to ensure material prosperity. It symbolizes strength and generosity, courage and endurance. It contains rebirth, good changes and the productive forces of nature. It is also a symbol of vigilance and safety.

In ancient Chinese mythology, the Turtle was also associated with fire, being considered its “devourer” [4]. For this reason, figures of turtles were installed on the ridge beams of the dwellings and in their own room – magical protection from fires. According to Chinese wisdom, the Turtle is a symbol of success and luck, positive resolution of all difficult actions, increased profits and, of course, safety.

The Tiger in Feng Shui is the strongest symbol that neutralizes negative influences from the outside and gives success in business and new grandiose undertakings [2]. Usually it is placed in front of the front door or by the window if there are buildings or structures there that have an adverse effect (a road, pipes, a lantern on a pole, a large lonely tree, etc.). If there is a place with destructive energy in the room, then you can also put a tiger figurine there – this will weaken the negative impact. In addition, tigers enhance the authority or head of the family. The Tiger symbolizes marriage and procreation. It is associated with fertility and passion. In order for the newly-weds to live peacefully, the bride was instructed to take with her the Tiger figurines made of dough [2].

Dragon, tiger and turtle tattoos are very common. The meaning of the Chinese dragon tattoo personifies divine light, life, wisdom, fantastic power and immense knowledge. It is an incredibly powerful symbol of pure cosmic energy. The Chinese dragon is a sign of imperial power and authority. Men use the symbolic image of a turtle on their bodies in order to enhance men’s health, as it personifies fertility [3]. Also, men apply a tattoo with a turtle to show that they are self-sufficient and balanced personalities. In China, girls make such a tattoo as a sign of their general sophistication and purity. In ancient times, it was a symbol of the feminine principle and the birth of the universe. The turtle tattoo is suitable for girls who want to have a family and children. Many people express the personality traits of an animal through a tiger tattoo. The depiction of these striped predators is popular among both sexes: a male tiger tattoo means dominance, willpower

and courage, a female tattoo – independence, luck and shrewdness.

Ancient people believed that animals are the gods who created the world. Also, one important thing should be noted – the Chinese do not clearly share myth and reality, in other words, they still believe and worship mythical creatures and sacred animals, attaching special importance to this. Modern Chinese people value their traditions and the thoughts of their ancestors very much, therefore now it would not be difficult to identify the features of the Chinese habitant's worldview through the prism of the bestiary's cultural code.

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